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1 Introduction
The method of economical unification resembles a production line with three inseparable
elements that are interconnected in two stages:
Economy → Economically unified ontology → Applications
In the first stage an economically unified ontology is explicated by applying the principle
of economy. In the second stage concepts are defined and disambiguated and problems
are resolved in terms of the ontology.
The central argument that is defended in this doctoral dissertation is that the method
is more progressive than plain conceptual analysis that proceeds in the absence of an
economically unified ontology and in the absence of the principle of economy as an
evaluation criterion of alternative ontologies. Its progressiveness results from having a
stable economically unified ontology that is the same for all derivative topics, and which
enables defining and disambiguating meanings of concepts, thereby facilitating their gen-
uine understanding and resolving problems around them, more efficiently than in plain
conceptual analysis. This argument is substantiated by applying the method in defining
and disambiguating some of the central concepts that are dealt with in contemporary
philosophy and in resolving problems around them. The scope of this thesis is on con-
cepts which are directly relevant and applicable in the domains of empirical science and
human social behaviour, i.e., the scope is not on language or linguistic philosophy, and
not on logic as such, as characterized in §3.5.
The key concepts around the method, the central topics that will be handled in terms
of it and some important sources are introduced in the following. The sources behind
the method are all authors who have formulated versions of the principle of economy
or expressed the preference for unified science, including Aristotle, Isaac Newton, Ernst
Mach and many more, as cited in §3.
theory as fusion of ontology and concepts defined in terms of it. An
ontology is a system of interrelated ontological commitments or a world-view of a human
being.1 An ontological commitment is a commitment to the existence of something, i.e.,
an ontology can be seen as a system of interrelated beliefs of a person about what exists.
According to Quine [323, p. 11], ontological commitments of a theory are those entities
1The term ‘ontology’ denotes sometimes also a branch of philosophy. Ontology derives from the
Greek logos peri ta onta. Logos stands for word, speech, reason; peri for around, about; ta onta for
the beings. Ontology can thus be translated as the study of being and as the study of the things that
exist. Aristotle used the term first philosophy in the book Metaphysics 1004a4. Metaphysics derives
from the Greek ta meta ta fysika, which means what comes after physics/nature, which in turn derives
from the cataloguing order of Aristotle’s works: “When Aristotle’s works were collected and catalogued
by Andronicus of Rhodes in the first century BC, the collection of writings dealing with substance,
causation, and other topics was placed after the book now known as the Physics” (Crane and Farkas
[95, p. vii]). I used originally the Finnish translations of Aristotle’s Metaphysics [11], Physics [12],
and Of The Heavens [13]. The English citations are from Ross [10], from Perseus Digital Library
http://www.perseus.tufts.edu, and from The Internet Classics Archive http://classics.mit.edu.
‘Ontology’ and ‘metaphysics’ are used in this thesis with exactly the same meaning when these denote a
branch of philosophy. ‘Ontology’ and ‘metaphysics’ have also been used with slightly different meanings
when these denote a branch of philosophy. In Wolff’s [415] distinction of general metaphysics and special
metaphysics, ontology denotes general metaphysics. According to Juti [192, p. 15], ontology as general
metaphysics is the heart of metaphysics that precedes the questions of special metaphysics. However,
as it is in many senses difficult to cleanly separate general and special metaphysics, this dichotomy is
not used.
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that the theory requires to exist in order for the theory to be true.2 As even a single
ontological commitment can be called a theory, it is often indifferent whether ‘ontology’
or ‘theory’ is used.3 However, theory as a fusion of ontology and concepts defined in
terms of it, is not exactly the same as ontology only. To illustrate, consider a theory of
the Solar System. Its ontology covers all that exists according to the theory, including
stellar objects such as the Sun and the planets, their orbits and the supposed interactions
between the objects which are characterized by mathematical formulas. One may define
e.g. the concept of one year in terms of the ontology of the theory of Solar System, as
the period in which the Earth orbits once around the Sun. The ontology of a theory is
thus not exactly the same as the theory, i.e., the ontology with the defined concepts.
Figure 1: Theory as fusion of ontology and concepts defined in terms of it. Perceptions
yield verified commitments. Metaphysics explains the verified commitments. Ontology
consists of verified and metaphysical (unverified and unfalsified) commitments, which
are classified in two on the right.
As depicted on the bottom left of figure 1, perceptions yield verified commitments, i.e.,
verified beliefs in the existence of something. For instance, direct perception (§8.1) has
yielded the commitments in the existence of trees, houses, people, the Moon, the Sun
and the Earth. Beliefs yielded by direct perception are understood as not involved with
interpretation in any significant sense, i.e., they are understood as not theory-laden.
When you perceive a tree in front of you and thereby believe in its existence, this is not
theory-laden, or it is theory-laden only on a very insignificant level. Likewise, perceiving
the outside temperature indirectly by perceiving a thermometer reading of 5 Celsius and
thereby believing that the temperature outside near the thermometer is about 5 Celsius
is not theory-laden, or only on an insignificant level. In the end, not much can be said to
hold with absolute certainty, but direct and indirect perceptions are accepted as certain-
enough points of departure, for otherwise it would be practically impossible to proceed.4
As perceptions yield verified commitments, ‘verified commitment’ and ‘perception’ do
2According to Bricker [58]: “The ontological commitments of a theory are, roughly, what the theory
says exists; a theory is ontologically committed to electrons, for example, if the truth of the theory
requires that there be electrons.” According to Cameron [72, p. 250] “the ontological commitments of a
theory are what must exist if it is true; the ontological commitments of a theory are what counts against
it when judging it for ontological parsimony; the ontological commitments of a theory are those things
whose existence its truth entails that have real being.” Cameron refers to parsimony which is central to
the principle of economy, and which is applied in evaluating metaphysical complexities of theories.
3The theory-ontology dichotomy vanishes e.g. in the cases of the axioms of EUO, which are unfal-
sifiable and unverifiable ontological commitments: presentism is a theory of temporal existence and a
metaphysical commitment; ontological realism is a theory of mind-independence and a metaphysical
commitment; finite divisibility is a theory of divisibility and a metaphysical commitment; causality is
as a theory of interactions and a metaphysical commitment.
4What has been taken as certain-enough can always be scrutinised in the search for a higher degree
of certainty. For instance, if a physicist says that dark energy is an ‘empirical fact,’ we are dealing with
a fully theory-laden metaphysical commitment, not with a direct or indirect observation. See §§3.3,5.4.
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not have the same meaning. However, for the sake of convenience ‘verified commitment’
is often replaced by ‘perception.’ This convention is analogous to the notion that seeing
is believing and allows saying that metaphysics explains perceptions.
While the verified commitments are not involved with interpretations, metaphysical com-
mitments especially are interpretations of the verified commitments. The function of
theories or the function of metaphysical commitments of a theory is to explain the veri-
fied commitments, i.e., to explain perceptions, to save phenomena, to answer questions
that result from perceptions, and to function as generalisations which are induced from
perceptions. The structure of the ontology of a theory thus appears as a fusion of veri-
fied commitments and metaphysical commitments, where the verified commitments are
explained by metaphysical commitments which are themselves unfalsified and unveri-
fied by perception. Metaphysical commitments have been called by many names such
as unobservables, brute facts, primitives, axioms, first principles, premisses, postulates,
hypothetical entities and unexplained explainers. Although metaphysical commitments
have especially been deduced by reasoning from perceptions and in this sense could be
seen as verified, they are best seen as unverified and unfalsified interpretations of per-
ceptions. For, different people interpret the existence of different metaphysical entities
from the same perceptions: the very same perceptions have been interpreted to indicate
mutually incompatible answers e.g. to the question of what is the center of the Universe.
Metaphysical commitments are classified5 in two: unfalsifiable&unverifiable commit-
ments; verifiable or falsifiable commitments. The unfalsifiable&unverifiable metaphysi-
cal commitments are not verifiable nor falsifiable by perception even in principle. Such
metaphysical commitments function as eventual answers to questions that perceptions
leave over; they are unexplained explainers which cannot be explained in terms of any-
thing else. The axioms of the given version of economically unified ontology (EUO) are
metaphysical commitments which are in principle unfalsifiable&unverifiable, which are
required in explaining perceptions, and which are economical with respect to their avail-
able alternatives. The verifiable-or-falsifiable metaphysical commitments are currently
unverified and unfalsified, and are either verifiable or falsifiable by direct or indirect per-
ception. For instance, before the planet Neptune and atoms were verified to exist, the
commitments to their existence were metaphysical, i.e., Neptune and atoms were hypo-
thetical entities. Once Neptune and atoms were verified to exist, the commitments to
their existence ceased to be metaphysical. Although these commitments were verifiable
all along, this was not strictly speaking known before these were actually verified. All
hypothetical entities are thus metaphysical as long as these are verified to exist.
the principle of economy. The principle of economy has also been called Ockham’s
razor and the principle of parsimony. Economy favours the theory which gives the
most accurate predictions; of two theories with equally accurate predictions, economy
favours the one which incorporates the least sum of metaphysics. In other words, of two
theories which explain the same phenomenon otherwise equally well, economy favours the
metaphysically simplest. Economy evaluates (I) empirical sufficiency and (II) simplicity
of metaphysical commitments of theories. As I is always applied first and II only after
I has been applied, economy does not favour over-simplification, whereas II guarantees
5For comparison, Michael Heidelberger (lecture on 17.6.2016, Ernst Mach Centenary Conference,
Vienna) maintained that according to Fechner [134] physics involves four kinds of metaphysics. (1)
Inference to the best explanation of phenomena: theoretical entities explaining the phenomena are not
given in experience (yet they are of an experiential form). (2) Inference to possible appearances: they
are not given in actual experience. (3) Inductive metaphysics: philosophical ‘completion’ of physical
theories. (4) Speculative metaphysics: to assume theoretical entities of no experiential form. (1) and (3)
seem to overlap heavily.
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that economy does not favour unnecessary complexity either. Perceptions or the total
sum of verified commitments is considered to be the same for all theories that are being
evaluated. Therefore, once two theories have been judged equally accurate by criterion
I, their metaphysical simplicities and other theoretical virtues are what can be evaluated
by criterion II, i.e., criterion I only is troubled by underdetermination and related issues,
which are effectively resolved by economy (§3.3). The weight of a sum of metaphysical
commitments is determined by the number of different types or kinds of metaphysical
entities and quantities of each type. The importance of counting in both the number
of kinds and the quantities of each kind is emphasised by Nolan [292], and II could
be characterized as the criterion of quantitative and qualitative parsimony. That both
are needed becomes evident e.g. when reviewing David Lewis’ arguments for his modal
realism in §4.9: one can compensate the other, and therefore both must be evaluated.
The central justification of applying economy in theory evaluation is the progress that
follows. It is shown in §3.1 that empirical sufficiency and metaphysical simplicity are
natural allies of other theoretical virtues, including unificatory power, understandability,
comprehensiveness and coherence, and there is thus a small step from plain economy
into a criterion which favours the most virtuous theory. Common sense indicates that
propagation into more and more virtuous total science is progress. Some more specific
ways in which the general application of economy would be progressive are pointed out
in §§3.3,3.5.
stage 1: selecting axioms of an economically unified ontology. At this
stage, axioms of an economically unified ontology are selected from within mutually
exclusive unverifiable&unfalsifiable metaphysical commitments by applying the principle
of economy. The given version of economically unified ontology is abbreviated as EUO.
Given two mutually exclusive provisional axioms which explain perceptions with an equal
accuracy, the metaphysically simpler is selected as an axiom of EUO. The simplicity
of a total ontology is always primary with respect to the simplicity of an individual
commitment, and therefore the evaluation of two axioms should always be the evaluation
of all metaphysics that comes along with them. Some evaluations might turn out to
be complex optimisation problems where various alternative collections of provisional
axioms and other metaphysical postulates are evaluated. However, the evaluation of
individual provisional axioms suffices for selecting the axioms of EUO, because these do
not bring along more metaphysics than themselves.
It is not claimed that EUO is in all ways final nor that it is the only correct ontology.
It is only claimed that EUO is more economically unified than its central alternatives,
with respect to functioning as a base for the concepts defined in terms of it, where
the concepts are intended to function in the contexts of natural science and human
social behaviour. This brings the focus to the inseparability of the elements of the chain:
economy→ ontology→ concepts with a specified range of application. That EUO is more
economically unified than its central alternatives means EUO as a whole contrasted to
alternative wholes that do the same jobs or explain the same scales, and each axiom
of EUO when contrasted one at a time to alternative axioms that explain the same
scale. In other words, as the concepts as the end results of applying the method are
intended to function in natural science and human social behaviour, also the ontology
must sufficiently explain phenomena that are relevant in these contexts; therefore, also
economy is applied in evaluating alternative commitments which explain phenomena
that are relevant in these contexts.
§4 should be seen as a modest attempt to explicate some extremely basic and economical
axioms and interrelate them into a unified whole, i.e., to explicate sufficient and meta-
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physically minimal axioms instead of sufficient but metaphysically excessive axioms. The
axioms of EUO are presentism, causality, finiteness, the law of non-contradiction, and
ontological realism. Presentism: it is supposed that only the present temporal stage of
the Universe (TSU) exists, as this is sufficient and simpler than to suppose that also
the past and the future exist as strongly as the present. Causality: causal influences are
supposed in the absence of better alternatives, and these together with presentism imply
that there is only one world, which is sufficient and simpler than to suppose that causally
isolated worlds and causally inefficacious objects exist. Finiteness: it is supposed that
the TSUs are finitely divisible and spatially finite as this is sufficient and simpler than
infinite divisibility and spatial infinity. The law of non-contradiction: it is supposed that
the TSUs are not contradictory as there is no need to suppose that they are. Ontological
realism: the existence of mind-independent reality is supposed in the absence of better
alternatives.
It turned out to be straightforward to formulate EUO by starting from presentism and
by building everything else around presentism. Presentism became central because an
economically unified ontology needs an unambiguous and minimal conception of time
in dealing with everything else and such a conception can be built on presentism. The
building of EUO was initially oriented by the work of David Malet Armstrong such as
[16, 18, 26]. Armstrong’s list of accepted and rejected principles in the end of [16, II]
functioned as an early orientation to looking at various axioms together, which led to
trying to fit them together. Armstrong’s naturalism —the doctrine that there is only
one world— is a theorem of presentism and naturalism, but e.g. Armstrong’s combina-
torial theory of possibility ceased to function as the central meaning of possibility in the
context of presentism, and Armstrong’s states of affairs became unnecessary as objects
—such as temporal stages of the Universe and their proper parts— could do their jobs
with less ambiguities. The Theory of Relativity contradicts presentism (§5.6). As a
priori theorising is insufficient in defending presentism against the Theory of Relativity,
an alternative theory that gives verifiably correct predictions had to be found and this
was Tuomo Suntola’s [384, 386] Dynamic Universe model (DU) that is compatible with
presentism. The incorporation of ontological realism was influenced by Ilkka Niiniluoto
[289] and Armstrong. The law of non-contradiction came directly from Aristotle (Meta-
physics, 1005b18-20). Although economy is the greatest source behind EUO, all authors
who have defended the axioms of EUO can be counted in the source literature, such as
those cited in the main text.
EUO overlaps partially with DU. The fusion of DU and EUO is called an economically
unified theory, as depicted in figure 2. The aim here is not to argue that the given version
is the only correct alternative nor that it is the final or ideal unified theory. However,
in order to defend EUO (presentism) it had to be coupled with DU, and in order to
defend the fusion of DU and EUO, it must be argued that it fares at least as well as the
available alternatives. Therefore, DU is contrasted to relativistic physics in §5, and it is
pointed out that DU is in fact a more economically unified explanation of the evaluated
scales. Likewise, it is argued in §4 that EUO is more economically unified that its main
alternatives. One can thereby evaluate the given approximation of the unified theory
against alternative approximations. The unified theory can also be seen as a fusion of
various overlapping theories, where the overlap means that the theories share some or
all ontological commitments. It is sometimes handy to talk about the unified theories of
truth and possibility, but these are merely aspects of the full unified theory, as truth and
possibility are concepts defined in terms of EUO, which is a proper part of the full unified
theory. DU is a theory, i.e., a fusion of an ontology and concepts defined in terms of
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Figure 2: The given approximation of economically unified theory: DU + EUO.
it. The context determines the exact meaning of ‘EUO.’ ‘EUO’ denotes sometimes only
ontological commitments, sometimes the fusion of the ontology and all concepts defined
in terms of it, and sometimes the fusion of the ontology and only some concepts defined
in terms of it. For instance, when it is said that the economically unified theory is the
fusion of DU and EUO, EUO is meant to include all defined concepts such as truth and
possibility. When only some concepts have already been defined in terms of the ontology,
‘EUO’ denotes the ontology with only those concepts that have already been defined.
stage 2: defining concepts in terms of euo. At this stage, concepts such as truth,
possibility, counterfactual, colour, particular, object, abstract and property are defined in
terms of EUO. By defining concepts in terms of EUO, they are also disambiguated,
which facilitates resolving problems around them. All concepts defined in terms of EUO
are derivative and not primitive, as the ontological commitments of EUO are the only
primitives. That a concept is defined in terms of EUO has the following meaning: the
ontological commitments of EUO together state what exists; the definition of concept X
states that when something exists in a certain specific way within the border conditions
of EUO, that something is denoted as X. Saying that a concept is defined in terms of
an ontology is equivalent with saying that the concept is grounded on the ontology or
mapped to the ontology. Concepts have always been defined in terms of an ontology in
natural science, mathematics and in society in general, i.e., basically all science functions
as the source literature of this stage. Here, this is done specifically in terms of EUO,
focusing on concepts and that are frequently discussed in contemporary philosophy.
Although the distinction of stages 1 and 2 is clarifying in the didactive sense when
explaining the method, in practice the building of the unified theory in §4 is a mixture of
both stages: first one axiom is postulated; then one concept is defined in terms of it; then
another axiom is postulated; then another concept is defined in terms of it or in terms
of all the previously postulated axioms, being aided by the previously defined concepts,
and so on. However, §4 is clearly different from §§6-8 in the sense that these sections
consist almost entirely of defining concepts in terms of EUO, not of postulating any
more axioms. The building of ontology and defining concepts are inseparable processes
also in another sense. Every openly explicated ontological commitment is a concept:
once you define an ontological commitment such as presentism, you have also defined a
concept as presentism is a concept. Moreover, even the principle of economy is a concept,
and it precedes all ontological concepts and applications. The methodology-ontology-
applications trichotomy is clarifying here. Methodological concepts are defined first;
they guide the selection and rejection of ontological concepts (commitments); applicatory
concepts are defined in terms of the ontological concepts. The central point is that
no concepts —except methodological— are defined nor contemplated independently of
ontology, whereas the methodological concepts are independent of specific ontological
commitments.
On one hand the definition of concept X in terms of EUO yields a theory of X: the
definition of the concept possibility in terms of EUO yields a theory of possibility, the
definition of the concept truth in terms of EUO yields a theory of truth, and so forth.
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On the other hand, and again, the fusion of DU and EUO with all defined concepts is
one single theory, but this theory is applied for many different purposes and has many
aspects, including the theories of truth and possibility. It is a matter of taste whether
expressions such as unified theory of truth and unified theory of possibility are used or
whether unified concept of truth and unified concept of possibility are used instead. All
such theories are in any case aspects of the full unified theory and all such concepts
are defined in terms of the ontology of the unified theory. Moreover, as DU and EUO
overlap, most clearly in the sense that they both accept the axioms for causality and
absolute simultaneity, concepts defined in terms of the overlapping axioms are defined
in terms of both DU and EUO.
A unified theory —of truth, possibility, colour— is formulated by starting from the defi-
nition of a central concept of the theory in terms of EUO. For instance, the formulation
of the unified theory of truth is started by defining the concept proposition in terms of
EUO. After this, the central concept is complemented by defining further concepts in
terms of EUO, being aided by the already defined concept, where all defined concepts
are mutually compatible. The concept proposition is complemented e.g. by the concepts
true proposition, correspondence, truthmaker, truthbearer, coherence and useful belief. A
unified theory is thus EUO together with some central concept that is complemented by
further concepts.
The concepts that are added on the top of the main concept may be ingredients of
competing theories, or it is shown that a unified theory as such does the jobs that a com-
peting theory does. It is impossible to build a coherent fusion of genuinely incompatible
theories, but their applicable ingredients can be incorporated in the unified theory in
terms of mutually compatible definitions. All theories that can be interpreted to be mu-
tually compatible are interpreted as such, whereas genuinely incompatible theories which
aim to do the same job are rejected. Either way, the end result is the same: applicable
ingredients are incorporated in the unified theory by mutually compatible definitions,
and thereby the unified theory alone does the jobs that several mutually incompatible
theories were separately supposed to do. For instance, the coherence theory of truth is
rejected as insufficient in the focal contexts, but its useful ingredients are incorporated in
the unified theory by deriving the coherence theorem of correspondence truths from the
unified theory. Likewise, the pragmatic theory of truth is rejected as empirically insuf-
ficient in the focal contexts, but its useful ingredients or the demand for verifiability is
shown to be implicit in the team play of the unified theory and the principle of economy.
A similar procedure is applied in constructing the unified theories of possibility and
colour. For instance, the relational theory of colour is rejected, but it is shown that the
unified theory does all that the relational theory does at least as well. As the unified
theories of truth, possibility and colour are merely aspects of the one and the same
theory, they complement one another. As truth is handled first, the unified theory of
possibility can be seen to complement it, and the colour theory can be seen to complement
their fusion. Therefore, the emphasis may seem to be on the theory of truth, but it
is equally on all concepts defined in terms of EUO, as all these are interrelated and
support one another. The path of replacing old theories by new ones that are more
economically unified and incompatible with the old theories resembles Kuhnian paradigm
shifts that are typically characterized in the context of empirical science, whereas the path
of defining a concept that was thought to be primitive in terms of primitive postulates
or deriving it as their theorem resembles reductionism. Both paths are characterized in
§3.3. These resemblances may not be complete but this is not a problem, for any path to
more economically unified total science is progressive, disregarding if the path resembles
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theory shifts, reductions or their combinations.
The unified theory of truth complements Ro¨gnvaldur Ingthorsson’s [182] project of uni-
fying other theories of truth around the correspondence theory of truth. The unified
theory or possibility is logically close to Von Wright’s [418] diachronic possibility, and
complements the work of a long line of authors who have attempted to give ontological
foundations for possibility, including David Lewis [221, pp. 84-5][223, p. 78] and David
Armstrong [18], but more directly the work of Nuel Belnap [46], Storrs McCall [255], and
Rachael Briggs and Graeme Forbes [59] who apply the causal structure of the Universe in
defining modalities, and simplifies their metaphysical foundations by replacing versions
of eternalism and the growing-block theory by presentism. The unified theory of colour
complements David Rosenthal’s [338, 339] Double-Property Theory and is congenial also
with Armstrong [20, p. 270].
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2 Analytical Table of Contents
This thesis consists of three successive parts: methodology; ontology and indispensable
applications; applications only. These are organized as follows.
§§1&3. The method of economical unification and the principle of economy are for-
mulated. Their historical roots are reviewed and they are positioned in the center of
philosophy of science.
§§4-5. The axioms of the given version of economically unified ontology (EUO) are
explicated by applying the principle of economy, and some indispensable concepts are
defined in terms of EUO. The basic structure of the Dynamic Universe model is expli-
cated and evaluated against relativistic physics. EUO and the Dynamic Universe model
are compatible and overlap, and form together with the defined concepts an economically
unified theory.
§§6-8. Further concepts are defined and disambiguated and problems around the con-
cepts are resolved in terms of EUO and the already defined concepts.
As the sections are intimately interconnected, the method in §1 must be comprehended
before investigating the ontology in §4, and the ontology and the indispensable concepts
before investigating further concepts in §§6-8. As this analytical table of contents is
extensive, the forthcoming sections do not have tables of contents. Also the glossary in
appendix C may be helpful.
§1. The method of economical unification and the key concepts around it are introduced.
The scope of this thesis is fixed on concepts which are directly relevant and applicable in
the domains of human social behaviour and natural science. The two stages of economical
unification are outlined: in the first stage an economically unified ontology is explicated
by applying the principle of economy; in the second stage concepts are defined in terms of
the economically unified ontology. The structure of theories is explained. A theory con-
sists of an ontology and concepts defined in terms of it; an ontology consists of verified
and metaphysical commitments where metaphysical commitments explain the verified
commitments; perceptions yield verified commitments, but verified commitment are typ-
ically abbreviated as perceptions. Metaphysical commitments are further classified in
unfalsifiable&unverifiable (such as the axioms of EUO) and those that are verifiable or
falsifiable. The principle of economy is introduced: economy favours the theory which
gives the most accurate predictions; of two theories with equally accurate predictions,
economy favours the one which incorporates the least sum of metaphysics. Empirical
sufficiency and metaphysical simplicity are complemented in §3.1 by other theoretical
virtues.
§3. The progress of science is characterized as propagation towards more and more eco-
nomically unified total science. Historical roots of the principle of economy are reviewed,
some models of scientific explanation and progress of science are reviewed, examples are
given of the indispensability of economy in evaluating theories, and it is pointed out that
the identification of the correct roles of economy and the goal towards unified science
that builds on an economically unified ontology in the center of philosophy of science
gives an extremely fruitful point of departure to various focal issues.
§3.1. It is pointed out that the central task of metaphysics since Aristotle has been
unification by explication of the simplest first principles that are common to all sciences,
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and that the principle of economy is needed as an evaluation criterion that prefers more
economically unified theories, thus guaranteeing the progress of science towards more
economically unified total science. Formulations of economy are given in a timely order
e.g. by Thomas Aquinas, William of Ockham, Isaac Newton, J.B.S Halldane, Eino Kaila
and Philip Kitcher. It is pointed out that an ideal economically unified theory brings to-
gether all theoretical virtues, and that metaphysical simplicity and empirical sufficiency
are natural allies of all other theoretical virtues such as unificatory power, understand-
ability, comprehensiveness, consistency, indispensability and fundamentality. There is
thus a small step from economy as a measure of empirical sufficiency and metaphysical
simplicity into a measure of virtuousness in general, and the progressive propagation
towards more economically unified total science is propagation towards generally more
virtuous total science. The principle of economy as the judge of theories is thus justified
by the progress that comes along by accepting it as the criterion.
§3.2. Ernst Mach is characterized as a unifier of science who saw relevant metaphysics in
the center of a unified world-view and also made suggestions about what the metaphys-
ical core would look like. When Mach openly rejected ‘metaphysics,’ he only rejected
metaphysics that is not needed in unifying science. The transition from Mach to logical
positivism, from positivism to the rejection of the positivist verifiability criterion and the
birth of neo-scholastic metaphysics is characterized. The positivists’ anti-metaphysical
verifiability criterion is characterized as a mis-interpretation of Mach’s rejection of un-
necessary metaphysics, and contemporary neo-scholastic metaphysics is characterized as
an over-propagated counter reaction to the verifiability criterion. The principle of natu-
ralistic closure by Ross, Ladyman and Spurrett is characterized as a version of economy,
as a reaction to neo-scholastic metaphysics and as a guideline whose purpose is to bring
philosophical metaphysics closer to empirical science.
§3.3. It is underlined that economy supports all paths to more economically unified
total science. Three paths are reviewed which all increase the relative simplicity of total
science: theory shifts, reductions and partial unifications. The shift from the Earth-
centered into the Sun-centered model is characterized, and it is pointed out that the
propagation towards a paradigm shift walks hand in hand with increasing metaphysical
complexity of the current paradigm, following Thomas Kuhn. It is shown that economy
provides a fruitful viewpoint to resolving the challenges of pessimistic induction and
underdetermination. It is suggested that the difference in a more truthlike theory and
a better theory is terminological for both have practically the same meaning: a more
economically unified theory. It is shown that the identification of the correct role of
economy enables incorporating Karl Popper’s falsifiability criterion in theory evaluation,
that economy it is a mean to prevent unconditional stagnation to paradigms, a mean to
see what is the rational degree of Paul Feyerabend’s theory proliferation. It is pointed
out that acknowledgement of the role of metaphysics in theories and their constant eval-
uations would likely make paradigm shifts smoother, which was a challenge for Imre
Lakatos. Oppenheim and Putnam’s micro-reduction and Nagel’s reductionist model are
investigated. Finally, partial unifications are investigated.
§3.4. Some arguments against simplicity evaluations are exhausted. It is underlined
that the progress of science is the primary justification of applying virtuousness as the
evaluation criterion, and that the order of evaluation is: empirical accuracy; ontological
virtues; syntactical or mathematical simplicity. The scheme of explaining in terms of
an economically unified theory (EUT) is defended. Economy as an evaluation criterion
of theories goes over and above nuances of different models of scientific explanation, in
the sense that a more economically unified theory enables a better explanation. EUT
is shown to be compatible with Carl Hempel and Paul Oppenheim’s covering-law model
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of explanation, and it is contrasted to Kitcher’s unification model. When the economi-
cally unified theory is fixed as DU+EUO, the scheme of explanation becomes congenial
with Wesley Salmon’s causal-mechanical model of explanation. It is shown that EUT
efficiently exhausts critique that has been targeted against Kitcher’s unification model.
This is critique that stems from causality-related contemplations, heterogeneity of unifi-
cation, the winner-take-all conception of explanatory unification, and the epistemology
of unification.
§3.5. It is emphasised that economical unification is more progressive than plain con-
ceptual analysis which proceeds in the absence of a unified ontology and in the absence
of the principle of economy. It is emphasised that logic is applied as a tool but not as
an end. Applying the axiomatic method in ontology is analogized with applying it in
mathematical logic. It is emphasised that the goal is not on arbitrary semantics, but
to map such semantics to EUO which functions in natural science and human social
behaviour. It is shown that economical unification provides answers to some of the cen-
tral question about the methodology of metaphysics. The central reasons why anything
like an economically unified theory has not been explicated earlier are pointed out: the
Theory of Relativity; the principle of economy is not taken seriously in contemporary
metaphysics and there seems to be negative attitudes towards building comprehensive
systems. The progressiveness of economical unification is contrasted to the regressive-
ness of the culture of uneconomical pluralism, following Mario Bunge and Jeffrey Poland:
synergy of a single unified theory with many interrelated definitions vs. discorded and
isolated micro industries with several competing theories in each industry; a functional
separation between ontology and the concepts defined in terms of it vs. mixed handling
of both; an overwhelming reduction of ontological and terminological redundancy; the
counterbalancing of specialization vs. suffering from the defects of redundancy; increase
in understandability without an abundant degree of conceptual analysis.
§3.6. A summary is given.
§4 The first stage of the method is executed by explicating the axioms of EUO by ap-
plying the principle of economy: presentism, causality, ontological realism, the law of
non-contradiction and finiteness. The axioms of EUO are unfalsifiable and unverifiable
metaphysical commitments. The aim is to show that EUO as a whole and its axioms
individually are at least as economically unified as their central alternatives, and con-
genial with the Dynamic Universe model which is the empirical foundation of EUO. A
synopsis of the basic structure of EUO and the axioms which imply the basic structure
are given first. In addition to the axioms, some concepts which are indispensable in
handling the axioms and other concepts are defined, some theorems are derived from
the axioms, and some rejections are done which show that some axioms of EUO imply
that something specific does not exist or that some result does not hold in EUO. The
subsections of this section are accordingly classified into axioms, definitions, theorems
and rejections. Suppose that axiom A is given first, axiom B after A, and axiom C after
B. Those definitions which require axiom A but no other axioms are given after A has
been postulated and before B; those definitions which require axioms A and B but no
other axioms are given after the postulation of B but before C. Likewise for theorems
and rejections: if a theorem or a rejection is implied by the fusion of axioms A and B
but not by A alone, it is given after B and before C.
§4.1. The building of EUO is started from presentism and everything else is organized
around presentism. Presentism is postulated as the most economical axiom for temporal
existence. Presentism is the thesis that only the present temporal stage of the Universe
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exists, whose all parts exist absolute simultaneity. It is notable that the only genuine
threat to presentism is the Theory of Relativity (§5.6), and the best defence of presen-
tism is its compatibility with a more economically unified theory of fundamental physics,
the Dynamic Universe model (§5). The defence of presentism is organized as follows. (i)
An argument that builds on the duration of the present is discussed in §4.3. (ii) It is
shown in §4.4 that presentism is a more economical theory of temporal existence than
its central alternatives. (iii) It is shown in §4.5 that McTaggart’s argument does not
threaten presentism. (iv) An argument from the rate of the passage of time is discussed
in §5.3.1. (v) The incompatibility of absolute simultaneity and the relativity principle
is discussed in §5.6. (vi) The alleged problems concerning past and future truthmakers
and cross-time relations are discussed in §6.6 and an argument that presentism cannot
explain the passage of time is handled. (vii) Some linguistically oriented arguments
against presentism are reviewed in §6.8.4. The resolutions of these arguments count as
a somewhat comprehensive defence of presentism, and it is hard to find more challenges
for presentism in the literature. For comparison, Fiocco [144] lists (ii, v-vii), Markosian
[249] lists (v-vii) and Markosian [250] lists (ii,iv-vi) as problems of presentism.
§4.2. Change is defined in terms of presentism and intrinsic forward directed time is
defined as the measure of change. Change is defined as a transition from one present
temporal stage of the Universe (TSU) into another present TSU. Intrinsic forward di-
rected time is defined by equating the transition from one present TSU into another with
the transition from one present time into another present time.
§4.3. The question of what is the length of the present moment is contemplated. Presen-
tism comes with least difficulties by selecting a positive present. However, the selection
between a positive and a non-positive present is left open, and therefore this section is
characterized as an open selection: positive xor non-positive present. Analogously, the
selection between total and partial determinism is left open in §7.2.
§4.4. Presentism is defended as the simplest axiom for temporal existence, which alone
without additional postulates explains the passage of time or embodies change, gives
an account of temporal ordering and the direction of time, and is compatible with both
partial and total determinism. The most famous alternatives to presentism —eternalism,
the growing-block theory and the moving spotlight theory— are more complex and also
require one or more additional postulates in one or more of these tasks. More nuanced
versions of the alternatives are reviewed in §7.5. The main support for eternalism comes
from the Theory of Relativity which entails eternalism (§5.6.3).
§4.5. It is shown that McTaggart’s argument does not threaten presentism.
§4.6. A part of the Universe is defined as either a single temporal stage of the Universe
(TSU) which is realized at one time or proper part of TSU, or a fusion of two or more
TSUs which are realized at different times or any proper part of such a fusion. Discrete
mereology (appendix A) is applied as the logical foundation for part-whole relations.
Object is defined as a part of the Universe and particular is defined as an object which
exists at one time only, i.e., a particular is either a TSU or a proper part of a TSU. It
is pointed out that presentism entails endurantism and that EUO is thus incompatible
with perdurantism. The definitions of sameness, identity and similarity are given. Same-
ness is defined directly in terms of EUO: particular x is the same as x, and no other
particular is the same as x. Sameness and identity are interrelated as follows: same(x, y)
→ identical(x, y). Identity and similarity of particulars is defined in terms their resem-
blance.
§4.7. The axiom for causality is postulated and defended. It is expressed as the fusion
of three interrelated axioms which are added on the top of presentism: (i) every part of
the present TSU realizes energy in an absolutely determinate location in an absolutely
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determinate way; (ii) all parts of the present TSU are causally connected; (iii) the present
TSU is the consequence of the preceding TSU and the cause of the succeeding TSU. (i)
is close to physicalism (§4.13) and its defence relies on economicality with respect to its
alternatives such as the existence of bare particulars and congeniality with the Dynamic
Universe model (DU). The defence of (ii) relies on the absence of intelligible alterna-
tives and on physics in general where it is supposed that the laws of nature dictate how
spatially separated object interact causally, and specifically on those interactions that
are postulated in DU. The defence of (iii) relies on uneconomicality of alternatives in
§4.11. (iii) is an expression of the law of cause and effect and can also be considered
as an explicit acceptance of the primitiveness of ontological causation or the thesis that
general causation is merely generalisation of singular causation. It is pointed out that
there is a small step from (iii) to the acceptance of the conservation law of energy, which
is an axiom of DU.
§4.8. Naturalism is the doctrine that all that ever exists is a part of the Universe and all
parts of the Universe are directly or indirectly causally connected. Naturalism is shown
to be a theorem of presentism and causality.
§4.9. Transcendism is rejected as an uneconomical alternative to naturalism and the
concept actual is defined. David Lewis’ modal realism is rejected as a version of tran-
scendism. It is shown in §7 that EUO is a sufficient ontological foundation for a theory of
possibility —including counterfactual analysis, physical possibilities, fictions and logical
possibilities— and thus transcendist foundations are not needed. It is pointed out that
the roots of transcendism can be traced back to Plato, that the roots of naturalisation
are in Aristotle’s rejection of Plato’s theory of forms, and that the given naturalisations
of transcendist concepts are nothing over and above Aristotle’s replacement of Plato’s
theory. It is suggested that the ontological version of nominalism is equivalent with
naturalism, and that the rest of nominalism is semantical (or terminological), not onto-
logical.
§4.10. The concepts property and universal are defined in terms of presentism and
causality, and it is shown that the principle of instantiation follows as a side product.
The dichotomy of properties and determinable ranges of properties is defined, following
Johnson and Armstrong. Resemblance and identity of properties is defined in terms of
the resemblance and identity of particulars. It is emphasised in §4.9 that properties are
nothing over and above particulars, i.e., that using the terms ‘property’ and ‘universal’
in talking about particulars is merely a terminological selection, for property is defined
as a way in which a particular exists. That particulars exist in some ways rather than
in no way at all is equivalent with rejecting bare particulars in §4.7.
§4.11. It is shown that the causality axiom entails the theorem that the Universe is
eternal: that the past is infinite and the future is potentially infinite. Alternative quali-
fications of the causality axiom are evaluated.
§4.12. The axiom for ontological realism is defended as the most economical version of
mental realism. In mental realism mental states of human beings exist. Mental realism
is postulated as the only alternative that explains experiences. Ontological realism is
a version of mental realism where also other parts of the Universe exist in addition to
human minds and these are independent of human minds. Ontological realism is de-
fended on the basis that there are no good reasons for rejecting the mind-independence
thesis, and on the basis that an empirically sufficient and minimal version of solipsism is
practically equivalent with ontological realism. Ontological realism is also defended by
Niiniluoto’s argument from the past.
§4.13. Physicalism as the thesis that all that ever exists is physical is derived as a the-
orem from presentism and causality, and all versions of mind-body dualism are rejected.
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When ontological realism (as a version mental realism) is coupled with physicalism, the
result is that some physical particulars have both concrete and mental properties, which
resembles the dual-aspect theory. It is pointed out that EUO is compatible with Galen
Strawson’s argument against brute emergence.
§4.14. Naturalisation of transcendism is continued by defining the concept abstract as
thought which is realized in a human mind. It is shown that the given definition dis-
ambiguates the concept, and that it manages to classify the paradigm cases of concrete
and abstract things. Naturalist Platonism is contrasted to transcendist Platonism. It
is argued that naturalist Platonism does what mathematics and natural science require
from it and that it is simpler and thus transcendist Platonism is rejected.
§4.15. The axiom for the law of non-contradiction (LNC) is postulated. The ontological
version of LNC is defended. It is pointed out that LNC is compatible with the existence
of propositions which violate the law of the excluded middle and the principle of biva-
lence, and that LNC is compatible with many-valued logics and paraconsistent logics, as
long as these remain in the level of semantics/language. It is noted that the compatibility
of LNC with dialetheism depends on how the range of dialetheism is interpreted.
§4.16. Genuine backward directed causation is rejected on the basis that it either vio-
lates the law of non-contradiction (LNC) or requires other uneconomical axioms, namely,
transcendism or some naturalist version of branching space-time (§7.4). It is pointed out
that van Inwagen’s hypertime framework sustains LNC but must commit to transcendism
or some naturalist version of branching space-time.
§4.17. The axiom for finiteness states that all temporal stages of the Universe (TSUs)
are spatially finite and consist of finitely many indivisible and positive interrelated parts.
Spatial finiteness is defended by economy and compatibility with both models of cos-
mology that are evaluated in §5. Ontological finite divisibility is needed not only as a
pillar of an economically unified world-view, but without it lots of derivative issues would
be left ambiguous, for finite divisibility entails that ontological self-reference (§4.18) is
impossible, and the rejection of self-reference is in turn applied in §§6.1,6.4,6.8.1,6.8.3.
Finite divisibility is defended by economy. It is noted that it is compatible with the ex-
istence of transfinite idealizations in mathematics, with contemporary physics and with
ontic structural realism of Ladyman and Ross. Two interpretations of infinite divisibility
—the point-continuum interpretation and non-wellfoundedness— are presented as alter-
natives to finite divisibility, and it is pointed out that in addition to being uneconomical,
these bring in further difficulties. These interpretations are needed in comprehending
§§4.3,4.18. Eliminative structural realism requires non-wellfoundedness and is rejected
as uneconomical.
§4.18. It is shown that ontological self-reference is impossible in the context of the
finiteness axiom, specifically in the context of finite divisibility. This result is needed in
exactifying the definition of a true proposition in §6.1, in rejecting the slingshot argument
in §6.4, in understanding the difficulties of fact-based correspondence in §6.8.1, and in
understanding the difference of correspondence and identity in §6.8.3.
§5. The overall metaphysical structure of Tuomo Suntola’s Dynamic Universe model is
introduced with the focus on explaining the largest cosmological scale, and contrasted
to relativistic physics (RP). The fusion of EUO and DU is characterized. EUO is fully
congenial with DU but incompatible with RP which violates presentism (§5.6).
§5.1. The basic structure of DU is explained: the fusion of 4D spherical geometry and
zero-energy formulation of the conservation law of energy; the energy balance equation
and the notions of mass and the velocity of light; how in DU the energy of motion of an
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object moving in space is related with the energy of motion of an object moving along
with the expansion of space, and comparison with RP’s Equivalence Principle.
§5.2. It is investigated how DU and RP explain the conveying of influences.
§5.3. It is explained how DU’s expansion hypothesis is calculated. Some preliminary
calculations are done and concepts are explained: the calculation of the present circum-
ference or size of the present TSU; the concepts of hypothetical homogeneous space and
mass equivalence and the calculation of the mass of the present TSU; calculation of the
volume and density of the present TSU; deriving the changing velocity of light from the
basic structure of DU; calculation of how much time has passed since the singularity.
Given all these, DU’s hypothesis of decelerating expansion can be calculated.
§5.3.1. The results of §5.3 are applied in exhausting J.J.C. Smart’s rate of the passage
of time argument which has been targeted against presentism.
§5.4. The historical evolution from Newtonian physics into the Special Theory of Rel-
ativity into the General Theory of Relativity and into FLRW cosmology is explained,
including the role of FLRW’s density parameter with dark energy in the hypothesis of
accelerating expansion. It is shown that the standard interpretation of the Planck equa-
tion that is incorporated also in FLRW is incompatible with the conservation law, unless
further metaphysics is introduced.
§5.5. It is investigated how certain observations about the Earth, the Moon and Mars
are explained in the contexts of DU and RP.
§5.6. The relativity principle of RP and some of its implications are investigated.
§5.6.1. It is shown how the relativity principle contradicts absolute simultaneity whereas
DU builds on absolute simultaneity, and how DU and RP explain the tests with atomic
clocks.
§5.6.2. It is explained that cosmologists commit to cosmic time which requires absolute
simultaneity and thus either contradicts the relativity principle or requires that cosmic
time and relativistic time are independent, which is uneconomical.
§5.6.3. It is indicated that the relativity principle entails eternalism, which in turn re-
quires an anchor for the direction of time, where entropy is the anchor.
§5.7. DU and RP are evaluated by a modified version of Kaila’s criterion of relative
simplicity. The predictions of DU match perceptions at least as accurately as those of
RP, and the commitments of DU are economically unified with respect to those of RP.
§6. The second stage of the method which concerns almost entirely applications is started
by defining and defending a unified theory of truth in terms of EUO, complementing the
work of Ro¨gnvaldur Ingthorsson.
§6.1. Proposition is defined as a thought realized in the mind of a human being, which
refers to something else than the thought itself and which states that the object to which
the proposition refers exists in some way; mental realism (§4.12) and finiteness which
excludes self-reference (§4.18) are thus strongly present in the ontological base of the def-
inition of proposition. True proposition is defined: a proposition is true if and only if the
object to which the proposition refers exists in the way that the proposition states. This
is abbreviated by saying that the proposition corresponds to the object. The object-based
correspondence theory of truth has thereby been defined. Truthmaker and truthbearer
are defined. It is shown how the central ingredients of the coherence theory of truth are
incorporated in the unified theory in terms of the fusion of object-based correspondence
and the law of non-contradiction which yield the coherence theorem of correspondence
truths. It is shown how the central ingredients of Jamesian pragmatic theory of truth, if
it is considered as a theory in the first place, can be incorporated in object-based corre-
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spondence, whereas the Pragmatic theory alone without object-based correspondence is
empirically insufficient. It is shown that the non-descriptivist views are compatible with
object-based correspondence.
§6.2. The argument that the requirement of reliable verification leads into solipsism is
rejected.
§6.3. It is underlined that the correspondence relation is not vacuous nor mysterious, and
that Hilary Putnam’s criticism against correspondence is answered. Putnam’s language
acquisition argument is answered by noting that it does not threaten the correspondence
of sensations, whereas theories with metaphysical commitments are not considered to
be correspondence-true or correspondence-false in the first place, but instead better or
worse based on their verifiable predictions and virtuousness, i.e., Putnam’s requirement
of rational assertability is implicitly incorporated by evaluating theories by the principle
of economy. Putnam’s model-theoretic argument is answered by noting that it does not
threaten the correspondence theory that an ideally rationally assertable theory cannot
be false. It is noted that Putnam’s internal realism is incorporated in the sense of ac-
knowledging theory-ladenness, but that it does not affect economy evaluations where all
metaphysical commitments of theories are counted.
§6.4. The slingshot argument or the big fact argument is exhausted.
§6.5. An argument that correspondence truth is an abundant property is handled.
§6.6. Allegations about truthmaking in presentism, cross-time relations, and an argu-
ment that presentism cannot explain the passage of time are handled.
§6.7. Funny fact arguments concerning negative, disjunctive, universal, existential and
subjunctive propositions are resolved. Conditional, probabilistic and counterfactual propo-
sitions are handled in §7.3 for these are involved with modalities.
§6.8. The analytico-linguistic analysis of truth which started by replacing objects with
facts in the early 20th century is contrasted to object-based correspondence. The cor-
respondence theory with facts and states of affairs, the deflationist theory of truth, the
identity theory of truth and the primitive theory of truth and their relations are reviewed.
§6.8.1. Correspondence with facts and states of affairs is reviewed, with the following
conclusions. If facts and states of affairs are objects or sufficiently close to objects in
EUO, they can function as truthmakers in a correspondence theory and we are dealing
with a version of object-based correspondence. If facts are not objects nor in objects,
they must be translated as true propositions, but the notion that a proposition cor-
responds to a proposition does not work, except in a special case. However, we can
translate correspondence with facts as true propositions into deduction based on known
true propositions that works in the context of object-based correspondence.
§6.8.2. The deflationist theories of truth are contrasted to object-based correspondence.
These are prime examples of linguistically oriented theories of truth which omit objects as
well as correspondence and empirical sufficiency along with them. The deflationist theo-
ries like Horwich’s minimalism do not even try to say anything about a relation between
a proposition and the mind-independent reality, and thus do not compete with object-
based correspondence in being the best empirically sufficient theory of truth. When the
status of a theory is removed from deflationism, it can be seen in the context of object-
based correspondence as a framework for handling what is supposed to be true at some
time in some context, disregarding whether it is true in object-based correspondence.
§6.8.3. It is pointed out that the identity theory of truth and the primitivist theory of
truth do not compete with object-based correspondence.
§6.8.4. Some linguistically oriented arguments against presentism are exhausted.
§6.9. A summary is given of the unified theory of truth.
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§7. The second stage of the method is continued by complementing the definition of
a true proposition by modalities —possible, contingent, necessary, impossible— and
thereby extending the unified theory of truth into a unified theory of possibility. An
unambiguous modal proposition which functions in natural science and human social
behaviour states that it is possible, contingent, necessary or impossible from the aspect
of one time that an object has certain properties at a target time, and has one of the
following truth values: true; false; indeterminate. The unified theory is very close logi-
cally to Von Wright’s diachronic possibility.
§7.1. Modal propositions with different combinations of aspect and target times are
given and it is explained how their truthmakers can be deduced.
§7.2. The mutually exclusive axioms for partial determinism and total determinism are
introduced as qualifications of the causality axiom (§4.7), although the selection between
them is left open. Modal propositions are analyzed in both contexts. Synchronic propo-
sitions are contrasted to diachronic propositions. Asymptotical determinism is defined.
§7.3. It is shown how the fusion of partial determinism and EUO implies that some
propositions are not true nor false but indeterminate, that the principle of bivalence and
the law of the excluded middle do not hold for such propositions in EUO, and that future
contingents are implications of selecting partial determinism. It is shown how counter-
factual can be defined in terms of EUO, how truthmakers of propositions whose surface
structure is involved with counterfactuals are deduced, and that some propositions about
counterfactuals are indeterminate in the context of partial determinism. It is shown that
the fusion of EUO and partial determinism manages to handle conditional propositions,
and provides a straightforward ontological foundation for probabilistic propositions.
§7.4. It is shown that EUO is the most economical available foundation for a theory
of diachronic modality that functions accurately in the focal contexts. Alternative onto-
logical foundations are contemplated, including Belnap’s branching space-time, McCall’s
shrinking-tree theory and the growing-block version of Briggs and Forbes.
§7.5. It is shown that the unified theory can be seen as an application of Kripke’s pos-
sible worlds semantics as well as of Hintikka’s version, although the unified theory shifts
from possible worlds into possible TSUs. It is noted that any theory of modalities which
is applicable in the focal contexts must incorporate temporal mappings, and that log-
ical possibility and Lewis’ modal realism are inaccurate and uneconomical foundations
for such a theory. Armstrong’s combinatorial theory of possibility is characterized as a
half-way solution between possible worlds and possible TSUs.
§7.6. It is shown that the unified theory suffices as a background for epistemic, fiction-
alist and logical considerations. This is another way of naturalising Platonism (§4.9).
§7.7. A summary is given.
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§8. The unified theory is complemented by exactifying the notion of perception in terms
of EUO, with colour perception as the case example.
§8.1. The process of perception is defined in terms of EUO, aided by the previously
defined object-based correspondence theory of truth. Colour perception is defined by
complementing plain perception by colour families: mind-independent colour objects;
colour sensations of human agents; lights in the environment. The equivalence of the
unified theory with David Armstrong’s colour realism and David Rosenthal’s double-
property theory is pointed out and the goal of colour science is defined as the goal of
discovering the contents of the colour families and their relations.
§8.2. It is shown how different cases of the experience of similarity of colours fit in the
framework of the unified theory, including the experience of similarity of homogeneous
as well as heterogeneous objects; metamers and the dichotomy of one-over-many colour
properties and ranges of colour properties are defined in terms of EUO.
§8.3. The chain from a colour sensation of a perceived object to the knowledge of the
structure of the object is discussed. The colour behaviour of an object is handled in
terms of its reflectance profile.
§8.4. It is shown that an argument from impossible colours does not compose a threat
to the unified theory.
§8.5. The unified theory is contrasted to relational and dispositional theories of colour.
It is shown that all these theories manage to resolve conflicts which follow from interper-
sonal differences and heterogeneous lightning conditions, but the unified theory resolves
them without mixing up the colour families, whereas the relational and dispositional
theories especially mix these up. It is noted that the unified theory can be seen to in-
corporate the applicable ingredients of the relational and dispositional theories.
§8.6. A summary is given.
§9 The progressiveness of economical unification is emphasised and the central contri-
butions of this thesis to the existing body of knowledge are listed.
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3 Economical Unification in Philosophy of Science
Economical unification is the process of approaching ideal total science which builds on
an economically unified base of metaphysical postulates which is sufficient for explaining
all scales of phenomena. Figure 3 represents the transition from disunified total science
into ideally economically unified theory which is the nexus of virtues. At the ideal stage
where everything is built on an economically unified postulate base, it is indifferent if one
talks about economically unified total science or about an economically unified theory.
In contrast, in the current disunified state, we must talk about different theories because
they build on different postulates and even contradict one another.
Figure 3: Economical unification as a process where a disunified aggregate of isolated,
heterogeneous and incompatible theories is replaced or otherwise transformed into a
homogeneous ideally economically unified and in all ways virtuous theory.
The following chain is the key to understanding the nature of unification and the need for
it: the progress of science is desirable; all progress of science is not economical unifica-
tion, but economical unification is progress of science and inseparable from the increase
of general virtuousness of total science; in order to efficiently advance economical unifi-
cation, the principle of economy is needed as an evaluation criterion that favours more
economically unified and virtuous theories; it is indifferent whether one arrives at more
economically unified theories by rejecting old theories and shifting into new ones, by
reducing theories to others or by yet unexplicated paths, for all paths of economical uni-
fication are paths to progress; in order to arrive at more economically unified theories,
one must explicate their metaphysical postulates; metaphysics is the science of explicat-
ing these postulates and their interrelations, i.e., metaphysics is primarily the science
of unification. It will be seen that the understanding of the correct role of economical
unification in the center gives an extremely fruitful point of departure to various focal
issues in philosophy of science.
3.1 Economically Unified Theory as the Goal and the Nexus of
Virtues
The goal of unified science and the preference for simplest empirically sufficient theories
have been present in philosophical and scientific thinking since the antiquity until today.
The ideally unified science cannot be had without an economically unified ontology in
its center, which consists of metaphysical postulates, or first principles. Thales (624-547
BC) may be the earliest documented author who searched for the first principles.6 For
Aristotle (384-322 BC), science starts from first principles, and therefore it is natural
that he called the science about them the first philosophy:
6See Aristotle, Metaphysics bk.1, ch.3.
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Clearly then Wisdom is knowledge about certain principles and causes (Aristotle, Meta-
physics, bk. 1, ch. 1). When the objects of an inquiry, in any department, have principles,
conditions, or elements, it is through acquaintance with these that knowledge, that is to
say scientific knowledge, is attained. For we do not think that we know a thing until we are
acquainted with its primary conditions or first principles, and have carried our analysis as
far as its simplest elements. Plainly therefore in the science of Nature, as in other branches
of study, our first task will be to try to determine what relates to its principles. Aristotle,
Physics, bk. 1, ch. 1
There is not much difference in the method of economical unification and in the method
Aristotle described, where the task is to explicate the simplest first principles and the
rest is a matter of relating applications to them. Their equivalence is substantiated by
Schaffer’s remark:
The task of metaphysics is to say what grounds what. That is, the neo-Aristotelian will
begin from a hierarchical view of reality ordered by priority in nature. The primary entities
form the sparse structure of being, while the grounding relations generate an abundant
superstructure of posterior entities. . . . The posterior is grounded in, dependent on, and
derivative from it. The task of metaphysics is to limn this structure. Schaffer [352, p. 351]
The process of explicating the first principles common to all sciences is also the process of
unification, for once the first principles have been explicated, sciences have been unified
under them and they have become closer to being the same science. Thus, metaphysics
should be primarily seen as the science of unification by explication of the first principles.
The following formulations of the task of metaphysics are mixtures of stating that it is
the task of unification and that of explicating the first principles. Again, if you unify
two sciences you have to explicate the principles that are common to them, and if you
do explicate those principles you have unified the sciences:
[Ontology is] ‘the’ theory of the most basic and pervasive traits of reality (Bunge [68, p. 4]).
[T]he metaphysician . . . looks for unity in diversity, for pattern in disorder, for structure
in the amorphous heap of phenomena. Bunge [69, p. 1]
[Metaphysics] is concerned with developing a unified picture of all that there is, a picture
that succeeds in portraying the fabric in which everything is woven and is connected with
everything else. Poland [312, p. 124-5]
Its business is to study the most general features of reality and real objects. Peirce [304,
6.6]
[F]irst philosophy, [is] concerned with the principles, such as they are, that are common
to all the sciences. Britannica [177, p. 63].
Formulations of the Principle of Economy. The principle of economy is needed as
an objective evaluation criterion that favours more economically unified theories. Formu-
lations of economy and formulations that are compatible it can be found throughout the
history, including the Aristotle’s above formulation, i.e., the given version of economy is
merely a restatement of earlier versions.
1225-1274. Thomas Aquinas [9, p. 129] states that something that would violate
economy is to be avoided: “If a thing can be done adequately by means of one, it is
superfluous to do it by means of several.”
1287-1347. William of Ockham likewise states that something that would violate econ-
omy is to be avoided: “It is vain to do with more what can be done with fewer.”7 “For
nothing ought to be posited without a reason given. . . .” [297, p. 290]
7As quoted in Russell [345, p. 472].
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1726: Isaac Newton (1642-1727) [284, bk. 3, Rules I, IV] states that something that
would violate economy is to be avoided, and also that a good theory ought not be rejected
on the basis of a theory that is not better:
We are to admit no more causes of natural things than such as are both true and sufficient
to explain their appearances. To this purpose the philosophers say that Nature does nothing
in vain, and more is in vain when less will serve; for Nature is pleased with simplicity, and
affects not the pomp of superfluous causes. . . . In experimental philosophy we are to look
upon propositions inferred by general induction from phenomena as accurately or very
nearly true, notwithstanding any contrary hypotheses that may be imagined, till such
time as other phenomena occur by which they may either be made more accurate or liable
to exceptions. Isaac Newton (1642-1727) [284, bk. 3, Rules I, IV]
1892-1964. J.B.S Halldane: “In scientific thought we adopt the simplest theory which
will explain all the facts under consideration and enable us to predict new facts of the
same kind.”8
1933. Einstein’s [128, p. 165] formulation is very close to the given version of economy:
“It can scarcely be denied that the supreme goal of all theory is to make the irreducible
basic elements as simple and as few as possible without having to surrender the adequate
representation of a single datum of experience.”
1935. Eino Kaila’s relative simplicity of theory h is the fraction RS(h, e) = syst(h,e)
K(h)
,
where syst(h, e) is the number of empirical propositions that are derivable from h based
on empirical evidence e, and K(h) is the number of logically independent assumptions
of h (Niiniluoto [287, pp. 158-9]). According to Niiniluoto [290, p. 190] “a theory
has high relative simplicity, if it explains a multitude of empirical data by means of
a few independent assumptions.” Kaila [194, p. 83] maintains that “the explanatory
value of a theory is proportional to its relative simplicity” but as in his analysis direct
references to metaphysics are well hidden in the positivistic spirit, it is left open whether
‘independent assumptions’ can be translated as ‘metaphysical postulates.’ If they can,
then relative simplicity is very close to the principle of economy. For in this case, given
two theories which give exactly the same number of empirical propositions (explain the
same phenomena), the one with the least sum of independent assumptions (metaphysical
commitments) has a greater relative simplicity. Relative simplicity is thus a version of
economy. Although relative simplicity could be interpreted in a different way and applied
e.g. independently of metaphysics, a modified version of it is applied in §5.7 in evaluating
theories with metaphysical commitments.9
8J.B.S Halldane, Science and Theology as Art-Forms, 1927. As quoted in McAllister [254, p. 105].
9According to Kiiskinen [198, p. 5], Kaila left the problem of relative simplicity for Pertti Lindfors
to be resolved, who took on the challenge, not seeing how difficult the thus far unresolved problem it
was. (The unpublished articles of Lindfors about the topic are in the hold of the Finnish Philosophical
Association, Suomen filosofinen yhdistys.) The problem was to define syst(h, e) and K(h), i.e., to define
the number of empirical propositions that are derivable from an evaluated theory h based on empirical
evidence e or just the magnitude of phenomena explained by h, and the number of logically independent
basic assumptions of h, in order to calculate relative simplicities of theories as ratios RS(h, e) = syst(h,e)K(h) .
As a proof that this is not an insuperable difficulty, the phenomena explained by a theory and the sum of
its metaphysical postulates are explicated in §5.7. It can be speculated what the difficulties might have
been. One difficulty might have been the general silencing of metaphysics away in the positivistic spirit
which makes it hard to openly explicate metaphysical commitments. An interrelated difficulty might
have been not seeing that there are metaphysical postulates in physics in the first place but instead
taking a bad reading of Mach and talking only about mathematics that predicts verifiable phenomena
and concentrating on the accuracy of predictions only. Another difficulty might have been the absence
of alternative comprehensive theories to be evaluated: while in the positivistic spirit scientists were
talking about empirical facts within the conceptual schemes of the paradigmatic theories instead of
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1945. Bertrand Russell [345, p. 472] states that something that violates economy is to
be avoided: “if everything in some science can be interpreted without assuming this or
that hypothetical entity, there is no ground for assuming it.”
1963. Mario Bunge [67, p. 75] takes in account also the simplicity of alternative for-
mulations or syntactical simplicity or descriptive simplicity and states that something
that violates economy is to be avoided: “conceptual entities should not be multiplied in
vain. . . but they should be welcomed whenever they lead either to a deeper understanding
of reality or to a syntactical simplification of theories.”
1974. Michael Friedman commits to a principle that looks very similar to Kaila’s rela-
tive simplicity: “Friedman’s motivational argument suggests a way of working out the
notion of unification: characterize E(K) as the set of arguments that achieves the best
tradeoff between minimizing the number of premises used and maximising the number of
conclusions obtained” (Kitcher [202, p. 431]). Friedman dodges the use of ‘metaphysics’
by characterizing the unexplained explainers as brute facts:
[T]he phenomenon doing the explaining is not itself understood; it is simply a brute fact.
But its ability to explain other phenomena is not thereby impaired. . . . nor do we have to
understand why it occurs. It merely has to explain the phenomenon to which it is related.
Friedman [150, p. 11]
1981. Philip Kitcher [201, 202] evaluates three features of a theory: the more general,
simpler and stringent, the better, i.e., the greater the unifying power.
Generality: the more general the theory, the greater the number of phenomena explained
or the number of conclusions that can be drawn from it.
Simplicity: the simpler the theory, the smaller the number of argument patterns in it.
Stringency: the more stringent the theory, the smaller its range of applicability.
The unifying power of a theory is great when a small set of patterns explains much:
“the unifying power of a set of argument patterns varies conversely with the number
of patterns in the set” (Weber et al [408, p. 15]). When generality and simplicity
are considered as a pair without the stringency criterion, Kitcher’s unificatory power
resembles closely Kaila’s relative simplicity. The requirement of saving phenomena is
implicit in the generality criterion. The argument patterns cannot be directly equated
with metaphysical commitments, and Kitcher aims to make sense of unification “without
indulging in the metaphysics” (Kitcher [202, p. 500]). However, an argument pattern
contains ‘premisses,’ and as genuine explanations are based on theories with metaphysical
commitments (§3.4), we can apply generality and simplicity in evaluating theories.
The purpose of the stringency criterion is to exclude argument patterns which are ir-
relevant in explanations and predictions. Consider two irrelevant patters. God-pattern:
God wants it to be the case that x; what God wants to be the case is the case; it is the
case that x. Pure-chance-pattern: everything happens by pure chance. One one hand
the irrelevant patterns explain everything, but on the other hand they are not applicable
in making predictions which are in practice needed and therefore such patterns had to
be discluded by the stringency criterion: “If [an argument] pattern sets conditions on
instantiations that are more difficult to satisfy than those set by another pattern, then
metaphysical commitments, the existence of an alternative would have revealed alternative ‘empirical
facts’ and pointed out in which respects the evaluated theories differ, thus providing something to be
evaluated. Another difficulty might have been the expectation of minute accuracy in the specification
of syst(h, e) and K(h), of the same level as is needed in evaluating the accuracy of predictions. This is
practically impossible and disoriented, for it does not require a look into the sixth decimal to see e.g.
that one theory needs 70% of dark energy and the other needs none.
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I shall say that the former pattern is more stringent than the latter” (Kitcher [202, p.
433]). The stringency criterion can be seen to be included in the fusion of generality and
simplicity. For, irrelevant patterns do not increase the generality of a theory which is ac-
tually needed in natural science, but as they in any case contain metaphysical postulates,
they are not favoured by the simplicity criterion. When the stringency criterion is seen
to be implicit in generality and simplicity, Kitcher’s degree of unifying power becomes
equivalent with Kaila’s degree relative simplicity.
1999. Michael Devitt and Kim Sterelny state the simplicity criterion [109, p. 278]: “We
should favor here, as in science, simple and economical theories. In ontology, the less the
better.”
2014. Gonzalo Rodriguez-Pereyra [336]: “Which one of these theories is the best has
to be decided by comparing how they score with respect to certain theoretical virtues,
like accommodating firm and stable intuitions and common sense opinions, avoiding
the unnecessary multiplication of entities, reducing the number of undefined primitive
concepts, etc.”
Inseparability of Economical Unification and the Increase of Virtuousness.
The process of economical unification walks hand in hand with the increase of general
virtuousness of total science. Accordingly, there is a small step from economy as a crite-
rion of empirical sufficiency and metaphysical simplicity only, into a criterion that eval-
uates all virtues of competing theories: empirical sufficiency and accuracy, metaphysical
simplicity, unificatory power, consilience, comprehensiveness, the lack of ad hoc features,
understandability, coherence, necessity and fundamentality.10 All these are interrelated
with all, and only some of their interrelations are explicated. The central unifying factor
behind all interrelations is naturally unification itself, which could be added in all below
titles.
empirical sufficiency, metaphysical simplicity, unificatory power. In figure
3 the three half-circles represent isolated theories of different scales —such as the scales
of particles, planetary systems, galaxies, and the present state of the Universe as a
whole— and the circle represents an ideally unified theory of all scales. By explaining all
scales with a unified postulate base, the overall quantity of postulates and parameters
is minimised, whereas in isolated theories their quantity is maximised, proportionally to
the degree of isolation. Even if an isolated one-scale theory were individually simpler
than a unified theory of all scales, the unified theory would be relatively simpler than
the isolated theories together. The fusion of wide or comprehensive empirical sufficiency,
metaphysical simplicity and coherence is close to great unifying power (p. 22), great
relative simplicity (p. 21) and great explanatory power (Psillos [317, p. 171]). The greater
unificatory/explanatory power and greater relative simplicity, the more economically
unified is the theory, i.e., all these terms have basically the same meaning.
understandability and comprehensiveness. When the minimal sum of metaphys-
ical commitments and their interrelations are explicated and as they explain all scales,
the whole is understandable and its minimal size facilitates understanding it, whereas
10Psillos [317, p. 171] lists external coherence, consilience, completeness, unifying power, lack of ad
hoc features, capacity to generate novel predictions and explanatory power. Chakravartty [80]) lists
simplicity, consistency and coherence (both internally, and externally with respect to other theories and
background knowledge), scope and unity (pertaining to the domain of phenomena explained) as theoreti-
cal virtues. Nolan [293, p. 224] lists internal consistency, external coherence, simplicity, explanatoriness,
fertility and unificatory power. Quine (1960) [324, p. 276] characterises the method of an ontologist:
“He can scrutinize and improve the system from within, appealing to coherence and simplicity; but this
is the theoretician’s method generally.”
23
understanding several isolated theories individually requires more work, and these in any
case fail to catch the unified picture of reality. Understandability and comprehensiveness
are interrelated, as a comprehensive theory does not leave central aspects of nature un-
explained, and as these are explained these are also understood. This is congenial with
Poland [312, p. 29]: “A unified picture of nature provides more and deeper understand-
ing than does a view of nature that represents it as a disunified aggregate of isolated and
disconnected facts.” The incorporation or explication of common-sensible metaphysical
commitments —such as the axioms of EUO— contributes to the understandability of
the unified theory, for once these are clearly explicated, there are no ambiguities about
whether these are incorporated or not.
internal and external coherence, consilience. Internal coherence is a basic re-
quirement for an economically unified theory, for an incoherent theory cannot genuinely
explain perceptions. Internal coherence means mutual consistency of all ontological
commitments of the theory and of all concepts defined in terms of them, plus internal
consistency of each individual commitment and concept. Coherence and understandabil-
ity walk hand in hand whereas an incoherent theory cannot be genuinely understood.
‘External’ coherence is misleading in the context of an ideally unified comprehensive the-
ory that explains literally all scales, as there is nothing external to it. However, in the
path towards it, a sum of compatible theories of different scales is more virtuous than an
otherwise equal sum of incompatible theories, where isolated theories may naturally have
conflicting commitments. A comprehensive and coherent unified theory is consilient, as
independent points of view conform to it. This is congenial with Whewell:
[O]nce a theory is invented by discoverers’ induction, it must pass a variety of tests before it
can be considered confirmed as an empirical truth. These tests are prediction, consilience,
and coherence. These are characterized by Whewell as, first, that “our hypotheses ought
to fortel [sic] phenomena which have not yet been observed” (1858b, 86); second, that they
should “explain and determine cases of a kind different from those which were contemplated
in the formation” of those hypotheses (1858b, 88); and third that hypotheses must “become
more coherent” over time (1858b, 91). Snyder [367] quotes Whewell [410, pp. 83-96]
necessity and fundamentality. Necessity is exemplified by using EUO. The aim
is to show that the axioms of EUO are simultaneously sufficient and necessary, and
thereby metaphysically minimal. (a) A theory may commit to the existence of several
causally isolated worlds (transcendism), but all sufficient theories must commit to at least
one world; at least one world is necessary and the aim is to shown that (naturalism) the
commitment to exactly one world is also sufficient. (b) A theory may commit to whatever
combination of the existence of past, present and future but all sufficient theories must
commit at least to the existence of the present; the aim is to shown that (presentism)
the commitment to the existence of the present only is also sufficient. (c) A theory may
commit to spatial infinity and infinite divisibility, but all sufficient theories must accept
at least finite space and finite divisibility; the aim is to shown that these only are also
sufficient. (d) A theory may commit to the existence of physical contradictions but all
theories must accept that some objects are non-contradictory; the aim is to show that
it is sufficient to suppose that all objects are non-contradictory. (e-f) The aim is to
show that all sufficient theories must commit to causal interactions and some form of
mind-independence.
It is natural to consider everything necessary as fundamental. The fundamentality of a
theory that consist of necessary and optional commitments can be measured by economy:
the more economical, the more fundamental. Further, in the light of the indispensability
of metaphysics in theories, economical unification functions as a point of departure to
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demarcation. It is not asked whether a theory is metaphysical or scientific, but it is
asked which of two ‘scientifico-metaphysical’ theories is better, i.e., more economical:
the more economical, the more ‘scientific.’11 Bunge’s and Quine’s characterizations fit
in this picture:
But the two concerns are not mutually exclusive and, in fact, sometimes they are indistin-
guishable: an extremely general scientific question may be a special ontological one (Bunge
[69, p. 1]). There is not even a gap, let alone an abyss, between them: ontology is general
science and the factual sciences are special metaphysics (ibid, p. 16). [E]very scientific
theory, if extremely general, is ontological; and every ontological theory, if exact and in
tune with science, is scientific (ibid, p. 21).
Naturalistic philosophy is continuous with natural science. . . . The boundary between
naturalistic philosophy and the rest of science is just a vague matter of degree. [325, p.
257] Quine
3.2 Mach → Verifiability → Neo-Scholasticism → Naturalistic
Closure
Ernst Mach (1838-1916) is best seen as a unifier of science, whose work was in line
with general positivism or empiricism, which was in turn natural continuation of the
18th century Age of Enlightenment where the common world-view was no longer given
by the church but by science, and where unnecessary mysticism needed to be banished
from science. As an illustration of the spirit of positivism, Auguste Comte (1798-1857)
characterized [91, p. 29] three stages of mental development of the human kind —the
religious stage, the metaphysical stage, the scientific stage— where the scientific stage
is the final and the most perfected stage. Mach’s anti-metaphysical aspect is best seen
as derivative from his project of unification: that metaphysics which is not needed in
this project was only in the way. Thus, when Mach rejects ‘metaphysics’ he aims to
reject unnecessary metaphysics, not metaphysics that is needed in unifying science.12
Mach coined in the term ‘the principle of economy of thought’ and emphasised it role
in unifying science in various works such as [236, 240, 237, 241].13 Consider Mach’s
characterisations of the goal of economically unified science which does not incorporate
excessive metaphysics, and of his own view of science:
It is the object of science to replace, or save, experiences, by the reproduction and antici-
pation of facts in thought. . . . any stock of knowledge worthy of the name is unattainable
except by the greatest mental economy. Science itself, therefore, may be regarded as a
minimal problem, consisting of the completest possible presentment. [237, pp. 481, 491].
11For comparison, Juti [193] concludes that theories in neither class —metaphysics and other
sciences— should be considered as primary or more fundamental with respect to one another. Juti
notes that e.g. Lowe [232] and Tahko [390] seem to promote the primary status of philosophical meta-
physics, whereas Ross, Ladyman and Spurrett [213, p. 30] take contemporary institutional science as
primary and give metaphysics the role of advancing its unity (§3.2).
12E.g. Peirce’s [304, 1.129], Planck’s [311, pp. 26,52] and Feigl’s [136, pp. 14-5] criticism against Mach
should be seen as criticism against the supposed over-propagated anti-metaphysics or against Mach’s
personal suggestions about the correct metaphysics, not against economy as a mature methodological
principle that in practice unites all scientists: “If we handle our concepts responsibly, we can avoid
metaphysical perplexities” (Feigl [135, pp. 50-1]).
13Charles Sanders Peirce first wrote about the economy of research a few years before Mach (Rescher
[330, p. 71]). The basic idea was that in practice, the simpler the hypothesis, the easier it is to test it.
A very similar idea was expressed by Quine and Ullian [326, pp. 408]: “At each stage. . . when choosing
a hypothesis subject to subsequent correction, it is still best to choose the simplest that is not yet
excluded. . . . the more complex the hypothesis, the more and wilder ways of going wrong; for how can
we tell which complexities to adopt?” See also Pietarinen [307, pp. 60-1].
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The goal which it has set itself is the simplest and most economical abstract expression of
facts. Mach [236, p. 207]
All living creatures who may study physics in the future will be obliged, like us, to provide
for their own survival and therefore to pay attention to whatever in nature is economically
important and permanent for them. Mach [242, p. 36]).
[E]very metaphysical and every one-sided mechanical view of physics were kept away, and
an arrangement, according to the principle of economy of thought, of facts—of what is
ascertained by the senses—was recommended. Mach [241, p. 9]
Again, the basis of an intelligible interpretation of what he meant by keeping metaphysics
away is Mach’s goal to unify science, which can never succeed without metaphysics as
some metaphysics must be in the very center of a unified world-view. Moreover, in
addition to the general preference for unification, Mach gave suggestions about what the
metaphysical core of the unified physics looks like, which makes it clear that Mach did not
intend to banish metaphysics completely: “Mach did not totally reject metaphysics (as
some of Vienna Circle tried). He looked through Kant’s ideas and accepted unavoidable
metaphysics. As a scholar of Beneke and principally a Neokantian, he tried to extract
the metaphysical errors of Kant.”14
Mach [243, pp. 361-2] [242, p. 39] explicity stated that he is not a solipsist or an extreme
idealist and therefore Mach’s metaphysics is compatible with ontological realism which
is an axiom of EUO; however, Mach concentrated heavily on psychology and on the
perceiver, and this tendency can be easily misinterpreted to be some version of extreme
idealism, when looking at Mach’s [237, pp. 482-3] passages such as: “Nature is composed
of sensations as its elements” and “the world is not composed of “things” as its elements,
but of colors, tones, pressures, spaces, times, in short what we ordinarily call individual
sensations.” Also, when Mach’s (ibid, p. 481) notion that “the object of science to
replace, or save, experiences, by the reproduction and anticipation of facts in thought”
is combined with his statements which reject ‘metaphysics,’ it can be misinterpreted and
applied in defending any theory of physics as the ‘correct description of facts’ without
seeing that it has a metaphysical base and without seeing that it has alternatives.
Mach’s views about the atomic theory are nuanced (cf. Brush [64]). His primary goal in
the anti-atomistic hypothesis was to reach a non-mechanistic description of the atomic
scale, i.e., to not to explain phenomena in that scale solely in terms of mechanistic
movement of particles; however, Mach also presented the falsifiable hypothesis that there
are no atoms e.g. in [239], a hypothesis which was also falsified, i.e., he was persistent
in both non-mechanicism and in the rejection of atoms (Blackmore [52]).
Mach [241] devoted a book for the conservation law of energy. Mach [237] suggested a
shift away from Newtonian absolute space and time, where time and space are indepen-
dent of particulars in space, and where a particular in space can move with respect to
the absolute space. The rejection of absolute space is interrelated with Mach’s view of
the Universe as a total gravitational system, where the principle “that links inertia of
mass to the total mass in space” (Suntola [385, p. 267]) has become to be called Mach’s
principle. According to Siemsen [360], by Mach’s principle “the movement of any object
would be dependent on the totality of mass in the universe.” In this view, when a mass
particular moves, its movement is always relative to and affected by the rest of the mass
in space, i.e., there is no such thing as ‘absolutely free movement’ that would not be
affected by the rest of the mass. Mach notes that the idea of absolute space is unneces-
14Karl Siemsen, personal communication. This interpretation is found from Hayo Siemsen, The Gen-
esis of Central Ideas of Ernst Mach, working paper.
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sarily metaphysical, whereas experience testifies that all moving bodies are affected by
other bodies:
No one is competent to predicate things about absolute space and absolute motion; they
are pure things of thought, pure mental constructs, that cannot be produced in experience.
All our principles of mechanics are, as we have shown in detail, experimental knowledge
concerning the relative positions and motions of bodies. Mach [237, p. 229, cf. pp. 542-3].
Some of Mach’s ideas are deployed in relativistic physics (Norton [295]) and some in the
Dynamic Universe model (DU) (§5). The analysis of Lichtenegger and Mashhoon [227]
shows that Mach’s principle is practically rejected in the General Theory of Relativity.
The relativistic standard model of cosmology is mechanistic and it violates the conser-
vation law or its role is at least ambiguous (§5.6.2). DU incorporates the conservation
law and “gives an unambiguous explanation and an exact mathematical expression for
inertia, in full agreement with Mach’s principle” (Suntola [385, p. 137]). DU is especially
holistic and not mechanistic (§5.2). Both models shift into intrinsic time from absolute
time but in different ways: while the Theory of Relativity incorporates intrinsic time in
the form of relativistic time, DU couples intrinsic time with absolute simultaneity.15
1924-1950’s positivism in philosophy. The anti-metaphysical turn was conveyed to
philosophical thinking through the classical logical positivist clubs —the Vienna Circle
and the Berlin Circle— which were active during the period 1924-1936. These clubs set
the path of 20th century analytical philosophy on logic, logical analysis and language,
drawing from the work of Russell, Frege and Wittgenstein. Mach was the biggest single
figure behind their extreme empiricism. This becomes clear from Uebel’s remarks about
the Vienna Circle:
[L]ong before the verification principle proper entered Circle’s discourse in the late 1920s,
the thought expressed by Mach’s dictum that “where neither confirmation nor refutation
is possible, science is not concerned” (1883 [1960, 587]) was accepted as a basic precept of
critical reflection about science. Uebel [402] and Mach [238]
According to the logical positivists’ verifiability criterion or the verifiability theory of
meaning, only verifiable commitments qualify as scientific. Therefore all unverifiable
and unfalsifiable metaphysical commitments are unscientific: e.g. all axioms of EUO
are unscientific according to the verifiability criterion. This full-blown anti-metaphysical
statement could have been a misinterpretation of Mach who did not aim to eliminate
metaphysics completely. Again, although Mach [237, p. 490] clearly declared that “where
neither confirmation nor refutation is possible, science is not concerned” he also proposed
unrefutable metaphysical principles. Although Mach seems to be inconsistent here, he
can also be interpreted to have taken his suggestions about metaphysics as verified, or
in any case as clearly ‘scientific’ in the sense that had great unificatory power? The
high point of the positivist movement was perhaps in the 1950’s (Aliseda and Gilles
[7, p. 436]). Philosophers such as Popper understood that the verifiability criterion is
unbearable because some metaphysics is present in theories in any case.
My criticism of the verifiability criterion has always been this: against the intention of its
defenders it did not exclude obvious metaphysical statements; but it did exclude the most
15It is notable that absolute time, or God’s time as Newton called it, was never needed nor applied
in giving predictions when applying Newtonian physics. Also, the focal periods of time were defined
intrinsically (§4.2), disregarding any God’s time whatsoever: one day was defined exactly as today as
the period of time during which the Earth rotates once around its own axis; one second was derived by
dividing the day; one year was defined exactly as it is defined today as the period in which the Earth
rotates once around the Sun.
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important and interesting of all scientific statements, that is to say, the scientific theories,
the universal laws of nature. Popper [313, p. 281]
The rejection of the verifiability criterion did not lead into a consensual positioning of the
goal towards economically unified science with a minimal metaphysical core, right into
the center of philosophy of science where it belongs to. Instead, the analysis proceeded
with a strongly formal, logical and linguistic outlook, without the most obvious unifying
goal. Several examples are given in §3.3 of how the unifying goal indeed unifies various
focal issues in philosophy of science. That is, although philosophers of science made great
contributions, the progress rate would have probably been lot greater with the commonly
accepted unifying goal. To illustrate the lack of the unified goal, consider the project of
giving meaning to approximate truth or truthlikeness of theories. The central approach to
truthlikeness has been the formal approach which only evaluates accuracies of predictions,
and the informal approach to truthlikeness means the evaluation of virtues of theories,
whereas in the unified approach the principle of economy evaluates both: accuracies
of predictions and virtues. As another example, the term metaphysics was replaced
during and after the reign of the verifiability criterion e.g. by logically independent
basic assumptions (p. 21), experimental laws, theoretical assumptions (p. 37), brute
facts (p. 22), premisses (p. 22) and unexplained explainers (Sellars [355]). Perhaps
the reason behind the hiding of the term ‘metaphysics’ even after the rejection of the
verifiability criterion was that although full-blown anti-metaphysics had been rejected,
metaphysics was still some kind of a taboo that did not have a respectable role among
philosophers of science who continued the research line conveyed to them by the logical
positivists? Whatever the reason, an overwhelming terminological redundancy does not
help in catching the unified goal.
1960’s and on: neo-scholastic metaphysics. After the rejection of the verifiabil-
ity criterion, when philosophers started to openly contemplate about metaphysics again
in the 60’s and 70’s, the principle of economy had very little importance. The absence
of the simplicity criterion in contemporary analytical metaphysics can be seen as an
over-propagated counter reaction to the positivists’ anti-metaphysics. The rejection of
positivism meant the tumbling down of a flood wall which prevented unnecessary meta-
physics from filling the valley. Ross, Ladyman and Spurrett characterize the transition16
from positivism into analytical or neo-scholastic metaphysics:
Initially granting themselves permission to do a bit of metaphysics that seemed closely tied
to, perhaps even important to, the success of the scientific project, increasing numbers of
philosophers lost their positivistic spirit. The result has been the rise to dominance of
projects in analytic metaphysics that have almost nothing to do with (actual) science.
Hence there are now, once again, esoteric debates about substance, universals, identity,
time, properties, and so on, which make little or no reference to science, and worse, which
seem to presuppose that science must be irrelevant to their resolution. Ross et al. [213,
pp. 9-10]
Recall that the greatest orientation behind the method of economical unification is to
function as an alternative to plain conceptual analysis that goes hand in hand with
neo-scholastic metaphysics (§3.5).
2007 the principle of naturalistic closure. Ross, Ladyman and Spurrett pre-
sented the principle of naturalistic closure (PNC) as a reaction to and as a mean to
restrain excessive neo-scholastic metaphysics, and as a guideline whose purpose is to
bring philosophical metaphysics closer to empirical science:
16For comparison, see Williamson’s [411] account of the transition.
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Any new metaphysical claim that is to be taken seriously should be motivated by, and
only by, the service it would perform, if true, in showing how two or more specific scientific
hypotheses jointly explain more than the sum of what is explained by the two hypotheses
taken separately, where a ‘scientific hypothesis’ is understood as an hypothesis that is
taken seriously by institutionally bona fide current science. Ross et al. [213, p. 30]
Unification and economy are implicit as PNC accepts only those new hypotheses which
explain more than previous hypotheses separately. When two previous theories are re-
placed by such a theory, the new theory has a higher relative simplicity. When a theory
is transformed by such hypothesis the resulting version has a higher relative simplicity.
PNC favours partial unifications (p. 38).
Although PNC is on the right track, it is in certain senses too strict. First, in PNC two
or more hypotheses should jointly explain more than the sum of what is explained by the
two hypotheses taken separately. Economy is increased already if postulate C explains as
much as A+B, but is simpler than A+B, i.e., the replacement of A+B by C is progressive
even if C does not explain more than A+B. Then again, if always when C explains at
least as much as A+B, it is also the case that C explains more than A+B, then PNC
could be sustained as such in this respect. A clear difficulty is that PNC accepts only
hypotheses that are taken seriously by current institutional science, and therefore PNC
functions solely within the current paradigms. Melnyk [268, p. 94] notes that this would
stall attempts to renew the current paradigms. That is, if Ross et al. accept all paths
of progress including reductions, theory shifts and partial unifications, they should also
accept that it is always institutional theories that are being shifted into new theories.
The exaggerated restriction can be removed by transforming ‘institutionally bona fide
current science’ into ‘theory that gives the most accurate predictions.’ When transformed
into a form congenial with the given version of economical unification, PNC becomes:
Any new metaphysical postulate or a system of postulates that is to be taken seriously
should explain more than the best earlier system, or explain as much with less metaphysics.
In the given version of economical unification and EUO as its product, no new metaphys-
ical hypotheses are made in the first place; instead, the goal is to identify an economically
unified theory with openly explicated metaphysical postulates. Axioms such as the law
of non-contradiction, causality and ontological realism are in any case implicit in the
thinking of scientists and in theories even if these are not written out, and these must
be explicated in order to make the evaluation of comprehensive theories objective.
3.3 Theory Shifts and Reductions; Pessimistic Induction; Un-
derdetermination; Approximate Truth; Falsifiability; Ra-
tional Proliferation
Theory shifts, reductions and partial unifications are paths into a more economically
unified total science. In a theory shift (or paradigm shift) that is favoured by economy,
theory A is replaced by theory B which does all that A does and is economically unified
with respect to A and incompatible with A. In a reduction which is complete and favoured
by economy, theory A is derived from theory B, where A and B are compatible and where
B is more economically unified than A. In a partial unification, postulate C is found
which is common to both A and B, but A and B also have non-overlapping postulates.
The characterization of these three paths and their relations is very inconclusive, but
29
it suffices for expressing the central point: all paths towards the ideally economically
unified science are paths to progress.
the shift from the earth-centered into the sun-centered model. As with
all theories, the ontology of a model of cosmology consists of the verified part and the
metaphysical part. The metaphysics of a model of cosmology can be characterized as the
fusion of the central unifying idea, laws of nature, regularities and hypothetical entities.17
Of all models with the most accurate predictions, economy favours the model with the
simplest sum of the central unifying idea, laws of nature, regularities and hypothetical
entities, or just the simplest sum of all metaphysics.
The central unifying idea of the Sun-centered model is that the Sun18 is the center of
the Solar System, and the central unifying idea of the Earth-centered model is that the
Earth is the unmoving center of the Universe. In both cases the central laws of nature
are the conservation law of energy, and gravitation that is expressed by some formulas.
In both cases the central unifying ideas are coupled with regularities. When a human
agent who is equipped with the idea that the Earth is the center of the Universe, makes
measurements M from the surface of the Earth19 with a telescope, the result is the
following: while the orbits of the Sun and the Moon around the Earth are circular, the
orbits of the planets around the Earth are epicyclic, as depicted in figure 4. In contrast,
Figure 4: A visualization of the Earth-centred model that requires the epicycles. The
figure is from pallisaard.com/blog
when a human agent who is equipped with the idea that the Sun is the unmoving center
of the Universe, makes the same measurements M , the conclusion is that all planets of
the Solar System circulate the Sun in elliptical orbits. Economy favours the Sun-centered
model because its uniform elliptical orbits are simpler than the epicyclic orbits of the
Earth-centered model. Therefore, when the Earth-centered model had been replaced by
the Sun-centered model, a shift into a metaphysically simpler model had taken place.
In both models, predictions —such as what will be the future positions of the planets—
are calculated by giving verified existents such as the present positions of the planets
as inputs to formulas which characterize the laws of nature and which are fitted around
the central unifying idea and regularities. One of the central notions of Kuhn [209]
was that when the predictions of a model do not match perceptions, the model may be
complemented with extra regularities or hypothetical entities, by which its predictions
can be made to match perceptions. Extra regularities and hypothetical entities may be
jointly called experimental parameters. These are by definition metaphysical entities, as
these are supposed to exist but these have not been verified to exist by perception. The
17The laws of nature postulated by the model could as well be considered to be implicit in the central
unifying idea, and vice versa.
18More accurately, the barycenter of the Solar System which is close to the center of the Sun.
19The point of measurement is in principle indifferent, as long as it is either the Sun or one of the
objects in a regular orbit in the Solar System, such as the planets, moons and comets.
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central reason why also metaphysical postulates need to be evaluated, i.e., the central
reason why the principle of economy is needed is to prevent an unconstrained explosion
of parameters; when the quantity of parameters increases, the theory gets less relatively
simple, which paves the way to a paradigm shift into a more economically unified theory,
which is progressive. This issue is handled below from the aspect of falsifiability.
underdetermination, pessimistic induction, approximate truth. Economy
would favour the Sun-centered model even if the Earth-centered model would give as
accurate predictions. Moreover, any other stellar object with a regular orbit could in
principle be selected as the center point. For instance, the idea that the Moon is the cen-
ter of the Universe and that everything else circulates the Moon would also suffice, but it
would have to be coupled with even more complex regularities than the Earth-centered
model. This raises the challenge of underdetermination: when “different, conflicting
theories are consistent with the data; . . . the choice of which theory to believe is under-
determined by the data” (Chakravartty [80]). Economy suggests that the metaphysically
simplest of all theories which are equally accurately consistent with the data is to be pre-
ferred. Thus, the challenge of underdetermination is exhausted by the basic formulation
of economy. The paradigm shifts also raise the challenge of pessimistic induction:
If one considers the history . . . what one typically finds is a regular turnover of older theories
in favour of newer ones, as scientific knowledge develops. From the point of view of the
present, most past theories must be considered false; indeed, this will be true from the
point of view of most times. Therefore, . . . surely theories at any given time will ultimately
be replaced and regarded as false from some future perspective. Thus, current theories are
also false. Chakravartty [80]
Even if the current theories were false, they are still the best approximations we have got
and there are no good alternatives for relying on them in the epistemic sense, except than
to replace them by even better theories. Pessimistic induction is thus not a threat to
economical unification, but it underlines that economy is needed in evaluating theories in
order to lubricate shifts into more economically unified theories. According to Niiniluoto
[289, p. 10]: “The best explanation for the practical success of science is the assumption
that scientific theories in fact are approximately true or sufficiently close to the truth in
the relevant respects.” Pessimistic induction indicates that the current theories are not
true, but as scientific realists wish to sustain some notion of a true theory, the concept
approximately true or truthlike does the job. In turn, explicating what approximately
true means is perhaps the most central challenge of scientific realism. Scientific realists
have had two broad strategies: “attempts to quantify approximate truth by formally
defining the concept and the related notion of relative approximate truth; and attempts
to explicate the concept informally” (Chakravartty [80]).
The formal approach can be characterized in terms of Niiniluoto’s [286, p. xii] similarity
approach where “the truthlikeness of the statement h depends on the similarities between
the states of affairs allowed by h and the true state of the world.” The basic idea
is that a theory gives predictions, and the better the predictions match perceptions,
the closer to truth is the theory. For comparison, Tambolo [393, p. 19] maintains
that ”a theory T is highly verisimilar . . . if it says many things about a target domain,
. . . and if many of these things are (almost exactly) true.” Niiniluoto [286] does not
openly talk about metaphysical postulates, and Agassi [4] characterises Popper’s and
Niiniluoto’s approaches to truthlikeness as halfway pro-metaphysical. Niiniluoto has got
nothing againstmetaphysics, but does not take it in account in evaluating theories either,
i.e., Niiniluoto has perfected the notion of what it means that a theory gives accurate
predictions, but has left metaphysics for others. When commenting the principle of
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economy, Niiniluoto20 maintains that the “definition of verisimilitude fits in principle for
all theories, i.e., also for theories with existential claims. In practical applications we
must do some kinds of evaluations of the weights.” Niiniluoto21 confirms that he accepts
the idea that we first apply the similarity approach in picking out theories with the most
accurate predictions, and after this evaluate the aesthetic features of the theories, like
simplicity of metaphysics. Economy can thus be characterized as a fusion of the formal
and informal22 approaches to theory evaluation. Psillos’ remarks show that equating
‘closer to truth’ with ‘more economically unified’ and ‘more virtuous’ is not a new idea:
As is well known, scientific realists typically suggest that when it comes to assessing the
support which scientific theories enjoy, we should not examine only their empirical ade-
quacy. This may be necessary but not enough on its own to make a theory well supported.
We also need to take into account several theoretical virtues such as coherence with other
established theories, consilience, completeness, unifying power, lack of ad hoc features and
capacity to generate novel predictions. These virtues capture the explanatory power of a
theory, and explanatory power is potentially confirmatory. Psillos [317, p. 171]
Accordingly, the fullest notion of economy should unify all applicable ingredients of both
approaches: the formal approach which was characterized in terms of Niiniluoto’s simi-
larity approach should be complemented by an as well finalised measure of the informal
approach which was characterized as the measure of virtuousness, a project which is
advanced in this thesis. Kaila’s relative simplicity is modified in §5.7 so that it takes in
account some other theoretical virtues in addition to empirical sufficiency and metaphys-
ical simplicity. Even this version is not all-pervasive. For instance, how to select between
two sums of metaphysics which are otherwise equal, but where one sum posits existence
to a greater quantity of one type of a metaphysical entity and less types of metaphysical
entities, whereas the other posits a smaller quantity of that type of a metaphysical entity
but more types of metaphysical entities? Although more nuanced versions will be needed
in the future, the given version is sufficient for the needs of this thesis and the current
state of the field where the differences in metaphysical complexities of competing theo-
ries are absolutely obvious: precision instruments are not needed in telling that a theory
which incorporates 70 % more unperceived energy and a stack of other commitments is
metaphysically more complex than another theory. Once we have arrived at two com-
prehensive theories which require a more nuanced evaluation criterion, we have already
taken a leap forward: once everything that is clearly excessive has been shaved away, we
can concentrate on more nuanced criteria. Moreover, the greatest problem today is that
the role of metaphysics in physics is not very well understood. Accepting the existence
of metaphysics in physics and explicating it is of course a prerequisite for objectively
evaluating theories. It is not surprising that many physicists have extreme difficulties in
accepting that a better theory is available, when it is difficult for them to accept that
there are alternatives to standard physics in the fist place.
It is important that in the light of the current investigation the terms ‘better’ and ‘more
truthlike’ have the same meaning: more economically unified. That is, the selection is
only a matter of terminology. Consider the main reason that supports ‘better.’ Theo-
ries have unverifiable and unfalsifiable metaphysical commitments whose correspondence
20Personal communication, 4.4.2015.
21Personal communication, 21.5.2016.
22Chakravartty [79, p. 222] suggests another informal account: “Consider all of the causal properties
and relations relevant to the nature or behaviour of a particular system or class of target systems. Degrees
of approximate truth are determined . . . by the extent to which theories incorporate the properties and
relations.” This approach seems to be implicit in relative simplicity as the ratio: the extent of how
widely a theory explains the focal phenomena, divided by its postulates.
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cannot be known even in principle and which in the light of pessimistic induction may
be rejected in the next turn. There are reasons to suppose that an ideally economically
unified theory is true (p. 138), but still all theories on the path towards it are strictly
speaking false, and it is awkward to call one false theory more ‘truthlike’ than another
false theory, whereas the term ‘better’ does not have this problem. I cannot find a better
support for ‘more truthlike’ than repeating Niiniluoto’s [289, p. 10] statement: “The
best explanation for the practical success of science is the assumption that scientific
theories in fact are approximately true or sufficiently close to the truth in the relevant
respects.” How to explain why a more economically unified theory indeed ‘agrees’ with
nature better than others, if it does not somehow reflect how nature works, better than
others? In the following, the terms ‘better’ and ‘more economically unified’ are used.
strengthening the sun-centered model. Newton [284] fused the inverse-square
law of gravitation with the elliptical orbits of the Sun-centered model in 1687. This
enabled predicting the whereabouts of the planets of the Solar System with a yet unseen
accuracy. A problem was confronted in 1781 and in 1821. While the other planets
conformed to the predictions, the measured orbit of Uranus deviated from the predictions.
There were two alternative conclusions: either there is something wrong with the fusion,
or there is something concrete that causes the deviations. As the fusion was the best one
available, it was natural to suppose that a stellar object was the cause of the deviations.
The search for the object started; as a result of the search the planet Neptune was
measured to exist in 1846. During the period of time [t 1846], where t is the time
when the hypothesis about Neptune was made, Neptune was a hypothetical entity. The
existence of Neptune was verifiable, but this was not known before it was measured.
After its discovery, Neptune ceased to be a hypothetical entity, and the commitment
to its existence became verified. The discovery of Neptune further confirmed the Sun-
centered model.
The following pattern may be excavated from the success story of discovering Neptune.
Model F initially gives more accurate predictions than any earlier model and F becomes
the paradigm. Later, a conflict is found between the predictions of F and new per-
ceptions. Since the hopes are still high for F , the proponents of F aim to explain the
deviations away in terms of a hypothetical entity h, which is supposed to correspond to
a mind-independent object. Since the correspondence of h is unverified, h becomes a
part of the metaphysics of F , i.e., F becomes F + h. As h is supposed to correspond
to a mind-independent object, the search for the object is initiated, i.e., attempts are
being made to measure the object. Eventually the object is empirically verified to exist.
In effect, h ceases to be a hypothetical entity and F + h is transformed back into F .
The commitment in the existence of h ceases to be a metaphysical and becomes verified.
Model F is further confirmed.
falsifiability. If the currently prevailing paradigm of cosmology were ideal or perfect,
the future of cosmology would be only about what Kuhn [209] calls normal science: about
building more and more on the central metaphysical commitments of the paradigm —
which Kuhn calls the disciplinary matrix of the paradigm— and about success stories of
making existence hypotheses based on deviations from predictions and always making
more and more discoveries by empirical confirmations. However, if the paradigm fails to
give correct predictions or if its metaphysical weight keeps on increasing, then it is not
at all clear that the paradigm is optimal. This is congenial with Newton and Kuhn:
In experimental philosophy we are to look upon propositions collected [or inferred] by
general induction from phenomena as accurately or very nearly true, notwithstanding any
contrary hypothesis that may be imagined, till such time as other phænomena occur, by
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which they may either be made more accurate, or liable to exceptions. Newton [284, bk.
3, rule IV]
Failure of existing rules is the prelude to a search for new ones. Kuhn’s [209, p. 68]
Economy is crucial: if the paradigm does not give correct predictions as such, it can
be fixed by incorporating extra hypothetical entities and/or regularities by which its
predictions can be made to match perceptions. That is, if the model does not match
reality, the reality can be forced to match the model by additional metaphysics. Again,
it is insufficient to look only at the accuracy of predictions, for this sets no kinds of
constraints to metaphysics, and clashes Karl Popper’s [313, p. 281] [315] falsifiability
criterion, which Popper introduced in the place of the positivists’ verifiability criterion:
“For Popper, a theory is scientific only if it is refutable by a conceivable event. Every
genuine test of a scientific theory, then, is logically an attempt to refute or to falsify it, and
one genuine counter-instance falsifies the whole theory” (Thornton [397]). The function
of the falsifiability criterion is not to render all theories with metaphysical commitments
as unscientific, but it is satisfied only by falsifiable predictions of theories. However, and
again, when the predictions of a theory do not match perceptions, it can be saved from
falsification by introducing more metaphysical commitments: “theories shape and order
facts and can therefore be retained come what may” (Feyerabend [139, p. 5]).
Unless metaphysical complexities of theories count in evaluating them, scientific meta-
physics can practically flow free. This underlines the importance of economy, which
guarantees that metaphysical parameters cannot be swept under the rug by maintaining
that they are merely ‘empirical facts’ or ‘observational terms’ after all, nor by trying to
downplay them as merely ‘philosophical’ or ‘ideological.’23 Economy as the evaluation
criterion thus incorporates falsifiability as far as possible: as falsifications are compen-
sated by adding metaphysics, the relative simplicity of the theory reduces, i.e., the theory
gets less economical. Kuhn teaches that the metaphysical weight of theories has increased
as a function of time in the past, and a look at relativistic physics (§5) testifies that the
weights have been increased also recently. Feyerabend’s worries about universal theories
underline the need to explicate metaphysical commitments of theories and evaluate them
by economy:
But if one accepts the pervasive character of universal theories, then one must ask oneself
how this kind of theory could be empirically tested at all. This gives rise to the suspicion
that these theories, by influencing the observation language, exclude the possibility of
articulating falsifying observational sentences. . . . Feyerabend suggests that a theory is
not, as previously believed, tested by confronting it with empirical data, but that much
more serious tests require confronting at least two theories that are incompatible with
each other. The weaknesses of a theory often do not appear if the theory confronted with
the facts as seen from its own perspective, but may only appear if facts as seen from the
perspective of an alternative theory are allowed. Hoyningen-Huene [176, p. 10]
As always, the accuracies of two universal theories or collections of theories are evaluated
first. If they are equally accurate, their openly explicated metaphysical commitments are
evaluated. The most economically unified theory wins. This shows that Feyerabend’s
23Quine’s [323] distinction of ontological and ideological commitments is not used because it is difficult
to distinguish commitments in the two classes, and because all metaphysics is any case taken in account
in economy evaluations. According to Cowling [92, p. 3890], ideological parsimony concerns primitive
concepts and ontological parsimony concerns existential commitments. This underlines the difficulty of
distinguishing the classes: What is the difference of a primitive concept and an existential commitment?
According to Sider [359, p. 230] ideological commitments are “as much commitments to metaphysics as
are ontological commitments.”
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worries are exhausted by explicating metaphysics in physics and by giving economy the
role of judge.
stagnation to paradigms vs. rational proliferation. If the paradigmatic the-
ory fails to give correct predictions or if its metaphysical weightload keeps on increasing,
it is natural to start searching for a more optimal theory. Given that a new theory
is available and if economy clearly favours it, the path should be open for a paradigm
shift. The shifts should happen in orderly fashion so that they would not be treated as
revolutions as Kuhn calls them, but more like something that must be accepted since the
old theory has been objectively evaluated to be worse than a new one. Unfortunately,
history and the present both show that ‘revolution’ characterises paradigm shifts very
well, and the enlightened state of science where theories can be evaluated objectively is
currently only a dream of a better future. The typical case is that a scientist takes the
commitments of the current paradigm as articles of faith and is not willing to consider
alternative commitments no matter what. The commitments of current paradigms of
physics and their implications are often not considered as metaphysical postulates but
as ‘empirical facts,’ just as Feyerabend saw. People who suggest new commitments are
treated as unscientific rebels, and stagnated environment effectively prevents paradigm
shifts as it prevents taking better theories seriously, despite objective evaluations:24
[E]mpirically minded scientists at once confront it with status quo and announce tri-
umphantly that ‘it is not in agreement with facts and received principles’. They are
of course right, and even trivially so, but not in the sense intended by them. For at an
early stage of development the contradiction only indicates that the old and the new are
different and out of phase. It does not show which view is the better one. A judgement of
this kind presupposes that the competitors confront each other on equal terms. How shall
we proceed in order to bring about such a fair comparison? Feyerabend [141, p. 113]
Economy is the suggested evaluation criterion. Economy is needed also in tackling dog-
matism: an extreme form of stagnation which prevents a more economical theory from
becoming the new paradigm. Economy thus paves the way to a more enlightened state of
science where the proposed changes would no longer be considered as ‘rebellions’ which
are always opposed until a revolution replaces the current paradigm, but instead as sug-
gestions which can be objectively evaluated. Perhaps the only long-term solution to
stagnation is to teach philosophy of science to the students of physics and of all other
disciplines, instead of teaching them the current paradigms as final truths. Moreover,
it is not enough to teach that the current paradigms may not be final, for the opti-
mal progress rate of science requires systematically encouraging students to seek out
alternatives, and to openly bring into light the problems of the current paradigms:
[C]onsider the role science now plays in education. Scientific ‘facts’ are taught at a very
early age and in the very same manner in which religious ‘facts’ were taught only a century
ago. There is no attempt to waken the critical abilities of the pupil so that he may be
able to see things in perspective. At the universities the situation is even worse, for
indoctrination is here carried out in a much more systematic manner. . . . In society at
large the judgement of the scientist is received with the same reverence as the judgement
of bishops and cardinals was accepted not too long ago. . . . Pursue this investigation further
and you will see that science has now become as oppressive as the ideologies it had once to
fight. . . . In this case it is of paramount importance to strengthen the minds of the young
and ‘strengthening the minds of the young’ means strengthening them against any easy
acceptance of comprehensive views. Feyerabend [139, pp. 4, 7]
24The discussion during 2010-2014 in the Tieteessa¨ Tapahtuu journal about the nature of relativistic
physics and its alternatives is a good example of the unwillingness to consider alternatives.
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Feyerabend [138, p. 26] suggests the replacement of indoctrination by proliferation of
theories that are inconsistent with the paradigms: “Invent and elaborate theories that
are inconsistent with the accepted point of view, even if the latter should happen to
be highly confirmed and generally accepted.” Obviously, the invention of competing
theories is a prerequisite for coming up with a better theory:
[O]ne should let them compete with each other in the very same manner in which party
lines are competing in politics. The invention of “contrary hypotheses” is the first step
towards such competition, and never is their invention more necessary than when it seems
that certain ideas have been confirmed beyond doubt and that matters have been settled
once and for all. Feyerabend [137], as cited in Achinstein [1, p. 45]
Proliferation leaves over the question that on what basis ought an alternative theory be
accepted. The suggestion at hand is that economy ought to be accepted as the criterion.
Achinstein’s notions are compatible with this view:
Scientists . . . don’t just aim at “inventing and elaborating” theories for the sheer joy of
it. They want to discover true theories, or ones that are probable, or ones that yield
reasonably good predictions, or at least theories that are good in some important way
(e.g. they are unifying or simple). . . . why should we regard a theory as true, or probable,
of good in some way simply because it is inconsistent with the accepted point of view?
Achinstein [1, p. 38]
rationality of paradigm shifts? Aliseda and Gilles [7, pp. 466-7] propose “that
philosophers of science have to develop not only a theory of the growth of science, but
also a theory of the appraisal of scientific hypotheses. . . . we need a theory of the ap-
praisal of scientific hypotheses which does not involve detailed considerations of how
those hypotheses are discovered.” Economy is a suggestion of exactly this kind of a
‘theory’ or a criterion of fitness. Aliseda and Gilles (ibid, p. 468) also conclude that
“Lakatos did not solve the problem he set out to solve, that is the problem of whether
scientific revolutions can be rational.” Lakatos maintains that there are no standards for
evaluating two paradigms:
There are no rational standards for their comparison. Each paradigm contains its own
standards. The crisis sweeps away not only the old theories and rules but also the standards
which made us respect them. The new paradigm brings a totally new rationality. There
are no superparadigmatic standards. The change is a bandwagon effect. Thus in Kuhn’s
view scientific revolution is irrational, a matter for mob psychology. Lakatos [214, pp.
90-1]
Against Lakatos, it is suggested here that economy indeed is a rational superparadig-
matic standard for comparing theories. Each paradigm does have its own standards
—metaphysical commitments or Kuhn’s disciplinary matrix or Lakatos’ hard core— but
these standards themselves can be evaluated by economy. The new standards do bring
new rationality in the sense that it is different to work with new metaphysics, but econ-
omy still functions as a superparadigmatic standard. On one hand, it is hard to avoid
some kind of a bandwagon effect when people see that it is time to withdraw the money
out of the bank before it goes bankrupt, but it is still better to constantly evaluate
competing theories than to hold on to one unconditionally. On the other hand, if com-
peting theories are constantly evaluated, the transition into a new one is more likely to
be smooth.
reductionist models. The reductionist models of Oppenheim-Putnam and Nagel
share the unificatory character of Aristotle and Mach. Were the reduction of sciences
36
fully completed in the way characterized in their models, everything would have been
explained in terms of some basic unified postulate base. Metaphysics is thus in the center
of the reductionist models, although their creators systematically silenced away direct
references to it. Oppenheim and Putnam [300, p. 4] maintain that unity of science refers
to “first, to an ideal state of science, and, second to a pervasive trend within science,
seeking the attainment of that ideal.” They also ask whether unitary science can be
attained at all, and if then how, but these questions do not need to be answered in
order to know that science can get more economically unified than it is now, and that
even a coherent postulate base for all sciences would be a major advancement. The
idea of explaining everything in terms of an economically unified postulate base does not
match practices of today’s disunified institutional physics and the characterizations of
reductionism by Oppenheim-Putnam and by Nagel are imperfect accounts of how the
ideal state of science can be attained. But science and philosophy of science are both
works in progress and proceed through trial and error: we should not reject the goal
towards ideally economically unified science, no more than the goal towards correctly
characterising just what kind of reduction works and what is the role of reduction in
unification. It is suggested in §3.6 that perhaps the age of reductionism can fully start
only after overall coherence has been first established.
In Nagel’s [281] [282, p. 352] reductionist model a theory is explained by a more fun-
damental theory: “A reduction is effected when the experimental laws of the secondary
science . . . are shown to be the logical consequences of the theoretical assumptions . . . of
the primary science.” Whenever a secondary science is indeed reduced to a more pri-
mary science, unification has taken place and the commitments of the secondary science
are seen to be commitments of the primary science, i.e., it is seen that two branches
of science belong to the same tree. However, if this were the only path to the progress
of science, then progress of science would have very limited prospects. For this kind of
reductionism does not take place in shifts where theory A is replaced by another theory
B: A cannot be reduced into B when A and B are incompatible. Feyerabend [140, pp.
44-5, 57-9] points out that Nagel’s principle that secondary science is explained in terms
of primary science and Hempel and Oppenheim’s [166, p. 321] scheme of explanation
where the explanandum is derived from the explanans, do not apply e.g. when trying to
reduce Galilean science to Newtonian science, as these are incompatible. However, the
phenomena that were explained in terms of Galilean science can be explained in terms of
Newtonian science, and as Newtonian science explains more, the transition is favoured
by economy, i.e., although reduction does not apply in this case, economical unification
is certainly implemented. Ross et al. [213, p. 49] maintain that although the derivations
are not perfect, e.g. some of Galileo’s laws can be derived from Newton’s, and some of
Newton’s from the Special Theory of Relativity, “given suitable additional assumptions
and restrictions in each case.” So, some kind of imperfect reduction has taken place in
physics, although paradigm shifts do not proceed by such reduction. In Oppenheim and
Putnam’s [300] micro-reduction a lower-level branch of science is reduced into a more
fundamental higher-level branch, and the reducing theory explains all that the reduced
theory explains. Ross et al. criticise Oppenheim and Putnam’s supposition that even
biology and social science are reducible to physics, but they see that reductions are
progressive:
[T]his hunch has been displaced by a widespread emphasis on ‘emergence’ and inter-level
feedback loops. Hence in many respects the inappropriateness of Oppenheim and Putnam’s
most crude background assumptions is not even controversial nowadays. . . .We reject
micro-reductionism but not Nagelian reductionism, because we think that there are real
examples of Nagelian reductions (though not of caricatures of Nagelian reductions involving
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bridge laws) that are significant contributions to science, and steps toward unification. Ross
et al. [213, pp. 47,49]
partial unification. It is certain that the reduction of e.g. biology to physics has
not been achieved, but it is another question that can biology and physics ever be even
partially unified. In partial unification of theories A and B, postulate C is found that is
common to A and B, but A and B have non-overlapping postulates even after the partial
unification. Suppose that one day evolution is derived from entelecheia or the actualiza-
tion of potentiality as a law of nature (p. 110), i.e., it is established somehow that given
entelecheia, the birth of life and further evolution are asymptotically determined (§7.2).
Were this unification achieved, evolution would have ceased to be a separate postulate,
and biology would have been unified with that physics where some version of entelecheia
is postulated. If physics and biology would still have non-overlapping postulates, we
would be dealing by definition with a partial unification, which can also be characterized
as ‘partial reduction.’ This is just an example of a desired step which would make science
more economically unified, but it is another question that can it be achieved. Partial
unification was inspired by the Principle of Naturalistic Closure (p. 28).
3.4 Critique of the Simplicity Criterion and Critique of Unified
Explanation
Consider allegations against the simplicity criterion of the principle of economy:
A common concern is that notions of simplicity appear vague, and judgements about
the relative simplicity of particular theories appear irredeemably subjective. Thus, one
problem is to explain more precisely what it is for theories to be simpler than others and
how, if at all, the relative simplicity of theories can be objectively measured. Fitzpatrick
[145]
In order to judge that one theory furnishes a better explanation of some phenomenon than
another, one must employ some criterion or criteria on the basis of which the judgement is
made. Many have been proposed: simplicity. . . consistency and coherence . . . unity . . . and
so on. One challenge here concerns whether virtues such as these can be defined precisely
enough to permit relative rankings of explanatory goodness. Chakravartty [80]
Given that the domain of application of the evaluated theories has been explicated and
it has been established that these give equally accurate predictions, it is hard to see
why the evaluation of their metaphysical complexities should be vague or subjective.
The evaluation works e.g. in the case of the Earth-centered vs. Sun-centered model as
well as with the case of relativistic physics vs. the Dynamic Universe model in §5.7.
It is not hard to see that epicycles are more complex than elliptical orbits, nor to see
that 70% of hypothetical dark energy is more complex than 0%, nor that massive hy-
pothetical greenhouse effects on Earth and Mars are more than no greenhouse effects at
all. Precision instruments are not needed in evaluating such differences in metaphysical
complexities, i.e., simplicity and other virtues can be defined and evaluated accurately
enough for the needs at hand. The real problem is to get scientists and philosophers to
genuinely respect virtues and to understand the role of metaphysics in physics. Consider
some queries about the justification of virtues:
In addition, even if we can get clearer about what simplicity is and how it is to be measured,
there remains the problem of explaining what justification, if any, can be provided for
choosing between rival scientific theories on grounds of simplicity. For instance, do we
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have any reason for thinking that simpler theories are more likely to be true? Fitzpatrick
[145]
Finally, there is the question of whether these virtues should be considered evidential or
epistemic, as opposed to merely pragmatic. What reason is there to think, for instance,
that simplicity is an indicator of truth? Chakravartty [80]
There is no prima facie reason to believe that a theory that endorses a smaller number of
things, or kinds of things, or employs a smaller number of primitives, is . . . likelier to be
true or likely to yield more insight than another. . . . If, in a given case, considerations of
this kind do make one theory better than another, then that point should be made, and
the particular reasons should be given. Parsons [302, p. 660]
There are good reasons for respecting theoretical virtues, and these are restatements of
what has been said in the previous sections. (1) It has been pointed out that once two
theories are established to be equally accurate, there are in practice no other pragmatic
and heuristic means available for evaluating theories than to evaluate their metaphysical
simplicities and degrees of other virtues, i.e., we must do what we can. The terms ‘more
truthlike’ and ‘better’ are used with the same meaning. It is not argued that a stepping
stone towards an ideally unified theory is true, but the terms ‘more truthlike’ and ‘better’
fit for characterizing more economically unified theories better than less economically
unified theories. (2) Giving virtuousness the role of judge feeds progress. By negation, if
virtues do not count then whatever goes as long as the theory gives correct predictions,
and this is regressive and feeds unconditional stagnation. (3) For some, plain common
sense reveals that virtuous theories are in all relevant senses more favourable than vicious
theories: “I think that we apply many of these criteria in assessing philosophical theories,
and that it is an important part of our job as philosophical theorists” (Nolan [293, p.
224]). Consider two theories, A and B, which are equally accurate in doing the very same
thing. Theory A is simpler, easier to understand, easier to use, coherent and consilient,
whereas B is a more complex disunified aggregate of incoherent theories that is harder to
understand and harder to use and requires more and more parameters in explaining new
data. Which one would you choose? (4) The classical paradigm shifts have been shifts
into more virtuous theories. (5) Economical unification is not progressive only in science,
but also in topics typically discussed in the context philosophy, as exemplified in §3.5. (6)
Perhaps the main reasons of why it seems to be difficult to some to accept virtuousness
as the judge are (i) the failure of identifying the correct role of metaphysics in science
and the tendency to consider metaphysical commitments of theories as ‘empirical facts,’
(ii) the fear of simplicity as a counter reaction to logical positivism, and (iii) the current
disunified institutional physics is so full of vices that this state of affairs may have created
an atmosphere where it is difficult to support virtues. Consider further worries about
the virtues:
Another challenge concerns the multiple meanings associated with some virtues (consider,
for example, mathematical versus ontological simplicity). Another concerns the possibility
that such virtues may not all favour any one theory in particular. Chakravartty [80]
The worry about multiple meanings —mathematical versus ontological simplicity— is
exhausted by the notion that the evaluation of syntactical or mathematical simplicity of
theories can be postponed to the third place after the accuracies of predictions have been
measured first and other virtues second. Unless this order is followed, it becomes very
hard to evaluate theories. To illustrate, McAllister [254, pp. 107-8] maintains that as dif-
ferent measures of a theory’s syntactical simplicity —magnitude of exponents, number of
variables and the criterion of integer exponents— are of equal intrinsic worth “any judg-
ment that one theory is simpler than another is arbitrary. Simplicity considerations—this
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argument concludes—are thus not suited to picking from among a number of competing
theories the one that is the closest to truth.” Newton-Smith [285, p. 231] agrees: “The
case for simplicity is pragmatic. It is simply easier to calculate with simpler theories.
There is no reason to see greater relative simplicity of this sort as an indicator of greater
verisimilitude.” McAllister and Newton-Smith both disregard the role of metaphysics in
‘closeness to truth’ and ‘verisimilitude’ for they talk solely about syntactical simplicity
in the above passages. Moreover, it is quite obvious that a metaphysically simpler theory
structure requires simpler mathematics, and does not need or needs less parameters in
the equations.
When we have reached the stage where we have equally accurate and equally complex
theories, a great leap has already been taken forward. The fear that all virtues do not
favour any one theory are in vain at this stage of development, at least when it comes
down to models of fundamental physics, which are just the ones that are relevant with
respect to the goals if this thesis. At some point in the future we might need a more
nuanced criterion which takes in account mathematical simplicity, but the future need for
such criterion should not prevent the primary evaluation of the accuracy of predictions
and the degree of virtuousness. McAllister discusses the argument from the simplicity
of phenomena:
The argument from the simplicity of the phenomena takes the following form: since the
phenomena are simple, a theory about a given phenomenon is more likely to be empirically
adequate if it too is simple. This argument has two principal defects. First, since judgments
of simplicity are relative rather than absolute, the claim that the phenomena are simple,
like the related claim that nature is uniform, is not well formulated. One would have
to claim rather that the phenomena are simple compared to some other entity, but it is
difficult to see what entity could act as a worthwhile term in this comparison. Second,
our only ground for believing that a given phenomenon is to some degree simple are our
theories about that phenomenon. Therefore, it is illegitimate to cite the belief that the
phenomena are simple in support of the claim that a given theory is empirically adequate.
McAllister [254, pp. 106]
First, when evaluating metaphysical complexities of theories which explain specific ranges
or scales of phenomena —such as the scale of cosmology or the scale of particles— the
relativeness vanishes: the theories are evaluated with respect to the same scales. Second,
it is not claimed here that simple and sufficient theories show that nature is simple: we
have theories and nature that the theories aim to describe. One can believe that nature
is more complex than needs to be supposed and another may believe it is just as simple
as needs to be supposed: the question is reduced into the question of why suppose that
nature is more complex than needs to be supposed?
critique of unified explanation. The basic Aristotelio-Machian scheme of explain-
ing in terms of an economically unified theory (EUT) gets over the critique targeted at
unified explanation, and it is compatible with specific models of scientific explanation.
The principle of economy as an evaluation criterion of theories goes over and above the
nuances of different models of scientific explanation. For, if in a model that characterizes
the logic of scientific explanation, explaining is about explaining with some theory, then
it in any case holds that a more economically unified theory enables a better explanation.
Kitcher’s unification model [201, 202] is in certain senses similar to EUT, but in another
sense crucially different. In Kitcher’s model, explaining is about unifying or deriving
disparate phenomena or a diverse set of facts under a small number of basic principles
or patterns. In Kitcher’s model, unification is explanation, whereas in EUT unifica-
tion is just unification, not explanation, although unification results into better theories
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and thus into better explanations. Despite mixing unification and explanation, the pro-
gressiveness of unification in science is the driving force behind Kitcher’s [202, p. 431]
thought: “Science supplies us with explanations whose worth cannot be appreciated by
considering them one-by-one but only by seeing how they form part of a systematic pic-
ture of the order of nature.” There is much good in Kitcher’s model, and there are no
reasons to throw the child away with the washing water.
EUT and Kitcher’s model are both compatible with Hempel and Oppenheim’s [166,
p. 321] classical covering-law model of explanation whose core principle is that “the ex-
planandum must be logically deducible from the information contained in the explanans.”
In EUT the explanans is understood as a unified theory, and the explanandum as some-
thing that is explained in terms of it.
Plain EUT can be understood without having to commit to any particular economically
unified theory, but when actual explanations are given, the theory must naturally be
explicated. The unified theory in EUT is DU+EUO in the following. In effect, EUT
is congenial with Wesley Salmon’s [347, p. 269] causal-mechanical model, where expla-
nation of a phenomenon “involves the placing of the explanandum in a causal network
consisting of relevant causal interactions that occurred previously and suitable causal
processes that connect them to the fact-to-be-explained.” For, causality is postulated in
§4.7 as an axiom of EUO. Explaining in terms of DU+EUO could be characterized e.g.
as conservation-law-causal rather than just causal-mechanical.
EUT has now been characterized clearly enough to show that it is untouched by the fol-
lowing critique from Woodward [416]. Woodward targeted the critique against Kitcher’s
unification model, but here it is pointed out only that it does not threaten EUT. The
first critique stems from causality-related contemplations:
Call derivations of the state of motion of planets at some future time t from information
about their present positions (at time t0), masses, and velocities, the forces incident on
them at t0, and the laws of mechanics predictive. Now contrast such derivations with
retrodictive derivations in which the present motions of the planets are derived from in-
formation about their future velocities and positions at t, the forces operative at t0, and
so on. It looks as though there will be just as many retrodictive derivations as predictive
derivations, and each will require premises of exactly the same general sort—information
about positions, velocities, masses etc. and the same laws. Thus the pattern or patterns
instantiated by the retrodictive derivations look(s) exactly as unified as the pattern or
patterns associated with the predictive derivations. However, we ordinarily think of the
predictive derivations and not the retrodictive derivations as explanatory and the present
state of the planets as the cause of their future state and not vice-versa. It is again far
from obvious how considerations having to do with unification could generate such an
explanatory asymmetry. Woodward [416]
It is misleading to say that considerations having to do with unification generate an
explanatory ‘asymmetry’ for the ‘asymmetry’ is merely the result of the supposed causal
structure of the Universe. The derivation of the position p−1 of the Moon at t−1, from its
position p0 at t0 is in one sense retrodictive, but in another sense predictive. In the unified
theory, it is supposed that the Moon must have moved from location p−1 to location p0.
Thus, the instead of considering the explanation retrodictive, it can be considered as
predictive, where the task is to give such coordinates of the Moon at t−1 that make it
possible in the unified theory to find it from position p0 at t0, so that the state of affairs
at t−1 could have caused the state of affairs at t0. Both retrodictive and predictive
explanations are given under DU+EUO, where causality is forward-directed, and where
the present causes the future and where the past caused the present. The famous flagpole-
shadow example is not a threat either: the sun and the flagpole cause a shadow and not
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vice versa, but we can still deduce from the perception of the shadow that something
caused it, i.e., we are dealing here with nuances of scientific explanation which compose
no threat to EUT. Woodward (ibid) maintains that the above example “casts doubt
on Kitcher’s contention that one can begin with the notion of explanatory unification,
understood in a way that does not presuppose causal notions, and use it to derive the
content of causal judgments.” This does not threaten EUT which incorporates causality
on the level of axioms. The second critique stems from heterogeneity of unification:
Is Kitcher’s account of unification sufficiently discriminating or nuanced to distinguish
those unifications having to do with explanation from other sorts of unification? The
worry is that it is not. The conception of unification underlying Kitcher’s account seems
to be at bottom one of descriptive economy or information compression—deriving as much
from as few patterns of inference as possible. Many cases of classificatory and purely formal
unification involving a common mathematical framework seem to fit this characterization.
Consider schemes for biological classification and schemes for the classification of geological
and astronomical objects like rocks and stars. If I know that individuals belong to a certain
classificatory category (e.g. Xs are mammals or polar bears), I can use this information
to derive a great many of their other properties (Xs have backbones, hearts, their young
are born alive etc.) and this is a pattern of inference that can be used repeatedly for
many different sorts of Xs. But despite the willingness of some philosophers to regard
such derivations as explanatory, it is common scientific practice to regard such schemes
as “merely descriptive” and as telling us little or nothing about the causes or mechanisms
that explain why Xs have backbones or hearts. Woodward [416]
It is not a problem of EUT if Kitcher’s model does not distinguish between derivations
from a theory and derivations from a classification scheme, for EUT explaining is done
with a theory. The main contribution of this critique might be the notion that two types
of derivation must be distinguished: derivations from classification schemes in the ab-
sence of a theory; derivations from a theory that is entangled with a classification scheme.
As a theory incorporates metaphysics, the explication of the metaphysical commitments
of the theory that does the explaining is again seen to have central importance: the
causes or mechanisms that explain e.g. why Xs have backbones or hearts, or in general
the eventual answers to such why-questions are metaphysical. Perhaps the reason why
Kitcher’s account of unified explanation does not distinguish between the two types of
derivations is that metaphysics was silenced away too strictly:
I have been trying to show that we can make sense of scientific explanation and our view
of the causal structure of nature without indulging in the metaphysics. The aim has been
to develop a simple, and, I think, very powerful idea. The growth of science is driven in
part by the desire for explanation, and to explain is to fit the phenomena into a unified
picture insofar as we can. What emerges in the limit of this process is nothing less than
the causal structure of the world. Kitcher [202, p. 500]
This attitude is very strange in the sense that a unified theory must have metaphysics
in its center. One way to make sense out of this is the hypothesis that Kitcher took the
anti-metaphysics conveyed by the logical positivists too seriously. But this does not help
understanding how one could make sense out of fitting phenomena into a unified picture
—that is built on a metaphysical core— without especially indulging in metaphysics.
Further, a characterization of the causal structure of the world cannot escape metaphysics
either. The third critique stems from the winner-take-all conception of explanatory
unification:
[G]eneralizations and theories can sometimes be explanatory with respect to some set of
phenomena even though more unifying explanations of those phenomena are known. For
example, Galileo’s law can be used to explain facts about the behavior of falling bodies
42
even though it furnishes a less unifying explanation than the laws of Newtonian mechanics
and gravitational theory. . . . If we reject this idea, we must adopt the conclusion that in
any domain only the most unified theory that is known is explanatory at all; everything
else is non-explanatory. Call this the winner-take-all conception of explanatory unification.
Woodward [416]
Economy judges less economically unified theories as worse, but still sustains expla-
nations done in terms of them as explanations. Therefore, one can commit to EUT,
without committing to the winner-take-all conception. The fourth critique stems from
the epistemology of unification:
Assume, for the sake of argument, that it is desirable to have a unified belief system in
Kitcher’s sense—whether because unification is connected to explanation and the latter is
intrinsically valuable or because unification is connected to other goals (e.g., confirmation)
that are desirable. It is still not obvious why it would be valuable to have a set of beliefs
that are a smallish proper subset of the beliefs that comprise such a unified system, which
is what most people seem to have, given Kitcher’s views about the transmission of causal
knowledge. Recall Kitcher’s basic picture: when I acquire the belief that, say, whether
salt is hexed is causally irrelevant to whether it dissolves and that whether it is placed in
water is causally relevant, I acquire a fragment of the community’s overall systemisation
S. But adding a fragment of S or even a number of fragments of S to my belief store
may not result in my having a belief system that is unified, or that facilitates whatever
epistemic goals are associated with unification. Of course if I end up adding all or most
of S to my belief store, I will have at that point a set of beliefs that is unified and that
brings with it all of the benefits of unification. But, as Kitcher agrees, it is unrealistic to
suppose that most people possess anything like the full systemization S that best unifies
all of the beliefs in their community. Woodward [416]
The critique is restated in steps. (1) Communities such as today’s community of physi-
cists have some overall systemization S. (2) Individual people typically acquire only
fragments of S by cultural transmission. (3) Unification is cognitively or practically
valuable only in the sense of unified belief systems of individuals and not just of the
community. (4) There is thus a major problem with the story of cultural transmission
of a unified picture. This critique does not threaten the goal towards a unified world-
view nor EUT. Perhaps it only testifies how disunified the contemporary science is and
how this disunification has influenced the thinking of philosophers. For, if the scientific
community were in the hold of a genuinely unified theory that is based on few mutu-
ally compatible postulates, including the conservation law of energy and understandable
conceptions of time and geometry of space, it would not be hard for individuals to grasp
the overall world-view. But as contemporary theories of different scales come with dif-
ferent postulates, people in practice acquire only fragments of the unsystematic and
fragmentary aggregate of isolated theories S, and there has been no such thing as an
understandable unified world-view to be grasped. Of course, EUO+DU is the given
suggestion.
3.5 Economical Unification vs. Plain Conceptual Analysis
It is emphasised that economical unification is more progressive than plain conceptual
analysis in dealing with topics that are typically dealt with in metaphysics as a field
of philosophy. Economical unification as the production line of economy → ontology
→ applications is best seen as a reaction to plain conceptual analysis which proceeds
in the absence of a unified ontology and without economy as an evaluation criterion.
Their basic difference is illustrated in figure 5. In plain conceptual analysis, one isolated
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concept is taken under investigation and various angles to it are reviewed. This does not
manage to unify all concepts and they do not communicate, as intimately as they should.
In economical unification, the unified ontology gives the understandable structure where
individual concepts can be placed, their correct roles can be found, and they communicate
through the ontology.
Figure 5: The half-circles on the left denote isolated and often mutually incoherent
ontological commitments, which are replaced on the right by a unified ontology. The
alphabets denote different angles to individual concepts. In plain conceptual analysis
some of these concepts are grounded on ontology but some are not, whereas in economical
unification all concepts are grounded and conceptual redundancy is diminished.
defining the scope; the roles of logic and semantics. Explication of the scope
of the defined concepts that are the end results of the analysis is of utmost importance,
for this is a prerequisite for evaluating alternative definitions. In this thesis, the scope is
on concepts which are applicable in the contexts of human social behaviour and natural
science. The defined concepts thus do not compete with concepts whose intended scope
is different, but only with concepts whose scope is the same. Although all sciences in the
end investigate the same nature, the scope of this thesis is very different from the scope
of analytical philosophy that typically concentrates on language, logic and semantics as
such. The focus is not on linguistic philosophy or language as such, but language or words
or concepts are mapped to the unified ontology in order for them to be applicable in the
focal contexts. The scope is not or semantics as such, but on applying such semantics
which is helpful in the focal contexts. For instance, the focus is not on possible worlds
semantics as such, but in fitting it to serve the focal contexts in terms of EUO (§7.5).
The focus is not on logic as such, but logic is applied as a very helpful tool in two
central ways. First, specific logical systems can be applied in exactifying ontology. For
instance, classical extensional mereology is applied as a logical foundation for talking
about part-whole relations between objects that is sufficient for the needs of this thesis
(§4.6, appendix A); further logical machinery can be incorporated along the need. As
another example, that there are future contingents is a theorem of EUO + partial de-
terminism; after the theorem has been derived, various logical or semantical approaches
can be applied in handling future contingents (§7.3). Second, as a unified ontology is a
coherent axiomatic system, i.e., a logical system, economical unification enjoys from the
benefits that mathematics has had for millennia, yet without having to suffer from diffi-
cult formalism. The axiomatic method as applied in this thesis is contrasted to applying
it in set theory.
In both cases some axioms are taken as the foundation for everything else and the axiom
base contributes to making the analysis systematic: Thomas Jech starts his book Set
Theory [188] by listing the axioms of Zermelo-Fraenkel set theory with the axiom of
choice (ZFC); the axioms of EUO are listed in the beginning of §4. The axiomatic
nature of ontology makes it easy to see that various axioms need to be incorporated
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in EUO, for otherwise it would be crippled, i.e., none of the axioms can be ‘taken
away’ but they are all needed for the overall axiomatic system to work as intended; by
analogy, ZFC would be crippled if e.g. the axiom of pairing were deleted, and Euclidean
Geometry would be crippled if any of its axioms were deleted. Therefore it is senseless
to demand a practitioner of economical unification to concentrate on one isolated axiom
in the absence of everything else; as the axioms and definitions are especially intended
to function together, it is not by accident that some of the axioms and definitions are
not given in a form in which these are typically given or handled in the philosophical
literature. The axioms of ZFC as well as the ontological commitments of EUO state
what exists. While the axioms of ZFC postulate purely abstract (§4.14) entities (sets),
the ontological commitments of EUO postulate the existence of physical objects. In both
cases, theorems —which like axioms state what exists— are proved from the axioms by
applying traditional rules of inference, although it is not explicitly stated in this thesis nor
in Jech’s book just which rules are used when using them, for this would amount to very
cumbersome use of language. In set theory e.g. the natural numbers, rational numbers
and real numbers are defined to be analogous to certain sets whose existence is implied
by the axioms of ZFC, whereas in this thesis concepts such as truth and possibility are
defined in terms of what EUO states that exists, or has existed or will exist. Lemmas
are used in set theory as well as in economical unification, although the term ‘lemma’ is
not used elsewhere in this thesis. A lemma is a proven proposition or a helping theorem
which is used as a stepping stone to a larger result rather than as a statement of interest
by itself. For instance, the result that there are no bare particulars in EUO could be
called a lemma: it is used as a stepping stone to statements of interest in §4.10. To
substantiate the axiomatic nature, §4 is organized into axioms, theorems, definitions and
rejections (of commitments which violate the axioms and arguments which lean on such
commitments).
Explication of the scope and working with an economically unified ontology with-respect-
to-the-scope thus provides a point of departure for logic and semantics to be applied
within the specified scope. This is very different to plain conceptual analysis. First
of all, the scope of the defined constructions is often not explicated, which leaves one
pondering about where they are intended to be applied. There is a crucial difference in
a construction intended to function e.g. in natural language understanding vs. natural
science, but without a specified scope the function of the construction hangs in the air.
If the scope is not explicated, it is natural that the ontology with-respect-to-the-scope is
not explicated either. In the absence of an explicated ontology, logical systems are built
as purely formal-abstract constructions, analogous to the non-grounded concept on the
left side of figure 5. There is of course nothing wrong in logic or mathematics as such,
but practicing these without intending to apply them in ontology must be separated
from metaphysics as a science that aims to make sense out of nature. In other words,
logic-without-ontology is only logic, and should not be considered as metaphysics, but
should only compete with other purely logical constructions. If the intended scope of
logic is nature, which is a reasonable supposition if we are dealing with metaphysics, the
analysis typically proceeds without economy as the criterion. Without economy, logic
or mathematical idealizations can be promoted on the level of ontology, i.e., ontological
answers can be sought from logic and formalism instead of asking first what is the
minimal ontology where logic and formalism can be applied. For instance, contemplations
about infinite divisibility are largely logic-driven (§4.17). Excessive rigor has been widely
present, whereas economical unification marks a shift from excessive logic to finding
application for logic that is sufficient and minimal:
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[M]ost of the contemporary essays on possible worlds, temporal logic, and causality, though
often exact, are far removed from science and sometimes even incompatible with it.
. . . Strive for rigor but do not allow it to curtail vigor: exactness is a means not an end —
a mean to attain clarity, systemicity, cogency and testability. Insisting on rigor for its own
sake and at the price of giving up deep intuitions is a mark of sterility. Bunge [69, p. 8-9]
answering questions about methodology. Consider Sider’s [358, p. 385] ques-
tions and their suggested answers. (a) Are the criteria that are commonly used in sci-
entific theory choice (for example, simplicity and theoretical integration) applicable in
metaphysics? Economy is applicable in evaluating theories. Moreover, the inseparability
of metaphysics from theories guides one from the distinction of metaphysics and science
into accepting that theories are scientifico-metaphysical. (b) How can these criteria be
articulated clearly? And what hope is there that that criteria will yield a determinate ver-
dict? Economy has been articulated clearly enough for it to yield adequately determinate
verdicts in §§3.3, 4, 5.7.
Consider Manley’s [245, p. 1] questions and their suggested answers. (a)What is the best
procedure for arriving at the answers to the questions of metaphysics? Common sense?
Conceptual analysis? Or assessing competing hypotheses with quasi-scientific criteria?
Economy is the suggested quasi-scientific criterion for assessing competing metaphysical
hypotheses, and economical unification is the suggested procedure for arriving that the
answers. (b) Are the answers substantive or just a matter of how we use words? If one
defines concepts in terms of an economically unified ontology that is sufficient in the
contexts of human social behaviour and natural science, then the answers are especially
substantive and not just a matter of how words are used; the defined concepts are
understandable and match the needs of people in these contexts. In contrast, if concepts
are defined in terms of an uneconomical ontology, their meanings may be understood
but it is often hard to say how these meanings connect to what is important to people
in the given contexts. For instance, if possibility is defined in terms of transcendent
worlds (§7.5), this leaves people pondering how such a definition is applicable. Given
that concepts are not mapped to an ontology at all, then it is very hard to tell what are
the meanings of the answers: non-grounded concepts hang in the air, which results in
ambiguities in all that follows.
economical unification vs. uneconomical pluralism. The idea of founding
everything else on an economically unified ontology has been present from Aristotle to
Mach, and such an ontology is needed in tackling problems of metaphysics as a branch of
philosophy. The problem is that this goal is absent in contemporary philosophy, or not in
the center as it should be. It is not claimed that the given approximation of the unified
theory (DU + EUO) is final or the only correct version, but it is economically unified
with respect its central contemporary alternatives, as shown in §§4,5.7,7.4. The given
suggestion can be rejected at once you come up with a more economical version that does
the same jobs. But it should not be rejected without showing what is wrong with it, and
it should be taken as a progressive step instead of an attempt to force a one-eyed solution
to everything. For comparison, Tahko [391, p. 235] concludes a book on the methodology
of metaphysics with the remark that “contemporary analytic metaphysics can go at least
some way towards meeting the challenge of combining science and metaphysics. . . .” It
has not only been testified that we can go some way towards meeting the challenge of
combining science and philosophical metaphysics, but a suggestion of just this kind of a
fusion has been given.
The greatest obstacle for any satisfiable unified theory has been the Theory of Relativity.
A genuinely unified theory is understandable and applies same postulates in explaining
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all scales or in all areas of physics. This is not the case in relativistic physics, which
makes it a blockade for a unified theory. For instance, the conception of time in rela-
tivistic physics is not understandable as a whole, for two conceptions of time are applied:
absolute simultaneity or cosmic time is applied on the largest cosmological scale; how-
ever, absolute simultaneity is more like an exception, whereas relativistic time is the
central notion of time in relativistic physics (§5.6). As another example, the relativistic
cosmology model with dark energy as a parameter makes role of the conservation law of
energy completely ambiguous, and the standard interpretation of the Planck equation
as an intrinsic property of radiation violates the conservation law of energy for radiation
propagating in expanding space (§5.4). Conservation laws are the primary laws e.g. in
particle physics and concerning planetary systems, but as the conservation law makes no
sense in relativistic cosmology, it is hard to see what is the common base under which
these are unified. Therefore, there are no prospects for a genuinely unified theory in the
context of relativistic physics. In contrast, DU builds on the conservation law and an
understandable conception of time.
Another obstacle on the way of a unified theory is that economy is not taken seriously
by philosophers, and thus the goal of explicating an economically unified ontology is not
taken seriously either. Perhaps economy is seen as some form of the anti-metaphysical
verifiability criterion? Even if we ideally had all metaphysical possibilities at hand, some
criterion would be needed in selecting between them. If empirical sufficiency is the only
criterion, we end up either with isolated postulates, or with a family of combinations
of mutually coherent postulates that together explain all scales. There are 4096 com-
binations25 even with the axioms of EUO, some of their well-known alternatives, and
with the given open selections (§4). Consider the negation of EUO: spatially infinite,
infinitely divisible and contradictory actual and transcendent worlds, with an ambiguous
conception of time where future and past exist as strongly as the present if there even
is a present, where time travel is possible, where all that exists is mind-dependent or
just your mind, where minds and bodies can be detached, and where abstract things and
universals exist in a transcendent realm. The main problem with such a metaphysical
swamp is that it gives very bad prospects for clarifying anything at all, for clarification
of other things requires a clear base.
Instead of aiming at a consensual economically unified ontology, many analytical philoso-
phers seem to have inherited from the positivists the idea that “the task of philosophy
is the clarification of meaning, not the discovery of new facts (the job of the scientists)
or the construction of comprehensive accounts of reality (the misguided pursuit of tra-
ditional metaphysics)” (Kosciejew [206, p. 620]). Consider how Russell [345, p. 834]
embraces what can be characterized as the negation of economical unification: “Modern
analytical empiricism . . . has the advantage, in comparison with the philosophies of the
system-builders, of being able to tackle its problems one at a time, instead of having to
invent at one stroke a block theory of the whole universe.” Russell was essentially wrong:
instead of managing to clarify meanings and tackling problems one at a time, more than
100 years of analysis without an economically world-view as the base has resulted in the
contemporary absence of consensus about the meanings of virtually all focal concepts
25Finite vs. infinite divisibility; spatial finiteness vs. spatial infinity; the length of the present is
positive vs. nonpositive; presentism vs. growing-block vs. eternalism vs. moving spotlight; the law of
non-contradiction applied to nature vs. there are contradictions in nature; total vs. partial determinism;
the eternal Universe theorem vs. the three alternatives; naturalism (as a theorem of presentism and
causality axiom) vs. transcendism; physicalism (as a theorem of presentism and causality axiom) vs.
mind-body dualism; ontological realism vs. everything is dependent on your mind. This leaves 2× 2×
2× 4× 2× 2× 4× 2× 2× 2 = 4096 combinations.
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such as truth, possibility and time. As there is no consensus about ontology, there is no
consensus about anything that follows either.
100 years in the state of disunification seems to have resulted in many philosophers con-
sidering the disunified state as natural and desirable. The fusion of the culture of dis-
unification, negligence of economy and unconstrained theory proliferation can be called
uneconomical pluralism,26 where any coherent combination of axioms which explains
perceptions is equally worthy. In economical unification, proliferation of empirically
sufficient metaphysical possibilities is good in the sense that we can select the most eco-
nomically unified combination. In the culture of pluralism, these are good as such, for
this is what pluralism is: embracing the plurality of metaphysical possibilities, prolifera-
tion by free association, the let-all-flowers-bloom attitude or the freedom of concentrating
on whatever one finds interesting in ‘metaphysics,’ without having to point out where it
should be applied. Contemporary pluralism may have been influenced by Feyerabend’s
notions about proliferation, whose central function was to overcome stagnation in sci-
ence (p. 36). It is quite different to try to come up with a more virtuous theory than to
start with metaphysical possibilities such as infinite divisibility and transcendent worlds
that are not even needed by best contemporary science. If the pluralists are genuinely
searching for better theories, then in these cases their search for them starts from worse
foundations. But if there is no criterion of fitness, anything goes.
The selection between pluralism and economical unification should be made based on
their progressiveness. Economical unification effectively blurs the borders of philoso-
phy and natural science, while pluralism keeps these apart, proliferating neo-scholastic
metaphysics which begs the question of how should it be used. There is no problem in
demarcating economically unified metaphysics. For, the necessary commitments (p. 24)
are implicit in theories in any case. After the necessary commitments have been identi-
fied, they can be complemented by minimal and sufficient optional commitments when
needed. This brings the focus right back to the classical formulations of economy (§3.1):
Why postulate more if you can make do with less? What other reasons are there for such
postulations than pluralism itself? The pluralists’ challenge becomes to demarcate the
excessive pluralistic metaphysics, i.e., to explain why it is useful and in what respect.
This is where the pluralist disagrees, for queries about utility are against the pluralist
culture, i.e., the pluralist more likely searches for ways to avoid answering the utility ques-
tion and maintains that such questions should not be asked because this is suppressive.
The unificationalist can only appeal to progressiveness and maintain that progressive
tools are more likely created by having the goal of creating usable applications in mind
than by dodging questions about applications. Certainly, proliferation of theories by free
association is better than nothing, but there is statistically a very big difference between
the most optimal and whatever at all that is better than nothing. In practice, without
economy as the criterion and without a clearly specified intended function of the defined
concepts, the philosophical corpus itself becomes the primary measure of relevance. This
means that quoting the corpus widely is at least as important a sign of good philoso-
phy than arriving at economically unified solutions with clearly specified functions. The
obvious problem is that this is not optimally progressive, and the reason is the same as
why 100 men aiming at a designated target more likely hit it than 100 men shooting at
the forest.
the benefits of working with a unified ontology. The benefits of economical
unification are revealed clearly in the stage of working with an economically unified
26This is not exactly the same doctrine as what Turner [401] calls ontological pluralism: “According
to ontological pluralism, there are different ways, kinds, or modes of being.”
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ontology, and the difficulties that result from its absence are proportionally cumulated
at this stage. The following characterizations of the progressiveness of the method were
originally inspired by Mario Bunge [68, preface, pp. 1, 3, 6-7, 238, 296-7] and Jeffrey
Poland [312, pp. 26, 29, 32, 35].
The fusion of DU and EUO is one single theory. There are no separate theories but only
definitions of different aspects of one theory, such as the definitions of the concepts of
truth, possibility, colour, time, property and abstract. Applicable ingredients of compet-
ing theories are incorporated by defining these in terms of EUO in a way that these are
compatible with the previously defined concepts. The resulting concepts are mutually
compatible and understandable and they manage to resolve arguments targeted against
them. Unification does not stop on the level of individual concepts. Literally every
concept defined in terms of EUO is interrelated with every other concept, directly or
indirectly via EUO. This is congenial with Juti’s conclusion:
On the whole, it can be said that in metaphysics the sentence “everything is involved
with everything” expresses a profound truth. In this sense, the building of a traditional
metaphysical system is not at all old-fashioned, but only if it is founded on carefully
analyzed suppositions about the contents and character of reality. Juti [192, p. 348]
The given suppositions about the contents and character of reality are the metaphysical
commitments of EUO, which are carefully derived by economy and interrelated. It is
clarifying to change the building of a traditional system into identification of commit-
ments and their interrelations that are present in any case. It is old-fashioned to do
this only when it is not seen that the hands are attached to the body in any case, or
analogously when it is not seen that e.g. causality and temporal existence are interre-
lated in any case, disregarding if one wishes to acknowledge the interrelations or not.
Identifying connections between specialized domains of inquiry and applying them in re-
solving problems is merely an alternative to working blindfolded without acknowledging
connections that exist in any case: the necessary commitments and their relations can
only be meditated away.
Unification yields inter-field synergy and helps coping with increasing specialization and
growth of knowledge. According to Oppenheim and Putnam [300, p. 3]: “the meta-
scientific study of major aspects of science, is the natural means for counterbalancing
specialization by promoting the integration of scientific knowledge.” (Unfortunately,
philosophers typically throw away the child with the washing water and only note that
reductionism does not work as Oppenheim and Putnam characterized.) No matter how
specialized a branch is, it is connected to the ontology. Conceptual and terminological
redundancy are reduced when all concepts are defined in terms of a unified ontology. A
unified ontology enables seeing what can and what cannot be omitted, what presupposes
what, what entails what, which concepts are wrongly supposed to play any role at all,
what are the roles of different concepts and which concepts are redundant. This way, a
unified ontology avoids uncontrolled introduction of arbitrary vocabulary and concepts,
it supplies a way to understand what has been achieved, what are the relevant challenges
or the advanced questions and what is the range of application of a concept, for all these
unfold when it is understood how things hang together.
It is practically impossible to discover these interrelations by concentrating on one topic
only. The aim is naturally to take relevant literature about each topic in account, but
apparently, details are not needed in unifying concepts on the top level. Ingthorsson
notes that there is a great plurality of nuanced version of different theories of truth, and
underlines that it is practically impossible to achieve unification if all details should be
taken in account at one stroke:
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It is important to note that I focus on the core ideas of various truth-theories rather than
the details of the views of particular thinkers. This is partly a practical necessity for the
big picture approach attempted here, but also a consequence of the fact that there is no
canonical version of any particular truth-theory. Ingthorsson [182, ch. 1]
Further, unification enables handling various concepts within a short space: once the
basic structure is understood, all the rest can be defined in terms of it shortly; the short
definitions make sense and can be understood sufficiently only by understanding their
places in the context of the ontology. In traditional conceptual analysis, literature about
individual and isolated topics drives the discussion. The left side of figure 5 depicts e.g.
truth, possibility and time as isolated stand-alone theories, or as isolated industries or
fields of various competing theories of truth, various theories of possibility and various
theories of temporal existence, whereas the right side depicts their unified fusion. The
results of the PhilPapers survey27 show that the current disunification is not a myth.
Time: A-theory or B-theory? 34.7% insufficiently familiar with the issue; 22.6% accept or
lean toward B-theory; 16.0% accept or lean toward A-theory; 9.8% agnostic/undecided.
Truth: correspondence, deflationary, or epistemic? 48.9% accept or lean toward cor-
respondence; 23.0% accept or lean toward deflationary; 10.9% accept or lean toward
epistemic.
Abstract objects: Platonism or nominalism? 40.8% accept or lean toward nominalism;
36.3% accept or lean toward Platonism.
From the aspect of economical unification the above questions about truth and abstract
objects are similar to asking “Do you select hands or feet?” and “Do you prefer head or
body?” whereas the progressive starting point is that the limbs and the head are attached
to the body. It is suggested in §4.4 that economy favours the presentist A-theory and
therefore it is selected as an axiom of EUO. It is suggested in §6 that object-based
correspondence is the most straightforward basis for a unified concept of truth in EUO,
and it is shown how the applicable ingredients of epistemic theories and deflationism are
incorporated by definitions in terms of EUO. The issue with abstract objects requires
settling first the ontological case between naturalism and transcendism. Naturalism is
shown to be a theorem of EUO in §4.8, transcendism is rejected as an uneconomical
alternative to naturalism in §4.9, and abstract is defined in §4.14 in terms of EUO so
than the job of Platonism is done and compatibility with nominalism is sustained.
In economical unification the difference of ontology and applications is crystal clear.
Without a consensual ontology, there is no consensus about anything that depends on
the missing ontology either. As a result, the difference of ontology and applications is
blurred: it is not known whether a concept is defined in terms of ontology or whether the
it is meant as an ontological commitment. Concepts which are defined and disambiguated
in terms of the ontology are not mixed with the ontology. For instance, once finite
divisibility is postulated (§4.17), everything that violates it is automatically rejected,
such as genuine self-reference (§4.18). This guides one into interpreting away cases which
seem to be involved with self-reference, whereas without a unified ontology and economy
as a criterion, one may freely suppose that genuine self-reference takes place and accept
infinite divisibility of nature as an implication.
Again, the unified ontology is a stable and consistent base for defining concepts unam-
biguously, which reduces conceptual and terminological redundancy and confusion, which
27The biggest ever survey of professional philosophers on their philosophical views was carried out
in November 2009. The percentages are calculated based on answers given by 1803 philosophy faculty
members and/or PhDs.
50
in turn allows moving forward and investing efforts to more advanced questions. With-
out economy as the criterion, conceptual and terminological redundancy and multiplicity
explodes and ambiguities emerge proportionally: even one ambiguity is enough to mud-
dify all that follows, but when many things are open, debates wallow without effectively
culminating in consensual conclusions. Two concepts which are mapped to unexplicated
ontologies may unknowingly contradict one another. When one does not consciously
recognise the foundations, one may unknowingly map different concepts on incompatible
ontologies, whereas concepts or semantical constructions which are not mapped to any
ontology in any case hang in the air. The openly explicated unified ontology makes
the analysis avoid pseudo-problems which result from its absence. Without an openly
explicated ontology, it is not known whether some debate is about ontological commit-
ments, about different terminology, different semantics or about conflicting definitions of
concepts in terms of the same ontology; the ontological background of a statement has
to be guessed. In effect and again, debates wallow without effectively converging into
consensual conclusions. To illustrate, arguments against presentism in §6.6 rely on com-
mitting to a truthmaking principle that is practically incompatible with presentism, but
this is not seen as the rejection of presentism is not written out in the surface structure of
that truthmaking principle; the semantical or linguistic arguments against presentism in
§6.8.4 result from circulating around the surface structure of language instead of taking
presentism seriously; the funny fact arguments in §6.7 amount to blaming a theory of
truth for ambiguous formulations of truthbearing propositions. The existence of such
pseudo problems is the reason why Devitt [108, pp. 29-30] insists that “our semantics
should be driven by our metaphysics and not vice versa.”
3.6 Summary
It can be concluded without exaggeration that the idea of economical unification gen-
uinely unifies the philosophy of science, and that the failure to see this results from the
currently disunified science. The goal of seeking out the simplest first principles com-
mon to all science has always been a central goal of first philosophy, from Aristotle to
Mach. The greatest source of difficulties is the logical positivists’ misinterpretation of
Mach, which resulted in the verifiability criterion that rejects metaphysic. What is more
wrong-headed than the project of unifying science without metaphysics that is needed in
the center of unified science? The verifiability criterion was naturally rejected, but this
did not lead into a consensual picture of having the goal of economically unified total
science in the center of philosophy of science. Although the idea of unification and the
criterion of simplicity have been implicit in philosophy of science all along the 20th and
the 21st centuries, where philosophers of science made valuable contributions to under-
standing of scientific explanation, progress of science and evaluation criteria of theories,
the goal towards unified science with an economically unified metaphysical core was not
openly placed in the very center where it belongs and functions as the unifying nexus.
Economical unification is not the only path to the progress of science. Even plain new
data and development of devices are progressive, and it is better to give correct predic-
tions by being aided by parameters than to fail to give correct predictions at all. But this
does not change the fact that the most desirable state is to give correct predictions with-
out parameters, i.e., economical unification is progressive without a question. Theory
shifts and reductions are paths to more economically unified science and thus paths to
progress. However, instead of taking in the unificatory picture and holding it for good, it
seems that the unificatory picture has been shaking in the minds of philosophers always
51
when somebody who has understood the nature of economical unification has failed in
some sense.
To illustrate, take Kitcher’s unification model. Maintaining that unification is explana-
tion is one thing. Seeing that unification is progressive and that a more economically
unified theory enables a better explanation is another thing. That someone has identified
unification as explanation, should not mislead anyone into thinking that now the unifi-
cationist project is somehow threatened. Alas, when you talk about unified explanation,
philosophers are ready to remind you that unification is not explanation. As another
example, many seem to take the failure of Oppenheim and Putnam’s characterization of
micro-reductionism as the path towards unified science as a proof of the failure of the
whole unificationist project, and as something that shows that all unifiers want to reduce
social science to particle physics. This picture is almost completely false. Everybody
now hopefully understands that incompatible theories cannot be reduced to one another,
but this should not prevent anyone from attempting to reduce mutually compatible the-
ories to one another whenever this is possible, nor from advancing unification by theory
shifts, nor from finding a postulate that unifies two or more theories. For all paths of
economical unification are progressive.
It is hard to predict just what are the detailed paths in which economical unification of
science will be advanced, but given that the tools are theory shifts, reductions, partial
unifications and their mixtures, it is a matter of implementing these in some order. The
path of theory shifts must be first traversed far enough, so that we have arrived at
mutually coherent theories. Once coherence has been achieved, it has become possible
to look at the theories together and to try to figure out which axioms can be derived
from which, i.e., there are no obstacles to fully traversing the paths of reduction and
partial unification. Once these have also been traversed, we are no longer dealing with
different sciences but with one and the same economically unified theory which explains
all scales of phenomena. While the road towards the ideally economically unified theory
is long, this does not prevent us from enjoying from more and more economically unified
theories.
Even though the greatest thinkers have expressed their consent to economical unification,
although this is in line with the large-scale historical progression of theories, and although
the progression towards more and more virtuous total science with increased explanatory
power, simplicity, understandability, usability, coherence and consilience makes sense to
most people, still many are not convinced about economical unification. One asks: How
can science be disunified now, if the progress of science is propagation towards more
economically unified science? In the Kuhnian picture, the evolution of theories walks
hand in hand with the increase of data; the more new data, the more parameters the
theory requires, which is a prelude to a paradigm shift. The 20th century development
fits perfectly in the Kuhnian picture as relativistic physics has developed along with a
growing parameter structure (§5.4). Its evolution has been progressive and unificatory in
the sense that it explained more than earlier, but not optimally economical unification,
for its explanations require the parameters. All that is needed in perfectly matching
the Kuhnian picture is the replacement of relativistic physics with a more economically
unified theory. Instead of seeing the big picture, many note that contemporary science
is disunified and conclude that this is also how things should be, i.e., their picture of
disunified science matches how science is practiced. These people forget progressiveness
and Hume’s guillotine: how things are should not indicate how things should be. One
should not bury the goal towards ideal science because science is currently not ideal.
The need for the principle of economy is best understood by the chain: progress is desir-
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able; economical unification is progress and inseparable from the increase of virtuousness
of total science; in order to efficiently advance economical unification, economy is needed
as an evaluation criterion that favours more virtuous theories. Evaluating the accuracy
of predictions alone is toothless in the face of underdetermination; the only alternative
to taking metaphysical commitments in account in theory evaluation is to accept that
failures of the current paradigms can be fixed by an increasing heap of parameters, which
is counter-progressive. Economy is the alarm bell which gives a signal that it is the time
to start searching for a better theory, it is a mean to tackle unconditional stagnation
which stalls shifts into better theories, and it incorporates falsifiability. Without econ-
omy, increased metaphysical complexity does not matter, the alarm bells do not ring,
stagnation is left untackled and the current paradigms are practically unfalsifiable.
Philosophical metaphysics should be primarily the science of unification: the science of
explicating metaphysical postulates of applicable theories and their interrelations, in
order to facilitate the process of economical unification. But this is not what it currently
is. Analytical or neo-scholastic metaphysics became a somewhat independent field of
inquiry where the principle of economy and applicability in natural science and society
had and still have very little importance. The principle of naturalistic closure is a version
of economy and a counter reaction to neo-scholastic metaphysics which rose after the
rejection of the verifiability criterion. The principle of naturalistic closure merely tries
to unite philosophical metaphysics with empirical science. This thesis continues on the
same lines, except that the preference for institutional science is changed into the more
general preference for economically unified science.
The progressiveness of economical unification in dealing with topics that are typically
discussed in the context of philosophy has the same cause as the progressiveness of
economical unification everywhere else: once you have a unified ontology, many things
become much easier. Everything else can be handled efficiently in terms of it: problems
can be efficiently resolved, meanings of concepts can be clarified and ambiguities can
be disambiguated. This is progressive and also releases efforts to dealing with more
advanced questions, i.e., progress by unification is not just progress but it also means an
accelerated rate of progress. In contrast, the absence of a unified ontology makes almost
everything hard, leading into great difficulties and preventing achievement of the optimal
progress rate in physics as well as in philosophical metaphysics. In order to arrive at
a unified ontology, a criterion is needed for evaluating metaphysical commitments, for
otherwise we are left with equally relevant metaphysical possibilities. The initiative of
searching for mutually compatible sums of metaphysical commitments enables organizing
them together, instead of looking at individual and isolated commitments. The unified
ontology is the key to progress, but it cannot be had in the context of relativistic physics
which especially keeps theories disunified, nor without having it as a goal, i.e., without
having economy as a criterion. The absence of a unified ontology is not surprising in
the light of relativistic physics, pluralistic tendencies, negligence of economy and the
cosmetic logico-linguistic basic touch.
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4 Ontology I: EUO
Axioms of the given version of economically unified ontology (EUO) are derived by
applying the principle of economy. The aim is to show that the traditional alternatives
to the axioms of EUO, if any, are either insufficient, metaphysically more complex or at
best equivalent with the axioms of EUO. In addition to the axioms, some concepts are
defined in terms of the axioms, some theorems are derived from the axioms, and some
rejections are done which show that some axioms of EUO imply that something specific
does not exist or that some result does not hold in EUO.
the basic structure of euo. The Universe is a single non-branching sequence of
consecutive temporal stages (TSUs) which are in a forward directed temporal and causal
succession. Only the present TSU exists, the past TSUs did exist, and future TSUs
become into existence one at a time. All parts of a single TSU exist absolutely simul-
taneously, they are causally connected and realize energy in an absolutely determinate
location in an absolutely determinate way. Every TSU is non-contradictory, spatially
finite and consists of a finite number of positive parts. Human beings with their mental
states are proper parts of the Universe, and the other parts of the Universe are indepen-
dent of human minds.
presentism. Only the present temporal stage of the Universe (TSU) exists.
causality. All parts of the present TSU are causally connected and realize energy in
an absolutely determinate location in an absolutely determinate way. The present TSU
is the consequence of the preceding TSU and the cause of the succeeding TSU.
ontological realism. A proper part of the Universe is independent of human minds.
the law of non-contradiction. The present TSU is non-contradictory.
finiteness. The present TSU is spatially finite and consists of finitely many indivisible
and positive parts.
4.1 Axiom: Presentism
Presentism is postulated as the most economical answer to the question of what exists
temporally. Presentism is the thesis that only the present temporal stage of the Universe
(TSU) exists.28 Presentism is to be taken literally. That only the present exists means
that the past does not exist and that the future does not exist: the past did exist; the
present exists now; future TSUs will become into existence one at a time.29 In words of
Dummett and Putnam:
The present forms the substance of the world; the past consists of what has been present,
the future of what will be present. Hence all that now exists is what is now present.
Dummett [116, p. 73-4]
Future things (which do not already exist) are not real (on this view); although, of course
they will be real when the appropriate time has come to be the present time. Similarly,
past things (which have ceased to exist) are not real, although they were real in the past.
Putnam [319, p. 240]
28This definition is compatible with Sider [356, p. 325] who defines presentism as the thesis that only
the present is real, with Markosian [249] who defines presentism as the view that only present objects
exist, and with Pezet [306] who defines presentism as the thesis that all and only present things exist.
Fiocco [144, pp. 197-8] calls the given version primitive presentism.
29The reason why the expression ‘future TSUs’ is used instead of ‘the future TSUs’ is explained in
§4.11.
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As only the present TSU exists, the present is the ultimate viewpoint in terms of which
everything is analyzed. As only the present exists, it should strictly speaking be always
qualified whether a particular exists or did exist or will exist. It should be said that
something holds for a particular when it exists which is when it is the present. Such
expressions are not typically added in order to facilitate the use of language, and the
context hopefully fixes the meaning of exists.
The present TSU is a single unchanging particular whose all parts exist absolutely si-
multaneously. The expression ‘particulars X and Y exist at time t’ means that X and Y
are parts of the TSU which is realized at time t. If X and Y would not exist at the same
time, they would not be parts of the same TSU either, for all parts of a TSU exist at
the same time. The Dynamic Universe model (DU) requires absolute simultaneity, and
therefore the postulation of presentism unifies DU and EUO in this sense; in contrast,
the relativity principle violates absolute simultaneity (§5.6). The organization of the
defence of presentism is given in the analytical table of contents.
4.2 Definitions: Change; Intrinsic Forward Directed Time
change. Perception testifies that change is taking place. As only the unchanging present
TSU exists, change is defined as a transition from one present into another.
intrinsic forward directed time. The transition from one present into another
is equivalent with the transition from one present time into another present time that
succeeds the preceding time. All transitions of time are thus in the forward direction.
Intrinsic forward directed time has thereby been defined, where ‘intrinsic’ means that
time is merely the measure of change. By intrinsic time, e.g. the concept of one day
can be defined as the period of time during which the Earth rotates around once its own
axis, and one year as the period in which the Earth rotates once around the Sun.
Leibniz [119, pp. 25-6] was a proponent of intrinsic time:30 “As for my own opinion, I
have said more than once, that I hold space to be something merely relative, as time
is, that I hold it to be an order of coexistences, as time is an order of successions.”
In contrast, Newton31 was a proponent of absolute time where time is independent of
the changing particulars in space. There is no need for absolute time in EUO and thus
intrinsic time is the only notion of time that is needed. Absolute simultaneity ought not
be confused with absolute time, although these are compatible.
Time is a measure of change also in the Dynamic Universe model (DU). There is thus
no need to define the direction of time in the fusion of DU and EUO in terms of the
increase of entropy as is done with relativistic physics; time and change are coupled
also in relativistic physics, but in a crucially different way, as explained in detail in
§5.6. While in relativistic physics time is especially an independent entity —the fourth
dimension— in EUO/DU time is not an independent entity, but merely the measure of
change: a figure of speech that is used in talking about TSUs and about transitions from
one TSU to another. Thus, we may talk about time t as well as about TSU t, and about
the period of time [x y] as well as about the sequence of TSUs which starts from x and
ends to y. Consider the sequence of consecutive TSUs 1,2,3. The transition from 1 to 2
and from 2 to 3 can be characterized as follows, where P (x) means that x is the present
TSU:
30E.g. Rundle [341, ch. 1.1] calls intrinsic time relational time, but this term is not used in order to
avoid confusions with the conception of time in relativistic physics.
31In General Scholium of Principia Mathematica [284].
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P (1),2,3: 1 is the present TSU; 2 and 3 are future TSUs.
1,P (2),3: 1 is a past TSU; 2 is the present TSU; 3 is a future TSU.
1,2,P (3): 1 and 2 are past TSUs; 3 is the present TSU.
The fusion of presentism, the perceived change and the definition of intrinsic forward
directed time implies that the past TSUs did exist in the past, the present TSU exists
now, and the future TSUs will become into existence one at a time. The present divides
the Universe strictly in past, present and future: future and past do not overlap.
4.3 Open Selection: Length of the Present Moment
Again, time p is equivalent with TSU p. That TSU p is unchanging is equivalent with
saying that time p is discrete. Given that hybrids are discluded, this leaves the following
mutually exclusive options open. (1) The length of the present is positive, i.e., denoted
by a real number greater than zero; this does not imply that the discrete duration of
every TSU is the same. (2) The length of the present is non-positive; this option can be
subdivided in a version where the present is zero and in version where it is infinitesimal,
but only the zero-option is handled here. In both (1) and (2) all times are strictly
ordered.32 Although (1) is in a certain senses easier than (2), there are no forcing reasons
to explicitly select between them and therefore the postulation is left open. However,
(1) is applied in the other sections as a provisional figure of speech. Consider some
implications and dependencies which follow from the selection between (1) and (2).
(1) implies that a positive period of time consists of finitely many (two or more) TSUs.
Therefore, (1) implies together with the rest of EUO (especially the finiteness axiom)
that only finitely many changes take place within a finite period of time. A single TSU
is not called a period of time, although its discrete duration is given a positive numeric
value. (1) entails that the TSUs are ordered one after another and thus enables talking
about sequences of consecutive TSUs p, p + 1, p + 2 and so on. This facilitates talking
e.g. about future possibilities in §7. (1) gets by with very simple logical foundations,
for times can be seen to be logically equivalent with integers. Given (1), the eternal
Universe theorem (§4.11) can be stated as: there are infinitely many TSUs in the past
and potentially infinitely in the future. Consider the following remarks in the context of
(1):
If we conceive of some point of time which cannot be divided even into the minutest parts
of moments, that is the only point that can be called present: and that point flees at such
lightning speed from being future to being past, that it has no extent of duration at all.
For if it were so extended, it would be divisible into past and future: the present has no
length. St Augustine [296, pp. 272-3]
The present has no duration: it is a mere boundary between past and future. Dummett
[116, p. 74]
Against Augustine and Dummett, in (1) the present is especially considered to have a
positive duration. Against Augustine, in (1) the present is not divisible in past and fu-
ture, but congenially with Dummett, (1) preserves the role of the present as the boundary
between the past and the future.
Given that it is impossible to build anything positive out of finitely many zero-width
instants, (2) must be coupled e.g. with point-continuum (§4.17) where a positive period
32The strict ordering of times can be characterized as follows. Irreflexivity: a < a does not hold for
any time a in past, present or future. Asymmetricity: if a < b, then b < a does not hold. Transitivity:
a < b and b < c implies a < c.
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of time consist of infinitely many zero-width points. Given (2), the eternal Universe
theorem (§4.11) appears as: the length of the past (as an interval) is infinite, and the
length of the future (as an interval) is potentially infinite. Given two real numbers x > y,
there is a real number in between them. This entails that there is no such thing as the
next TSU p + 1 which is realized after p. Therefore, (2) entails that sequences of TSUs
such as p, p+1, p+2 strictly speaking cannot be realized. Accordingly, expressions such
as ‘TSU p partially determines TSU p+1’ must either be translated as ‘TSU p partially
determines TSUs which follow p’ or interpreted so that p+ 1 does not denote the ‘next’
TSU but some TSU that is assigned and is after p. (2) faces Zeno’s next-point paradox,
also called dichotomy, which is familiar from Aristotle’s Physics, bk. 6: if time consists
of points, but there is no next point of time after the present, then how can time go
forward? By selecting (1), this paradox never raises.
Dorato [114] presents an argument against both (1) and (2): if the present is discrete
(zero or positive), we cannot have direct experience of it; therefore “presentism has
no direct phenomenological evidence in its favor and its only force can come from its
explanatory power.” This is not a problem, for presentism has been postulated especially
as the simplest axiom for temporal existence that explains perceptions.
4.4 Presentism vs. Alternative Theories of Temporal Existence
The complexities of presentism and its alternatives are evaluated, and it is evaluated
how they manage to embody change or the passage of time, and to give an account of
temporal ordering and the direction of time.
The central theories of temporal existence which all accept the existence of the present are
depicted in figure 6: presentism, eternalism, the moving spotlight theory, the growing-
block theory and the shrinking-block theory. Eternalism is sometimes called a block
theory, but this convention is not used here in order to distinguish eternalism from the
growing-block and the shrinking-block theories, which are called jointly block theories
here. Presentism, the block theories and the moving spotlight theory are A-theories,
Figure 6: Presentism and its basic alternatives.
whereas eternalism is a B-theory. According to Deasy [104]: “A theory of time is an
A-theory just in case according to that theory, there is an absolute, objective present
moment; otherwise, it is a B-theory.” According to Zimmerman [425, p. 402], the A-
theorists “posit an objective distinction between what is present and what is past and
what is future” whereas the B-theorists “deny the objectivity of any such distinction.”
In presentism the present exists while the future and the past do not. It is quite difficult
to point out the origins of presentism as it is the common-sensical view of temporal
existence. In eternalism past, present and future exist equally (cf. Baron and Miller [43,
p. 32]). Although no such thing as an objective present exists in eternalism, all points
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of time still exist, and that what is typically considered as the present is one of these.
The Theory of Relativity is the greatest threat to presentism and the main support for
eternalism,33 as it entails eternalism and is incompatible with presentism (§5.6.3). In
the growing-block theory the present is equivalent with the tip of the existing block
which grows as time goes by. C.D. Broad [60] is credited for introducing the growing-
block theory.34 In the shrinking-block theory the present is equivalent with the tail of
the existing block which reduces as time goes by. The shrinking-block theory is kept
along for the sake of conclusiveness; I have not found defenders of it in the literature,
but it is acknowledged as a logical option by Merricks [269, p. 103] and Hare [163,
p. 17]: “Some imagine that the future exists but the past does not.” In the moving
spotlight theory past, present and future exists, but there is also the objectively changing
present. Deasy [103, p. 2075] credits Broad [60, pp. 59-60] for its early description and
characterises the moving spotlight theory as follows: “Some instant of time is absolutely,
non-relatively present (A-THEORY) and it is always the case that everything exists
eternally (PERMANENTISM).”
In presentism all existing things are of the same type: present. In the growing-block
theory there are two types of existing things: present and past. In the shrinking-block
theory there are likewise two types of existing things: present and future. In the mov-
ing spotlight theory there are two or three types of existing things, depending on the
interpretation: there are three types of things if past, present and future are all inter-
preted to be of different types; there are two types of things if past and future are both
interpreted to be of the same type, non-present. In addition to more types of existing
things, the other theories are also quantitatively heavier, as the past or future or both is
quantitatively more than the present. Eternalism must be complemented by an indexical
wrapping or something equivalent, in order to account for the experience of the present
moment. Lewis characterises the indexicality:
Our present time is only one time among others. We call it alone present not because it
differs in kind from all the rest, but because it is the time we inhabit. The inhabitants of
other times may truly call their own times ‘present’, if they mean by present what we do;
for the meaning we give to ‘present’ is such that it is indexical, and refers at any time t to
that time t itself. Lewis [221, p. 86]
Thus in eternalism there exists the indexical present that you experience right now when
reading this text, plus the indexical past and the indexical future. Although the past,
present and future indexicals are all of the same type —indexical time— their sum is
quantitatively more than in presentism. In sum, economy favours presentism: eternalism
is only quantitatively uneconomical, whereas the block theories and the moving spotlight
theory are both quantitatively and qualitatively uneconomical with respect to presentism.
embodying change or the passage of time. A sufficient theory of temporal exis-
tence must explain the perceived change or the experience of the ever-changing present.
In presentism the perceived change is explained as a transition from one present 1 into
another present 2: when the transition from 1 to 2 has occurred, 2 has become into
existence and 1 has ceased to exist. In the growing-block theory, when 1 is the present 1
exists whereas 2 does not exist because 2 is in the future at 1; when the transition from 1
to 2 has occurred, 2 has become into existence and 1 remains existing: “to become past
is merely to cease to be on the ‘cutting edge’ of the growing four-dimensional manifold of
events” (Zimmerman [425, p. 403]). In the shrinking-block theory, when 1 is the present
33Eternalism has been defended e.g. by Putnam [319], Mellor [267] and Sider [357].
34The growing-block theory has been defended e.g. by Forrest [146], Tooley [399] and Button [70].
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1 exists and also 2 exist because 2 is in the future at 1 and the future exists; when the
transition to 2 has occurred, 1 has ceased to exist.
In eternalism, change cannot be explained in terms of becoming to exist or ceasing
to exist, because all times exist equally and there are initially no such things as past,
present and future. Therefore, eternalism must incorporate some additional postulate
which embodies change, or alternatively an eternalist can consider the perceived change
as an illusion. On one hand, maintaining that the perceived change is an illusion does
not help in any way, for the function of metaphysics is to explain perceptions and not
to maintain that they are illusions; on the other hand, the commitment to the idea that
change is an illusion is a metaphysical postulate; either way, eternalism is uneconomical
because it either fails to embody change or must appeal to some additional postulate.
The indexical wrapping does not seem to help, for it does not explain why I seem to
constantly jump from one indexical present to another. In sum, presentism and the
block theories suffice as explanations of the perceived change in terms of ceasing to exist
and/or becoming into existence, but eternalism must incorporate something additional.
temporal ordering and the direction of time. A sufficient theory of temporal
existence must provide a foundation for placing different times in before-after relations.
Given two arbitrarily assigned times x and y, a theory of temporal existence must provide
the ontological foundation for saying that one is before, after or the same as the other.
In presentism present exists, past did exist and future temporal stages of the Universe
will become into existence one at a time. The before-after-same relations can be defined
in terms of all A-theories, for these incorporate the objective present: x is before y ≡
when x is the present, y has not been the present yet; x is at the same time as y ≡ when
x is the present, y is the present; x is after y ≡ when x is the present, y has already
been the present in the past. For instance, take instantial times in the years 1000 and
2000. When 1000 was the present, 2000 had not been the present yet and therefore
1000 is before 2000; when 2000 was the present, 1000 had already been the present and
therefore 2000 is after 1000. Likewise, the direction of time is merely a definition in the
A-theories: when the present has changed —when something has become into existence
or has ceased to exist or both— time has gone forward.
In eternalism all times exist equally and there is no objective present. Therefore in eter-
nalism the direction of time and the before-after-same relations have to be incorporated
as additional parameters or founded on additional parameters. This reminds that the
greatest support for eternalism comes from the Theory of Relativity, where the map-
ping to entropy gives the direction to time: the increase of entropy is equivalent with
time going forward (§5.6.3). The entropy mapping can be also used as the basis of the
before-after relations by equating these with lower-higher entropy states.
summary. Theories of temporal existence are answers to the question of which of
these exist: past, present, future. Presentism is a more economical answer than the
initial versions of eternalism, the block theories and the moving spotlight theory. All
A-theories postulate the objective present, and are therefore sufficient explanations of
change, whereas eternalism requires an additional postulate in this task. The direction
of time and temporal ordering relations can be given as definitions in the A-theories,
whereas eternalism has been coupled with entropy as the additional anchor. With re-
spect to these tasks, presentism is most economical of the sufficient theories. Further
difficulties of the growing-block theory, the moving spotlight theory and eternalism —
which need to be explained away by further metaphysics— are contemplated in §7.5.
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4.5 Rejection: McTaggart’s Argument
McTaggart [259, 261] coined in the terms A-series of time and B-series of time. The
A-series is “that series of positions which runs from the far past through the near past
to the present, and then from the present through the near future to the far future, or
conversely” and B-series is the “series of positions which runs from earlier to later, or
conversely” (McTaggart [261, p. 10]). The A-theory and B-theory of time are analogous
to taking the A-series and B-series ontologically.
Presentism is a version of the A-theory. McTaggart concluded that the A-theory is needed
as the ontological base which does embody change or the passage of time, whereas the
B-theory does not embody change. McTaggart’s [261, pp. 14-22] argument about the
unreality of time aims to show that the A-theory contradicts itself, and because the A-
theory is anyhow needed to embody change and the passage of time, the passage of time
is an illusion. According to Ingthorsson [179] there is a consensus that McTaggart does
not manage to show that time is unreal, unless one commits to McTaggart’s ontology,
which appears to be some version of eternalism based on Ingthorsson’s (ibid, ch. 6) as
well as Broad’s [61, p. 307] analysis. As eternalism is clearly uneconomical with respect
to presentism (§4.4) the appeal to eternalism cannot be used to support McTaggart’s
argument. Therefore it is only show that McTaggart’s argument does not hold in the
context of presentism. The argument can be given in two steps:
step i. Time t is in the future when the present is before t; t is the present when t is
the present; t is in the past when the present is after t. As t being past, present and
future is contradictory, and as the A-theory leads into this contradiction, the A-theory
is contradictory, and therefore the passage of time is an illusion.
step ii. The resolution that t is strictly either past, present or future from the aspect
of a single assigned present time p fails, for step I applies to p as well. “Thus, according
to McTaggart, we never resolve the original contradiction inherent in the A series, but,
instead, merely generate an infinite regress of more and more contradictions” (Markosian
[250]). Therefore, the passage of time is an illusion.
Presentism remains standing in the face of McTaggart’s argument because there is no
contradiction to start with. Consider the law of non-contradiction: the same attribute
cannot at the same time belong and not belong to the same subject in the same respect.
The attribute ‘future’ belongs to t when the present is before t; the attribute ‘present’
belongs to t when the present is t; the attribute ‘past’ belongs to t when the present is
after t. Thus, the attributes ‘future,’ ‘present’ and ‘past’ do not belong to t at the same
time: they belong to t at different times. Therefore, there is no contradiction to start
with. Broad made the same conclusion already in 1938:
I cannot myself see that there is any contradiction to be avoided. When it is said that
pastness, presentness, and futurity are incompatible predicates, this is true only in the
sense that no one term could have two of them simultaneously or timelessly. Now no term
ever appears to have any of them simultaneously. . . . Thus, there is nothing in the temporal
appearance to suggest that there is a contradiction to be avoided. Broad [61, p. 313]
Especially, the first step of McTaggart’s argument is invalid, i.e., there is no contradiction
to start with, given presentism. This is crucial, for if you first get lulled into thinking that
the first step reveals a genuine contradiction, then you have already stepped into the trap.
Once you have accepted that the first step reveals a contradiction, all counter arguments
are rejected by saying that McTaggart anticipated just these arguments. Consider one
such argument:
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Thus, according to the A Theorist, there is no contradiction in the A series — i.e., no
contradiction in saying of a time, t, that t was future, is present, and will be past — and,
hence, no contradiction to be passed along to the different times at which t was future, is
present, and will be past. In effect, then, the typical A Theorist makes exactly the move
in response to McTaggart’s argument that McTaggart anticipated, and explicitly rejected.
Markosian [250]
It seems that Markosian fails to see that step II of McTaggart’s argument is irrelevant,
because step I never shows any contradiction in the first place, although Carroll and
Markosian [78, p. 165] especially note that “when A Theorists reject the first premise
of McTaggart’s argument. . . they are not merely passing a contradiction along from one
set of times to another, thereby generating an infinite regress of contradictions. Instead,
they will claim, there is no contradiction in the first place.” Making one understand that
McTaggart’s argument is forceless against presentism requires two steps:
step X. Step I of McTaggart’s argument never manages to show that there is a contra-
diction in the A-series to start with, and therefore there is no need to look at step II.
step Y. If you think that step X is exactly what McTaggart anticipated in step II, then
you have not understood step X, for step X exhausts step I of McTaggart’s argument.
If you insist on looking at step II you have not understood that the intelligibility of II
requires that I is intelligible; as I is not intelligible, II is not intelligible either.
The conclusion about McTaggart’s argument should be seen in the overall context of
EUO and economical unification: presentism is the most economical axiom for temporal
existence; McTaggart’s argument has no force in the context of presentism.
4.6 Definitions: Classification of Objects; Sameness, Identity,
Similarity
Observe figure 7. A denotes the whole circle. There is a smaller circle inside A, which
is denoted by B. B is a part of A: B  A. B is not the whole A, and therefore
B is a proper part of A: B ≺ A. By analogy, the hand is only a proper part of the
body, because the body has other parts in addition to the hand. It is usually said
that the hand is a part of the body, as it is known from the context that ‘part’ in
this case means ‘proper part.’ A is a part of A, but A is not a proper part of A:
A  A&A 6≺ A. A part of A is either a proper part of A or the whole A, but not both:
x  A → (x ≺ A xor x = A). All proper parts of A are parts of A but a proper
part of A is not the whole A: x ≺ A → x  A&x 6= A. E.g. mereology (Appendix
A) is a formalization of such part-whole relations and a sufficient logical foundation for
part-whole relations for the topics discussed in this thesis.
Figure 7: B is a proper part of A.
When mereology is mapped to EUO, a part of the Universe is either the Universe as a
whole or a proper part of the Universe. As the Universe is the sum of all that ever exists,
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the Universe is not a proper part of anything. Further, by the finiteness axiom (§4.17)
discrete mereology suffices as the logical foundation for part-whole relations between
parts of the Universe in EUO. The collections of discrete mereology are called aggregates.
An aggregate is either a single indivisible ur-element, or a composite of two or more ur-
elements. Ur-elements are mapped to elementary particulars; aggregates which consist
of two or more ur-elements are mapped to structural particulars and other objects. For
example, suppose that a chunk of iron at time t is composed of the elementary parts
e1, e2, e3, . . . , ek, where the relations between the elementary parts are not written out.
The elementary parts are considered logically as ur-elements, and the chunk of iron is
modeled as the aggregate e1e2e3. . .ek. To illustrate that discrete mereology suffices
for talking about all kinds of parts of the Universe, consider the Universe as a single
aggregate U which consists of all elementary particulars which are ever realized in the
past, present or future. Then consider any arbitrary part of the Universe X . As every
part of X is a part of U , it follows that X is a part of U .
As the Universe is a sequence of consecutive temporal stages (TSUs) and as every TSU
consists of proper parts, a part of the Universe is either a part of a single TSU which
is realized at one time, or a part of two or more TSUs which are realized at different
times. All parts of the Universe are objects and all objects are parts of the Universe, i.e.,
‘object’ and ‘part of the Universe’ are interchangeable. ‘Object’ is applied for the sake of
convenience. Objects are classified in particulars, sequences of particulars and temporally
scattered objects. The intention here is not to give an exhaustive classification, but to
come up with a classification that is sufficient for the purposes of this thesis.
particulars. A particular is either a single TSU or a proper part of a single TSU, i.e.,
a particular is realized exactly at one time in one location. Therefore, in the context of
presentism particulars are strictly speaking all that ever exist. ‘Particular’ is equivalent
with what Simons and Melia [363] call ‘continuant’ whereas other objects fall under what
they call ‘occurrent’: continuant/particular exists at one time only and thus does not
have temporal parts (or a particular is itself its only temporal part); an object that is
not a particular exists at two or more times and thus has two or more temporal parts.
Again, as particular X exists at exactly one time only, X is the only temporal part of X,
i.e., a ‘temporal part’ of an object covers all spatial parts of the object which exist at
one specific instant. For instance, you at time t is the only temporal part of you at time
t, although you at time t has several spatial parts.
sequences of particulars. A sequence of particulars is an unbroken sequence of
parts of two or more consecutive TSUs. As a part of a TSU is either the whole TSU or a
proper part of the TSU, all the following qualify as sequences of particulars: a sequence
of consecutive TSUs which are realized within a period of one year; a person during
a period of one minute; an electron during a period of one millisecond; a tree in your
backyard during a period of ten years; the Universe. Individual particulars are temporal
parts of such sequences. Thus p1 is a particular and a temporal part of the sequence
of two consecutive particulars p1, p2 which are realized at consecutive times 1, 2. Also
sub-sequences of p1, p2, p3, p4 such as p1, p2 and p3, p4 could be called temporal parts of
p1, p2, p3, p4, but in the following ‘temporal part’ denotes only particulars.
temporally scattered objects. Some objects are not particulars nor sequences of
particulars. Consider the sequence of three consecutive particulars B = b1, b2, b3. b1 is a
particular; b2 is a particular; b3 is a particular; b1, b2, b3 is a sequence of particulars; b1, b2
is a sequence of particulars; b2, b3 is a sequence of particulars; b1, b3 is not a particular
nor a sequence of particulars, but a temporally scattered object. For instance, but the
sum of the Eiffel tower at the first instant of the year 1900 and at the last instant of the
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year 1999 is not a particular nor a sequence of particulars, but a temporally scattered
object. As another example, the sum of Barack Obama at the first instant of the year
2015 and the Eiffel Tower during the whole 20th century is not a particular nor a sequence
of particulars, but a temporally scattered object.
endurantism and perdurantism. One could in principle start building an ontology
by selecting either perdurantism or endurantism, but as these are partially redundant
with the straightforward theories of temporal existence from which the building of EUO
was started, it is convenient to handle them in terms of temporal existence, not the other
way around. Consider Hawley’s definition:
Perdurantists believe that ordinary things like animals, boats and planets have temporal
parts (things persist by ‘perduring’). Endurantists believe that ordinary things do not
have temporal parts; instead, things are wholly present whenever they exist (things persist
by ‘enduring’). Hawley [165]
Presentism entails endurantism, and thus perdurantism is automatically incompatible
with EUO: a particular is wholly present when it exists, and a particular exists without
exceptions at the present; only the present temporal part of an object exists, the past
parts existed and future parts will exist. Perdurantism is compatible with eternalism,
the growing-block theory and the moving spotlight theory (§4.4), as in these theories all
temporal parts of an object may exist. Although EUO is incompatible with perdurantism
as theory, perdurantism can be considered as a mere figure of speech. The perdurantist
way of talking is used frequently in the context of EUO, as objects that are not particulars
‘have’ by definition two or more temporal parts. However, and again, as presentism is
an axiom of EUO, only the present temporal part of an object exists.
sameness, identity, similarity. Recall that a particular is realized in exactly one
location at exactly one time. Particular x is the same as x, and no other particu-
lar is the same as x. Sameness and identity are interrelated as follows: same(x, y) →
identical(x, y). Sameness of particulars x and y implies that they are identical, but the
identity of x and y does not imply that they are the same. As identity does not im-
ply sameness, in principle two particulars which are realized at different times may be
identical, i.e., two particulars which are not the same may be absolutely identical. Some-
times the term ‘numerically different’ is used instead of ‘same.’ Identity and similarity
of particulars is defined in terms their resemblance; as the resemblance of particulars
is nothing over and above the particulars in their environments, identity and similarity
of particulars is nothing additional to the particulars in their environments either (cf.
Armstrong [19, p. 56]). If the resemblance of x and y is absolute, they are identical; if
the resemblance of x and y is partial but not absolute, they are similar but not identical.
Similarity (or partial identity) is mostly sufficient for the needs of this thesis: e.g. two
iron atoms in different states of motion and gravitation resemble in some degree and are
therefore at least partially identical. However, both identity and sameness are needed,
and it is implausible to maintain that two non-same parts of the Universe cannot be abso-
lutely identical, given any sustainable requirements for their external relations. Consider
two examples. (i) Two absolutely resembling temporal stages of the Universe (TSUs)
which are realized at different times; these have no external relations and thus their ab-
solute intrinsic resemblance suffices for absolute identity. (ii) Two absolutely resembling
halves of a single TSU which has the form of a sphere (cf. Black [51, p. 165]); such
halves share all external relations.
Consider some disambiguations of the predicate ‘same.’ The expression ‘particulars x and
y instantiate the same property P ’ indicates nothing about the times when and locations
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where x and y are realized, but only means that x and y resemble absolutely with respect
to the range of properties where P belongs to (§4.10). The expression ‘particulars a and
b belong to the same range [length]’ means that a and b resemble partially or totally with
respect to length. The expression ‘I had the same idea as you’ means that two ideas
which are realized in different locations (in different minds) resemble as ideas. With
expressions ‘the same person has lived in that house for 10 years’ and ‘the same electron
has occupied several locations in the cloud chamber’ we are dealing with sequences of
functionally identical particulars; it is not known whether the temporal parts of the
electron are also identical. The expression ‘one cannot step twice into the same river’
manifests the strongest sense of sameness as defined above, whereas in ‘one can step
twice into the same river’ the term ‘river’ denotes a sequence of functionally identical
particulars: “A river replaces its water all the time and thus is functionally rather than
materially genidentical” (Reichenbach [329, p. 64]).
4.7 Axiom: Causality
The axiom for causality can be expressed in terms of three interrelated axioms that are
formulated on the top of presentism: (i) every part of the present TSU realizes energy
in an absolutely determinate location in an absolutely determinate way; (ii) all parts of
the present TSU are causally connected; (iii) the present TSU is the consequence of the
preceding TSU and the cause of the succeeding TSU. Although the axioms explicitly
state what holds for the present TSU, the axioms hold for all TSUs which are ever
realized, for all that is ever realized is present when realized.
i axiom for energy-endowed parts, or physicalism: every part of the present
TSU realizes energy in an absolutely determinate location in an absolutely determinate
way. As the TSUs are all that ever exist, it follows that all that ever exists without
exceptions realizes energy at some absolutely determinate time in some absolutely de-
terminate location35 in some absolutely determinate way, which is equivalent with physi-
calism (§4.13). As all parts of the Universe or all objects are endowed with energy, there
are no energy-free objects. Objects in EUO are equivalent with energy objects in DU.
DU and EUO are seamlessly unified also in this respect, as energy objects are all objects
there are in both DU and EUO. The ways of realizing energy are defined as properties
in §4.10.
Economy favours this axiom as the explanation of perceptions requires supposing the
existence of energy-endowed objects which are located in space, but does not require
supposing that in addition to the energy-endowed objects, there should be energyless
objects located in space, or objects which are not located in space. The rejection of bare
particulars (RBB) is implicit in this axiom, for RBB is in the ontological sense equiv-
alent with accepting that every particular which ever exists, exists in some absolutely
determinate way. The acceptance of bare particulars (ABB) in the ontological sense
is equivalent with accepting that one or more particulars at one or more times exist
without existing in some absolutely determinate way. Consider the economy of RBB vs.
ABB. As every perceived particular has some absolutely determinate form and size and
so forth, it suffices to suppose that all particulars —those which are perceived and those
which exist at some time but are not perceived at that time— exist in some absolutely
35A TSU does not exist in any location in the sense that location can be defined only in relation to
another location, and the location of a TSU cannot be defined in relation to anything else. In DU the
location of a TSU can be defined in terms of the distance from the abstract center point of the TSU
and vice versa, but the location of the fusion of the center point and the TSU cannot be defined.
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determinate ways, i.e., RBB suffices. In ABB it is supposed that in addition to the
non-bare particulars, some bare particulars exist at some times somehow as propertyless
substances. Economy favours RBB over ABB, for the commitment that all particulars
are of the same type (non-bare) is simpler than the commitment that there are two types
of particulars (bare and non-bare). Therefore RBB is postulated and ABB is rejected.
Bare particulars can be applied as useful fictions if needed, but fictions are nothing over
and above mental states (§§4.12, 7.6). In Bunge’s [69, p. 26, 57] words, “there are no
bare individuals except in our imagination” and “there is no formless substance except
as a useful fiction.” See Bailey [38] for an in-depth attack on bare particulars.
ii axiom for laws: all parts of the present TSU are causally connected. Perceptions
testify that the Moon stays on its orbit around the Earth, that the Earth stays on its orbit
around the Sun, that parts of smaller objects such as rocks and atoms somehow remain
attached to one another, and so forth. This raises the metaphysical question of why is
this so. The hypothesis that all parts of a TSU are causally connected by gravitation,
chemical bonds, nuclear bonds and other influences suffices as an explanation, and this is
postulated as an axiom of EUO in the absence of other explanations. This axiom is thus
an explicit postulation of the laws of nature that dictate what relations hold between
particulars. DU is applied as the provisional model of physics which is coupled with
EUO, i.e., DU’s descriptions of the laws of nature are applied, i.e., DU’s metaphysical
postulates are applied. The form of this axiom conforms to Armstrong’s formulation of
laws of nature as relations between universals: properties instantiated by a particular.36
To illustrate, the Earth and the Moon instantiate mass properties, and the relation of
gravitational attraction between the Earth and the Moon is an instantiation of a law of
nature as it is a realized relation between realized properties.
iii axiom for causal succession of tsus: the present TSU is the consequence of
the preceding TSU and the cause of the succeeding TSU. This axiom is an expression
of the law of cause and effect, i.e., the principle that each event has its cause, fitted in
the context of presentism in the cosmological scale. This axiom was formulated already
in the Ancient Greece e.g. by Hippocrates of Cos:37 “Every natural event has a natural
cause.” Various modern formulations are available.38 The need for this axiom can be
understood by looking at the basic structure of DU, where all parts of the Universe
move and there are two kinds of movement: movement in space and movement of space
(expansion of the Universe). The parts of TSU t with their energies of motion are the
cause of TSU t + 1 and the consequence of TSU t − 1. It is a small step from the
axiom for cause and effect to the conservation law of energy (CLE), for it is only the
step of adding that every cause has an equal effect. These are connected in William
Whewell’s axioms:39 “(1) nothing takes place without a cause, (2) the magnitude of an
effect is proportional to the magnitude of its cause, and (3) to every action there is an
equal and opposed reaction.” (1) is compatible with the axiom for causal succession of
TSUs whereas (2) and (3) seem to be expressions of CLE or very close to it. In DU the
axiom for cause and effect is accepted, and explicitly complemented by the zero-energy
formulation of CLE, which finds roots in G. W. Leibniz (§5.1).
This axiom can be considered as an expression of general causation, whereas an expression
of singular causation would be the statement that the 1st TSU of the year 2016 caused
the 2nd TSU of the year 2016. Consider two characterizations of the dichotomy:
36See Armstrong [17], [19, p. 76] and §4.10.
37As quoted in Meadows [262, p. 12].
38See Bugajak [66, p. 90], Losee [231, p. 129], Meadows [262, p. 12] and Bergman and Collins [47].
39As quoted in Losee [231, p. 129].
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Singular causation applies to cause-effect relations that occur in a single fragment of the
world’s history. Examples of singular causal claims include, “The collapse of the Tacoma
Narrows Bridge was caused by wind,” and “The cholera outbreak was caused by a contam-
inated well.” General causation addresses the kinds of events that can cause some chosen
kind of effect. Examples of general causal claims include, “Smoking causes cancer,” and
“Bribes encourage corruption.” Kutach [212, ch. 1.4]
Singularist theories of causation deny that general relations between types of events (like
the relation expressed in “Electrons repel other negatively charged particles”) are more ba-
sic than singular relations between particulars (like the relation expressed in “This electron
is repelling that electron”). Singularism, finally, is just the thesis that some singularist
theory of causation is true. Rota [340]
In Mellor’s view [266, pp. 6-7] general causation is merely generalisation of singular
causation and according to Broadbent [62, p. 54] general causation is reduced to singular
causation: both of these views certainly seem to be plausible in the light of this axiom, for
the postulate that all TSUs are in a causal succession is equivalent with a conjunction
of postulates concerning particular TSUs; in this sense there is no decisive difference
in general and singular causation. This axiom can thus be considered primarily as
an explicit acceptance of the primitiveness of causation. Rota characterizes primitive
causation:
Ontological primitivism with respect to causation, then, would be the view that the relation
of causation is a basic or primitive relation; it cannot be reduced to any other relation, or
set of relations, or any other ontological items whatsoever. Rota [340] especially
The attempt to somehow reduce causation ontologically to something even more funda-
mental seems to be equivalent with the attempt to reduce movement to something more
fundamental, and therefore I do not even try to do so. This is also the starting point
of Rota [340]: “Perhaps the reason that we haven’t yet found a successful reductionist
analysis. . . is simply that there isn’t one to be found—perhaps causation is primitive.”
In sum, as there seems to be no prospects of reducing causal succession of TSUs to some-
thing else, it is accepted as an axiom. Alternative versions of this axiom are evaluated
in §4.11.
4.8 Theorem: Naturalism
Naturalism can be formulated as the doctrine that everything that ever exists is directly or
indirectly causally connected to everything else that ever exists. This definition conforms
to Popper’s [314, p. 10] causality principle and is analogous to Armstrong’s [16, I, p.
138] use of ‘naturalism’ in the sense of one-world ontology. Naturalism contradicts the
existence of causally isolated or transcendent things and the function of naturalism is to
explicitly reject these from EUO.
Naturalism can be derived as theorem from the axioms for presentism and causality, as
follows. (i) Presentism states that everything that exists is a part of the present TSU.
(ii) Causality states that all parts of the present TSU are causally connected. The fusion
(i-ii) runs as: everything that exists is a part of the present TSU and all parts of the
present TSU are causally connected. (iii) Causality also states that the present TSU is
the consequence of the preceding TSU and the cause of the succeeding TSU. The fusion
(i-iii) determines cumulatively (§4.11) the single sequence of TSUs as all that ever exists,
where all parts of each individual TSU in the sequence are causally connected, and where
all consecutive TSUs in the sequence are in a causal succession. Naturalism has thereby
been derived, as everything that ever exists is a part of the sequence, and is directly or
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indirectly causally connected to everything else that ever exists in the sequence. The
single sequence is named as the Universe. Naturalism can thereby be also formulated as
the doctrine that all parts of the Universe are directly or indirectly causally connected
and all that ever exists is a part of the Universe. The meaning of naturalism is illustrated
in terms of two arbitrary particulars x and y. There are two alternatives: (1) x and y
are realized at the same time; (2) x and y are realized at different times.
(1) As x and y are realized at the same time, they are parts of the same TSU. Therefore,
they either overlap or are spatially separate. If they overlap, they are obviously causally
connected. If they do not overlap, they are still causally connected as presentism and
causality imply this. To illustrate, e.g. an atom on Earth is gravitationally connected
to the Earth; the Earth is gravitationally connected to the Sun; the Solar System is
connected to the Milky Way; the Milky way is connected to some cluster of galaxies;
and so forth up to the TSU as a whole. Therefore, all parts of a single TSU are causally
connected, directly or indirectly. Such gravitational connections are characterized in
terms of a system of nested energy frames in the Dynamic Universe model,40 and their
acceptance resembles Mach’s Principle (p. 26).
(2) As x and y are realized at different times, they are parts of different TSUs. Either
x is realized earlier than y or vice versa. Suppose that x is realized earlier than y. As
all parts of a single TSU are causally connected, all parts of TSU X whose part x is are
causally connected, and all parts of TSU Y whose part y is are causally connected. The
causality axiom implies that X and Y are causally connected, for X participates in the
following chain of temporally and causally connected TSUs: X, X+1, X+2, . . . , Y. In
sum, x and y are causally connected in the sense that x is causally connected to all parts
of X, X as a whole is causally connected to Y as a whole through the TSUs in between
X and Y, and y is causally connected to all parts of Y.
To illustrate that naturalism is conclusive, consider the following question. Is your mental
state xM today when reading this sentence the cause of the state of a dust particle y in
Andromeda after a million years from now? Claiming that xM is the cause of y is very
different from claiming that xM and y are at least indirectly causally connected. First,
as the mental state xM is inseparable from particular x, we can talk about the causal
connections of x (§4.12). Second, x is a part of the present TSU t and thus causally
connected to every part of t. TSU t causes TSU t+ 1, which causes t+ 2, which causes
t+3 and so forth. This way, x participates in causing the chain of TSUs where the dust
particle y resides in Andromeda after t + one million years. But this does not mean that
x would cause the state of y in the same way as e.g. you affect the state of a rocking
chair by sitting on it.
4.9 Rejection: Transcendism and Modal Realism as a Version
of Transcendism. The Roots of Naturalisation in Aristotle’s
Naturalisation of Platonism
Transcendism41 is rejected as an uneconomical alternative to naturalism. In the context
of naturalism the actual world —our world as the world where we reside— is exactly the
40See §5 and Suntola [384, §4.1.4, pp. 29, 34, 48-49, 70, 101].
41‘Transcendism’ denotes here solely the metaphysical doctrine that violates naturalism and which
commits to the existence of ‘transcendent’ or other-worldly entities. E.g. Kant’s transcendental idealism
is compatible with naturalism (See Stang [374]). A transcendental proof or argument is not involved with
transcendism. One translation is that a transcendental proof of X is that X is necessary: “Transcendental
proofs are like demonstrations in that transcendental proofs provide necessity. That is, the conclusion of
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same thing as the Universe and accordingly all parts of the Universe are actual. Economy
favours naturalism, for naturalism is sufficient and gets by with one single world whereas
transcendism adds one or more worlds that are causally isolated from the actual world.
This is a sufficient reason for rejecting transcendism. Armstrong was clear about this:
The reason why we need not take the worlds realistically is that they have no causal or
nomic links with the actual world. . . . The actual world will be no different whether they
are there or are not. Why, then, give the possible worlds . . . any existence (Armstrong [21,
p. 68])? But if the entities postulated lie beyond our world, and in addition have no causal
. . . connection with it, then the postulation has no explanatory value. . . . Other possible
worlds, whether Leibnizian or Lewisian, are not thought to have any effect on our actual
world. Nor is there thought to be any non-causal law of nature linking such worlds with
our world. Armstrong [18, pp. 7-8]
It is important to reject transcendism because it is highly confusing. The most direct
sing of its confusing nature is that even its rejection results in terminological ambiguities,
but these ambiguities must be temporarily accepted as transcendism has already entered
the philosophical thought. The actual world is selected as the stable anchor which must
be used in discussing transcendism, while the meaning of ‘the Universe’ is left floating
in the below combinations. Naturalism as the combination A&B is depicted on the top
of figure 8. A version of transcendism is either not-A&B, A&not-B or not-A&not-B.
A: all parts of the Universe are directly or indirectly causally connected.
B: all that ever exists is a part of the Universe.
not-A: some parts of the Universe are not causally connected even indirectly.
not-B: something that exists at some time is not a part of the Universe.
Figure 8: A&B on the top; not-A&B on the center; A&not-B on the bottom.
not-A&B is depicted on the center of figure 8. As always, we are situated in the actual
world. As B is sustained and A is rejected, the Universe is the repository of worlds that
are absolutely causally isolated from each other, and where the actual world is one of
these worlds. All other worlds are transcendent with respect to the actual world, which
a transcendental proof must be true” (Bayne [45, p. 33]). Bunge [68, p. 74] uses the term transcendent
to denote anything that is not necessarily observable.
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means that they are causally isolated from the actual world.42 Given any world, all
other worlds are transcendent to it. When X and Y are different worlds, it is absolutely
impossible for X to have any direct or indirect effect on Y in any way, and vice versa;
if there were a chain of effects between X and Y , then they would be parts of the same
world. Even if transcendent worlds would exist, these could not affect the actual world.
This remark points the attention towards that sense of ‘transcendent’ which does affect
us. Only ideas about transcendent worlds in the thinking of some people living in the
actual world affect us. And this reveals the sense in which ‘personal transcendism’ can
do something that ‘personal naturalism’ cannot. The belief itself in transcendism may
guide the actions of a person; a person who does not have this belief is not affected by
the belief.
A&not-B is depicted on the bottom of figure 8. Sustaining A allows us to call the actual
world the Universe. As B is rejected, something that exists at some time is not a part
of the Universe. It follows that the container of all things that ever exist must be given
another name, such as multiverse, or pluriverse as Armstrong [29, p. 95] calls it.
not-A&not-B is depicted in figure 9. The overall collection of all worlds and collections
(of collections, ad enough) of worlds is called multi-pluriverse. The rejection of A implies
that the Universe contains at least two worlds which are causally isolated from one
another. The rejection of B implies that there exists worlds also outside the Universe.
Whether these exist individually or inside a container depends on imagination. Likewise,
the actual world is drawn as an element of the Universe by free association.
Figure 9: The combination not-A&not-B.
some definitions. Four definitions are given which are compatible with both natural-
ism and transcendism, and one definition which is incompatible with transcendism, in
order to underline that the rejection of transcendism requires both A and B. (1) This
definition allows the existence of transcendent parts of the physical world: “The physical
world consists entirely of physical facts. What is not a physical fact is not part of the
physical world. And physicalism is the thesis that the physical world is the only world
there is, or the only world that is real” (Stroud [379, p. 264]). (2) This definition allows
that the actual world contains transcendent parts: “Actualism is the doctrine that there
are no things that do not exist in the actual world” (Adams [3]). (3) This definition
only requires that if there exists a transcendent world X, then everything in X affects
something else that exists in X: “everything that exists makes a difference to the causal
powers of something” (Armstrong [26, p. 41]). (4) This definition allows that nature
contains transcendent worlds: “The hypothesis that nothing but nature, the single, all-
embracing spatio-temporal system exists” (Armstrong [16, I, p. 138]). It can be safely
42The causality principle A is in practice altered into causality-within-a-world: all parts of world x are
causally connected (directly or indirectly). Otherwise there would be no sense in talking about ‘actual
world’ —nor about any world— for if causality-within-a-world would not hold in the actual world, then
the actual world would contain causally isolated worlds.
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assumed that Armstrong especially intended to reject everything transcendent, but with-
out A, the single all-embracing spatio-temporal system can contain transcendent parts.
(5) This definition incorporates A by ‘related’ and B by ‘single’: “All the particulars
which we have any reason to postulate are related to each other in a single space-time”
(Armstrong [16, II, p. 63]).
rejection of modal realism as a version of transcendism. David Lewis [221]
presented modal realism as the ontological base for counterfactual analysis or more gener-
ally for possible worlds semantics or just a theory of possibility. According to Williamson
[411, p. 10] “Lewis’s modal realism gave him a way of informally explaining what a pos-
sible world is in non-modal terms: roughly, a spatiotemporal system; the individuals in
such a system are spatiotemporally connected to each other and to nothing outside the
system.” Consider Lewis’ orientation behind modal realism:
I believe that there are possible worlds other than the one we happen to inhabit. If an
argument is wanted, it is this. It is uncontroversially true that things might be otherwise
than they are. I believe, and so do you, that things could have been different in countless
ways. But what does this mean? Ordinary language permits the paraphrase: there are
many ways things could have been besides the ways they actually are. On the face of
it, this sentence is an existential quantification. It says that there exist many entities of
a certain description to wit ‘ways things could have been’. . . . I therefore believe in the
existence of entities that might be called ‘ways things could have been’. I prefer to call
them ‘possible worlds’. . . .When I profess realism about possible worlds, I mean to be
taken literally. . . . Our actual world is only one among others. We call it alone actual not
because it differs in kind from all the rest but because it is the world we inhabit. Lewis
[221, p. 84-5]
Lewis is correct in noting that a theory of modalities requires ontological foundations,
but it is another question that what are the minimal and sufficient foundations. It
will be shown in §7 that EUO is a sufficient ontological foundation for such a theory
—including counterfactual analysis and complementations about physical possibilities,
fictions and logical possibilities— and thus transcendent foundations are not needed.
Therefore it suffices to show here that modal realism is uneconomical with respect to
EUO. Showing this requires only seeing that modal realism is a version of transcendism:
Lewis [223, p. 78] explicitly states that the possible worlds are causally isolated from one
another. Modal realism is thereby rejected as uneconomical. Rejecting modal realism is
important because it is the prime version of contemporary transcendism and thus one of
the prime sources of confusion in philosophy. According to Williamson [411, p. 8] Lewis
is the “most influential figure in the development of analytic metaphysics over the final
quarter of the twentieth century, and the contemporary philosopher most cited within
recent analytic philosophy.” Therefore it is important to emphasise that there are no
economical reasons for following Lewis’ ideology, i.e., that it is not just a matter of taste
whether one is a modal realist or not.
Consider Lewis’ [221, pp. 86-8] arguments for modal realism. Arguments (i-ii) do not
favour modal realism in any way and are thus not commented. (i) Transcendent worlds
cannot be rejected just by saying they do not exist. (ii) A non-actual possibility is
confined to one world only and thus does not pose problems for individuation. (iii)
Transcendent worlds cannot be rejected on the basis of parsimony (economy), for Lewis
maintains that modal realism does not add more kinds of entities or more qualities but
only adds quantitatively more entities, as for Lewis all possible worlds are of the same
kind and only qualitative parsimony is “good in a philosophical or empirical hypothesis.”
This argument is nothing more than a sleight of hand, i.e., Lewis basically insists that
his theory should not be evaluated by a fair criterion. First, if transcendent being is
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not different in kind than actual being, then what is different in the first place? Second,
even if it is accepted that the other worlds are not qualitatively but only quantitatively
different, it is unbearable to disregard the importance of quantitative parsimony. For,
if quantitative parsimony would not matter, then e.g. a spatially infinite TSU would
be as economical as a finite one. It is essential that both aspects of parsimony must be
taken in account, for the quantity of one kind of a metaphysical entity can compensate the
number of different kinds of metaphysical entities. (iv) Lewis’ strongest argument is that
modal realism is the only successful attempt he knows that manages to systematize the
modal opinions that there are not just tables and chairs but that these could have been
arranged differently. As EUO manages to systematize just these opinions but without
transcendism, the principle of economy favours it over modal realism.
aristotle’s naturalisation of platonism. Thus far, transcendism has only been
rejected, but concepts defined in terms of a transcendist ontology have not been natu-
ralised yet, i.e., they have not yet been defined in terms of EUO. Both the rejection of
transcendism and its naturalisation were initiated by Aristotle as a reaction to Plato.
The roots of transcendism can be traced back at least to Plato43 according to whom
forms such as sphere and goodness reside in a ‘heaven.’ This is where the term ‘Platonic
heaven’ derives from. The Platonic heaven is a repository which contains the forms, and
Plato’s theory of forms or Platonism is the doctrine that the forms exist in their own
realm that is separate from the objects in the actual world. As the Platonic heaven as the
realm of forms is not causally connected to the objects, the Platonic heaven is analogous
to a transcendent world. Aristotle rejected Plato’s theory of forms and replaced it by a
naturalist theory where (a) forms are forms of objects and forms do not exist separately
from the objects, and where (b) conceptualised forms exist, i.e., ideas that are realized
in minds of human beings about other ideas and objects exist.44 The forthcoming natu-
ralisations are merely versions of what Aristotle did. (a) is equivalent with the naturalist
definition of properties and universals in §4.10. (b) is equivalent with the definition of
abstract as thought in §4.14. As Lewis’ modal realism is merely a contemporary version
of transcendism, also its rejection and the giving of naturalist foundations for modalities
in §7 are continuous with what Aristotle started.
reconciliation of platonism and nominalism. According to the PhilPapers sur-
vey, of 1803 philosophy faculty members and/or PhDs, 40.8% accept or lean toward
nominalism and 36.3% accept or lean toward Platonism. This lack of consensus gave
the initiative to reconcile them. If these are contradictory theories then they cannot
be fitted together. They are contradictory when Platonism is interpreted as a theory
where abstract objects and universals exist as transcendent entities,45 and where nomi-
nalism especially rejects everything transcendent; according to Rodriguez-Pereyra [336],
one version of nominalism rejects the existence of abstract objects and the other rejects
the existence of universals. However, the applicable ingredients of Platonism can be
incorporated by defining ‘abstract’ and ‘universal’ in a way that is compatible with nom-
inalism. This can be done by defining these in terms of EUO which is a naturalist ontol-
ogy. That is, the ontological function of nominalism is interpreted here to be equivalent
with naturalism, or equivalent with the fusion of naturalism and physicalism, which are
both implied by presentism and causality. This is compatible with Rodriguez-Pereyra
43E.g. Republic 509d-511e, Phaedo 65d, 76d-e, Phaedrus 247c.
44See e.g. Metaphysics 991a, 1033b, Physics 259a, , andOn Ideas which has survived only in Alexander
Aphrodisian’s commentary of Metaphysics. Also Armstrong [26, p. 22] [19, preface] supports the view
that forms do not exists independently of objects.
45E.g. Balaguer [40] and Cheyne [83, pp. 2-3] define Platonism as the metaphysical doctrine that
completely causally inert and non-spatiotemporal abstract objects or universals exist.
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(ibid): “what motivates Nominalism (in one of its senses) is basically the rejection of
non-spatiotemporal and causally inert objects.” Compatibility with nominalism, when
interpreted to be equivalent with the fusion of naturalism and physicalism, is guaranteed
by defining abstract things as thoughts of human beings (§4.14), and by defining univer-
sals as properties, and properties as ways of how particular exist (4.10). In sum, when
EUO is accepted to be a nominalist ontology, versions of ‘nominalism’ become definitions
on the top of EUO (§4.10).
4.10 Definitions: Properties; Universals. Theorem: the Prin-
ciple of Instantiation
Properties and universals are defined in terms of the axioms for presentism and causality;
the principle of instantiation follows as a side product.
(1) By presentism and causality and the definition of particulars, particulars are all that
ever exist, there are no causally isolated transcendent particulars (§4.8), and there are
no bare particulars, i.e., when a particular exists it exists in some absolutely determinate
way rather than in no way at all (§4.7).
(2) Property is an absolutely determinate way of how a particular exists.
(3) Properties may be called universals. A universal is thereby a property which is
instantiated by a particular in the past, present or in the future (cf. Armstrong [19, p.
76]), and no transcendent universals exist. This is close to Armstrong [26, p. 38] who
advocates the conception of “universals as ways, ways things are and ways things stand
to each other.” This definition can be complemented: the more instantiations a property
has during a given time interval, the more universal it is within that interval.
(4) The principle of instantiation, according to which all universals are instantiated
in particulars and there are no uninstantiated universals (Armstrong [19, pp. 75-81]),
follows from (1-3): as particulars are all that ever exist, as properties are solely properties
of particulars, as properties are universals, and as transcendism is rejected, there is no
other place for properties to exist than in particulars.
Again, a property is an absolutely determinate (absolutely precise) way of how a partic-
ular is. The notion of an absolutely determinate property can be grasped by contrasting
it to a determinable range46 of properties. For instance, mass is a determinable range
of properties, whereas a single mass property such as 1 kg is absolutely determinate,
qualified by the precise numeric value 1 of the unit kilogram; atom is a determinable
range of properties, whereas a single atom property such hydrogen is absolutely deter-
minate, qualified by the precise numeric value 1 of the unit atomic number; length is a
determinable range of properties, whereas a single length property such as 1 metre is
absolutely determinate, qualified by the precise numeric value 1 of the unit metre.
A determinable range is an abstraction which is thought to contain two or more properties
which are such that a particular cannot instantiate any two of them simultaneously
in the same respect. A particular can instantiate the property 1 kg which belongs to
the determinable range mass, but it follows from the law of non-contradiction that a
particular cannot instantiate simultaneously in the same respect any other property
such as 2 kg which belongs to the range mass. A particular can instantiate the property
hydrogen, but a particular cannot instantiate simultaneously in the same respect any
other property such as oxygen which belongs to the range atom. Similarly for all ranges.
Because of this reason, Simons [362, p. 20] calls determinable ranges exclusion families.
46See Armstrong’s definition [16, II, pp. 112, 117] and Johnson’s [189, ch. 11] original definition.
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disjunctions and conjunctions of properties. A particular cannot literally in-
stantiate a determinable range, but expressions such as red(x) and atom(y) are mean-
ingful. red(x) means that particular x instantiates some property in the range red, and
atom(y) means that particular y instantiates some property in the range atom. As a
disjunction of properties, the range atom can be expressed e.g. as: hydrogen or helium or
lithium, or . . . or atom-n, where atom(y) means that y instantiates one of the disjuncts.
Likewise, the range 1 kg or 2 kg contains two mass properties, which makes it evident
that 1 kg or 2 kg(z) means that particular z instantiates one of the disjuncts: either the
property 1 kg or the property 2 kg, but not both. While a disjunction of properties is
not a property, some conjunctions of properties can be called a property (Armstrong [16,
II, chs. 14-15]). Consider particular x which has a certain mass M , a certain colour C,
and a certain geometrical form F . This can be expressed e.g. as M&C&F (x), where
the conjunction of properties M&D&F may be called a property of x.
resemblance and identity of properties. As properties are ways of how par-
ticulars are, saying that two properties which are elements of some range resemble, is
an indirect way of saying that two or more particulars resemble in some respect. For
instance, the closer two properties are in the range length, the more they resemble one
another with respect to length: 2 metres resembles 10 metres more closely than 1 metre
resembles 10 metres. This is equivalent with saying that a 2 metres particular resembles
a 10 metres particular more closely than a 1 metre particular resembles a 10 metres
particular, with respect to length. In this scenario e.g. the following expressions are
equivalent characterizations of particulars x and y:
(a) x and y resemble absolutely with respect to length.
(b) x and y are identical with respect to length.
(c) x and y instantiate the same length property L.
(d) x and y are elements of class [L] whose all elements resemble absolutely with respect
to length.
Let us take (a) and (c) under scope and contrast the given suggestion with resemblance
nominalism, which is defined by Rodriguez-Pereyra [336] as: “it is not that scarlet things
resemble one another because they are scarlet, but what makes them scarlet is that they
resemble one another.”
The given suggestion: (a) ↔ (c)
Resemblance nominalism: (a) → (c)
In the given suggestion, (a) and (c) are equivalent statements about x and y, and the only
primitive entities are x and y. In resemblance nominalism (a) and (c) are not equivalent,
resemblance is taken as primitive and the task is to somehow reduce properties to the
resemblance of particulars. The given suggestion can be defended by economy, which
favours presentism and causality, which in turn imply that all particulars which ever exist,
exist in certain ways rather than in no way at all. Calling the ways that particulars exist
properties and universals adds only terminology to EUO. As particulars are primitive
in EUO, the resemblance of particulars follows from the particulars themselves, i.e.,
resemblance of particulars is nothing over and above the particulars (cf. Armstrong [19,
p. 56], Rodriguez-Pereyra [335, pp. 120-1]). If one works in the context of presentism
and causality, there are no genuine alternatives to accepting that (a) ↔ (c) holds, and
the project of trying to reduce properties to resemblance classes can at best result in
formulations of equivalent expressions. Therefore, in the context of EUO, resemblance
nominalism of the kind (a)→ (c) cannot hold, and if a ‘resemblance nominalism’ holds in
EUO, we are dealing with a semantical or a terminological construction on the top of EUO
where (a)↔ (c) holds. Then again, if a version of resemblance nominalism is built on an
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ontology that is genuinely different from EUO, the case comes down to evaluating their
complexities. The question is that what exactly is different in a nominalist ontology. At
least naturalism is implicit in nominalism as well as in EUO (§4.9). If also physicalism is
implicit in nominalism, then there are no bare particulars, i.e., when a particular exists
it exists in some absolutely determinate way rather than in no way at all; if so, why
cannot (a) ↔ (c) hold?
4.11 Theorem: Eternal Universe
Presentism gives the present TSU p, and the causality axiom states that p is the con-
sequence of the preceding TSU p − 1 and the cause of the succeeding TSU p + 1. This
implies that the Universe is eternal: that the past is infinite and the future is potentially
infinite.
the past is infinite. Presentism gives p which is the only TSU that exists. Given p,
causality states that p− 1 did exist; given that p− 1 did exist, causality states that also
p− 2 did exist; given that p− 2 did exist, causality states that also p− 3 did exist; and
so on infinitely.
the future is potentially infinite. Presentism gives p which is the only TSU that
exists. Given p, causality states that p+1 will exist; given that p+1 will exist, causality
states that also p + 2 will exist; given that p + 2 will exist, causality states that also
p + 3 will exist; and so on potentially infinitely. Given any assigned time p + n in the
future, some finite sequence of TSUs will be realized at times p + 1, p + 2, . . . , p + n.
Yet, an infinite sequence of TSUs will not be realized in the future: the future will
never be complete, for one present TSU will always come after another. As the future is
never complete, there is no such thing as ‘all’ TSUs which will be realized in the future.
This raises a tension because when you think of the future, your mind forces you to
think about it as a completed stretch, but the notion that it is potentially infinite and
never complete simultaneously indicates that thinking about it as a completed stretch is
misleading. This reasoning is compatible with Rundle:
But while there cannot be a time when, starting from the present, the universe will have
existed for an infinity of years, this does not debar us from saying that it could go on for
an indefinitely long period of time, that it could continue in existence for the foreseeable
future, even that it could go on for ever; Rundle [341, p. 179]
alternative version of causal succession. Alternative interpretations about
whether all TSUs at all times in the past, present and future are similarly causally
connected are evaluated by the principle of economy. The central interpretations are
depicted in figure 10, and axioms (1-4) which imply these interpretations are listed
below, where (1) is the given version of the causality axiom.
Figure 10: Alternative versions of the causal succession of TSUs.
(1) TSU p is the cause of p+ 1 and the consequence of p− 1.
(2) (1) holds for all TSUs except for the first TSU F which is the cause of F+1 but not
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a consequence of any TSU.
(3) (1) holds for all TSUs except for the last TSU L which is the consequence of L-1 but
not a cause of any TSU.
(4) (1) holds for all TSUs except for F which is the cause of F+1 but not a consequence
of any TSU, and for L which is the consequence of L-1 but not a cause of any TSU.
Given (1), all TSUs are of the same type as all are both causes and consequences. In (2)
the first TSU F is not a consequence of anything. In (3) the last TSU L is not a cause
of anything. In (4) F is not a consequence of anything and L is not a cause of anything.
The principle of economy thus favours (1) over (2-4) based on qualitative economy. Note
especially that economy does not favour rejecting the premisses of the eternal Universe
theorem on the basis that more things are supposed to exist if the past is infinite than
when the past is finite; for, only the present exists in EUO, i.e., supposing that the
infinite past did exist does not increase the metaphysical weight of EUO, as long as the
same axioms are supposed to have held for each past TSU —all of which once were
present— which is the case with (1). In addition to plain economy, (2-3) are bothered
by counter-intuitive implications. The primary lessons about the forthcoming analysis
are that (1) does not suffer from the counter-intuitive implications, and that cosmology
is tightly interrelated with philosophical questions.
First, either F was born out of nothing or the length of F was infinite, and either L
will vanish into absolute nothing or its length is potentially infinite. As the lengths
of all other TSUs are finite (§4.3), the exceptional-length solution further increases the
metaphysical weight of F and L and thus of (2-4). If the exceptional-length solution is
rejected, the problem becomes to make sense of birth out of nothing and of vanishing
into nothing. Instead of seeing birth out of nothing as a problem, for Craig [412] it
gives a function to God, i.e., to the explanation that God is the first cause that created
the Universe. On one hand, if one wishes to call the TSUs which preceded F as ‘God-
times’ and if these are of a different type than the rest, then we are dealing again with
parameters; on the other hand, if God is totally separate from the Universe, then we are
dealing with uneconomical transcendism and there is also the problem that how could
God affect the Universe; on the third hand, if the TSUs before F are like all the rest,
then we are dealing with (1) or (3). For Craig this cannot be the case for he especially
argues that the past cannot be beginningless, i.e., that it cannot be infinite. Craig has
two central arguments.
Craig’s [412, p. 12] central a priori argument is that various absurdities would result if
an actual infinity were to be instantiated in the real world. The primary remark here is
that in EUO there are no actual infinities in the sense of a completed totality whose all
parts exist simultaneously which is the meaning of ‘actual infinity’ in mathematics when
applied to abstract entities such as the set of all natural numbers. Spatial infinity and
infinite divisibility are especially rejected by the finiteness axiom; the past especially
does not exist in EUO but it did exist, for this is what presentism means. It is true
that the Universe has infinitely may parts for in EUO the past is infinite, and as the
Universe is equivalent with the actual world, in this sense we are dealing with the actual
world with an infinite past, but again, the past does not exist at the present. Craig
makes an analogy of the past and an actually infinite library whose manipulation would
have paradoxical consequences. Morriston [279, p. 148] correctly answers that the past
cannot be manipulated. Morriston also rejects Craig’s other a priori arguments against
the infinite past. The central a posteriori argument of Craig and Smith [412] is the Big
Bang theory of the standard model cosmology. Reichenbach reviews how Craig could be
answered in terms of the relativist standard cosmology. The answer seems to be very
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mysterious:
[G]iven the Grand Theory of Relativity, the Big Bang is not an event at all. An event takes
place within a space-time context. But the Big Bang has no space-time context; there is
neither time prior to the Big Bang nor a space in which the Big Bang occurs. Hence, the
Big Bang cannot be considered as a physical event occurring at a moment of time. . . . Time
might be multi-dimensional or imaginary, in which case one asymptotically approaches a
beginning singularity but never reaches it. And without a beginning the universe requires
no cause. The best one can say is that the universe is finite with respect to the past, not
that it was an event with a beginning. Reichenbach [328]
This response replaces Craig and Smith’s excessive metaphysics by relativistic meta-
physics, where the background is the relativistic conception of tenseless eternalist space-
time (§4.4,5.6.3). One way to understand Reichenbach’s reply is to consider the past
as a sequence such as 1, 0.5, 0.25, 0.125, . . . which never reaches the singularity 0. One
must ask that is a Big Bang theory which denies that the Big Bang itself is a physical
event really plausible? Reichenbach seems to consider the past as the open interval ]0,
. . . , 0.125, 0.25, 0.5, 1] where the Big Bang 0 itself does not exist as the cause but only
its consequence exists. The question that how can a consequence exist without a cause
remains, and it does no go away by trying to blur the case by a converging sequence or
a mystical conception of time.
In contrast, the Dynamic Universe model (DU) starts by assuming that the previous
singularity was merely a turning point from contraction to expansion: the contracting
space was the cause of the singularity and therefore God is not needed as the cause. Craig
and Smith’s argument from the Big Bang theory is thereby exhausted in the context of
DU, and DU is compatible with the eternal Universe theorem. There are basically two
alternatives to combine DU with the eternal Universe theorem. First, one may suppose
that the Universe was contracting for the whole infinite past, which how Suntola [384]
visualises the case. When this alternative is considered backwards, the Universe should
be growing infinitely backwards, unless one maintains that the growth rate decreases
conveniently, and one may find difficulties from this approach. Second, one may fit DU
with the Bouncing Universe model or the Cyclic Theory of the Universe where the past
is an infinite sequence of contraction-singularity-expansion cycles (cf. Steinhardt [375]).
Although such model is not analyzed in Suntola [384], Suntola personally considers it as
the most obvious alternative.
4.12 Axiom: Ontological Realism
Ontological realism and its competitors are handled as versions of mental realism. Men-
tal realism is defined and defended first, after which ontological realism is defined and
defended as the most economical version of mental realism.
mental realism. According to mental realism, mental states of human beings exist.
This formulation is congenial with Kim’s [199, p. 344] definition of mental realism
as the doctrine that “mental properties are real properties of objects and events” and
compatible with Restrepo’s [331] definition of mental realism as “the doctrine that mental
properties, objects, and events are a part of the causal structure of the world, and
that they enter into causal relations as mental.”47 Mental realism is verified by direct
experience: that you have first-person access to your conscious thoughts proves that your
thoughts exist; that you think proves that your thoughts exist, as Descartes famously
47It is also congenial with the definitions of Demeter [106, p. 60] and Tozser [400, p. 337].
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conjectured with his slogan cogito ergo sum. The only alternative to mental realism
is to deny that your thoughts exists. Such a denial contradicts the evidence given by
first-person access. Moreover, denying that your thoughts exist requires thinking, as the
denial is an act of thinking. Mental realism is thus postulated as the only alternative
that explains experiences.
ontological realism. According to ontological realism, a proper part of the Universe
is independent of human minds. This formulation is congenial with various formulations48
including Niiniluoto’s [289, p. 10] formulation: “At least part of reality is ontologically
independent of human minds.” When fitted in EUO, ontological realism becomes the
doctrine that human beings with their mental states are proper parts of some temporal
stages of the Universe and the other parts of the Universe are independent of the mental
states of human beings.
versions of mental realism. When defending ontological realism, it is useful to ap-
ply the dichotomy of (a) your mind and (b) the rest of the Universe, where (b) denotes
everything which does not overlap with (a), including minds of all the other people. This
way it is easy to see ontological realism as the mind-independence thesis: (b) is inde-
pendent of (a). Ontological realism may now be contrasted to other versions of mental
realism, as depicted in figure 11. Starting from the top, plain mental realism leaves open
Figure 11: A classification of versions of mental realism.
whether your mind is all that exists or whether there exists something external to your
mind, i.e., plain mental realism leaves open the selection between solipsism and its nega-
tion. The defence of ontological realism against solipsism is given the last. The negation
of solipsism states only that something exists which is external to your mind, but leaves
open the selection between ontological realism as the mind-independence thesis and the
mind-dependence thesis. The mind-independence thesis may now defended against the
mind-dependence thesis.
mind-independence vs. mind-dependence. Objects such as planets, stars and the
other people seem to be independent of your mind. The mind-independence thesis is
postulated as the explanation: they seem to be independent because they are indepen-
dent. Accordingly, and as the apparent independence is not explained by supposing that
they are dependent, the mind-dependence thesis is rejected.
The dependence of (a) on (b) and the subjectivity of (a) are compatible with the mind-
independence thesis. Perception yields a sensation of a mind-independent object in your
consciousness, where the sensation is in correspondence with the mind-independent ob-
ject (§8.1). As your sensation reflects the mind-independent object, your sensation is in
this sense dependent on the object, i.e., (a) is dependent on (b). The mind-independence
thesis is not violated, as the dependence of (a) on (b) does not imply that (b) is depen-
dent on (a). Changes in the perceived (b) change (a), but changes in the thoughts of the
perceiver do not change anything in (b), and therefore (b) is independent of (a). Sen-
sations about mind-independent objects are subjective in the sense that every conscious
48See e.g. Hirst [170, p. 77], Devitt [107, II.2.4] and Halldane [160, p. 15].
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agent experiences the mind-independent objects in the particular way in which the agent
happens to experience them, but the subjectivity of sensations does not entail that (b)
is dependent on (a). E.g. Peirce and Mach insisted that there are no good reasons
for confusing the subjectivity of sensations with the violation of the mind-independence
thesis:
Even the man in the street knows how external circumstances and sense organs affect our
impressions of the world, so that it appears somewhat different to each one of us. Scientific
experience confirms this, and teaches us further that sensation (perception) is determined
by the final link in a chain reaching from the environment to the central organ of sense;
in exceptional cases, it can occur spontaneously, without external stimulus, in the form
of hallucination. . . . placing too great an importance on these exceptional cases can easily
lead to monstrous systems of idealism, or even solipsism. Mach [242, p. 39]
The first step of Kant’s thought . . . is to recognize that all our knowledge is, and forever
must be, relative to human experience and to the nature of the human mind. . . . At this
point, the idealist appears before the tribunal of your reason with the suggestion that
since these metaphysical conceptions are . . . only valid for experience and since all our
knowledge is relative to human mind, they are not valid for things as they objectively are;
and since the conception of existence is pre-eminently a conception of that description, it is
a mere fairy tale to say that outward objects exist, the only objects of possible experience
being our own ideas. . . . Kant never said that. . . . we have direct experience of things
in themselves. Nothing can be more completely false than that we can experience only
our own ideas. That is indeed without exaggeration the very epitome of all falsity. Our
knowledge of things in themselves is entirely relative, it is true; but all experience and all
knowledge is knowledge of that which is, independently of being represented. Peirce [304,
6.95]
The inseparability of human mind from human body (§4.13) is compatible with the
mind-independence thesis. The inseparability entails that mental states are causally
connected to all other parts of the TSUs where human beings are realized. However,
all required causal connections are compatible with the mind-independence thesis. For
instance, gravitational links do not qualify as links of mind-dependence, because (b)
is in the relevant sense independent of the changes in (a). On the other hand, as the
changes in (a) are also changes in the whole particular whose mental property (a) is,
changes in (a) in this sense gravitationally influence all other parts of the TSUs. Calling
such influences as links of mind-dependence is over-propagation, for such influences only
remind that nothing is causally isolated: that there are no causally isolated things should
certainly not be over-propagated into the heights of thinking that everything is mind-
dependent. In the historical Copenhagen interpretation of quantum theory, it is supposed
that there are superluminal influences between spatially separated particulars where a
change in one particular especially changes the other. If such influences would exist,
then also (b) could in principle depend on (a). However, in the Dynamic Universe model
such influences do not have to be supposed, and as cited in §5.2, there are interpretations
quantum theory which get by without such influences.
the equivalence of empirically sufficient solipsism and ontological re-
alism. If you are a solipsist, then your mind is absolutely everything that exists and
nothing that exists is external to your mind: “solipsism states that the world is my
world, or that everything there is equals to the contents of my thoughts” (Pihlstro¨m
[310, pp. 15-16]); “It adopts a position that only acknowledges the existence of one’s
very own mind and opposes that there is anything beyond the realm of my mind that
could be known” (So¨temann [368, p. 73]. Solipsism thus seems to propagate mental
realism into heights where the dichotomy of your mind and the rest of the Universe has
vanished. Similarly as with any internally coherent metaphysical postulate, the refuta-
tion of solipsism without having economy as the judge is impossible in the sense that
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whatever arguments you provide, the solipsist can always say that it is in his mind, and
he can qualify his mind by whatever further metaphysical commitments. For comparison,
Pihlstro¨m [308, p. 275] notes that it is “trivially true that solipsism. . . cannot be con-
clusively refuted.” Therefore, the prerequisite for refuting solipsism as uneconomical or
insufficient is to first spell out the exact version of solipsism to be refuted, which is some
system of metaphysical postulates that is coupled with the initial postulate ‘my mind
is all that exists.’ In other words, the rejection of solipsism is a matter of searching for
alternative versions of solipsism, explicating their metaphysical commitments, seeing if
these are empirically sufficient, and if so then evaluating their metaphysical complexities
against ontological realism.
Johnstone [190] classifies various versions or solipsism found in the literature. Due to
space limitations, it is impossible to review these versions here. It suffices to note that
Johnstone manages to refute various versions as empirically insufficient, but he is also
forced to conclude that one version cannot be refuted, although it does not have any
special empirical support either. Moreover, those versions that Johnstone manages to
refute as insufficient can always be complemented by additional parameters which would
make them sufficient, no matter how weird they look like. The decisive question is thus
that is the minimal and sufficient version of solipsism more economical than ontological
realism. The aim of the following proof is to show that a version of solipsism that is both
empirically sufficient and minimal, must incorporate ontological commitments which
make it practically equivalent with ontological realism, i.e., that the best solipsism can
ever do as a metaphysical theory is to be equivalent with ontological realism. The idea
that solipsism is equivalent with ontological realism can be found fromWittgenstein [413,
p. 82]: “Here we can see that solipsism coincides with pure realism, if it is strictly thought
out.”49 Given that they are equivalent, it becomes a matter of style or terminology
whether ontological realism and a minimal and sufficient version of solipsism is used.
However, some terminology must be used consistently, and the terminology of ontological
realism is chosen because it matches the common use of language better.
An empirically sufficient and minimal version of solipsism is contrasted to ontological
realism in figure 12, where the mind of the solipsist is depicted on the top and the mind
of an ontological realist as a proper part of the Universe on the bottom. For a realist,
perception yields verified beliefs about the rest of the Universe in the mind of the realist,
and the rest of the Universe is independent of the mind of the realist. For a solipsist, there
is no such thing as the rest of the Universe, as the mind of the solipsist is all that exists.
The mind of the solipsist is classified in two parts: the sense-realm and the insensible
realm. The sensations of the solipsist such as visual sensations, smell sensations and
touch sensations are parts of the sense-realm. The solipsist senses e.g. the other people,
trees, mountains and his own body; all these are parts of the sense-realm. The sense-
realm is classified in two parts: the experienced part and the sensible-but-unexperienced
part. The solipsist’s dichotomy of sense-realm and insensible realm is analogous to the
ontological realist’s dichotomy of verifiable and unverifiable&unfalsifiable beliefs. The
solipsist’s dichotomy of experienced and sensible-but-unexperienced parts of the sense-
realm is analogous to the ontological realist’s dichotomy of verified and verifiable-but-
unverified beliefs about the rest of the Universe. The solipsist’s mind is thus analogous
with the ontological realist’s mind, with the crucial exception that the solipsist’s mind
49As cited in Pihlstro¨m [310, p. 83]. According to Pihlstro¨m (ibid, p. 106) “transcendental kind
of solipsism . . . claims with Wittgenstein . . . that solipsism is in the end not incompatible with, but
rather indistinguishable from realism.” See Pihlstro¨m (ibid, chs. 3-4) for remarks about transcendental
solipsism. See definitions of ‘transcendental’ in p. 67.
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does not contain the ontological realist’s belief in the existence of the rest of the Universe.
Figure 12: Solipsist’s mind on the top. Ontological realism on the bottom.
The solipsist’s sensations testify that the behaviour of most of the experienced parts of
the sense-realm such as planets and stars and the other people who disagree about what
the body of the solipsist says, is independent of the desires and hopes of the solipsist.
Conversely, the solipsist’s sensations testify that the body of the solipsist has a very
special status compared to the other parts of the sense-realm, for the body typically
behaves as the solipsist wishes. The body (especially the brain) is the nerve center of
the solipsist, who senses when the body is manipulated and who experiences the sense-
realm through the body. In order to explain these experiences, the solipsist must accept
the link between his body (brain) and his thoughts, and the existence of two essentially
different proper parts of the experienced part of the sense-realm: the very special body
of the solipsist which is dependent on the hopes and wishes of the solipsist; the rest of the
experienced part of the sense-realm which exists independently of the hopes and wishes
of the solipsist.
These commitments are dangerously close to ontological realism where mind-independence
is postulated as the explanation of why most things seem to be independent of your mind,
and the mind of the realist is postulated to be inseparable from the body of the realist.
In effect, the only difference between ontological realism and solipsism seems to be a
naming convention: in ontological realism the Universe is all that ever exists and it is
divided in your mind and the rest of the Universe; in solipsism your mind is all that ever
exists and it is divided in that part which is dependent on your hopes and wishes and
that part which is independent. This result is applied in §§6.2,6.3.
the argument from the past. Niiniluoto presents another very straightforward
argument for ontological realism:
[W]e have very strong evidence from many fields of contemporary science that there was a
point of time t0 in the history of our planet when no human being had yet appeared through
evolution. . . . This gives us a powerful test of mind-independence: whatever existed before
t0 must be ontologically independent of human mentality and human cultural constructs
such as concepts. This refutes all philosophical doctrines—such as subjective idealism,
phenomenalism, solipsism, positivism and pragmatism (in some of their varieties), internal
realism, and social constructivism, which literally claim that nothing exists independently
of the human mind or that all objects are our constructions. Niiniluoto [291, p. 168]
80
Niiniluoto’s argument functions as such in the context of presentism. Something addi-
tional could be invented to reject it, but everything additional is ruled out as uneconom-
ical. For instance, an eternalist solipsist can maintain that he exists tenselessly and thus
the past can be his mental creation, but eternalism is rejected in §4.4.
4.13 Theorem: Physicalism. Rejection: Mind-Body Dualism
Physicalism as the doctrine that all that ever exists is physical clarifies ontology and
feeds economical unification (cf. Poland [312, p. 35]). When applied specifically in
philosophy of mind, physicalism attaches mental to physical and functions as the base
for rejecting all varieties of mind-body dualism where thoughts and minds can exist
independently of bodies of human beings, which are physical particulars in EUO. The
goal of attaching mental to physical is implicit also in Stoljar’s [377] formulation of
physicalism as “the thesis that everything is physical, or . . . that everything supervenes on
the physical” where the supervenience of mental on physical guarantees that everything
mental is inseparable from something physical. The axioms of EUO imply physicalism as
a theorem. The essential content of physicalism is embedded in this partial formulation
of the causality axiom: every part of the present TSU realizes energy in an absolutely
determinate location in an absolutely determinate way (§4.7). However, strictly speaking
presentism and the full causality axiom are needed to imply physicalism as a theorem.
Let this theorem be called TPC:
All that ever exists is a part of the Universe and directly or indirectly causally
connected to all other parts of the Universe, and realizes energy at some
absolutely determinate time in some absolutely determinate location in some
absolutely determinate way.
When the doctrine that all that ever exists is a part of the Universe and all parts of the
Universe are directly or indirectly causally connected is abbreviated as naturalism (§4.8),
TPC can be written as:
Naturalism + all that ever exists realizes energy at some absolutely determi-
nate time in some absolutely determinate location in some absolutely deter-
minate way.
When physical particular is defined as a particular which is endowed with energy, realized
in an absolutely determinate location at an absolutely determinate time, TPC can be
written as:
Naturalism + all that ever exists is physical.
Finally, as physicalism is the doctrine that all that ever exists is physical, TPC can be
written as: naturalism + physicalism. This version of physicalism and thus also EUO are
compatible e.g. with all 13 versions of physicalism listed by Stoljar [377], and with the
following definitions: “The world could not have been different in any respect without
having been different in some strictly physical respect” (Haugeland [164, p. 1]); “Within
a physicalist system, once the physical facts and truths are fixed, then so are all the facts
and truths” (Poland [312, p. 285]).
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rejection of mind-body dualism. When ontological realism (a version mental re-
alism) is coupled with physicalism as the theorem that physical particulars are all par-
ticulars that ever exist, the result is that some physical particulars are in some sense
mental. However, the supervenience of mental on physical does not yet guarantee that
human minds supervene on human bodies, for minds could in principle be considered as
physical objects whose existence is independent of human bodies. Therefore, in addition
to plain physicalism, it is explicitly supposed by economy that human minds supervene
on physical human bodies. The inseparability thesis explains why the human mind seems
to guide the actions of the human body, it disambiguates the theories of truth and pos-
sibility where propositions are considered as thoughts of human beings and which are
thereby attached to human bodies, and it is more economical than to suppose that there
exists mental things which are separate from the body. All forms of mind-body dualism
are thus rejected.
physical particular with concrete and mental properties: the dual-
aspect theory? Thus far, it has been pointed out that the fusion of presentism,
causality and ontological realism attach mental to physical, and the inseparability thesis
especially attaches human minds to physical human bodies.50 Accordingly, that a men-
tal thing exists means that a physical particular exists which is in some sense mental.
This can be expressed by saying that a physical particular has a mental aspect, that a
mentality-involved particular exists, or that the particular has mental properties.51 If
panpsychism (see below) is true, then all particulars have mental properties. If panpsy-
chism is false, then only some particulars have mental properties. In either case, all
particulars have concrete properties. Supposed that some physical particulars have men-
tal properties and some do not, physical particulars can be classified in two: physical
particulars which have both concrete and mental properties; physical particulars which
have concrete properties only; Stubenberg characterises the dual-aspect theory:
All versions of the theory appear to be committed to the view that there are certain sub-
stances. . . that are intrinsically neither material nor mental. Nevertheless these substances
can present themselves under the aspect of the mental and the aspect of the physical. And
these aspects are distinct yet inseparable and basic in the sense of being irreducible to each
other or to anything else. Stubenberg [380]
In EUO physical objects are all substances there is, and at least some of these are
neither fully mental nor fully concrete, in the sense that physical particulars may have
both aspects. If this is what Stubenberg means by saying that some substances are
“intrinsically neither material nor mental” then EUO is compatible with the dual-aspect
theory in this sense. Consider the characterization that “these aspects are distinct yet
inseparable and basic in the sense of being irreducible to each other or to anything else.”
Concrete and mental are ‘distinct’ in the sense that they are opposites of one another,
but they are also inseparable as they are after all aspects of the one and the same physical
thing; the physical is irreducible to anything else as physical particulars are the primitive
building blocks in EUO; therefore, if a physical particular is incomplete without both
aspects, one aspect only cannot complete the other, i.e., they are irreducible to one
another.52 Thus, if the question is the mind-body problem as “that of finding a place for
50This investigation concentrates on human beings, but also minds of other creatures such as animals
are supposed to be inseparable from their bodies.
51For comparison, Martikainen [251] uses the convention that mental things subsist; according to
Marek [246], Alexius Meinong [264, pp. 252-3, 366-7] uses subsistence to denote the existence of mental
things.
52However, there are no reasons to deny that one day the mental state of a relatively simple organism
such as a banana fly could be deduced based on the knowledge of its concrete properties, for this only
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the mind in a world that is fundamentally physical” (Kim [200, p. 2]), then the answer
of EUO is that the human mind is an aspect of the physical human body.
There is no contradiction here: the case is merely a matter of fitting together conveniently
the meanings of the terms ‘exists,’ ‘physical,’ ‘concrete,’ and ‘mental.’ Consider three
alternative naming conventions, where (A) is the given convention, where the difference
of (A) and (B) is merely terminological, and where (C) clashes with Strawson’s argument
(below).
(A) ‘Exists’ is equivalent with ‘physical’ and ‘exists=physical’ denotes the primary form
of existence; ‘exists=physical’ is different from ‘concrete’ and ‘mental’; ‘concrete’ and
‘mental’ are opposites. Again, anything that ever exists in whatever way at all is ex-
isting=physical; all existing=physical particulars have the concrete aspect whereas only
some existing=physical particulars have the mental aspect (given that panpsychism is
not true), i.e., existing=physical, mental and concrete by definition fit together, because
mental and concrete are merely aspects of existing=physical particulars.
(B) Plain ‘existence’ denotes the primary form of existence; ‘exists’ is different from
‘physical,’ ‘concrete’ and ‘mental’; ‘physical’ is equivalent with ‘concrete’; ‘concrete=physical’
and ‘mental’ are opposites. Some existing particulars have two aspects (the physi-
cal=concrete and the mental aspects) while others have only one aspect (the physi-
cal=concrete aspect). The difference to (A) is merely terminological.
(C) ‘Physical,’ ‘concrete’ and ‘exists’ are equivalent and ‘concrete=physical=exists’ de-
notes the primary form of existence; ‘concrete=physical=exists’ and ‘mental’ are op-
posites. In this convention mental things are not said to exist but e.g. to subsist
(although subsistence could be applied also with (A) and (B)). This convention gets
driven into the paradoxical situation where mental things supervene on or are emergent
from physical=concrete=existing things, but where Strawson’s argument shows that con-
crete=physical=existing particulars should somehow contain mental things, while con-
crete=physical=existing and mental are simultaneously opposites. This convention does
not work as mental cannot be emergent on its opposite, for this would imply that mental
is in its opposite, as Strawson’s argument shows, whereas in (A) and (B) mental is not
in its opposite but only inseparable from it.
From here on, convention (A) is applied again. A characterization of the concrete-
mental dichotomy is a characterization of the concrete and mental aspects or properties
of particulars. The following characterizations were inspired originally by Sowa [370,
p. 76]. The mental properties of a particular are conceivable, but not perceivable with
material senses nor measurable even in principle with particle detectors nor expressible
in any units of the international system of units (SI) such as metre, kilogram, coulomb
and so on. The concrete properties of a particular are especially perceivable, in principle
measurable and expressible in SI units. For instance, we can conceive but not perceive
a mental image such as a square by vision nor by any measurement device, but we
can measure the approximate location of the particular X whose mental property X
is. Among the concrete properties of X are an absolutely determinate mass, energy, a
location in space and causal effects; the mental square has a mass, energy, a location
in space and causal effects only through the concrete properties of X , with which it
is inseparable. The concrete-mental dichotomy is applied in §4.14 in the definition of
abstract.
strawson’s inseparability argument. To emphasize the inseparability of mental
from physical, consider Galen Strawson’s [378] argument against brute emergence, where
requires that our science has succeeded in correctly capturing the complexity of the banana fly. At this
stage intentionality or entelecheia (p. 110) must have been incorporated.
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‘brute emergence’ could be replaced by ‘brute supervenience,’ by ‘brute grounding’ and
alike, i.e., no version of physicalism can escape Strawson’s argument. In the following,
X denotes a mentality-involved particular, and Xm denotes the mental aspect of X .
Strawson emphasizes that Xm is inseparable from X . In the below quote Xm = Y :
If it really is true that Y is emergent from X then it must be the case that Y is in some
sense wholly dependent on X and X alone, so that all features of Y trace intelligibly back
to X . . . . Emergence can’t be brute. It is built into the heart of the notion of emergence
that emergence cannot be brute in the sense of there being absolutely no reason in the
nature of things why the emerging thing is as it is. . . . For any feature Y of anything that
is correctly considered to be emergent from X, there must be something about X and X
alone in virtue of which Y emerges, and which is sufficient for Y. Strawson [378, p. 18]
When Y = Xm, there are no difficulties, for ‘brute’ emergence is not involved: the
expression ‘Xm is emergent from X ’ is a way of saying that Xm is inseparable from X , a
property of X , or the mental aspect of X . To emphasize that it is contradictory that Xm
is not inseparable from X , suppose temporarily interpretation (C) above, where there
are only the mental aspect Xm and the concrete=physical=existing aspect Xc, and that
Xm is simultaneously emergent from Xc and not a property of Xc:
If it really is true that Xm is emergent from Xc then it must be the case that Xm is in some
sense wholly dependent on Xc and Xc alone, so that all features of Xm trace intelligibly
back to Xc. Emergence can’t be brute. It is built into the heart of the notion of emergence
that emergence cannot be brute in the sense of there being absolutely no reason in the
nature of things why the emerging thing is as it is. For any feature Xm of anything that
is correctly considered to be emergent from Xc, there must be something about Xc and
Xc alone in virtue of which Xm emerges, and which is sufficient for Xm.
Xm cannot be simultaneously emergent from Xc and not a property of Xc, for if Xm
would be emergent from Xc, then Xm would be a property of Xc, and thus Xc would
after all be the whole particular X .
Strawson intended to support panpsychism with the above argument against brute emer-
gence, the “view affirming the presence throughout nature of mentality” (Clarke [88, p.
1]) or “the doctrine that every physical particular enjoys some measure of mentality”
(Stubenberg [380]). No stand is taken for nor against panpsychism.53 It suffices to note
that EUO is compatible with panpsychism and with its negation: if panpsychism holds,
then every particular has a mental aspect; if panpsychism does not hold, then some
particulars do not have a mental aspect. This reasoning is compatible with Stoljar, and
also the dual-aspect theory seems to be:
[N]o matter how implausible and outlandish it sounds, panpsychism per se is not incon-
sistent with physicalism [cf. Lewis [222]]. After all, the fact that there are some conscious
beings is not contrary to physicalism — why then should the possibility that everything is
a conscious being be contrary to physicalism? . . . the paradigms or exemplars in terms of
which one characterises the notion of the physical might turn out to be radically different
from what we normally assume . . . they might turn out to be in some essential or ultimate
respect mental. . . . To illustrate, imagine a world in which the fundamental properties are
both mental and physical. That is certainly a far-fetched scenario but it doesn’t seem to
be impossible. Would physicalism be true in such a world? It is hard to see why not;
Stoljar [377]
53Whether panpsychism is true depends on what is the definition of mental. Suppose that mental
is defined as intentional; further, suppose that everything which aims towards the minimum potential
energy is intentional. In this case everything would be mental in the context of the Dynamic Universe
model, but still e.g. rocks and atoms would be very far from human mentality.
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4.14 Definition: Abstract
The concept ‘abstract’ is defined in terms of EUO in a way that it (a) saves all func-
tionality that is required from abstract things; (b) disambiguates the concrete-abstract
dichotomy by drawing a clear and philosophically significant line between concrete and
abstract things and thereby manages to classify the paradigm cases of concrete and ab-
stract things in the standard way (cf. Rosen [337]); (c) is metaphysically minimal and
compatible with nominalism, i.e., does not have transcendent foundations (§4.9). The
ontological base of the definition of abstract consists of the axioms for presentism, causal-
ity and ontological realism (mental realism), which imply naturalism and physicalism as
theorems, and the inseparability of human mind from human body.
Abstract thing: a thought realized in a human mind.
All thoughts do not have to be abstract but all abstract things are thoughts, and all
thoughts are mental. Whenever an abstract thing (or an abstract idea) exists, it is a
mental property of an existing physical particular. As the concrete-mental dichotomy
was already given in §4.13 and as abstract has been defined as thought, a concrete-
abstract dichotomy is merely a version of the concrete-mental dichotomy where it has
been decided just which thoughts are called abstract. At the widest, all thoughts can
be classified as abstract: any sensation such as a colour sensation, any visualized idea
such as a circle, a square or a street view, any emotion or a feeling such as joy, anger,
love; any consciously or subconsciously experienced thought or belief. Alternatively, one
may classify only consciously experienced thoughts as abstract, another one may classify
only thoughts about other thoughts as abstract, one may classify all thoughts which are
not consciously pointed at concrete properties of objects as abstract, and one may wish
to disclude e.g. emotions and all sensations which result from direct perception out of
the scope of abstract. The task of giving a specific criterion of just which thoughts are
classified as abstract exceeds the main focus of this section: all concepts contemplated
in any field of inquiry can be called abstract if one wishes to use this naming convention.
‘Abstract’ has thereby been naturalised. The naturalist definition directly contradicts
the traditional definitions of ‘abstract’ as something transcendent. But this should not
be worrying as the task is to naturalise the concept in a way that it does all required jobs.
Margolis and Laurence [247] is used as the most central source in showing that it does.
They approach the case in a slightly different way, starting from the question of what is a
concept and noting that there are two central answers: “One proposes that concepts are
mental representations, while the other proposes that they are abstract objects” (ibid,
p. 561). They do not reject abstract as something transcendent as such, but they in
any case maintain that such abstract things do not do the job they are supposed to,
whereas concepts as mental representations —as thoughts— do (ibid, p. 580). The given
account thus complements their project and vice versa. In both cases the conclusion
is that thoughts suffice, whereas the notion that concepts are transcendent only brings
confusion, just because of transcendism itself. Rosen [337] presents paradigm cases of
concrete and abstract things:
[I]t is universally acknowledged that numbers and the other objects of pure mathematics
are abstract . . . whereas rocks and trees and human beings are concrete. Some clear cases
of abstracta are classes, propositions, concepts, the letter ‘A’, and Dante’s Inferno. Some
clear cases of concreta are stars, protons, electromagnetic fields, the chalk tokens of the
letter ‘A’ written on a certain blackboard, and James Joyce’s copy of Dante’s Inferno.
Rosen [337]
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In the given definition objects of pure mathematics, classes, propositions, concepts and
the conceived letter ‘A’ are thoughts and these can be called abstract. Trees and human
beings as well as all particulars are physical and have concrete aspects; a part of a human
being has also the mental aspect, and thoughts are mental properties which may be called
abstract. The given definition of abstract as thought thus succeeds in disambiguating
the concept by defining it clearly: the definition functions as a philosophically significant
line between concrete and abstract things, and therefore also manages to classify the
paradigm cases of concrete and abstract things.
Consider mathematical objects such as the number 17. It is an idea which is realized
in our minds from time to time. Rosen (ibid) asks: “Is there one 17 in your mind
and another in mine? In that case, the appearance of a common mathematical subject
matter is an illusion.” Margolis and Laurence [247, p. 567] maintain that this argument
is based on type-token confusion: “the question is whether different tokens in different
minds can be of the same type, and we see no reason why they can’t be.” There is
one 17 in my mind and another 17 in your mind; you and I as well as our ideas are
spatially separate, but the appearance of a common mathematical subject matter is not
an illusion, for the consciously experienced ideas are identical or near enough identical to
be of the same type, so that applying mathematics is possible and we can communicate
about mathematical ideas. Margolis and Laurence (ibid, p. 567) point out that Frege’s
[148, p. 60] complaint about this is that we cannot be sure that we are talking about the
same representation, and that therefore some non-mental abstract objects are needed.
They resolve the case as follows:
[S]uccessful communication doesn’t require that people can always establish that they are
talking about the very same thing. What matters is simply that they are talking about the
same thing, not that they know that they are. . . That is, what’s important is that speakers
and hearers are reliably coordinated in how they interpret one another’s sentences. . . .Why
think that communication requires anything more? Margolis and Laurence [247, p. 567-8]
Peacocke [303, p. 169] argues that concepts cannot be mental representations for this
would rule out the possibility of there being concepts which human beings did not or
could not conceive. Margolis and Laurence [247, p. 568] reply as follows: “it simply
amounts to the claim that there are mental representation types that will never be
instantiated in anyone’s mind.” In EUO, the reply to Peacocke’s argument is: there
strictly speaking are no types that will never be realized in someone’s mind, although
the idea about such types is realized in our minds: this is the idea of types that will
never be realized, such as a visualized ‘black box’ of types. Partial determinism allows
that some thoughts that are or have been realizable are never realized (§7.6).
Margolis and Laurence (ibid, ch. 4) maintain that mental representations do not get
driven into a regress, for positing an internal system of representation does not require
positing further levels of representation. They (ibid, ch. 5) maintain that mental repre-
sentations cannot lack the needed structure for otherwise human productivity could not
be explained. They (ibid, ch. 6) maintain that it suffices that the view of concepts as
mental representations works for human beings, i.e., that we do not have to worry about
angels, Martians nor God here, and they (ibid, ch. 7) maintain that neo-behaviorism is
too costly to undermine the identification of beliefs and concepts with mental represen-
tations.
Hale’s [161] central argument for mind-independent abstract objects is that some asser-
tions contain singular terms which denote abstract objects; as the assertions are true
and they need to be true independently of us, also abstract objects need to exist in-
dependently of us. A commitment to mind-independent abstract objects is a premise
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in Hale’s argument. Consider the assertion ‘a triangle has three angles.’ In the tran-
scendist reading ‘triangle’ denotes a transcendent object and the assertion ‘has three
angles’ corresponds to the object. In the naturalist reading, we have a commonly agreed
and conceivable definition of triangle as a closed form with three sides, and the assertion
‘has three angles’ corresponds to particular conceptualisations or mental images of tri-
angles, as well as to concrete triangles. The truth or our assertions thus does not require
postulating transcendent forms.
The same thing can be said by contrasting transcendist Platonism to naturalist Platon-
ism. On the left side of figure 13, there is a concrete triangle in the Universe. When a
person perceives the concrete triangle, an experience of the triangle becomes realized in
the person’s mind as an idea (the leftmost triangle). In addition to the plain triangle
which is realized in the mind of the naturalist Platonist, it is practical to talk about
triangles with different sizes, or about all geometrical forms. As we do talk about all
geometrical forms, the conception of the collection of the forms is implicit. Further,
we may talk about all mathematical objects or about all abstract objects. In EUO the
Figure 13: Naturalist Platonism contrasted to transcendist Platonism.
collection of all abstract objects is the naturalist Platonic heaven, which is itself an
idea which is realized in the mind of a person. The right side of figure 13 represents
Platonism in a transcendist mapping, where the Platonic heaven is considered as a tran-
scendent world which is supposed to exist literally. Given this interpretation, there are
not just the three triangles as on the left, but there is also the fourth triangle in the
transcendent heaven plus the transcendent heaven itself, which is especially external to
the transcendist’s idea about the heaven. Transcendist Platonism is uneconomical with
respect to naturalist Platonism, and as it is not needed it is rejected as uneconomical.
Transcendent foundations for mathematics or for any discipline can be characterized as
‘necessarily unnecessary.’ For, everything transcendent is by definition causally isolated
from us, and thus cannot affect in any way how mathematics is applied or practiced. Or,
only the idea of a transcendent heaven affects some people living in the Universe. Margo-
lis and Laurence [247, p. 580] make a similar remark: “the relation can’t be causal, since
senses, as abstract particulars, are supposed to fall outside the realm of physical causes
and effects. But if it’s not causal, the nature of the relation remains utterly mysterious.”
Even if transcendent abstract objects existed, these would still have to be conceived
always when these are contemplated, i.e., the commonly agreed definitions would be
applied in any case, but in addition to these there would be the unnecessary idea about
the transcendent heaven. All this is repetition of Aristotle’s arguments against Plato’s
theory of forms: “The Forms we can dispense with, for they are mere sound without
sense; and even if there are such things, they are not relevant to our discussion, since
demonstrations are concerned with predicates such as we have defined.” (Aristotle, Pos-
terior Analytics, 83a33). The difference is systematicity: the rejection of transcendism
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is justified by economy, and economy is justified by its progressiveness. Consider how
the given definition of abstract in terms of EUO helps to clarify an ambiguity:
An ontology which announces that it recognizes no entities but physical ones, and promises
an uncompromising naturalism, takes on, one would have thought, some obligation to find
naturalistic interpretation for mathematics. At least Platonism seems to be ruled out.
But when he needs sets or numbers, Post just helps himself to them —even allowing
Platonism, if that’s your preference. The physical suddenly comes the mathematical-
physical. Campbell [73, p. 359]
In EUO physical particulars are all that ever exist; mental things are properties of some
physical particulars; some mental things may called abstract, such as sets, numbers
and all mathematical objects. So, the physical does not become mathematical-physical
suddenly, as mathematical objects are abstract, and abstract things as thoughts are
properties of some physical particulars. In EUO there are no abstract objects if there are
no conscious agents who conceive the abstract objects: this is sufficient for mathematics
and for natural science in general as long as conscious agents exist; when conscious agents
do not exist, abstract objects are not needed in the first place.
This can be contested by smuggling transcendism in as a premise e.g. by maintaining that
1+1=2 is timelessly true, even before any human-like conscious creatures existed, and
that this requires a transcendent Platonic heaven. It suffices to show that the definition
of abstract as thought suffices in the relevant sense as the basis of the timeless truth of
1+1=2, where the ‘timeless truth of 1+1=2’ is not understood to contain transcendism
as a hidden premise. So, consider a time before any human-like conscious creatures. Back
then there were no mathematicians and thus nothing like mental constructions which are
today contemplated by them. Therefore the only domain of application of the timeless
truth of 1+1=2 concerns objects such as planets and particles; summing up one planet
and another made up two planets even then. This means that nowadays human beings
can conclude that 1+1=2 corresponds to various objects that existed before conscious
agents existed, but this does not require transcendism.
But what about back then? Was it not true that two planets made up two planets even
then, even if humans never existed? ‘True proposition’ will be defined in §6 as thought
that corresponds to an object. Given the definition of a true proposition, saying that it
is true that two planets made up two planets even then means only that there existed
two planets back then. We cannot escape the fact that this is in any case a matter of
us contemplating what happened in the past. It is true that two planets made up two
planets even back then and even if it had turned out that humans never existed, but now
humans happen to exist. Alternatively, one could postulate a transcendent repository
for true thoughts back then, which would be uneconomical.
traditional definitions. ‘Abstract’ is typically defined as something absolutely
causally inert, i.e., as something transcendent. According to Rosen [337] “if any char-
acterization of the abstract deserves to be regarded as the standard one, it is this: An
object is abstract if and only if it is non-spatial and causally inefficacious.” Rosen lists
various definitions.
1. An object is abstract iff (if and only if) it is both non-mental and non-sensible.
2. An object is abstract iff it is both non-physical and non-mental.
3. An object is abstract iff it is non-spatial and causally inefficacious.
4. An object is abstract iff it fails to occupy anything like a determinate region of space.
5. An object is abstract iff it either fails to occupy space, or does so only in virtue of the
fact some other items occupy that region. For instance, the set {Peter, Paul} occupies a
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location in virtue of the fact that its physical elements, Peter and Paul, together occupy
that location, but the set does not occupy the location in its own right.
6. Abstract things are equivalent with universals.
7. Abstract things are classified in terms of paradigm cases.
8. Abstract is defined by way of abstraction. According to Lewis [223, pp. 84-5] “abstract
entities are abstractions from concrete entities. They result from somehow subtracting
specificity, so that an incomplete description of the original concrete entity would be a
complete description of the abstraction.” According to Rosen [337]: “abstraction is a
distinctive mental process in which new ideas or conceptions are formed by considering
several objects or ideas and omitting the features that distinguish them. One is given
a range of white things of varying shapes and sizes; one ignores or ‘abstracts from’ the
respects in which they differ, and thereby attains the abstract idea of whiteness.”
The basic difficulties in defining abstract as non-spatial, causally inefficacious, non-
mental, non-physical or alike are: (i) these state what abstract things are not instead
of saying what they are, which renders the definitions incomplete and question-begging;
(ii) even if abstract as transcendent would succeed in drawing a line between concrete
and abstract objects, concepts as transcendent entities fail to do what is required from
concepts, as was pointed out above; (iii) Transcendism is metaphysically complex with
respect to Naturalism. Because of (i-iii), and as the definition of abstract as thought
is plausible, there is no need to review the perplexities of the negative definitions in
detail. It suffices to investigate what the definitions have to give, when forced into the
naturalist-physicalist mold as characterizations of mental representations.
It is hard to find anything applicable from 1-4 whereas in 5 the set {Peter, Paul} can be
considered as a mental representation of two physical objects. On one hand, 6 cannot be
totally fitted together with the given definition of abstract as thought in the sense that
universals are especially defined as properties in §4.10, and although thoughts are mental
properties of physical objects, all properties are not mental properties. On the other
hand, abstract things as conceptualised forms can be translated as ‘conceptualisations
of universals.’ 7 could be considered as any classification of just which kinds of thoughts
qualify as abstract, such as those given in p. 85. In the context of the given definition,
8 can be considered as a definition of which kinds of thoughts qualify as abstract. When
extended far enough, whatever consciously experienced thoughts can be considered as
abstractions by the way of abstraction.
4.15 Axiom: The Law of Non-Contradiction
Aristotle formulated the law of non-contradiction (LNC) in Metaphysics, 1005b18-20:
Evidently then such a principle is the most certain of all; which principle this
is, let us proceed to say. It is, that the same attribute cannot at the same
time belong and not belong to the same subject and in the same respect;
When fitted in EUO, LNC can be formulated as: one property cannot be instantiated
and not instantiated by the same particular at the same time in the same respect. As
temporal stages of the Universe (TSUs) are particulars, it follows from LNC that the
TSUs are non-contradictory. E.g. the attribute round cannot at the same time and in
the same respect belong and not belong to the subject ball, where the ball is a physical
object. The attribute round can be translated as a determinable range of properties
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(§4.10): a particular can instantiate exactly one of these properties at one time in one
respect.
LNC applies also for mental properties of particulars: one mental property cannot belong
and not belong to the same particular at the same time in the same respect. E.g. the
property round mental object cannot at the same time and in the same respect belong
and not belong to the same particular. Saying that the property round cannot at the
same time and in the same respect belong and not belong to the mental property ball,
is an indirect way of saying that the property round mental object cannot at the same
time and in the same respect belong and not belong to the same particular.
According to Gottlieb [156] the above version of LNC is the ontological version which
“concerns things that exist in the world” and this is also its intended scope here.54 Got-
tlieb maintains that altogether three versions of LNC can be found from Aristotle: on-
tological, doxastic and semantic versions, where the doxastic version is not immediately
important with respect to the topics of this thesis. Aristotle formulates the semantic
version as follows: “opposite assertions cannot be true at the same time” (Metaphysics
1011b13-20). The semantic version seems to be very close to the coherence theorem of
correspondence truths (§6.1) —a theorem of ontological realism and the ontological ver-
sion of LNC— where correspondence truths are the assertions, i.e., propositions realized
in minds of human beings. This is in line with Tahko’s [389, p. 27] remark that “Aristo-
tle’s line of thought suggests that the link that is often taken to exist between language
or grammar, and logic, is in fact between reality and our thoughts.” Gottlieb [156] notes
that the semantic version results from the ontological version: “the idea that opposite
assertions cannot be true at the same time suggests that this third version is better inter-
preted as a variant of the first formulation.” That is, the semantic version follows from
the ontological version when it is coupled with the notion that “any assertion involves
predicating one thing of another” (ibid); and this is very close to saying that the coher-
ence theorem follows from the fusion of ontological realism and the ontological version
of LNC. Form here on, LNC denotes the ontological version. Consider three arguments
for LNC.
(1) A violation of LNC is inconceivable. If a particular would violate LNC, we could
not conceive how that violation is realized, for everything that is in principle conceiv-
able conforms to LNC: “The law of non-contradiction provides the ‘formal’ criterion of
conceivability: anything that violates it is inconceivable” (Stang [373, p. 191]). In other
words, perception can never confirm the existence of a contradiction, because it is impos-
sible to simultaneously perceive (or measure) and not to perceive something in the same
respect. For instance, it is impossible to measure that the temperature is 10 Celsius and
not 10 Celsius in the same place at the same time in the same respect.
(2) If something is interpreted to violate LNC, the same thing can be interpreted so
that LNC is not violated, i.e., we are dealing with mutually exclusive metaphysical
commitments. The commitment that there are some particulars that violate LNC and
some that do not (those which are perceived), is more complex than the commitment
that all particulars conform to LNC, and therefore economy favours committing to LNC.
54For comparison, Kutach [212, ch. 1.6] postulates something very close to LNC: “Fundamental reality
is as determinate as reality ever gets. . . . Fundamental reality is consistent.” Sami Pihlstro¨m commented:
“Contradictions can be found from expressions of language or in logical systems, but hardly in the world
itself; it is not wholly clear that it is even sensible to attribute contradictoriness or non-contradictoriness
to nature.” Certainly, if one commits to LNC, then one commits to non-contradictoriness of nature.
LNC may seem to be self-evident, but it is important to explicitly postulate this self-evident axiom, so
that there would be no ambiguities about the case.
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(3) The rejection of LNC is either meaningless or the rejection implicitly commits to LNC.
Suppose that an extreme relativist argues that LNC is a vague or a subjective statement
that does not have a definite meaning; if the relativist’s argument has a definite meaning,
then he commits to LNC, for his argument does not simultaneously have and not have a
meaning in the same sense; if the relativist’s argument does not have a definite meaning,
then there is nothing to worry about. Gottlieb [156] says the same, where PNC denotes
LNC: “Anyone asking for a deductive argument for PNC, as Aristotle points out, is
missing the point, or, rather, is asking for something that is impossible without using
PNC. You cannot engage in argument unless you rely on PNC.” As the rejection of LNC
requires committing to LNC, it follows that the willingness to reject LNC is a signal of
either a failure in understanding the meaning of LNC, or of self-deception. Self-deception
occurs when a person implicitly relies on what he explicitly denies. When a relativist
travels in an aeroplane at 30 000 feet, he implicitly relies on the technology that is
used in building the aeroplane, but he explicitly denies the validity of LNC which is a
prerequisite for the technology (cf. Norris [294, pp. 249, 314]). Norris (ibid, p. 249)
refers to an example from Richard Dawkins [100, p. 32]: “show me a cultural relativist at
30 000 feet and I’ll show you a hypocrite.” Likewise, when a relativist is seriously ill and
accepts the medicine which was developed by holding LNC as a premise, he implicitly
relies on what he explicitly denies.
many-valued logic, paraconsistent logics, dialetheism. LNC is compatible
with the existence of propositions which violate the law of the excluded middle and the
principle of bivalence, i.e., LNC does not exclude the application of many-valued logics
(§7.3). LNC is also compatible with paraconsistent logics, whose basic idea is in non-
trivial inconsistency: although the surface structure of a sentence is incoherent, you can
deduce something intelligible from it, but you cannot deduce everything from it, i.e.,
paraconsistent logic accepts incoherent statements but denies that everything can be
deduced from them. To illustrate, even though the surface structure of the proposition
S=“Mary is happy and sad” is incoherent, S makes perfect sense together with the
propositions “Mary won the lottery” and “Mary’s house burned down.” Mary is happy
in the sense that she won the lottery and sad in the sense that her house burned down,
i.e., LNC is not violated here as Mary is not happy and sad at the same time and in the
same respect.
Whether LNC and dialetheism are compatible or incompatible depends on how LNC is
interpreted and how the range of dialetheism is interpreted. According to Priest and
Berto [316] a “dialetheia is a sentence, A, such that both it and its negation, ¬A, are
true.” E.g. “Mary is happy” seems to be a dialetheia in the sense that it is true and its
negation is true, in the context of the above paragraph: again, not in the same sense and
therefore LNC is saved. Priest and Berto maintain that dialetheism violates a certain
version of LNC, which is denoted here as the linguistic LNC (LLNC): “for any A, it is
impossible for both A and ¬A to be true.” Again, Priest and Berto talk solely about
sentences (propositions) and they do not indicate anything about the correspondence of
sentences to mind-independent reality. Therefore, they do not claim that the ontological
version of LNC is violated, but they remain strictly in the linguistic realm.
Priest and Berto [316] note that dialetheism draws its orientation from the paradoxes of
self-reference. Also the self-reference industry is purely linguistic, or if it is metaphysical
then it is uneconomical: genuine self-reference is explicitly rejected in §4.18 on the basis
that it violates finite divisibility, which is an axiom of EUO. Therefore, there are no
paradoxes of self-reference to be resolved in EUO: if a seemingly self-referring proposition
has a meaning —other than the intention of expressing a paradox— then the meaning can
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be explained also without self-reference. The order is the same as always in economical
unification: ontology first, semantics second. It would be against economical unification
to take a paradoxically formulated surface structure of a sentence so seriously as to
propagate it into a violation of LNC. Although Priest and Berto maintain that other
“cases involve contradictions affecting concrete objects and the empirical world” they still
remain in the linguistic realm and discuss violations of LLNC, not LNC. To illustrate,
they consider transition states of leaving a room, maintaining that there must be “a
precise instant in time, call it t, at which I leave the room. Am I inside the room or
outside at time t? . . . if I am neither inside not outside the room, then I am not inside
and not-not inside” and that this is “a dialetheic situation.” This does not violate LNC,
for nothing in the temporal stage of the Universe which is realized at t violates LNC,
although examples that violate LLNC can be invented.
4.16 Rejection: Backward Directed Causation
Expressions may be formulated in a way that their surface structure seems to require
backward causation. For instance, one can state that the fact that a person is a president
now, caused his desire to take part in the elections 2 year ago. This may be translated
as: the person’s desires and hopes 2 years ago to become the president caused him to
become the president. In general, statements of the form ‘the past was determined by
the present’ may be translated as ‘in the past our goal was to get to where we are now’ or
as ‘our past contemplations essentially effected our present state.’ If the present would
really affect the past, this would require genuine backward causation, i.e., genuine time
travel. It is notable that the emergence of time travel stories walked hand in hand with
the rise of the relativistic conception of time in the late 19th century:
[T]he exponential explosion of timetravel stories in the popular media, beginning late in the
nineteenth century, is an indication that a very new conception of time is brewing in the
Zeitgeist. The utter absence of any timetravel stories whatsoever prior to the nineteenth
century is a profoundly puzzling fact. Bigelow [49, p. 35]
The resolution of the puzzle is that time travel stories have no place in a common-sensical
ontology. This reminds that one of the central themes of this thesis is the replacement
of the relativistic conception of time with presentism and absolute simultaneity, which
are compatible with the Dynamic Universe model. Along with this replacement, time
travel stories are limited into the context of pure fiction, and excluded from the context
of science.
Genuine backward causation contradicts EUO. In EUO the past has been realized, it has
caused the present, and it does not exist any longer. In genuine backward causation the
past has been realized and it has caused the present, but still a part of some past TSU
is changed. This is contradictory in EUO as this requires that some part of a past TSU
was realized and was not realized in the same respect. Once the initial contradiction is
accepted, other contradictions follow: “one travels into the past and kills one’s grand-
father before one’s father has been conceived, thus making it the case that one is not
conceived, which thus makes it the case that one does not travel into the past, in which
case one’s father is conceived, and so on” (Tooley [120, p. x]).
The rejection of backward directed causation requires the fusion of the axioms for pre-
sentism, causality and the law of non-contradiction (LNC). Backward directed causation
can be incorporated by dropping one or all of these axioms and switching them into
something uneconomical. As the rejection of LNC is hard to conceive and its violation
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is impossible to conceive (§4.15), let LNC be sustained. As LNC is sustained, the in-
corporation of backward directed causation requires postulating transcendism or some
naturalist version of branching sequences of TSUs: as LNC is sustained, the past is in
some sense forever unchanged; however, as the past is still being changed in backward
causation in some sense, there must be two senses of the past, such as two branching
sequences of TSUs or two different worlds of which the other is transcendent to us. Both
of these options violate EUO, namely, transcendism violates naturalism —a theorem
of presentism and causality— and branching TSUs violate the causality axiom (§7.4).
Both of these are uneconomical with respect to EUO, and as the explanation of percep-
tions in the context of the Dynamic Universe model does not require backward directed
causation, these are rejected, along with backward directed causation.
In contrast to its rejection, van Inwagen [405] especially enables time travel by introduc-
ing the hypertime framework, where the hypertimes are analogous to transcendent worlds
or to a single naturalist branching space-time, such as Belnap’s version in §7.4. In EUO,
there has been only one history, and therefore only one period P from the year 1900
to the present: P=[1900 present]. In the hypertime framework, if you travel from the
present to 1900 with a time machine, the period P becomes a mere hyper-period, while
P’ becomes the new ‘real’ period that starts from 1900 and contains you and the time
machine. This is perfectly legitimate if transcendism or naturalist branching space-time
is supposed: there must be as many hyper-pasts as there are trips back in time.
Forrest [147, p. 29] maintains that the hypertime framework is an interpretation of
what the physicists have done when they have sent a particle or two back in time.
The uneconomicality of transcendism and branching space-time guides into searching for
another explanation. Whenever someone claims that genuine time travel has occurred,
you have two options: (1) you can accept that genuine time travel has indeed occurred
and accept the hypertime framework or another uneconomical construction among your
ontological commitments as this is the implication of genuine time travel; (2) you can
deny that genuine time travel has occurred, drop uneconomical explanations that are
needed in having time travel, and try to come up with an interpretation that does not
require time travel.
Time travel can be interpreted to have support: from empirical science “G.Feinberg sug-
gested that there might be particles — called tachyons — which travelled faster than
the speed of light, and which thus, according to the Special Theory of Relativity, would
have to travel backward in time” (Tooley [120, pp. ix-x]). Where did the interpretation
that there are superluminal particles originally come from? If it came from an interpre-
tation of the Bell inequality tests, then it suffices to note that there are interpretations
of these tests which do not require superluminal influences (§5.2). As another example,
the Dynamic Universe model incorporates instantaneous gravitational influences with-
out postulating particles that convey the influences, and without requiring backward
causation.
4.17 Axiom: Finiteness
EUO would be too ambiguous without explicating how great the temporal stages of the
Universe (TSUs) are spatially and how far they are divisible. The finiteness axiom states
that all TSUs and thus all particulars are spatially finite and consist of finitely many
indivisible and positive interrelated parts.55 The finiteness axiom is the fusion of the
55The finiteness axiom is compatible with option (1) of Tahko’s [392] classification of the four logical
combinations: (1) spatial finiteness and finite divisibility; (2) spatial infinity and finite divisibility; (3)
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axioms for spatially finite TSUs and finite divisibility.56
spatially finite tsus. Perceptions testify that space continues very far. This raises
the question of just how far. Consider two mutually exclusive empirically sufficient
unfalsifiable hypotheses: every TSU is spatially finite; some or all TSUs are spatially
infinite. Economy favours the hypothesis of spatially finite TSUs, which is thereby
selected as an axiom of EUO. Answers to questions about the volume and the contents
of the spatially finite TSUs are sought from cosmology in §5. It is notable that both
the Dynamic Universe model and the standard model of cosmology get by with spatially
finite TSUs, and thus natural science gives no reason for supposing otherwise.
finite divisibility. Particulars which are perceivable by the material senses such
as rocks, trees, mountains and planets consist of proper parts and are in this sense
divisible in parts. This raises the question about the limits of divisibility. Consider two
mutually exclusive empirically sufficient unfalsifiable hypotheses: particulars are finitely
divisible and consist of finitely many parts; particulars are infinitely divisible and consist
of infinitely many parts. Economy favours the hypothesis of finite divisibility, which is
thereby selected as an axiom of EUO. Finite divisibility leaves open how much will ever
be verified, but explicitly rejects infinite divisibility.
Finite divisibility is only the starting point; if it could be established somehow that a
particular natural number is a sufficient and unfalsifiable limit of division, this would be
even better. Finite divisibility should not be confused with the doctrine that the currently
verified limit of division N is the ontological limit. Ernst Mach [239] famously rejected
the hypothesis of the existence of atoms, thereby committing to ‘N’ of his day, but his
hypothesis was falsified when the existence of atoms was verified. The commitment to
today’s N does not qualify as an axiom of EUO because an axiom of EUO is by definition
unfalsifiable. An axiom ought to function as an unshakeable pillar of a world-view, and
as history shows that the commitment to N would have been falsified time and again,
this commitment can be rejected without further consideration. This does not mean
that some assigned finite limit could not be accepted as an axiom, but such limits are
not suggested here.
Finite divisibility implies that every spatially finite structural particular consists of a
finite number of indivisible interrelated parts. The axioms for spatially finite TSUs and
finite divisibility together imply that every TSU consists of finitely many indivisible parts.
The finitely many parts are supposed to be positive by economy. That every TSU consists
of finitely many parts leaves the following mutually exclusive metaphysical hypotheses
open: (i) all indivisible parts are positive; (ii) some indivisible parts are positive and
some are non-positive; (iii) all indivisible parts are non-positive. Qualitative economy
favours (i) over (ii) for (i) gets by with positive parts only while (ii) commits to both
positive and non-positive parts. (iii) begs the question of how can something positive be
built out of finitely many non-positive parts. One could try to make sense out of (iii)
by assuming that relations between the non-positive parts are positive, but this would
spatial finiteness and infinite divisibility; (3) spatial infinity and infinite divisibility.
56Simo Knuuttila asked how does the finiteness axiom relate to the open selection between positive
and zero duration of the present in §4.3. The finiteness axiom is compatible with both options. Also
the selection between qualitative finiteness (QF) and qualitative infinity (QI) was left open. These
metaphysical options can be defined by applying diachronic possibility (§7). QF: finitely many different
particulars have a possibility of being realized at the future time t. QI: infinitely many different par-
ticulars have a possibility of being realized at the future time t. The account of how these two open
selections or dichotomies —QI vs. QF and zero vs. positive present— relate to the other axioms of
EUO is one of the interesting analyses that was not included because of the lack of space.
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only be a switch from positive parts and positive relations into positive relations and
non-positive parts, which would be qualitatively uneconomical.
compatibility with contemporary mathematics. (See the glossary for the mean-
ings of ‘infinite,’ ‘transfinite’ and ‘potential infinity.’) The ontological hypothesis of finite
divisibility is compatible with sustaining transfinite idealizations in mathematics, such
as all set theoretic idealizations of sets which contain infinitely many elements, but such
idealizations are not required in modeling individual particulars in EUO. Although the
modeling of an individual particular does not require an idealization of anything infinite
nor transfinite in EUO, the eternal Universe theorem states that the past is an infinite
sequence of TSUs and thus modeling the past naturally requires an idealization about
the infinite past (§4.11). A mathematical model that is capable of modeling such se-
quences contains infinitely many elements and such models are called transfinite. That
is, in EUO transfinite mathematical models can be used whenever needed and they are
needed at times, but EUO does not force one to use such models everywhere. In contrast,
if ontological infinite divisibility were supposed, the modeling of all particulars —except
points if this is the selected idealization— would especially require a transfinite model.
compatibility with contemporary physics. Finite divisibility is merely an alter-
native to infinite divisibility. Finite divisibility in turn implies that there exists indivisible
particulars at the bottom, but this should not be interpreted as a suggestion about any-
thing further, for everything further is left to the physicists: elementary particulars can
be called elementary fields, energy objects, resonators, waves or whatever is convenient,
i.e., the term ‘elementary particular’ does not have to refer to a billiard ball like Dem-
ocritean atom. Finite divisibility is fully compatible with contemporary physics, unless
hypotheses about infinite divisibility count as physics. It is sufficient for both models of
physics that are evaluated in §5, and e.g. particle physics does not need infinite divis-
ibility. It is independent of whether there exists the same number of elementary parts
at all times, whether and how they change and so forth. Consider what Ross, Ladyman
and Spurrett say about divisibility:
Physicists do not believe there are such things as good a priori grounds for holding be-
liefs about the constitution of the physical world, and we suggest that only a foolhardy
philosopher should be willing to quarrel with them on the basis of his or her hunches.
Ross, Ladyman and Spurrett [213, p. 18]
A number of physicists have speculated about divisibility. Some have favoured finite
divisibility and some infinite divisibility, i.e., physicists have provably speculated about
the a priori grounds, and the source of these speculations can be safely be assumed to
be in mathematical idealizations. E.g. Dehmelt [105] and Georgi [154, p. 456] have
speculated about non-wellfounded structures. Bohm [53, pp. 132-40] speculates about
infinite divisibility but also notes that his view is compatible with finite divisibility. I
asked two physicists with different backgrounds to answer the question that does physics
require infinite divisibility. Tuomo Suntola (30.9.2015): “the Dynamic Universe Model
does not require that mass objects are infinitely divisible.” Tapio Ala-Nissila¨ (2.10.2015):
“I cannot at this instant come up with an example. As a matter of fact the contemporary
quantum theory entails that in the smallest scales matter (and everything else, i.e., fields)
should be quantised.” Suppose that two physicists disagree: one favours finite and the
other infinite divisibility. Which one should we believe? Similarly as all metaphysical
speculations, the metaphysical speculations of physicists —about divisibility or about
anything else— should be judged by the principle of economy. It is very hard to even
imagine examples which would violate the following principle: if an explanation of a
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perceptions appeals to infinite divisibility, then the same perceptions can be explained
equally by appealing only to finite divisibility. It can be safely concluded that finite
divisibility is compatible with contemporary physics.
compatibility with ontic structural realism. EUO starts from the causal suc-
cession of temporal stages of the Universe, which are structural particulars whose parts
are causally connected. EUO is thus compatible with all views that emphasise the im-
portance of relations between parts and the importance of the causal structure of the
Universe, as long as objects are not totally eliminated. When characterizing ontic struc-
tural realism (OSR) Ladyman and Ross [213, §3] strongly emphasise the causal structure
of the Universe. On one hand, they (ibid, p. 130) proportionally diminish the role of
objects: “There are no things. Structure is all there is.. . .We will argue that objects are
pragmatic devices used by agents to orient themselves in regions of spacetime, and to
construct approximate representations of the world.” On the other hand they (ibid, p.
152) maintain that OSR is construed as either (i) or (ii): (i) there are only relations,
and no relata; (ii) there are relations in which the relation is primary, while the things
are secondary. As EUO is compatible with (ii) and the causal structure of the Universe
is the starting point, compatibility with OSR is secured. It seems to be hard to combine
(i) with a model of physics that commits to mass objects, i.e., basically all models, but
if the relations somehow do the job of mass objects then the case is different.
Problems of Infinite Divisibility. Infinite divisibility is the metaphysical postu-
late that all particulars which are perceivable by material senses are infinitely divisible.
Infinite divisibility was rejected above because finite divisibility is simpler. Now it is
shown that infinite divisibility brings along further problems or ambiguities. Consider
two interpretations of infinite divisibility: the point-continuum interpretation and the
non-wellfoundedness interpretation.
point-continuum. Point-continuum is the conception that a continuous mathematical
object such as a line segment consists of infinitely57 many zero-size points: the segment
is dense (a point exist between any two points) and continuous (the segment contains no
holes). Considerations about point-continuum realized in nature have been around since
the antiquity, most famously by Zeno of Elea (cf. Dowden [115]). When point-continuum
is mapped to a positive structural particular, the particular is accordingly thought to
consist of infinitely many zero-size parts, and the only simple particulars are individual
zero-size parts. Consider a particular which has the width 1. The particular is thought to
be infinitely divisible in proper parts. The zero-size points are considered as limit values
of infinite divisions. For instance, point 0 is the limit value of the sequence of divisions
0.5, 0.25, 0.125, . . .. Set theory is usually considered as the formal foundation of point-
continuum. point-continuum can be enriched with infinitesimals, but the infinitesimal-
enriched point-continuum is not investigated here.
non-wellfoundedness. Non-wellfoundedness is the conception that there are no zero-
width points as limits of infinite divisions, but instead the infinite divisions are realized
as infinite chains of ever smaller parts, where “spaces may contain spaces as proper
parts ad infimum without being composed of simple things at all” (Armstrong [23, pp.
117-8], cf. [16, II, p. 67], Lewis [225, p. 203]). Non-wellfounded set theory (Aczel [2])
suffices as the formal foundation of non-wellfounded structures. Non-wellfounded set
theory discludes the axiom of foundation which, together with the other axioms of e.g.
Zermelo-Fraenkel set theory, implies that non-wellfounded sets do not exist. Two types
57The continuum hypothesis is the hypothesis that the cardinality of a continuous segment or any
other continuous thing is the second-order infinity, whereas the cardinality of the infinite sets of natural
and rational numbers is thought of as the first-order infinity.
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of non-wellfounded sets can be identified: sets that do not contain themselves and sets
that do contain themselves. When self-containing sets are given an ontological status,
e.g. the following kind of a particular is allowed to exist: atom ∈ molecule ∈ . . .∈
Universe ∈ atom . . . . The historical roots of non-wellfoundedness can be traced back to
the Kabbalah religion.58
eliminative structural realism. The view that there does not exist objects such
as elementary parts but only relations has been called eliminative structural realism
(ESR). ESR can be seen as over-propagation of relations. Unsurprisingly, ESR has been
criticised by the argument that ‘relations without relata’ does not make sense e.g. by
Psillos [318] and Dorato [112, 113]. The fusion of ESR and finite divisibility would
amount to positive and indivisible relations without relata: it is quite hard to make
sense out of this combination, unless this only means that also parts are now called
relations. The fusion of ESR and infinite divisibility finds a logical foundation e.g. from
continuous mereology59 and a model of non-wellfounded set theory where all members of
all sets are infinitely divisible without a bottom: as everything is divisible in interrelated
members, ad infimum, the relations are eventually all that exist. Morganti [278, p. 83]
is trying to dig out the useful features of ESR: “I think that in a proper interpretation
of ESR we should take it to be ‘agnostic’ in relation to what exists, if anything, beyond
knowable structures.” If ESR is interpreted as agnosticism about what exists, then the
relations-only postulate naturally loses its ontological meaning and the selection of the
metaphysical axiom is left open.
ESR has defenders. Schaffer [351, p. 499] asks: “So why believe there is a fundamental
level? Why not an infinite descending hierarchy of levels? . . . The proposition that there
is a fundamental level is widely accepted but seldom defended.” Schaffer notes that
the existence of elementary parts cannot be proved, maintains that therefore there is
no reason to believe that they exist, and concludes that this is a sufficient reason to
commit to ESR. However, it cannot be proved either that the positive and indivisible
elementary parts do not exist. We are dealing with two mutually exclusive metaphysical
commitments which both explain perceptions, given that ‘relations without relata’ after
all makes sense: ESR and finite divisibility. Finite divisibility is simpler, and therefore
economy favours finite divisibility. Schaffer (ibid, p. 503) notes that history shows that
the confirmation of deeper and deeper divisions has been like a regularity. No matter
how deep divisions will be confirmed —even 1000 divisions per year— the discovery rate
will always be finite, and infinitely many divisions will never be confirmed because the
future is only potentially infinite (in EUO). Therefore, finite divisibility will always be
sufficient. It is noted in the next example that potentially infinite divisibility is not a
mid-option between finite and infinite divisibility.
positive out of zeros? In arithmetic 0+0=0, and thus also the sum of infinitely many
zeros should be zero. However, the point-continuum interpretation of infinite divisibility
forces one into interpreting that positive mathematical objects can be built out of zero-
size points. In mathematics, the interpretation that point-continuous intervals such as
[1 2] consist of continuum-many zero-size points which are arranged in such a way that
58An excerpt from Ashlag at al. [33, p. 489]: “It is written in The Zohar, Vayikra, Parashat Tazria,
p 40, “Come and see, all that exists in the world, exists for man, and everything exists for him, as it
is written, ‘Then the Lord God formed man,’ with a full name, as we have established, that he is the
whole of everything and contains everything, and all that is Above and below, etc., is included in that
image.””
59Mereology (appendix A) gets continuous by adding the axiom which states that every aggregate has
a proper part: ∀x∃y(y ≺ x). Continuous mereology is incompatible with discrete mereology, i.e., if the
axiom for continuous mereology is added then the axiom for discrete mereology must be dropped.
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[1 2] contains no holes, has been conventional for more than 100 years. But it is still
an additional interpretation that infinitely many zeros can make up something positive.
This interpretation can be used in mathematics as an idealization, but this does not mean
that it should be supposed in the ontological sense. To elaborate the difficulty of this
interpretation, consider Aristotle’s reasoning. (Note that Aristotle did not handle the
divisibility of abstract geometrical objects and the divisibility of particulars separately.)
—nothing that is continuous can be composed of indivisibles: e.g. a line cannot be com-
posed of points, the line being continuous and the point indivisible. . . . since indivisibles
have no parts, they must be in contact with one another as whole with whole. And if
they are in contact with one another as whole with whole, they will not be continuous: for
that which is continuous has distinct parts: and these parts into which it is divisible are
different in this way, i.e., spatially separate. Aristotle, Physics, bk.6, ch.1, 231a19-b15
Aristotle’s reasoning is still fresh and shows that point-continuum requires the additional
interpretation. Finite divisibility does not require the extra interpretation, which makes
it more economical. Although Aristotle rejected infinite divisibility, he thought that all
assigned magnitudes are further divisible, i.e., divisible potentially infinitely. Potentially
infinite divisibility of abstract objects is compatible with finite divisibility in the sense
that conscious agents can only ever divide finitely and assign finitely many smaller and
smaller numbers. However, consider a particular which exists exactly at one time such
as a concrete rock with the diameter of 10 cm: it is either finitely or infinitely divisible
for it has either finitely or infinitely many parts at one time, i.e., potentially infinite
divisibility is not a mid-option.
Summary. The aim of the above review was to show that there are no obstacles for
rejecting infinite divisibility in the ontological sense and for selecting finite divisibility as
an axiom of EUO: there is a long way from Mach’s rejection of atoms to the rejection
of infinite divisibility. The greatest obstacle in the context of philosophy for not openly
accepting finite divisibility may be the traditional attitude of taking logic first without
asking what is empirically sufficient, and then imposing logic to nature; in the case of
divisibility the logic-first attitude happens to be heavily seasoned with the charm around
infinity. In other words, supposing that infinite divisibility is after all needed in the on-
tological sense would mean first inventing that nature is infinitely divisible, and then
maintaining that infinite divisibility is needed. The clearest problems of committing to
infinite divisibility in ontology is that this results in pondering about which version of
infinite divisibility to choose and which to reject, when no version of infinite divisibility
is needed in the first place in explaining phenomena. For instance, Armstrong [16, II,
pp. 68-9] rejects only self-containing non-wellfounded structures as follows: none of the
proper parts of the structural property P are identical to P . This does not rule out
those non-wellfounded structures which do not contain anything identical to themselves,
and does not rule our point-continuum nor infinitesimals. Finite divisibility rules out all
versions of infinite divisibility and thus cleans the table from all contemplations about in-
finite divisibility. Finite divisibility is applied in §4.18 in rejecting genuine self-reference.
4.18 Rejection: Genuine Self-Reference
Genuine or ontological self-reference requires postulating the existence of infinitely divis-
ible thoughts; such mental objects violate Miller’s Law [273], and they also violate finite
divisibility of the finiteness axiom, given the inseparability thesis of complexity (below).
Because of these reasons and because genuinely self-referring thoughts are not needed in
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explaining phenomena, these are explicitly rejected. The topic is handled exhaustively
in order to plug all holes leading into genuine self-reference. The explicit rejection of
self-referring thoughts is needed also in exactifying limits of the object-based correspon-
dence theory of truth and in defending it in §§6.1,6.4,6.8.1,6.8.3: self-correspondence is
rejected along with self-reference, for self-correspondence entails self-reference.
Example I shows that the existence of a genuinely self-referring thought violates Miller’s
Law and finite divisibility, given the inseparability thesis of complexity, and requires
postulating non-wellfoundedness. Example II shows that two thoughts cannot refer to
one another, for this entails self-reference. Examples III-V show that correspondence
and identity are mutually exclusive relations: when proposition a corresponds to its
truthmaker —which is in object-based correspondence an object or a mental property
of an object— the truthmaker cannot be identical to a; when proposition a is identical
to proposition b, a cannot correspond to b. Examples I-V thus show that the reference
relation and the correspondence relation along with it is asymmetric, i.e., that a thought
cannot refer to itself, nor to anything identical to itself. (Recall the difference of identity
and sameness in §4.6). Example VI elaborates the limitations which result from rejecting
genuine self-reference. Examples VII-IX show how cases which only seem to be involved
with self-reference can be given plausible positive interpretations.
The result that all mental things such as thoughts or ideas are properties of particulars
and inseparable from particulars is used (§4.13). Ea, Fa, Ga denote ideas which are prop-
erties of particulars E, F,G, respectively. Ea = ref(G) means that Ea is the reference
to G, i.e., that the reference to G is the only part of Ea.
example i: a self-referring idea. Suppose that Ea refers to itself, which is written
as Ea = ref(Ea). Ea = ref(Ea) implies Ea = ref(ref(ref(. . .))), i.e., that Ea is a
non-wellfounded transfinite hierarchy of thoughts without a bottom. The first reason for
rejecting ontological self-reference is thus that it is uneconomical. The second reason is
that Miller’s Law directly contradicts the existence of Ea. According to Miller’s Law, a
person can conceive/visualize simultaneously 7 plus-minus two individual mental objects.
A person can visualize the definitions Ea = (((((((. . .))))))) and Ea = ref(Ea) of a
transfinite collection, but the transfinite collection that the definitions define cannot be
literally realized in a person’s mind as an idea. The question is not about whether the
upper limit is absolutely 9, for any finite limit guarantees that Ea cannot be realized.
If one commits to Miller’s Law (or to another finite limit) one also admits that genuine
self-reference and thus also self-correspondence is impossible. For comparison, already
Ockham concluded that the limit of levels in thinking about what one is thinking is
finite:
[S]peaking naturally, there will be some vision that cannot be seen. This is because our
intellect is a limited power and thus capable of a set number of visions and no more.
I do not know, however, at which vision [the regress] is stopped —though perhaps it is
stopped at the second-order vision, since the second-order vision may not be seen naturally.
Ockham [298, I, q. 14], as quoted in Brower-Toland [63, p. 214]
Whether the genuine existence of Ea = ref(Ea) also violates finite divisibility of partic-
ulars is a matter of interpretation, but the interpretation that it does not violate finite
divisibility is more complex than the interpretation that it does. Again, suppose that Ea
consists of infinitely many mental parts which are all consciously experienced simultane-
ously, even though this violates Miller’s Law, i.e., Miller’s Law is temporarily dropped
for the sake of the example. Recall the basic setting in §4.13 where some particulars
such as E have two aspects: the concrete and the mental aspect which are inseparable.
99
Ea is a mental property of E and inseparable from the concrete aspect Ec of E. There
are two alternative interpretations.
(1) The separability thesis of complexity: Ea can consist of infinitely many parts while
Ec consists of finitely many parts.
(2) The inseparability thesis of complexity: If Ea consists of infinitely many parts, then
also Ec consists of infinitely many parts.
Given (2), genuine self-reference would violate finite divisibility. Given (1), genuine self-
reference would not violate finite divisibility, but (1) would detach the complexity of Ea
from the complexity of Ec. This would practically violate the inseparability of human
mind from human body (§4.13), which would in practice be some version of mind-body
dualism, for in this case the link between Ea and Ec would be very loose. Thus, unless
something too close to mind-body dualism is accepted, it is hard to see how (1) could be
plausible. Moreover, Miller’s Law together and empirical data together support (2). To
illustrate, consider a commonly known fact: “As regards the issue of complexity, this is
quite evident: the brain is one of the most complex systems we know” (Atmanspacher
[34]). Now, even though the brain is extremely complex, still Miller’s law gives 9 as the
limit. If you wish to select (1), you must disregard all this.
In sum, given that Miller’s Law holds or finite divisibility with (2) holds, a thought
(a proposition) cannot refer to nor correspond to itself. Self-referring thoughts in any
case violate Miller’s Law and are uneconomical, but given that (1) holds, self-referring
thoughts do not violate finite divisibility but instead require something close to mind-
body dualism. This reminds that in metaphysics everything is interrelated and that a
satisfiable analysis requires explicating the interrelations.
example ii: two ideas cannot refer to one another. Suppose that Ea refers
to Fa and that Fa refers to Ea, which is written as Ea = ref(Fa) and Fa = ref(Ea).
Together they imply Ea = ref(ref(Ea)), which implies Ea = ref(ref(ref(. . .))), i.e.,
the existence of a genuinely non-wellfounded thought, which is uneconomical as shown
in example I. Exactly the same paradox concerns all circular chains of ideas such as
the following: Ea = ref(Fa), Fa = ref(Ga), Ga = ref(Ea). Together, these im-
ply Ea = ref(ref(Ga)), which implies Ea = ref(ref(ref(Ea))), which implies Ea =
ref(ref(ref(. . .))). In sum, two spatially separate ideas cannot refer nor correspond to
one another in EUO as wholes.
example iii: a proposition cannot simultaneously correspond to and be
identical to a particular. Suppose that the proposition Ea=‘Mount Everest is
over 8000 metres tall’ corresponds to its truthmaker: the physical object, the mountain
Mount Everest. Clearly, the proposition Ea which is realized in the mind of a human
being cannot be identical to a concrete mountain. Compare to Candlish [75, p. 205]:
“the fact which makes true the proposition that I have an Australian 5$ note note in my
pocket seems to involve a piece of plastic; but the proposition itself does not.”
example iv: if proposition a corresponds to idea b, then a cannot be
identical to b. Suppose that a corresponds to b. For instance, a is the true proposition
that b is a circle. In other words, a is the proposition that a certain person is experiencing
a mental image which is a circle, and a is true because that person is experiencing a circle,
i.e., the person who conceives b conceives a circle. In this case a and b are not identical,
for the proposition a=‘b is a circle’ is not identical to the idea b=‘circle.’ This example is
about as close as possible of a truthbearer being identical to a truthmaker in the context
of object-based correspondence. For, if you think that another person is thinking about
a circle, you are thinking about a circle too, although not in the same sense as the other
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person. The difference is revealed clearly by the following example: suppose that you
think that another person is feeling pleasure and your proposition is true; your belief
that another person is feeling pleasure is not identical to the feeling of pleasure that the
other person experiences.
example v: if propositions a and b are identical, they do not correspond
to one another. Suppose that a and b are identical. For instance, suppose that
persons A and B are standing in front of one another, that A thinks that B is thinking
about a circle, and B thinks that A is thinking about a circle. Both A and B are
experiencing an identical proposition: the person in front of me is thinking about a circle.
A is experiencing the proposition a and B is experiencing the proposition b, where a and
b are identical but not the same, as they are spatially separate (§4.6). Now, a and b are
identical, but a does not correspond to b —nor vice versa— for the proposition a=‘B is
thinking about a circle’ does not correspond to the mental state of B. The proposition
a=‘B is thinking about a circle’ is not true because B is not thinking about a circle.
What B is thinking about is this: ‘A is thinking about a circle.’
example vi: practical limitations. Recall that the Universe has been defined as
the sum of all that has existed in the past, all that exist now, and all that will exist in
the future. That is, we have the idealization U of all that ever exists. The difficulty is
that the idealization U also exists, and thus if U refers to the sum total of all that ever
exists, U refers to itself. In EUO, U is interpreted to not to refer to U itself. Russell [343,
p. 225] had exactly the same solution. Although the solution that U cannot refer to
itself may feel problematic in the sense that all that ever exists should be covered by the
idea of all that ever exists, this problemacy is explicitly taken as a practical limitation
in EUO. In contrast, a proponent of infinite divisibility may accept that self-reference
actually takes place, and conclude that U is a non-wellfounded structure.
As an equivalent example, in EUO the present temporal stage of the Universe (TSU) p
determines which TSUs are realizable at time p+1 (§7.1). Consider the proposition Ea:
“TSU p determines which TSUs are realizable at time p+ 1.” If Ea is true, then TSU p
is the truthmaker of Ea. If Ea is stated at p, i.e., if E is a proper part of TSU p, then Ea
refers to E. Again, in the context of EUO it is accepted as a practical limitation that
Ea cannot refer to itself. Therefore, if Ea is especially stated at p, then the expression
‘TSU p’ in Ea must be interpreted to not include Ea.
example vii. An agent perceives the sign on the left side of figure 14. The agent in-
terprets that the meaning of the sign is that the sign refers to itself, as depicted on the
right side of the figure, where the arrow is the interpretation. positive interpreta-
tion. The sign THIS is not the same nor identical to the sign plus the interpretation of
the sign, i.e. THIS6=THIS+interpretation. Therefore, nothing infinite is required here.
nonpositive interpretation. THIS is interpreted to be the same or identical to
THIS + interpretation. It follows that THIS = THIS + interpretation + interpretation
+ interpretation . . . , i.e., THIS contains all the infinitely many interpretations.
Figure 14: A sign on the left and the sign with an interpretation on the right.
example viii. Consider an announcement that you hear in a buss station: “Buss
number 42 leaves at 15.00 from platform 6. This announcement will not be repeated.”
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positive interpretation. The term ‘this’ refers to “Buss number 42 leaves at 15.00
from platform 6,” i.e., ‘this’ does not refer to itself. nonpositive interpretation.
‘This’ refers to itself, and therefore non-wellfounded sets find application. For instance,
Barwise and Ross [44] apply non-wellfounded sets in modeling such cases. Again, using
non-wellfounded sets as mathematical idealizations is one thing, but this does not require
assuming that nature, including thoughts, is genuinely non-wellfounded.
example ix. Suppose that there are three zoom-levels: (A) a picture of the Earth taken
from space; (B) a picture of a country; (C) a picture of a room where is the picture A
among other things. positive interpretation. There is a link from A to B, from B
to C, and from C to A: this is what is done in practice in any case with computers. The
idea that you can zoom potentially infinitely is enough and nonproblematic: always when
you zoom, a function calculates what exists in the next level; there is no need to think
that the zooming goes infinitely all the way through. nonpositive interpretation.
The non-wellfounded sets A={B}, B={C}, and C={A} are used in modeling the case.
(The other members of the sets are not written out.)
Similarly with Mandelbrot’s [244] fractals. Although these were defined originally as non-
wellfounded sets and these can be applied in many ways e.g. in modeling economical
behavior and living organisms, this does not require supposing that nature is genuinely
non-wellfounded: living organisms do not need to literally contain themselves nor be
infinitely divisible in order for fractals to apply in modeling them. The repetition can
continue as far as it must, but it does not have to continue infinitely all the way through
in order for fractals to apply in the relevant sense.
summary. Genuine ontological self-reference is not needed, and non-wellfounded mathe-
matical idealizations can be applied without supposing that nature is infinitely divisible.
Therefore, there is no place for genuine self-reference in an economically unified theory.
Supposing that genuine self-reference takes place means in practice that unnecessarily
heavy mathematical idealizations are imposed on nature, i.e., this case is very close to
imposing infinite divisibility in general on nature.
4.19 Summary
It was shown how the axiomatic method can be applied together with the principle of
economy in metaphysics in an easily understandable and informal way. The axioms
of EUO were derived, defended and interconnected, and their central connections with
the Dynamic Universe model (DU) were explicated. The axioms of EUO —presentism,
causality, ontological realism, the law of non-contradiction, finiteness— are mutually
compatible, compatible with DU and they function together seamlessly in the overall
axiomatic system. Some indispensable concepts were defined in terms of the axioms,
some theorems were proved from the axioms, and some rejections were committed.
The axioms were defended primarily by economy, but also by relying on the existing
literature, yet without going into details of all presented arguments and their resolu-
tions. Opening up all arguments that have been presented for and against the axioms
is impossible because of limitations in space. But there are no surprises in the vicinity:
the functioning of the axioms does not hang on good luck.
Presentism is defended exhaustively in this and the other sections: in addition to being
the simplest axiom for temporal existence, all arguments against presentism I could find
from the literature are exhausted. When defending presentism, it becomes impossible to
miss the importance of coupling DU with EUO, for the only genuine threat to presentism
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is the Theory of Relativity. Much was built on the fusion of presentism and causality. The
causality axiom attaches everything to space, rejects propertyless particulars, and accepts
that every cause has a consequence and that all objects are directly or indirectly causally
connected. The causality axiom underlines the connections of EUO and DU, as EUO
relies on those descriptions of causal connections between objects that are postulated
in DU, and as there is a small step from the causality axiom into the conservation law
of energy and Mach’s Principle. Ontological realism was contrasted to solipsism and it
was concluded that an empirically sufficient version of solipsism is at best equivalent
with ontological realism, and thus the commitment to ontological realism stands on a
firm footing. It is very difficult to find any good arguments against the ontological
version of the law of non-contradiction. The finiteness axiom is a sufficient explanation
of perceptions, it is simpler than its alternatives and it is very difficult to find relevant
obstacles for accepting it.
Once again, it is not argued that EUO is final or perfect or complete or all-pervasive.
The purpose of EUO is to function as an economically unified foundation for the concepts
defined in terms of it, so that these function in the focal contexts. EUO can be rejected
at once it is shown that it does not do what it ought to. There are different ways
of pointing out errors of EUO. One is to show that EUO is contradictory. One is to
show that EUO does not suffice in explaining something that is required by the concepts
defined in terms of it. One is to present a viable alternative fusion of axioms, show that
it is compatible with some theory or some combination of mutually compatible theories
of fundamental physics, and to show that the principle of economy favours this fusion
over EUO+DU. One can also come up with another objective, clearly formulated and in
all ways as viable evaluation criterion. But one should not reject EUO without showing
what is wrong with it. Criticising one axiom in isolation of the totality or in isolation
from the job that EUO is intended to do would be equivalent with criticising one axiom
of a collection theory such as mereology or set theory without seeing its role in the total
system. If one axiom is criticised and it is suggested that it should be replaced by an
alternative, then the effects of this replacement with respect to the total ontology and
its intended function must be taken in account.
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5 Ontology II: The Dynamic Universe Model
The Dynamic Universe model60 (DU) and physics based on the Theory of Relativity are
investigated and evaluated. This is done in order to show that EUO and DU fit together
seamlessly, to show why EUO is incompatible with relativistic physics, and to provide
together with §4 an easily accessible introduction to some of the central relations of
physics and topics that are typically investigated in philosophical literature, where the
most central intersections are time and causality. The following abbreviations are used.
DU: The Dynamic Universe model. The central postulate is the zero-energy formulation
of the conservation law of energy within spherically closed space. In DU the Universe
is a sequence of consecutive TSUs which are in a forward directed temporal and causal
succession, where all parts of a single TSU are causally connected and exist absolutely
simultaneously. Every particular aims towards its minimum potential energy and poten-
tiality aims to get actualized/realized into motion. (Suntola [385, p. 125], [384, ch. 1]).
SR: The Special Theory of Relativity. The central postulates are the relativity principle
(§5.6), constant velocity of light and Lorentz transformations.
GR: The General Theory of Relativity. GR inherits all postulates of SR. The central
addition is the equivalence principle (p. 109).
FLRW: The Friedmann-Lemaˆıtre-Robertson-Walker model, the contemporary standard
model of cosmology (§5.4). Inherits all postulates of GR and adds postulates on the top
of these.
Relativistic physics: all physics based on SR and GR, including FLRW.
DU and EUO are compatible and form together the given version of the unified theory.
The left side of figure 15 illustrates that DU and EUO share the causality axiom and
absolute simultaneity, but no other postulates. The smaller ellipse on the right denotes
what DU and EUO together state or imply to exist. The larger ellipse on the right denotes
all that is compatible with DU. While DU leaves open the selection of some axioms, in
EUO these selections are especially done. Although DU does not explicitly commit to all
axioms of EUO, it is compatible with all of them. DU does not stand in the need of their
alternatives, although DU is compatible with some of them.61 As DU and EUO function
Figure 15: The overall relations of DU and EUO.
together and as numerous popularisations of relativistic physics are available but none
of DU, this section concentrates on popularising DU, whereas the account of how DU
differs from relativistic physics is secondary. Although DU explains phenomena from
the cosmological scale down to the sub-atomic scale, the emphasis here is on cosmology.
As the function of a model of cosmology is to predict how the Universe behaves in the
largest cosmological scale and to give an account of the overall contents of the Universe,
60DU was formulated by Tuomo Suntola [384]. See also Suntola [386] and Suntola, Lehto,
Kallio-Tamminen and Sipila¨ [387]. More publications about DU are available at http://www.
physicsfoundations.org/founders/tuomo-suntola/foundations-of-physics/
61Suntola personally commits to all axioms of EUO and their implications, except he leaves the case
between the mind-independence thesis and mind-dependence thesis open (§4.12).
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cosmology is a natural starting point to investigating all-pervasive principles in physics,
that are essential in forming a comprehensive and unified world-view. This introduction
is mainly informal and aims only to give a an understandable introduction to the overall
metaphysical structure of DU, without going into details. A more detailed investigation
would require more formalism and such accounts are already available.
5.1 The Basic Structure of DU: 4D Geometry and Zero-Energy
Balance
What is the center of the Universe which is at rest, i.e., where is the center of each tem-
poral stage of the Universe (TSU)? Perceptions show that when looking at any direction
from the Earth or anywhere from the Solar System, space is homogeneous: there is ap-
proximately as much perceivable matter everywhere. We see as ‘far’ in every direction,
and all perceived galaxies appear to move away from the observer. Based on the observed
redshifts, the farther away a galaxy or a supernova is from the observer, the faster it
appears to be moving away from the observer. Thus, if space is three-dimensional, the
observer can consider himself as the center of the TSUs. Given the amount of galaxies,
it is terribly improbable that just the one where we reside is the center point. Thus,
the huge improbability must be explained away. DU gives an answer to the question
about the center point by means of four-dimensional spherical geometry. In DU, a TSU
is modeled as a three-dimensional surface of a four-dimensional sphere, where the radius
of the 4D sphere is the fourth dimension, and where the 3D space is spherically closed
(Suntola [384, pp. 36-9, 73-4]).62 Accordingly, the Universe is modeled as a sequence of
such TSUs, i.e, the Universe behaves or evolves as if the 3D space were the surface of a
4D sphere that expands.
As it is impossible to draw a 4D figure, the closing of a 3D object with the fourth
dimension can be characterized by an analogy with the closing of a 2D object with the
third dimension. A closed object has no edges. There is a 2D plate (a piece of paper or
parallelogram) on the left side of figure 16. The plate is not closed, as it has four sides
as the edges. On the center, the plate is wrapped into a tube, which eliminates two of
the four edges. As the plate is wrapped into a tube, the third dimension is added as the
radius of the tube. The tube still has two edges in the ends. As depicted on the right, all
four edges can be eliminated by wrapping the plate into a sphere, which is the simplest
structure that can eliminate all edges. Also the sphere has a radius, which is the third
dimension. The 2D plate has thus been closed by wrapping it into the form of a 2D
surface of a 3D sphere. An analogous wrapping is made to the 3D Universe: its edges
Figure 16: Closing 2 dimensions with a third dimension. Suntola [384, p. 73].
are eliminated by wrapping it into s form of a surface of a 4D sphere. The surface of the
62More accurately, hypothetical homogeneous space (p. 111) has the shape of a perfect 3D surface
of a 4D sphere, creating the overall zero-energy condition of motion and gravitation. The process of
formation of local mass centers in 3D space conserves the zero-energy balance by tilting the 3D space
relative to the 4-radius, i.e., bending the surface of the 4D sphere in the vicinity of mass centers.
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sphere counts as the three dimensions, and the radius of the sphere counts as the fourth
dimension. That a TSU is a 3D the surface of a 4D sphere means that the surface of
the sphere is all that exists: nothing exists inside nor outside the sphere. As the surface
is closed, if one could move far enough in any one direction, starting from point x, one
would eventually return to point x.
In DU the center of a TSU is the center of the 4D sphere. The center of a TSU is not in
the 3D space, for the 3D space is the surface of the 4D sphere: the center is only a part
of the 4D model of the 3D space, i.e., the center of a TSU is merely an idealization. The
fourth dimension is the radius of the 4D sphere and the radius has metric nature as it is
given in meters. In contrast, in relativistic physics the fourth dimension is time-like. 4D
spherical geometry is not a new idea, as spherically closed space was outlined in the 19th
century by Ludwig Sha¨fli and Bernhard Riemann (Suntola [384, p. 33], cf. Feynman
[142, p. 164]).
the fusion of 4D geometry and the conservation law. The conservation law
of energy (CLE) states that the total amount of energy of every possible temporal stage of
the Universe is identical. The basic structure of DU can be characterized as the fusion of
the 4D geometry and CLE. DU incorporates CLE in the form of the zero-energy principle,
where zero63 is the sum of the total potential energy and the total energy of motion.64
In DU, potentiality aims to get actualized/realized into movement and moving objects
aim at their minimum of potential energy: the apple aims to actualise its potential by
dropping into the location of its minimum potential.
The energy of motion comes in two forms: the energy of motion related to the expansion
or contraction of space;65 the energy of motion of localized objects that move in space.
The energy of motion results primarily from the expansion of space, and motion within
space may be disregarded in the largest cosmological scale. Likewise, gravitational energy
is the primary form of potential energy, and other forms of potential energy may be
disregarded in the largest cosmological scale. Figure 17 depicts relations of the 4D
geometry and the zero-energy balance between the gravitational energy and the energy
of motion, within one contraction-expansion cycle. When the Universe expands the
radius of the 4D sphere increases; when the Universe contracts the radius of the 4D
sphere decreases. An analogy with an ideal pendulum is depicted on the bottom of the
figure. On the extreme left at the initial stage of the contraction-expansion cycle, the
pendulum is ideally still, the radius of the 4D sphere is at the widest, the energy of
motion is minimal and the gravitational energy is maximal. The maximal gravitational
energy is mathematically 0. When the Universe contracts the radius of the 4D sphere
decreases. Mathematically, when the Universe contracts the energy of motion increases
in the positive direction, and the gravitational energy decreases, i.e., increases in the
negative direction, where their sum is always zero. The contraction continues until the
singularity, where the gravitational energy has reached its minimum and the energy of
motion has reached its maximum, where their sum is zero as always. The closer the
Universe is to the singularity in the contraction stage, the faster is the contraction and
the greater the energy of motion, and the smaller the gravitational energy. After the
63That the total energy of every possible TSU is 0 does not imply that an empty TSU is possible.
64The zero-energy principle finds roots in G. W. Leibniz’s dichotomy of vis viva or the living force,
and vis mortua or the dead force. See e.g. Leibniz’s Specimen Dynamicum (1695) [217, vol. VI, p.
238f]. Energy of motion or kinetic energy analogous to vis viva, and potential energy is analogous to
vis mortua. Vis viva is obtained against release of vis mortua and vice versa. In turn, Suntola [385,
p. 46] maintains that “Leibniz was searching for a physical expression for Aristotle’s entelecheia, the
actualisation of potentiality” which is discussed in §5.2.
65This is equivalent with rest energy in relativistic physics.
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Figure 17: The balance of the gravitational energy and the energy of motion. The figure
is a modified version of Suntola [384, p. 82].
singularity, contraction turns into expansion. Currently the Universe expands: the radius
of the 4D sphere increases, the energy of motion decreases and the gravitational energy
increases.
Suntola [385, p. 148] uses an analogy with a book-keeper’s principle: the gravitational
energy (potential energy) which is released into motion in the contraction stage is paid
back in the expansion stage. The closer the Universe is to the state of maximal expansion,
the slower is the velocity of expansion and the smaller the energy of motion, and the
greater the gravitational energy. Ideally, when the expansion has stopped the Universe is
‘still’ and the energy of motion is minimal and the gravitational energy is maximal. After
this the contraction may start again, i.e., the cycle may start again. DU is compatible
with the eternal Universe theorem (§4.11) although Suntola does not speculate about
any other cycles than the current one.
the energy balance equation, mass and the velocity of light. DU’s energy
balance equation interrelates CLE, the velocity of expansion/contraction (c) in the fourth
dimension, the radius of the 4D sphere (R4), the mass of the Universe (M) and the mass
equivalence (M ′′, p. 111). The equation states that the energy of motion (the left side
of the equation) is equal to the potential energy (the right side of the equation):
c20M =
GMM ′′
R4
c0 is the velocity of expansion of space, i.e., the velocity of the increase of R4.
66 As
a consequence of the zero-energy balance, c0 is the maximum velocity of any object
moving in space. Thus, c0 is also the maximum velocity of light in space. In hypothetical
66The velocity expansion in the expansion stage; the velocity of contraction in the contraction stage.
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homogeneous space (p. 111) the velocity of light in space is equal to c0. However, in
reality space is not homogeneous, and in the vicinity of mass centers in space, local
space is tilted in the fourth dimension, making local velocity of light smaller than c0.
67
The velocity of light in space changes along with the change of R4, and with the local
gravitational state. This is a decisive difference to relativistic physics where the velocity
of light is constant.
In DU all particulars —including electromagnetic energy particulars— have mass and
all forms of electromagnetic energy are derivatives of the energy of motion. Therefore
‘particular’ and ‘mass particular’ are equivalent. In DU mass is postulated as the sub-
stance of the expression or realization of energy, i.e., mass particulars are the substances
that realize energy: mass is eternal but the ways or forms of how mass particulars realize
energy change. A mass particular realizes both forms of energy: potential energy such
as gravitational energy and energy of motion. This applies to temporal stages of the
Universe (TSUs) as wholes as illustrated by the energy balance equation, as well as to
proper parts of the TSUs. In the level of TSUs the energy balance equation states that
the energy of motion of the mass of a TSU is equal to the gravitational energy of the
mass of the TSU. See unified expression of energy in Suntola [384, pp. 40-1, 336].
the relation of a particular’s gravitational energy and its energy of
motion. In DU the energy state of a particular is its combined state of motion and
gravitation. A particular which is a proper part of a TSU —such as a planet, a star,
a galaxy or a single particle— resides in a certain location in a gravitational potential
field created by all other mass in space. The particular recognizes (§5.2) its gravitational
potential as its gravitational energy. A particular expresses two forms of energy of
motion: motion with space in the fourth dimension (or rest energy); motion in space as
kinetic energy. In sum, the energy state of a particular is its combined state of motion and
gravitation, and its state of motion is its combined state of motion with the expanding
space and its state of motion in space. Mach’s principle is thus is implicit in DU (p. 26).
As an implication of the conservation of energy mechanism, an object’s momentum in
the fourth dimension decreases when its momentum in a space direction increases, and
vice versa; the closer the velocity of an object in space is to the velocity of light, the
smaller its momentum in the fourth dimension, and vice versa. Consider three cases. (i)
An object such as a photon moving at the velocity of light in space has momentum only
in the direction of its motion in space. (ii) An object at rest in space has momentum
only in the fourth dimension. (iii) An object moving in space at a velocity lower than of
light has momentum both in the fourth dimension and in a space direction.
There are two cases of the change of velocity of an object: acceleration/deceleration at
a constant gravitational potential; acceleration in free fall in a gravitational field and
deceleration in escape in a gravitational field. At a constant gravitational potential an
object such as a particle in an accelerator on the surface of the Earth gains kinetic energy
from the energy released by the accelerator. The obtained state of motion of the object
is associated with an increase of its inertial mass. The kinetic energy of an object in free
fall in a gravitational field is obtained against reduction of its rest energy; this does not
increase the inertial mass of the falling object. See Suntola [384, §4] for a more accurate
description of these proportions.
comparison with gr. In GR there are particulars which have mass, and particulars
which do not have mass such as photons, gluons and gravitons. A particular’s mass is
expressed in terms of its rest mass (or invariant mass) and inertial mass (or relativistic
67See Suntola [384, p. 106, eq. 4.1.1:13; p. 109, eq. 4.1.1:28, p. 141].
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mass). The rest mass of a particular is independent of its velocity in space, whereas its
relativistic mass depends on its velocity in space. The Equivalence Principle —which
states that an object’s gravitational mass is equal to its inertial mass or that “the state
of affairs in a homogeneous gravitational field is identical to the state of affairs in a
uniformly accelerated coordinate system” (van Dongen [404, p. 6])— implies that an
object’s inertial mass increases along with the increase of velocity in both cases: when
an object is accelerated at a constant gravitational potential; when an object’s velocity
increases in free fall.
5.2 From Mechanistic Force to Nonmechanistic Energy
Relativistic physics (RP) is mechanistic as all influences are explained solely in terms of
moving objects. DU is nonmechanistic as only some influences are explained in terms
of moving objects and others in terms of potential energy (Suntola et al. [387]). Me-
chanicism would be more economical than nonmechanicism if all influences could be
explained without difficulties in terms of moving objects and if mechanicism would not
be involved with metaphysical postulates equal to the postulates of nonmechanicism.
However, mechanicism happens to be involved with equally heavy metaphysical postu-
lates as nonmechanicism, plus the hypothesis of mechanistic influences that propagate at
the velocity of light faces unsurmountable problems, whereas the hypothesis of instan-
taneous nonmechanistic influences resolves these.
In RP objects emit force-conveying particles that move in space: forces are thought to
be conveyed via particles called gauge bosons. Also gravitation is mechanistic in the RP,
where gravitation is thought to propagate mechanically at the speed of light via gauge
boson particles called gravitons. The existence of gravitons has not been empirically ver-
ified, which makes them hypothetical entities. This means that mechanistic gravitation
is as metaphysical as nonmechanistic gravitation.
Gravitons reveal a disunified feature of RP. Particles which move in direction D are
generally conceived to push objects in direction D, and not pull them in the opposite
direction. On one hand, in the scale of individual galaxies and smaller systems such as
star systems, gravitons are supposed to move with a force towards direction D, but still
pull the objects which they hit towards direction opposite to D. On the other hand, in
the largest scale the pushing-idea works at least partially, in the sense that dark energy
is supposed to push the galaxies away from one another in FLRW. In addition to the
pushing-pulling controversy, the idea that gravitation propagates at the speed of light
faces a problem which was recognized by Pierre-Simon Laplace. The stability of the
Solar System requires that the velocity of gravitation must be remarkably faster than
the speed of light:
I was first led to suppose that the propagation of gravitation is not instantaneous, but
happens with the speed of light. This seems at odds with results obtained by Laplace,
who announced [in Me´canique Ce´leste 1, 1799-1825] that this propagation is, if not instan-
taneous, at least much faster than that of light.” Poincare´, as quoted in Suntola [385, p.
73]
Instantaneous gravitation would sustain the stability. However, if instantaneous gravi-
tons were accepted, the idea of graviton particles could be rejected altogether, for in-
stantaneous movement is not movement at all: to move instantaneously from location A
to location B is the same as to be in A and B simultaneously. DU replaces the convey-
ing of forces via moving particles by recognition of the local gradient of potential energy.
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Objects recognize their potential energies always, everywhere and instantaneously: the
recognition is the link between an object and its potential energy. Take gravitation as an
example. DU shifts from mechanistic conveying of gravitation via graviton particles into
recognition of the local gradient of gravitational potential. For instance, the recognition
of the gradient of the gravitational potential of a football may be analogized with the
recognition of the steepness of the hill where the football is situated.
To illustrate the difference of DU and RP, consider an apple hanging from a tree. In RP,
gravitons that are emitted by the Earth hit the apple and attract it towards the ground.
Also the apple emits gravitons which hit the Earth. The apple remains in the tree as
long as the gravitational force conveyed by the gravitons is weaker than the force of the
chemical bonds of the molecules that keep the stem of the apple attached to a branch.
In DU, the apple recognizes its gravitational energy and it also recognizes the energy
of the chemical bonds with which the apple is attached to the tree. The gravitational
energy together with the chemical bonds create a local minimum of potential energy at
the bonding distance, i.e., at the location where the apple hangs from the tree. When
the apple hangs from the tree in location x, the apple is in a local minimum in x, and
therefore the apple does not fall to the ground. As the apple ripens, the chemical bonds
weaken. In effect, the location of the local minimum of the apple changes: the apple falls
to the ground to the new local minimum.
In DU, potentiality aims to get actualized/realized into movement and the moving objects
aim at their minimum of potential energy: the apple aims to actualise its potential by
dropping into the location of its minimum potential. This scenario is close to Aristotle’s
entelecheia, the idea that movement is actualization of potentiality:68 “Now since every
kind of thing is divided into the potential and the real, I call the actualization of the
potential as such, motion” (Aristotle, Metaphysics, bk. 11, 1065b15-20). Suntola [385,
p. 132] maintains that the “study of space as a dynamic energy system reestablishes
Aristotle’s . . . actualization of potentiality, to the status of a primary law of nature.”
Actualization of potential energy into energy of motion naturally fits perfectly together
with the zero-energy balance of these two forms of energy.
That gravitation is instantaneous in DU does not mean that whatever superluminal in-
fluences should be applied by free association. The order must be always kept in mind:
if the simplest explanation of a phenomenon does not require superluminal influences,
these should not be imposed. For instance, Di Lorenzo, [229, 230], Jaynes [187], Thomp-
son [396], Geurdes [155], Christian [86] and Bryan and Medved [65] have argued that
superluminal influences are not required as the explanation of the results of the Bell
inequality tests, as long as one sticks with the mind-independence thesis (ontological
realism). DU does not support the interpretation that explaining the results of the Bell
inequality tests require something superluminal.
5.3 DU’s Expansion Hypothesis and Other Calculations
It is shown how the 4D spherical geometry and DU’s energy balance equation can be
applied together in cosmological calculations. This section proceeds as follows. (i) The
energy balance equation and the basic constants are listed. (ii) The circumference or
the size of the present TSU is calculated. (iii) The concepts of hypothetical homogeneous
68Consider the relation of potentiality and possibility. Being at a local minimum at the present time
is always a possibility, for the actual present is a possibility. Given partial determinism, when the apple
drops from the tree, the location of its new local minimum is not totally determined, but there are
several possible locations. See e.g. Sach [346, ch. 2] for a discussion of Aristotle’s entelecheia.
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space and mass equivalence are explained and the mass of a TSU is calculated. (iv)
The volume and density of the present TSU are calculated. (v) It is explained how the
changing velocity of light is derived from the basic structure of DU. (vi) It is calculated
how much time has passed since the singularity. (vii) The hypothesis of decelerating
expansion is calculated.
energy balance equation c2M = GMM
′′
R4
, where R4 is the radius of the 4D sphere.
The equation states that the energy of motion (the left side of the equation) is equal to
the potential energy (the right side of the equation).
mass of the Universe M = M
′′
0.776
.
mass equivalence M ′′ = 0, 776 . . .×M .
current velocity of light c = 300000km
s
or 3× 108m
s
.69
one light year 9.4605284× 1015m. The distance travelled in one year at the current
c.
gravitational constant G = 6.67× 10−11 m
3
kgs2
.
megaparsec Mpc = 3.086× 1022m.
hubble constant H = 70km/s
Mpc
. The dimension of H is velocity
distance
. H denotes the current
expansion rate of the Universe.70
hubble radius RH = 1.4× 10
10 light years or 1.32× 1026m. RH is equal to the current
R4.
circumference or size of the present tsu. First, R4 =
c
H
, i.e., R4 can be
calculated from the constants H and c. Second, the size of the present TSU may be
considered as the circumference of the 4D sphere, which is 2piR4 = 88 billion light years.
The circumference increases proportionally to the increase of R4. As a TSU is a closed
system in DU, you can imagine that you are holding one end of an ideal thread with
the length of 88 billion light years in one hand, and the other end in another hand; the
length of the thread increases along with the expansion of the Universe. 88 billion light
years is analogous to the concept of co-moving distance in FLRW.
mass; mass equivalence; hypothetical homogeneous space. Hypothetical ho-
mogeneous space and mass equivalence are used for several purposes in DU. These are
not ontological commitments but syntactical idealizations. In hypothetical homogeneous
space, all mass is thought to be uniformly distributed in space: objects are not thought
to move in space, but they are only moving along the expansion of space, i.e., all objects
are thought to be at rest in space. The mass equivalence is set in the center of the 4D
sphere. Consider a particular such as an elementary part (or test mass) m in space. The
gravitational energy of the hypothetical homogeneous space that affects m, is equal to
the gravitational energy of the mass equivalence M ′′ which is set in the center of the 4D
sphere. Consider the energy balance equation c2M = GMM
′′
R4
. Eliminating M from both
sides of the equation results in c2 = GM
′′
R4
. By elaboration, M ′′ = c
2R4
G
. With the above
values M ′′ = 1.78× 1053 kg.71 M = M
′′
0.776
= 2.3× 1053 kg. As mass is conserved in DU,
69Although the local velocity of light cx in a specific location x in space is different from the velocity
of expansion c0, as was explained in p. 108, the difference is very small. For instance, when x is in the
vicinity of the Earth, c0 = 1.000001cx approximately (Suntola [384, p. 123]). Because the difference is
so small, and as the Hubble constant (below) is inaccurate, and as these are used together in the below
calculations, we can simplify the notation and use plain c in all examples.
70Empirical estimations of H have varied in the past. Chen and Ratra [152] calculate the median
statistical value H = 68 ± 5.5km/sMpc , based on some 553 estimations. As the error margin of the value
H = 70km/sMpc is so great, everything that is calculated by using H must be seen as an inaccurate
approximation as well.
71The mass equivalence is calculated in (Suntola [384, §§3.2.1-3.2.2, pp. 85, 91])
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every TSU has the same mass.
volume and density. The volume V of the present TSU —the volume of the 3D
surface of the 4D ball— is given by the formula V = 2pi2R34, which makes about 4.5 ×
1079m3. The average density D = M
V
is calculated by dividing the mass of a TSU M
by its volume V , which makes about 5 × 10−27 kg
m3
. As in DU the density of a TSU can
be calculated from the basic structure, the density parameter (with or without the dark
energy) is not needed in the expansion hypothesis of DU, although the hypothesis of
dark matter is required in the scale of an individual galaxy.
the changing velocity of light. As the mass of the present TSU has been calcu-
lated, the changing velocity of light can be calculated by changing R4. Consider again
the energy balance equation c2M = GMM
′′
R4
. By eliminating M from the equation and
taking a square root of both sides, we get c =
√
GM ′′
R4
as the velocity of expansion, which
is also the velocity of light with the given R4. When the Universe expands, R4 increases
and the velocity of light decreases; when the Universe contracts, R4 decreases and the
velocity of light increases. The greater the radius, the smaller the velocity of expansion
and light; the smaller the radius, the greater the velocity of expansion and light. The
velocity of light is equal to the velocity of the increase of R4: the energy balance is
primary, whereas the velocity of light is derived as a function of R4. In the on-going
expansion phase, as R4 increases, the velocity of expansion decreases and all movement
within space gets slower, including the velocity of light. The velocity of expansion is the
maximum velocity that anything may have in space, and this is the velocity of light. The
changing velocity of light is not measurable, for atomic clocks must be used in measuring
it, and the ticking rate of atomic clocks is directly proportional to the velocity of light.
Therefore, all measurements give always a constant speed of light. Although the velocity
of light will always be measured and experienced to be the same, the length of one second
now is shorter relative to one second in the future, for the velocity of light decreases as
the Universe expands.
time that has passed since the singularity. If the velocity of light were constant
and the present velocity of light, about 14 billion years would have passed since the
singularity. The decreasing rate of the expansion and the proportionally decreasing
velocity of light entail that the velocity of light was higher in the past, and it can be
calculated that 2
3
× 14 = 9.3 billion current years have passed since the singularity
(Suntola [384, pp. 90-4]). In DU the 14 billion light years radius R4 makes up only 9.3
billion current years because the velocity of expansion has been decreasing ever since the
singularity.
decelerating expansion. Similarly as FLRW, DU applies in its expansion hypothesis
the Hubble constant, the gravitational constant and the current velocity of light. Once
these are given, mass and density of the present TSU can be derived from the basic
structure of DU as shown above. The velocity of expansion ct at time t —where ct is
also the velocity of light at time t— is calculated with the formula ct =
2
3
R4,t
t
, where t
is the time that has passed since the singularity, and R4,t is the radius of the 4D sphere
at time t (Suntola [384, eq. 3.3.3:8]). Given the current R4 = 14 billion light years,
and the current time 2
3
× 14 = 9.3 billion years since the singularity, the formula gives
ct =
2
3
R4,t
t
= c0, where c0 is the current velocity of light, about 300000
km
s
.
When calculating the expansion rate at other times t, R4 at time t is needed, which
is given by the formula R4,t =
3
√
9
4
t2GM ′′ (Suntola [384, eq. 3.3.3:7]). For instance,
what is the velocity of expansion one billion years from the present, where velocity is
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given proportionally to the current velocity of light? The value t = the present time +
1 billion years must be fitted as explained above. Again, currently 2
3
× 14 = 9.3 billion
years have passed since the singularity, and so the question is what is the velocity of the
expansion at t = 9.3 + 1 = 10.3 billion years from the singularity? When t is placed in
R4,t =
3
√
9
4
t2GM ′′, the result is about 15× 109 current light years. When R4 = 15× 10
9
light years, and t = 10.3 billion years are placed in the equation ct =
2
3
R4,t
t
, the result is
about 98% of the current velocity of light, i.e., the velocity of light decreases about 2%
during the next billion years.
Figure 18: The crosses denote the observed distance modulus of Ia supernovae as the
function of their redshifts. The dashed lines denote the FLRW prediction. The solid line
denotes the DU prediction. The only actually measured values are the redshift and the
apparent magnitude (or the distance modulus). The redshift describes the distance of
the objects: the greater the redshift the greater is the distance.
Figure 18 shows the relation of the distance modulus (y-axis) and redshift (x-axis) of
Riess et al. [133] dataset about observations of Ia supernovae. The FLRW predictions
are obtained by giving the density parameter the value Ωm = 1 in the lowest FLRW curve,
and Ωm = 0.27 and ΩΛ = 0.73 (dark energy) in the highest FLRW curve. The DU curve is
obtained without the density parameter. At some point in the future even more accurate
measurements will be available. Then we will see whether the current approximation of
dark energy suffices, or whether the density parameter must be readjusted once again.
5.3.1 The Rate of the Passage of Time Argument
The rate of the passage argument will be discussed in defence of presentism here, because
it can be effectively exhausted in the context of DU. A reader interested only in cosmology
can skip this section. The argument has been formulated e.g. by Smart [366], but here
it is handled according to Markosian’s formulation:
[T]here is no rate that can be coherently assigned to the passage of time. (“One hour per
hour,” for example, is said not to be a coherent answer to the question “How fast does time
pass?”) Thus, the argument concludes, it cannot be true to say that time really passes.
Markosian [250]
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If time would not pass, change would not take place, given intrinsic time. If change
would not take place, the perceived change would be an illusion. It is first shown that
the general question of how fast does time pass can be given a coherent and plausible
answer in the context of DU. The answer appeals to the changing expansion rate, as
explained above.
(1) The passage of time is in EUO and in DU a way of talking about the passage of
change, and periods of time are defined in terms of sequences of temporal stages of
the Universe, i.e., as change-sequences. For instance, the period of one second is the
length of the sequence during which a cesium-133 atom performs 9,192,631,770 complete
oscillations, when measured on the sea level on Earth.
(2) The definition of one second is exactly the same at all times, such as at the present
and in the year F = the present time + 1 billion years.
(3) However, as the Universe expands, the expansion rate gets slower; the velocity of
light and the characteristic frequencies of atomic clocks get slower. As calculated above,
all these are about 2% slower at F than at the present. Therefore, the duration of one
second at F is 2% longer than the duration of one second now, again when measured
on the sea level on Earth. In other words, consider the period of one present second
(sP ) and the period of one second at F (sF ): the duration of sF is about 1.02× sP ; the
duration of sP is about 0.98× sF .
(4) Therefore, we can talk about the rate of the passage of time in year X in terms of
the proportion to year Y.
Markosian72 formulates two of Smart’s [366] arguments and maintains that these do not
have force. Note that Markosian is unaware of the answer that can be given in the
context of DU, but still maintains that Smart’s arguments do not have force.
the first rate of passage argument.
(1) If time flows or passes, then there is some second time-dimension with respect to
which the passage of normal time is to be measured.
(2) If there is some second time-dimension with respect to which the passage of normal
time is to be measured, then the second time-dimension must flow or pass.
(3) If the second time-dimension flows or passes, then there must be some third time-
dimension with respect to which the passage of the second time-dimension is to be
measured, and, hence, some fourth time-dimension with respect to which the passage of
the third time-dimension is to be measured, and so on ad infinitum.
(4) It’s not the case that there is some third time-dimension with respect to which
the passage of the second time-dimension is to be measured, and, hence, some fourth
time-dimension with respect to which the passage of the third time-dimension is to be
measured, and so on ad infinitum.
(5) It’s not the case that time flows or passes.
The argument is answered in the context of EUO where all sorts of transcendist time-
dimensions are rejected (§4.16), i.e., the time-dimensions must be found from the Uni-
verse. The time-dimensions which can be used in giving the answer can be considered
in the context of DU as different times or different periods of time, such as (A) a period
of one second in the year 2014 and (B) a period of one second in another year such as in
the year 2014 + 1 billion years. The rate of A can be given proportionally to B and vice
versa. There does not have to be infinitely many periods: that the rate of A is given
proportionally to B does not require a third period for giving the rate to B, for the rate
72These citations are from an on-line paper http://myweb.facstaff.wwu.edu/nmarkos/Papers/
Rate.pdf which is a version of Markosian [248]. Basically the same reasoning can be found from Carroll
and Markosian [78, ch. 7.4].
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of B is proportional to A. However, proportions can be calculated to as many periods as
one wishes. For comparison, Markosian (ibid) rejects premise (1) on the basis that he
cannot see why it should be accepted.
the second rate of passage argument.
(1) If it makes sense to say that time passes, then it makes sense to ask ‘How fast does
time pass?’
(2) If it makes sense to ask ‘How fast does time pass?’, then it’s possible for there to be
a coherent answer to this question.
(3) It’s not possible for there to be a coherent answer to this question.
(4) It doesn’t make sense to say that time passes.
An answer was given to the question of how fast does time pass: the passage rate of one
period of time can be given proportionally to another period. For comparison, Markosian
(ibid) makes guesses about what ‘rate’ means in the first place, and aims to show that
whichever coherent answer is selected “there is some premise of Smart’s argument that
is, according to the way I have answered the relevant questions, clearly false.”
5.4 From Newton into SR into GR into FLRW and its Expan-
sion Hypothesis
DU and FLRW agree that the Universe is currently expanding and that gravitation
constrains the expansion by pulling the expanding parts together. The models agree
that the Universe was smaller yesterday than it is today, smaller the day before yesterday
than it was yesterday, and so on. The backward decrease in size is propagated in both
models in the hypothesis that the Universe was condensed into a singularity in the past,
which bursted out, although in DU the singularity is not supposed to be a zero-size
point.73 This is where the agreement stops. DU predicts that the rate of expansion
has been decreasing since the singularity, whereas FLRW predicts that the expansion is
currently accelerating. In the following, the 20th century development into FLRW and
its hypothesis of accelerating expansion and the interrelated addition of dark energy as a
parameter are explained. It is notable that the 20th century developments fit perfectly
in the Kuhnian picture where the evolution of theories walks hand in hand with the
increase of data; the more new data, the more additional parameters the old theory
requires, which creates pressure to replace it by a more economically unified theory.
Newtonian physics suffices as the point of departure. In Newtonian physics, we have
absolute time and linear three-dimensional space. Mass objects which move in space
follow Newtons laws of motion and gravitation, which define the forces acting on mass
objects. Newtonian physics does not explain why clocks in different states of motion and
gravitation show different cumulated readings. SR explains this phenomenon by applying
relativistic time (§5.6). In other words, SR produces the concepts of relativistic time
(or time dilation) and length contraction, and applies these in explaining phenomena.
Relativistic time and length contraction are best seen as parameters. Consider a step-
by-step illustration of why relativistic time should be seen as a parameter: (1) we are
evaluating systems of total physics that explain all scales; (2) contradictions are not
accepted in such systems; (3) absolute simultaneity is implicit in cosmic time, which
73According to Suntola [385, p. 291], Lemaˆıtre was the first to suggest that the Universe started to
expand from a single point. For comparison, Hoyle, Burbidge and Narlikar [175] suppose in their quasi-
steady state model that there was no single singularity, but several little mini-bangs or mini-creation
events.
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is needed when applying FLRW in cosmology; (4) relativistic time contradicts absolute
simultaneity; (5) as contractions are not accepted, we must accept two independent
notions of time in relativistic physics: relativistic time and cosmic time (§5.6.2).
GR inherits all postulates of SR, and applies the Newtonian equivalence principle in a
new way by equating gravitational mass with SR inertial mass. As the result, Newtonian
linear space is replaced with curved space-time which modified celestial mechanics and
explained the effect of gravitation on atomic clocks. Now, the modified time and distance
become the parameters defining the curved spacetime in GR. These modified Newtonian
gravitation and allowed re-interpretation of gravitation as the result of the parametrised
non-linear space-time. GR became the point of departure for explaining phenomena on
the cosmological scale. Although SR and GR explained more than Newtonian physics
and were in this sense more unified explanations, the unification did not come without
further parameters and was thus not optimally economical unification.
SR [123] was published in 1905 and GR [124] in 1916. In 1917, Einstein [125] supposed
that the Universe is static, i.e., that it does not expand nor contract, and postulated the
cosmological constant which is compatible with this commitment. Einstein (ibid) also
suggested 4D spherical geometry as a logically consistent visualization of the General
Relativity: “At any rate, this view is logically consistent, and from the standpoint of
the General Theory of Relativity, lies nearest at hand.” In Einstein’s considerations, the
4D sphere was static, i.e., the Universe was not considered to expand nor contract, and
therefore the static 4D model sufficed, together with the cosmological constant whose
job was to make the Universe static.
In 1922 Alexander Friedmann’s [151] dynamic solutions of the field equations of GR indi-
cated that there are three alternatives: the Universe is static; the Universe expands; the
Universe contracts. By the end of the 1920’s there was enough data or empirical observa-
tions —Hubble’s observations— about red-shifts and magnitudes of distant galaxies that
these together with Friedmann’s (ibid) and Lemaˆıtre’s [219] (1927) reasoning proposed
that the Universe is currently expanding. As Einstein had to accept that the Universe
expands, he abandoned his static 4D model and the cosmological constant.74 As a re-
sult of abandoning 4D spherical geometry, the geometry of space was left open, and the
question about the center point of the Universe was left open along with it.75
As there was a consensus in the 1930’s that the Universe is expanding and observations
that supported the consensus, the cosmology model had to be developed so that it
provides predictions which match these observations (Suntola [385, pp. 89-99]). The
resulting model became to be called FLRW (the Friedmann-Lemaˆıtre-Robertson-Walker
model), which became the standard model of cosmology. In its basic form, it contains
two central parameters, the Hubble constant and the density parameter, which can be
74Why did Einstein not transform the static 4D model into a nonstatic and dynamic 4D model,
which is exactly what is done in DU? This would have required very much work and re-thinking the
fundamentals. Time was already the fourth dimension in the Theory of Relativity, whereas in DU the
fourth dimension is the radius of the 4D sphere. The velocity of light was already postulated to be
constant and the current velocity of light, which does not fit easily with the dynamic 4D model.
75On one hand, FLRW does not give a straightforward answer to the question of what is the center
point. On the other hand, the answer can be sought by combining the relativity principle and the
cosmological principle. According to the cosmological principle, the distribution of matter in the Universe
is homogeneous and isotropic, when viewed in a large enough scale. According to the relativity principle,
the equations describing the laws of physics have the same form in all admissible frames of reference.
When the principles are combined, any perceiver is in some sense allowed to define his state as the state
of rest, where everything else moves with respect to the perceiver. In this sense, the perceiver is always
the unmoving center point of the Universe. As any part of any TSU can be considered as a perceiver,
FLRW gives the freedom of mapping the center point anywhere in a TSU.
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estimated by adjusting them in such a way that the predictions of the model match the
observations.
In the end of the 1990’s, accurate measurements of the magnitudes and red-shifts of
sufficiently distant supernovae were available. In order to make FLRW match these
measurements, something repulsive had to be incorporated. This repulsive element has
become to be called dark energy. FLRW together with the dark energy gave the hypoth-
esis that the expansion of the Universe is currently accelerating. In other words, observe
figure 18 in p. 113. Without dark energy the lowest FLRW curve clearly misses the
target, and therefore dark energy had to be added. The hypothesis that the expansion
of the Universe is currently accelerating followed as a result.
FLRW’s density parameter Ω = Ωm + ΩΛ consists of two central parts. Ωm denotes the
sum of the masses of the visible or normal matter and the so-called dark matter, which
ought not be confused with dark energy. The visible matter includes all planets, stars,
nebulae and so on. FLRW and DU both agree that there must exist some amount of
directly inperceivable matter somewhere in the galaxies. Dark matter is needed in the
scale of galaxies in both models in order for celestial mechanics to work: to explain the
orbital velocities of the stars on the edges of the galaxies. This form of unperceived but
gravitationally attractive matter is usually denoted as dark matter.
ΩΛ denotes the dark energy. Unlike the perceived matter and dark matter, the dark
energy is supposed to be gravitationally repulsive. According to NASA:76 “The new
estimate of dark matter content in the universe is 26.8 percent, up from 24 percent,
while dark energy falls to 68.3 percent, down from 71.4 percent. Normal matter now is
4.9 percent, up from 4.6 percent.” The dark energy is indispensable for FLRW to match
perceptions. The dark energy is by far the greatest burden of the accelerating expansion
hypothesis. Dark energy remains to be unperceived, which makes it a hypothetical entity.
It is especially an exceptional entity, for it is supposed to work against gravitation, i.e.
pushing masses apart instead of pulling them. The dark energy makes it difficult to sort
out what is the role of CLE in FLRW, for it is an open question that does the quantity
of dark energy increase or decrease.
The hypothesis of inflationary expansion is applied to some period near the singularity,
where it is supposed that the expansion was immensely faster than today. After the
inflationary stage the acceleration rate is supposed to follow the FLRW prediction which
is supplemented by dark energy. In sum, FLRW must incorporate different expansion
regularities at different times —inflation and acceleration— plus the hypothetical dark
energy which entails the hypothesis of accelerating expansion.
contradiction with the conservation law. The wavelength of radiation which
moves in space —such as the cosmic background radiation— grows proportionally with
the expansion of space. In relativistic physics and in standard physics in general, the
Planck equation E = hf —the energy of a photon in Joules is the Planck constant h
multiplied by the photon’s frequency f— is interpreted to describe intrinsic properties
of radiation. Accordingly, as the wavelength λ of the radiation increases along with
the expansion of the Universe, its frequency f = c
λ
—the velocity of light c divided by
the wavelength λ— decreases and therefore its energy decreases along with the decrease
of the frequency: E = hc
λ
. Total energy thus decreases and CLE is violated, unless
an additional parameter is invented to compensate the violation, which in effect would
decrease the relative simplicity of FLRW. See Suntola [384, §6.4.1]. The role of CLE is
76March 21st, 2013 http://www.nasa.gov/mission_pages/planck/news/planck20130321.html#
.VP8axFbfihO
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thus at least ambiguous in FLRW, whereas DU incorporates CLE in its basic structure.
For consistency with Maxwell’s equations, Suntola [384, §5.1.1, pp. 162-168] has shown
that the Planck equation describes the energy conversion in the emission/absorption of
an electromagnetic wave; the energy the wave obtains in the emission is conserved in
relation to the total energy in space; only the energy density of the wave decreases due
to the increase of the wavelength, along with the expansion of space, but the total energy
carried by the wave does not decrease. Therefore there is no contradiction with CLE.
5.5 Gravitationally Bonded Systems
In DU, all systems bonded by gravitation such as galaxy clusters, individual galaxies and
planetary systems expand along with the expansion of the Universe, and the wavelength
of the cosmic background radiation increases as the Universe expands, whereas compact
objects such as planets and stars do not expand along with the expansion of the Universe
(Suntola [384, §6.2.2-3]).
The standard interpretation since the 1930’s has been that galaxies and planetary systems
do not expand but the Universe as a whole expands (de Sitter [102]). The expansion is
explained by Hubble flow between galaxies or galaxy groups (de Sitter [101]). Currently,
in FLRW the hypothetical dark energy reduces the effect of gravitation and results in
the hypothesis of accelerating expansion of the Universe, as pointed out in §5.4. FLRW’s
interpretation that local gravitationally bonded systems do not expand along with the
expansion of space leads into conflicts with perceptions, and thereby requires additional
parameters. To illustrate, consider an abbreviation of Heikki Sipila¨’s [364] presentation.
The commonly accepted premisses are the following:
(1) The Solar luminosity or the radiation efficiency of the Sun increases about 7% in a
billion years (Gough [157], Bahcall et al. [36]).
(2) There were seas in Mars about 4 billion years ago but nowadays all water is in the
form of ice, concentrated in the poles of Mars; the current mean temperature of Mars
is -63 Celsius.77 Emiliani [131, p. 543] notes that there was water in Mars more than
3 billion years ago. That there is currently ice on Mars and its mean temperature is
considered as common knowledge.
(3) There were seas and life on Earth some 3,85 billion years ago and the temperature
was about 30-40 Celsius. See e.g. Kusky [211, p. 238] and Le Bihan and Fukuyama [50,
p. 344] for the existence of life and water 3.85 billion years ago. Lunine [233, p. 162]
notes that the Earth should have been frozen for the first three billion years due to the
faint Sun but that geological findings suggest that the temperature of the seas was much
higher 3.4 billion years ago than today.
(4) The distance between the Moon and the Earth increases 3,8 cm per year. This is
considered as common knowledge.
the faint sun paradox: circumstances on earth. Suppose again that the Solar
System does not expand. This supposition leads into the conclusion that the mean
temperature on Earth was about -20 Celsius 3.85 billion years ago, for the solar luminosity
was about 25% smaller back then. This raises the faint Sun paradox: How can there have
been seas on Earth 3.85 billion years ago and why do the geological findings indicate that
the temperature was about 30-40 Celsius and there was life back then, when it should
77Expressions of the form ‘X billion years ago’ function as such in the context of FLRW. However, in
terms of DU, they are always translated into ‘when the radius of the Universe was X billion light years
smaller’ (§5.3).
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have been -20 Celsius? The heat produced by the nuclear reactions in the core of the
Earth does not explain why there was water. Again, an additional parameter can be
given: there was an atmosphere which had just that kind of a constitution where the
temperature was so high that life could have been born: Lunine [233, p. 162] proposes
an atmospheric green house effect. In contrast, DU predicts that the Earth was closer to
the Sun in the past, and that the expansion rate is such that the mean temperature on
Earth back then —30-40 Celsius— allowed the existence of seas (not ice) even with the
smaller solar luminosity.
faint sun paradox: circumstances on mars. Suppose that the Solar System does
not expand. This begs the question that how can there have been seas in Mars 4 billion
years ago, when the temperature was a lot colder than it is now, because of the increase
in solar luminosity? An additional explanation can be given: there was an atmosphere
in Mars which had just that kind of a constitution that the temperature was so high that
the seas could have existed a very long time ago. McNally [118, p. 602] proposes that
one has to assume that there has been a greenhouse effect on Earth 2-3 billions years
ago and on Mars 3.8 billion years ago. In contrast, DU predicts that Mars was closer
to the Sun in the past, and that the expansion rate is such that the seas were possible
even with the smaller solar luminosity at least around the equator of Mars. As the Solar
System expanded, Mars gradually moved so far that the temperature decreased, and the
seas turned into ice.
the growing distance between the earth and the moon. Given the hypothesis
that all gravitationally bonded systems expand along with the expansion of the Universe,
the Hubble constant and the current distance between the Moon and the Earth gives the
hypothesis that the annual growth of the distance is 2,8 cm.78 As 3,8 cm is the measured
increase, in DU this leaves 1 cm to be explained in terms of the effects of the Moon
and the Sun on the tides on Earth. In the context of FLRW the whole 3,8 cm must be
explained in terms of the tides (Suntola [385, p. 180]).
In sum, the first two explanations of FLRW require very special atmospheric conditions,
whereas the basic structure of DU alone suffices in both cases. DU provides a unifica-
tory explanation, whereas FLRW requires inventing the extra conditions. In the third
explanation FLRW makes the tides the only explainer, whereas DU requires the tides to
explain only 1 cm. For consistency with coral fossil data, see Suntola [384, §7.4.2].
5.6 The Relativity Principle
According to Suntola [385, p. 39] “Galilei defined the principle of relativity, which was
later inherited in both Newton’s mechanics and Einstein’s special relativity.” Through
SR it was conveyed into GR and through GR into FLRW. The relativity principle can
be formulated as: the equations describing the laws of physics have the same form in
all admissible frames of reference. Einstein’s [127, p. 37] formulation has essentially
the same meaning: “the same laws of electrodynamics and optics will be valid for all
frames of reference for which the equations of mechanics hold good.” Consider the
central logical relations of presentism, the relativity principle, absolute simultaneity,
78The crude values in §5.3 give the following result, when the current mean distance between the Moon
and the Earth is 384403000m. There are 365 × 24 × 60 × 60 seconds in a year. The Hubble constant
70 km/sMpc means that a stretch of space that has the length of one Mpc expands 70000 m in one second,
and one Mpc is 3.08567758× 1022 meters. 3844030003.08567758×1022 × 70000× 365× 24× 60× 60 = 0.0275m.
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cosmic time, eternalism, and an ontology which incorporates two independent and equally
fundamental conceptions of time, relativistic time and cosmic time (2T):
Presentism xor Eternalism
Relativity principle → eternalism
Presentism and eternalism are mutually contradictory axioms for temporal existence
(§4.4). As the relativity principle implies eternalism (§5.6.3), it contradicts presentism.
Presentism entails absolute simultaneity
Cosmic time entails absolute simultaneity
Relativity principle → (relativistic time & no absolute simultaneity) or 2T
The relativity principle also implies relativistic time, where objects do not stand in the
relation of absolute simultaneity (§5.6.1), i.e., the relativity principle contradicts absolute
simultaneity, and thus also cosmic time and presentism. However, the relativity principle
contradicts absolute simultaneity only if relativistic time is the only notion of time. As
cosmology cannot get by without cosmic time and contradictions are not wanted, the only
path to coherence in the context of relativistic physics is to commit to two independent
conceptions of time, relativistic time and cosmic time, which is uneconomical (§5.6.2).
5.6.1 Atomic Clocks: Contradiction with Absolute Simultaneity
DU and GR interpret differently the results of tests with atomic clocks.
the test setting. This test takes in account only differences in altitudes of the clocks
and is in this sense analogous to Chou et al. [85]. Suppose that identical or sufficiently
similar atomic clocks A and B stand side by side on the surface of the Earth on the sea
level, and they tick at an identical rate and show the same reading. Clock A remains on
the sea level while clock B is transported to a higher location, where B remains for some
period of time, after which B is transported back to the side of A on the sea level. Again,
the clocks tick at an identical rate, but B shows a greater cumulated reading than A.
du’s explanation. The clocks show different cumulated readings because they have
had different ticking rates; they have had different ticking rates because they have been in
different states of gravitation. Clock B which has been in a greater gravitational potential
than A has had a greater ticking frequency than A, and therefore B shows a greater
cumulated reading than A. In DU, the ticking rate of an atomic clock is determined by
the energy state of the clock, where the energy state of a particular is its combined state
of motion and gravitation (Suntola [384, pp. 12, 54-7, 283-4, 301, 313]). The higher the
altitude, the greater the gravitational potential (and the local velocity of light) and the
faster is the ticking frequency of a clock; the greater the velocity (or the kinetic energy),
the slower the ticking frequency of a clock. In this example, the difference of the velocities
of the clocks was so small that it can be disregarded. This leaves gravitation to do all
explaining. DU’s interpretation is compatible with absolute simultaneity.
the relativistic explanation. The case is explained in terms of the central postu-
lates of GR: constancy of the velocity of light, the relativity principle, the equivalence
principle (p. 109), and coordinate transformations.79 The relativity principle states that
the equations that describe the laws of physics —that determine the ticking frequencies
79The coordinate transformations are formulas for calculating differences in the clock readings. As in
this test we are dealing with differences in the state of gravitation, we apply Schwarzschildian metrics,
which is a solution of the field equations of GR which is based on the equivalence principle. In contrast,
if we were dealing only with differences in velocity in a fixed state of gravitation, Lorentz transformations
alone would suffice.
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of the clocks— have the same form in all admissible frames of reference, i.e., they have
been the same for both clocks. However, the clocks show different cumulated readings.
The different readings of A and B are correctly predicted by the coordinate transfor-
mations, and interpreted as differences in the flow of time experienced by A and B, i.e.,
there is no time which is the same and absolutely simultaneous for A and B, but instead
the frames of reference where the objects reside have their own times: the clocks have
‘experienced time differently.’ Consider another phrasing.
(a) The relativity principle states that the equations and the interrelated metaphysical
commitments of GR hold in all frames of reference.
(b) These include the commitment that the frequencies of identical atoms are identical
in all frames of reference, such as the frequencies of all caesium-133 atoms, which are the
resonators in atomic clocks.
(c) The test reveals that the atomic clocks show different cumulated times.
(d) In order for (a-c) to be mutually coherent, time must be postulated as an indepen-
dent fourth dimension, which sustains the relativity principle and the equations of GR,
but contradicts absolute simultaneity. In contrast, if absolute simultaneity were sus-
tained, the relativity principle would have to be rejected, because this would imply that
the atoms have resonated in different frequencies. But one cannot reject the relativity
principle without rejecting GR.
Chou et al. [85] and various others interpret that the tests with atomic clocks ‘prove’
that GR is correct. It is now clear that the tests equally ‘prove’ that DU is correct. Both
DU and GR give correct predictions about the focal phenomena, but they cannot both
be true in the same sense as they have mutually contradictory premisses.
5.6.2 Cosmic Time and Relativistic Time: Contradictory or Independent?
Absolute simultaneity is implicit in the concept of a temporal stage of the Universe
(TSU), for all parts of a TSU are realized absolutely simultaneously. As the relativity
principle contradicts absolute simultaneity (§5.6.1), it also contradicts the existence of
TSUs and thus also presentism where only the present TSU exists. The contradiction
is unavoidable if one commits to only one notion of time, but the contradiction can be
avoided by incorporating two different notions of time, which is in turn uneconomical.
Cosmology cannot get by without talking about TSUs and thus cannot get by without
absolute simultaneity. For instance, saying that the age of the Universe is x years, that
the diameter of the Universe is y meters, that the average density of the Universe is
z kilograms per cubic meter, that the mass of the Universe is v kilograms, that the
Universe expands at the rate denoted by the Hubble constant, and that a TSU has a
total energy, makes no sense without absolute simultaneity. How can the Universe have
any age, size, density, mass and expansion rate now, if we cannot talk about all parts of
a single TSU simultaneously, and if all its parts have different times? Cosmologists have
incorporated the notion of cosmic time just for this purpose. According to Wu¨thrich
[420, p. 119] “two events are FLRW-absolutely simultaneous just in case they . . . occur
at the same cosmological time t.” Absolute simultaneity is implicit in cosmic time, for
cosmic time is the same for all parts of a TSU. E.g. Lehti [216] and Janzen [186] point out
several instances where cosmologists including Einstein apply cosmic time when talking
about e.g. the expansion of the Universe and its form. One of Einstein’s [126] chapters
is titled Considerations on the Universe as a Whole. Here he openly talks about the
geometrical form of the Universe as a whole and about its radius: these are illegitimate
without cosmic time. Lehti [216] cites Einstein [129, pp. 98-9] and notes that he in no
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way indicates that he has given a suggestion about the structure of the Universe which is
incompatible with his own relativity principle. Such remarks are not found from Einstein
[126] either. The case can be summarised as follows.
(1) The relativity principle was postulated in SR.
(2) SR was extended into GR, and GR was extended into FLRW.
(3) The relativity principle contradicts absolute simultaneity.
(4) Cosmology requires cosmic time which entails absolute simultaneity.
(5) Therefore, either the contradiction must be accepted or cosmic time and relativistic
time must be independent of one another.
Consider different reactions to this ambiguous state of affairs. Some have remained
faithful to absolute simultaneity on the basis of understandability and common sense:
“at the same time” belongs not to a special science but to logic; . . . Our practical grasp
of this logic is not to be called into question on account of recondite physics; for without
such a practical grasp we could not understand even elementary propositions in physics,
so a physicist who casts doubt upon it is sawing off the branch he sits upon. Peter Geach
[153, p. 312].
Some have tried to reconcile SR with absolute simultaneity, such as Tooley [399, §11] and
Craig [93]. This seems odd in the sense that SR especially incorporates the relativity
principle which violates absolute simultaneity. Therefore, if the reconciliation would
genuinely succeed, this would turn the Special Theory of Relativity into the Special
Theory of Non-Relativity. Tooley and Craig have not tried to expand their solutions to
GR or to FLRW. Some take the path of committing to two independent conceptions of
time or leaving the case ambiguous. Consider a discussion with an anonymous physicist:
I don’t see why using ‘cosmic time’ (as an approximation valid just on extremely large
scales) should be at all in contradiction with denying absolute simultaneity. Doesn’t it
just follow from the approximate symmetry seen on the very large scales?
The author refers to the cosmological principle, according to which the distribution of
matter in the Universe is homogeneous and isotropic, when viewed in a large enough
scale. Given the homogeneous and isotropic distribution, one can think that in large-
enough scales the frames of reference are so similar in average that their relativistic
times are equivalent with cosmic time which is thus the same for all frames in that scale,
i.e., that relativistic and cosmic times meet at the largest cosmological scale. Absolute
simultaneity would thus hold in the cosmological scale, but not on smaller scales. This
requires accepting that some very big parts of TSUs exist absolutely simultaneously at
the same cosmic time, but the proper parts of a very-big-part X do not exist at the same
cosmic time as X, as the notion of cosmic time does not apply to small-scale parts. This
does not resolve the contradiction between cosmic and relativistic times, for the idea that
a whole can exist at time t without its parts existing at time t is itself contradictory. To
this notion, the author replies by suggesting two different conceptions of time:
Can’t one think about the connection between large and small scales in the following way.
Consider water flowing down a river and look at a bit of it with an extremely powerful
microscope: what you’d see is water molecules moving rapidly in almost random directions
and not a continuum fluid. Now look without the microscope and you see water flowing
much more slowly as a continuous medium with a directed velocity field, but not the local
motion of the molecules which dominates at small scales. However, the molecules are part
of the fluid and share in its velocity field although that’s not what you’re aware of looking
through the microscope. Transferring the analogy to the universe, the cosmic time is a
property of the large-scale behaviour and is defined in terms of that, but the small scales
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do inherit this property because of being part of the large scales. That seems to me to
make sense!
This approach seems to resolve the contradiction, because now TSU X as a whole and
all its parts exist at the same cosmic time, but small-scale parts of X also have their own
relativistic times, i.e., we have two independent conceptions of time: cosmic time that
applies in all scales but is primarily used only in cosmology; relativistic time which is
applied in talking about smaller scales only. As always, explanatory failures can be fixed
by incorporating more metaphysics, in this case two conceptions of time. The question is
then that should one build on cosmic time or on relativistic time? For, one cannot build
on both simultaneously. What does a physicist mean when he talks about the present
time, relativistic time or cosmic time or both? In contrast and again, in DU cosmic time
is the only time and it applies in all scales. A mature way of seeing the need for two
conceptions of time in relativistic physics is as a prelude for unifying them, which is what
has been done in DU.
5.6.3 Eternalism and the Entropy Mapping
Eternalism is rejected as an uneconomical alternative to presentism in §§4.4,7.4. In
addition to violating absolute simultaneity, the relativity principle entails eternalism.80
When you commit to the relativity principle, events which from the presentist aspect
occur at different times, are co-real from the relativistic aspect, and eternalism fits in
this picture: the co-reality of the past, the present and the future is practically the
same as their existence. Compare to Einstein [130] who stated: “People like us, who
believe in physics, know that the distinction between past, present and future is only
a stubbornly persistent illusion.” It would be more objective to say that people who
believe that the relativity principle is truly a law of nature are also inclined to believe
that the distinction between past, present and future is only a stubbornly persistent
illusion. For, DU is physics, DU does not incorporate the relativity principle, and DU
does not entail eternalism. Therefore, the distinction between past, present and future is
again legitimate, and it is seen that the stubbornly persistent illusion is that relativistic
physics is the only available alternative.
As the relativity principle contradicts absolute simultaneity and entails eternalism, but
as cosmology requires cosmic time which entails absolute simultaneity, people are left
wallowing between different options. Authors such as Wu¨thrich [420] who are not aware
of alternatives such as DU and who consider relativistic physics as the best available, but
also see the clash between cosmic time and the relativity principle, can only conclude
something like “fundamental physics does not uniquely determine the metaphysics of
time, and hence does not entail the denial of presentism” and “the tension between
modern physics and presentism can be resolved, but . . . all resolutions either require
unpalatable metaphysics or speculative science, which our best current knowledge cannot
support.” For, as pointed out in §5.6.2, if cosmic time and relativistic time contradict
one another, relativistic physics is contradictory, and to save it from the contradiction,
cosmic and relativistic times must be independent. But if they are independent, the
question raises that on which one should be build all the rest? It is misleading to ask
which is the correct notion of time in the context of relativistic physics, for relativistic
physics especially makes it impossible to understand the nature of time. Thus, instead
of giving a clear conception of time that should be the foundation for everything else,
relativistic physics perfectly confuses the foundations.
80See e.g. Rietdijk [334], Putnam [319], Peterson and Silberstein [305] and Saunders [349] for proofs.
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There has practically been no chances of reaching a consensus about a theory of temporal
existence in the midst of relativistic physics. According to PhilPapers survey, when 1803
philosophy faculty members and/or PhDs were asked to select between the A-theory
and the B-theory, 34.7% were insufficiently familiar with the issue, 22.6% accepted or
leaned toward B-theory, 16.0% accepted or leaned toward A-theory, and 9.8% were agnos-
tic/undecided. Recall that eternalism is a B-theory, whereas presentism and all theories
with an objective present are A-theories (§4.4). The survey shows that the conception
of time is an open question among philosophers, and the obvious reason is relativistic
physics which is considered quite generally as today’s fundamental physics. That the
relativity principle entails eternalism, which is a B-theory, explains the 22.6% popularity
of the B-theories. That an objective present is still needed in explaining the perceived
change explains the 16.0% popularity of the A-theories. As the relativistic conception of
time cannot be genuinely understood but as an objective present is still needed, it is not
surprising why 44.5% are insufficiently familiar with the issue or agnostic/undecided.
the entropy mapping. As the relativity principle entails eternalism and eternalism
does not give a direction to time (§4.4), it is not surprising that Arthur Eddington [121]
—one of the most influential early proponents of the Theory of Relativity— suggested
entropy as the anchor which gives direction to time: entropy has increased ≡ time has
gone forward. Consider the entropy mapping in steps:
(1) The relativity principle entails eternalism.
(2) Eternalism raises the need for an anchor to the direction of time.
(3) Entropy has been suggested as the anchor.
(4) An intelligible concept of entropy is that of total entropy.
(5) Total entropy of a TSU requires absolute simultaneity.
(6) The increase of entropy must thus be coupled with the increase of cosmic time that
is independent of relativistic time (§5.6.2).
In sum, entropy is needed as the anchor for the direction of time because of the relativity
principle which implies eternalism and relativistic time, but an intelligible conception
of total entropy requires cosmic time, which is independent of relativistic time. This
underlines that a proponent of relativistic physics must deal with the soup that consists
of relativistic time, eternalism, the entropy mapping and cosmic time. In DU, entropy
(or thermodynamics in general) is not needed as the anchor for the direction of time, for
intrinsic time can be defined in terms of presentism and change by definition takes time
forward (§4.2). A comprehensive understanding of DU’s conception of time is not easy,
but there is a crucial difference in between hard and impossible.
5.7 Summary: Evaluation of DU and Relativistic Physics
The central ontological commitments of DU and relativistic physics (RP) were explicated
in order to defend presentism, to popularise the central issues at stake in physics, and to
show that the evolution of RP fits in the Kuhnian picture where the amount of parameters
of a theory increases proportionally along with the increase of data. It remains to
be concluded that the predictions of DU match perceptions at least as accurately as
those of RP, and the metaphysical commitments of DU are economically unified with
respect to those of RP. The forthcoming comparison also supports other conclusions
of §3: in addition to accuracy of predictions, an objective evaluation of theories must
take the metaphysical postulates of theories and their implications into account, i.e., to
evaluate their virtuousness. A modified version of Kaila’s formula for relative simplicity
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(§3.1) is applied in the evaluation, that takes theoretical virtues into account.81 The
formula is initially the fraction E
P
, where E denotes the phenomena that are explained
by the theories, and P denotes the magnitude of metaphysical commitments needed
in the explanations. The phenomena to be explained are evaluated in the following
order: (1) explaining tests with atomic clocks, compatibility with absolute simultaneity,
giving an account of temporal existence, the passage of time and the direction of time;
(2) giving a geometrical picture of temporal stages of the Universe (TSUs) as wholes;
(3) giving an account of the expansion of the Universe, i.e., explaining the observed
redshift/magnitude ratios of Ia supernovae and explaining the faint Sun paradox; (4)
explaining how interactions/forces are conveyed; (5) explaining the precession of the
perihelion of Mercury.
If DU and RP would indeed explain 1-5 equally well, then E would be the same with
both models and the evaluation could concentrate on P : the better model has a smaller
P and thus greater E
P
. However, the models do not explain all of 1-5 equally well. To
illustrate, if a model is contradictory, should this be counted as a subtraction from E
or as an addition to P ? On one hand, as a contradictory explanation is not a genuine
explanation, this should be counted as a subtraction from E; on the other hand, whatever
contradictions can be explained away by inventing more metaphysics, and in this sense
a contradiction could be counted as an addition to P . Likewise, all explanatory failures
could be counted as subtractions from E as well as additions to P , for all failures can be
explained away by adding more parameters, and thus the selection seems to be a matter
of taste. The tactic of adding to P is applied below. Moreover, the basic structures of
the models are considered as equally metaphysically complex, which leaves only their
implications to be evaluated and added to the P ’s of DU and RP.
a summary of du’s and rp’s postulates. The basic structure of DU is the fusion
of the zero-energy formulation of the conservation law of energy, 4D spherically closed
space, absolute simultaneity, and instantaneous non-mechanistic interactions. The basic
structure of RP is the fusion of the relativity principle, the constant velocity of light, the
coordinate transformations, the equivalence principle, the concept of space-time (or three
space dimensions and one time dimension), mechanistic force-conveying at the velocity
of light, and in FLRW cosmology cosmic time which entails absolute simultaneity. See
Suntola’s [385, p. 125] [384, ch. 1] comparison of the postulates.
case 1: atomic clocks, absolute simultaneity, temporal existence, the
passage and the direction of time. DU and RP explain the tests with atomic
clocks equally accurately but differently. In DU, the ticking frequencies of atomic clocks
are different at different states of motion and gravitation, as a consequence of the con-
servation of energy. In RP, the flow of time is different for an object moving relative to
the observer (this is called time dilation) and for an object at a different gravitational
state (this is called gravitational red/blueshift), i.e., objects in different states of motion
and gravitation have their own relativistic times.
FLRW requires absolute simultaneity or cosmic time in addition to relativistic time. As
the relativistic time would contradict absolute simultaneity, these must be considered as
independent of one another, i.e., there are two fundamental and independent conceptions
of time in RP. Relativistic time is counted as an addition to RP’s P , whereas in DU,
cosmic time is the only time. Further, as the two times are independent, the nature
of time is practically an open question in the context in RP. The problem cannot be
over-stated. As time is interrelated with most of the physical quantities such as velocity,
81A version of this evaluation also in [382].
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momentum, energy, force, etc., the formation of a comprehensive and understandable
unified theory has been impossible in the context of RP for more than 100 years now.
The relativity principle implies eternalism, which with partial determinism implies some
version of branching space-time (§7.4). If branching space-time is evaded by selecting
total determinism, the question boils down to whether total determinism is a plausible
after all. All versions of eternalism are in any case uneconomical with respect to pre-
sentism. Eternalism does not give a direction to time, and therefore it has been coupled
with entropy, which is an addition, and the notion of total entropy must be coupled
with cosmic time which is independent of relativistic time (§5.6.3). Eternalism does not
explain the perceived change or the passage of time, and thus some additional postulate
is needed in doing this (§4.4). Eternalism (with or without branching), the entropy map-
ping and the postulate that explains change are counted as an addition to RP’s P . DU is
compatible with presentism and does not require eternalism, the fusion of presentism and
partial determinism does not entail branching except as present possibilities, presentism
explains the perceived change, and DU does not require entropy as time is defined as a
measure of change and change by definition takes time forward.
case 2: geometry of space . In DU, hypothetical homogeneous space (p. 111)
has the shape of a perfect 3D surface of a 4D sphere, creating the overall zero-energy
condition of motion and gravitation. The process of formation of local mass centers
in 3D space conserves the zero-energy balance by tilting the 3D space relative to the
4-radius, i.e., bending the surface of the 4D sphere in the vicinity of mass centers. The
local geometry of space is precisely linked to the overall geometry of space. In FLRW’s
space-time geometry there are 3 space dimensions and 1 time dimension. In the vicinity
of mass centers, 3D space is tilted relative to the fourth, time-like dimension, resulting
in much the same local geometry of 3D space as in DU. Although FLRW’s space-time
geometry can somehow be considered initially on par with DU’s spherically closed 4D
geometry, the space-time geometry does not give any kind of a geometrical form to the
temporal stages of the Universe (TSUs). There are three geometrical options for the
geometry of a TSU, i.e., the geometrical form of a TSU is an open question in the
context of FLRW: on one hand FLRW fails to give a geometrical form to a TSU; on the
other hand it gives three alternatives which is a failure. Therefore, RP’s P is increased.
case 3: expansion hypotheses. In explaining observations about redshifts and mag-
nitudes of distant supernovae, FLRW requires the density parameter with dark energy,
which comprises about 70 % of the total energy (§5.4). The hypothesis of accelerating
expansion results from dark energy. In addition to this, the early inflatory expansion is
assumed. These are counted as an addition to RP’s P . DU does not need the density
parameter, nor inflation, nor dark energy, nor accelerating expansion, i.e., no hypothet-
ical entities nor exceptional regularities are needed in the expansion hypothesis, which
results from the basic structure of DU. In FLRW, gravitationally bonded systems such
as galaxies and star systems do not expand along the expansion of space, whereas in
DU all gravitationally bonded parts expand equally. As a result, in FLRW additional
parameters are required in explaining the faint Sun paradox (§5.5), which is counted as
an addition to RP’s P . These discoveries are in line with the predictions of DU, without
additional parameters.
case 4: conveying of influences. RP’s mechanistic force-conveying at the velocity
of light can be considered as equally complex with DU’s non-mechanistic instantaneous
conveying of influences. However, based on Laplace’s calculations, the Solar System is
unstable with gravitation that propagates at the velocity of light, which is the case in
RP (§5.2). In DU the Solar System is stable as gravitation is instantaneous. RP’s failure
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of explaining the stability of the Solar System, is counted as an addition to RP’s P ,
as the failure of explaining something must be compensated by additional metaphysics,
although this is not a generally acknowledged problem.
case 5: precession of the perihelion of mercury. The precession of the planet
Mercury’s perihelion within a 0.7 million years period can be explained in terms of DU
so that Mercury remains on its orbit. In GR the perihelion shift solved for Schwarzschild
space comprises a cumulative term which increases the orbital radius, and Mercury is
thrown away from the orbit. This is not a generally acknowledged problem, but if the
problem will be fixed while sustaining Schwarzschild space, some metaphysical postulate
is needed in that fix. Therefore, RP’s P is increased. See Suntola [385, pp. 75-6].
summary. The basic idea in the evaluation was to consider the fraction E
P
as initially
equal for both models and to count only extra parameters as additions to P , where ex-
planatory failures were counted as additions to P as well, for all failures can be explained
away by more parameters. The following additions were made to RP’s P : relativistic
time which is independent of cosmic time; eternalism with entropy as the parameter
for the direction of time, and a another parameter to explain change; a parameter that
explains away the instability of the Solar System; special atmospheres in Earth and Mars
as parameters that explain away the faint Sun paradox; the big bang hypothesis requires
early inflation as a parameter, and the density parameter with dark energy explains
the Ia supernova observations, and implies the accelerating expansion hypothesis; the
instability of the orbit of Mercury must be explained away by some parameter.
Numeric additions to P would be very approximate or qualitative and thus a numeric
quantification could also be misleading. For instance, it is hard to say how should dark
energy and a special atmosphere of a planet be weighted with respect to one another.
Although the numeric values are approximate, this does not change the fact that the
whole case amounts to just how much greater is P in RP. Eventually, all phenomena of
all scales and all postulates and their implications needed in explaining the phenomena
should be counted in conclusively. This is not done here, but looking at all scales and
all postulates would not change the general picture that the above evaluation reveals.
Thousands of physicists during more than 100 years have applied relativistic physics in
explaining various phenomena, and it is natural that one man has not given a detailed
analysis of all these phenomena, but this does not mean that DU could not be applied
in explaining them. In other words, this is enough for showing that all physics can be
built on better foundations. Feyerabend [141, pp. 113-4] maintains that “we must retain
the new cosmology until it has been supplemented by the necessary auxiliary sciences.”
When fitted in the case of relativistic physics vs. DU, this can be translated as: we
must retain the new unified science even though one man has not shown that it explains
absolutely all cases, as this requires many men and women.
How should physicists and philosophers react in the face of this result? If they take
progress of science as important and if theoretical virtues have any importance, then
they should naturally start shifting into the better theory. This would make physics
very much easier:
The Dynamic Universe offers a unified framework for phenomena currently described in
terms of classical physics, electromagnetism, relativistic physics, standard cosmology and
quantum mechanics. This unification allows theory structures and the mathematics needed
to be greatly simplified. Suntola [385, p. 13]
But the shift is not to be expected to happen very soon, and the reason is stagnation to
relativistic physics. The central notion here is that society should react to unconditional
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stagnation, for the sake of a faster progress rate of science, which would benefit the
society. One way to do this is to teach philosophy of science to students, to prepare
them to deal with paradigm shifts. An enlightened future scientist has understood the
role of metaphysics in physics and received the goal towards economically unified science
by means of theory shifts and reductions in mother’s milk, i.e., the idea that progress
is not to be stalled, even though there are always stagnated people who wish to stick
with their views. This ‘future scientist’ does not have to be an ideal scientist, but an
average person who has been taught the basic idea starting from the elementary level,
proceeding through levels such as the junior high and high school into the university.
Now, compare an average contemporary physicist to an enlightened future physicist.
It would require a wide survey to reliably state what is the current average attitude
towards metaphysics in physics among physicists. Based on observations in the Finnish
Society for Natural Philosophy and discussions with physicists during several years, I can
conclude that there is a wide variety of physicists in the scale from extremely enlightened
to extremely unenlightened, but the average is certainly short of the enlightened future
physicist. Starting from the unenlightened end, many physicists still seem to go with
the old misinterpretation of Mach that has been fitted in defending relativistic physics:
there is no metaphysics in relativistic physics, but it is merely the correct description of
perceptions. As no metaphysics is admitted to be implicit in relativistic physics and it
is the correct description of perceptions, all metaphysical postulates such as gravitons
and dark energy are instead called ‘empirical facts’ and other theories must naturally be
false as they fight against the ‘empirical facts.’ So, the old way is the way of the most
unconditional stagnation. But there are also enlightened physicists who accept that
there is metaphysics in physics and who are ready to talk about alternative postulates.
But those who have grown with the postulates of relativistic physics, even the quite
enlightened ones, and who apply them in their work, are almost univocally severely
stuck with them, and it seems to be almost impossible for them to genuinely change
their thinking even because of good reasons: it is hard to make sudden fundamental
changes after decades of thinking about the world-order in one way. Finally, the most
enlightened ones have already rejected relativistic physics, but they are unfortunately
faced with the majority whose progress is slower. This underlines the need to incorporate
philosophy of science in education programs.
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6 Definition: Truth
An economically unified theory of truth is defined and defended. The theory is intended
function in natural science and typical human social behaviour. The formulation of
the theory starts from the definition of the concept proposition in terms of EUO, and
continues by defining true proposition and correspondence. These definitions yield an
object-based correspondence theory of truth (OBC).82 OBC is complemented by further
definitions which incorporate applicable ingredients of e.g. other central theories of truth.
The unified theory of truth is the fusion of all these definitions together with EUO as
their ontological base. It is shown how some of the central arguments targeted against
the correspondence theory can be efficiently exhausted in the context of EUO. OBC
complements Ro¨gnvaldur Ingthorsson’s [182] project of unifying other theories of truth
around the correspondence theory.
6.1 The Fusion of Object-Based Correspondence and Epistemic
Theories
All axioms of EUO function directly or indirectly as the metaphysical ground of the
forthcoming definitions, but the central axiom is ontological realism.
proposition: a proposition is a thought83 which is realized in the mind of a human
being, which refers to —or points to or is targeted at or represents— something else
than the thought itself,84 which especially states that the thing to which the proposition
refers exists in some way, and is thus capable of bearing a truth value. A proposition is
realized in a certain location at a certain time and states that an object exists or more
specifically has certain properties in a certain location at a certain time. A proposition
itself is a mental property of a physical object and thereby realized in a certain location
at a certain time (§4.13). A thing to which a proposition refers is an object, a mental
property of an object or any combination of these, i.e., it suffices to say that a proposition
refers to an object.
82The use of objects instead of facts or states of affairs as truthmakers (§6.1) is a conscious selection.
Originally the switch from objects to facts happened in the early 20th century along with the general
linguistic turn (Ku¨nne [210, p. 112]) but here facts are switched back to objects. The switch from
objects to facts brought in ambiguity about the ontological nature of truthmakers (§6.8.1). By reverting
back to objects there are no ambiguities.
83The view of proposition as a thought is endorsed e.g. by McTaggart [260, pp. 15-17], Armstrong
[29], Ingthorsson [180], Jubien [191] and James [184, preface]: “The pivotal part of my book named
Pragmatism is its account of the relation called “truth” which may obtain between an idea (opinion,
belief, statement, . . . ) and its object. “Truth,” I there say, “is a property of certain ideas. It means their
agreement, as falsity means their disagreement, with reality. . . . .” ” Sullivan [383, p. 34], in commenting
Tractatus, maintains that a proposition is a thought. In Tractatus[414, 4] Wittgenstein states: “A
thought is a proposition with a sense.” The definition of proposition as thought is compatible with
McGrath [258]: “Propositions, we shall say, are the sharable objects of the attitudes and the primary
bearers of truth and falsity.” McGrath maintains that this “stipulation rules out certain candidates
for propositions, including thought- and utterance-tokens” but McGrath’s definition does not rule out
thoughts in the sense that different people can share the identical or sufficiently identical thought such
as “Urho Kekkonen was bald.” In contrast, according to Stoljar [376, p. 60]: “Propositions are abstract
objects and so are neither mental nor physical on any ordinary understanding of those notions.” Stoljar’s
definition is incompatible with EUO, where transcendent abstract objects are rejected, although also
‘abstract’ can be defined as thought (§4.14), which is not the case is Stoljar’s definition.
84This follows from the impossibility of self-reference as shown in §4.18. However, an idea may in
principle point at the concrete aspect of the physical particular whose property the idea is; this is the
only case where an idea refers to something which is not independent of itself.
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true proposition: a proposition is true if and only if the object to which the propo-
sition refers exists in the way that the proposition states; otherwise the proposition is
either false or indeterminate. (Indeterminate propositions are handled in §7.3.) Con-
sider the proposition P=“The Sun exists now.” If P is true, then the Sun exists in the
mind-independent part of the Universe at the present. (Some ambiguous propositions
are handled in §6.7.) This is compatible with the following passages:
Then that speech which says things as they are is true, and that which says them as they
are not is false? Plato, Cratylus, 385B
To say of what is that it is not, or of what is not that it is, is false, while to say of what
is that it is, and of what is not that it is not, is true. Aristotle, Metaphysics, 1011b25
object-based correspondence: that the object to which a proposition refers exists
in the way that the proposition states, is abbreviated by saying that the proposition
corresponds to the object. Object-based correspondence (OBC) has thereby been de-
fined.85 Saying that ‘a proposition is true’ is equivalent with saying that ‘a proposition
is corresponds.’ The following passages are compatible with OBC:
[In] the traditional correspondence theory of truth where something is true if the idea that
I have in my head corresponds to an object in the outside world. Stambaugh [372, p. 3]
[A] correspondence theory of truth . . . suggests that we can speak of truth when there is
a correspondence between an object/event and a statement about this object/event. The
statement “this metal table is brown” is true, if it corresponds to the object (a brown
metal table). Walsh et al. [407, p. 30]
E.g. Armstrong [15, p. 113] and Ingthorsson [182, ch. 2.1] define the correspondence
theory as follows: a proposition is true if it corresponds to the reality independent of
the proposition itself. Although Armstrong talks about states of affairs and Ingthorsson
about facts, their facts and states of affairs are implicitly assumed to be objects or
properties of objects.
statement and target times. Consider a true proposition where the location-time
where the target object is realized is written out: Z=“Mount Everest existed at the first
instant of the year 2015 approximately in 27.986065 latitude and 86.922623 longitude.”
Z points to an object which is in this case a particular which supposedly did exist in
the location-time where Z proposes it did. Even though the proposed locations are
not explicitly written out in the proposition V=“There exists currently life forms very
similar to human beings in some planet in the Universe in addition to the Earth,” these
are implicit in V. V points to all planets that exist currently, and V is true if there
exists life forms very similar to human beings in any of the other planets. The statement
and target times are essential with modal statements (§7). That the time when the
proposition is stated and the time at which the proposition is targeted are essential was
noted by Frege:
Are there not thoughts (propositions) which are true today but false in six months’ time?
The thought, for example, that the tree there is covered with green leaves, will surely be
false in six months’ time? No, for it is not the same thought at all. The words ‘This tree is
covered with green leaves’ are not sufficient by themselves to constitute the expression, for
the time of utterance belongs to it as well. Without the time-determination thus given we
85The term ‘object-based correspondence’ is adapted from Ku¨nne [210, pp. 5, 94] who notes that
paradigmatic elements “of the right field of the correspondence relation thus understood are material
objects such as mountains and people” and that for “centuries, ‘correspondence’ had been wedded to
‘thing’, or to ‘object’, rather than to ‘fact’.”
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have no complete thought, i.e. we have no thought at all. Only a sentence supplemented
by a time-determination and complete in every respect expresses a thought. Frege, Der
Gedanke, p. 76, as translated by Ku¨nne [210, p. 7]
truthbearer: a truthbearer is a true proposition. Armstrong [29, p. 12] maintains
that truthbearers are propositions and that “all other suggested truthbearers besides
propositions are called truthbearers on account of their relationship to certain proposi-
tions.” It is indifferent which one of the following expressions is used: a proposition is
true if and only if it corresponds to nature (cf. Devitt [107, p. 27]); an idea, a thought
or a belief is true if and only if it corresponds to nature; a hypothesis is true if and only
if it corresponds to nature. For, when a proposition or a hypothesis is conceived, it is in
any case realized as an idea in the consciousness of a human being. A paper or a screen
where the text ‘the philosopher Demokritos existed in the past’ is written, and a sound
or a voice that comes from a loudspeaker and says ‘the philosopher Demokritos existed
in the past’ state the truth in the sense that if an agent would read and conceive the text
or hear and conceive the sound, the agent would supposedly be conceiving a true idea.
truthmaker: a truthmaker is the object to which the truthbearer corresponds. Ac-
cording to Armstrong [29, p. 5] “The idea of a truthmaker for a particular truth, then,
is just some existent, some portion of reality, in virtue of which that truth is true.” The
definition of a true proposition can now be stated in terms of correspondence, truthmaker
and truthbearer: a truthbearing proposition corresponds to its truthmaker. Conversely,
if a proposition does not correspond to the object it refers to, then the object is the
falsemaker of the false proposition or the falsify-bearing proposition. As EUO starts
from presentism, the applied truthmaking principle must conform to presentism: the
truthmaker objects of true propositions either have existed in the past, or exist at the
present (§§6.6,7.1,7.3). As ideas are properties of objects, also ideas can be truthmakers,
i.e., this is just another case of objects being truthmakers. For instance, if the proposi-
tion D=‘Peter is thinking about a circle’ is true, then the idea circle which is realized in
the mind of Peter is the truthmaker of D. As the correspondence relation is asymmetric,
a truthbearing proposition cannot be its own truthmaker, and two propositions cannot
correspond to one another (§4.18).
coherence theorem of correspondence truths. The fusion of OBC and the
law of non-contradiction implies the coherence theorem: all OBC truths are mutually
coherent. In OBC a true proposition corresponds to some specific part of the Universe,
i.e., that part exists in the way the proposition states; the law of non-contradiction states
that there are no contradictions in the Universe, i.e., an object either exists in a certain
absolutely determinate way or not;86 therefore, two mutually contradictory beliefs about
the same part cannot be simultaneously true in the same respect, i.e., all true beliefs are
mutually coherent: “while the world can be described in various ways, these descriptions
cannot be incompatible” (Pihlstro¨m [309, p. 136]). The coherence theorem holds also
for theories: “Conflicting theories, if interpreted realistically, cannot be true at the same
time” (Niiniluoto [289, p. 176]). Cf. Newman [283, ch. 4.2]. The coherence theorem
incorporates the applicable ingredients of the coherence theory of truth in OBC.
coherence theory of truth. The coherence theory of truth “states that the truth of
any (true) proposition consists in its coherence with some specified set of propositions”
(Young [424]). To illustrate that the coherence theory is insufficient for the needs of
natural science, consider the collection of all currently known OBC truths C. Whatever
86As an exception, if partial determinism holds, then the truth values of some modal propositions
about the future are at the present indeterminate (p. 167).
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hypothesis which is compatible with C is true in the coherence theory, even if it were
false in OBC. The coherence theory alone thus cannot distinguish between what are
called true and what are called false hypotheses in OBC:
A belief may be coherent with all our other beliefs about the world, but nevertheless be
false. . . . even if coherence were assumed to provide good reasons to believe in something, it
would not establish that beliefs never correspond to fact, nor would it provide an alternative
understanding of the [correspondence] relation between belief and fact. Ingthorsson [182,
ch. 5.3]
Moreover, if verified OBC truths are disregarded altogether, then whatever coherent set
of beliefs —such as any set of pure fictions in terms of OBC— is true in terms of the
coherence theory. This does not suffice for the needs of natural science nor human social
behaviour. In words of McDovell [257, p. 15] “Coherentist rhetoric suggests images of
confinement within the sphere of thinking, as opposed to being in touch with something
outside it.” As the coherence theory is insufficient for the needs of natural science which
is especially interested in what goes on in mind-independent reality, it is intelligible to
reject the coherence theory as the base theory of truth, and to incorporate its applicable
ingredients in OBC in terms of the coherence theorem of correspondence truths.
the pragmatic theory. If the central function of the pragmatic considerations about
truth is to sufficiently incorporate verifiability with the correspondence theory, then we
would not be dealing with two separate theories in the first place. This is a likely
interpretation and it is investigated after the pragmatic theory of truth is first rejected.
The pragmatic theory can be defined as: proposition X is true if it is useful to believe
that X is true. This formulation is compatible with Lewis’ [226, p. 275] formulation of
the pragmatic theory: “It’s true that cats purr iff it’s useful to believe that cats purr.” It
is also compatible with Horwich [174, p. 3] who maintains that the pragmatist definition
is “that truth is what we find it helpful in practice to believe.”
Pragmatic truths can be classified in terms of OBC: (1) pragmatic truths that are true
in OBC; (2) pragmatic truths that are false in OBC; (3) pragmatic truths whose truth
value is indeterminate in OBC. Examples of (1) are ‘it is dangerous to play Russian
roulette’ and ‘it is dangerous to walk on thin ice.’ As an example of (2), suppose that
a person believes that he will win a sports competition, that this belief is false in terms
of OBC, but that by believing in his victory he wins the silver medal, and if he would
not have believed in his victory he would not have won any medal. Ingthorsson [182, ch.
5.2] gives another example: “To believe that the stores close at 5 p.m. may prevent a
person from ever failing to buy the groceries in time, even though in fact the stores stay
open until 9 p.m.” As an example of (3), suppose that a person believes that he will
win a sports competition, that this belief is indeterminate in terms of OBC, but that by
believing in his victory he gets either gold or silver, and if he would not have believed in
his victory he would not have got any medal.
The pragmatic theory is insufficient alone without OBC, for without it all useful beliefs
would be univocally true: “the pragmatist’s definition . . . overstates the connection be-
tween truth and utility: many, but not all, practically useful beliefs are true; and many
but not all, true beliefs are useful” (Horwich [174, p. 3]). A pragmatist who commits to
ontological realism must in any case make a classification of beliefs in events that actually
took place and beliefs in events that did not take place in the mind-independent reality,
i.e., a pragmatist must appeal to something that is practically equivalent with OBC. For,
suppose that a pragmatist believes that X will take place and it is useful to believe so;
however, when the pragmatist perceives that X does not take place, there are no plausi-
ble alternatives than to admit that the belief that X will take place was not true after
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all, even though it was useful to believe that X will take place. While pragmatic truths
are best seen as ‘locally useful beliefs’ for some individuals at some times, it is useful
to accept OBC in the scale of general philosophy of science. To illustrate why, consider
the reasoning: the progress of science is useful; economical unification is useful because
it feeds the progress; accepting EUO is useful as it is a prerequisite for applying the
method; committing to OBC is useful as it is the only theory which genuinely functions
in the context of EUO; therefore, the belief that OBC is the most fruitful background
theory of truth in the scale of general philosophy of science, is a pragmatic truth.
Again, the above definitions of the pragmatic theory of truth by Lewis and Horwich
contradict OBC. However, William James’ definitions leave space for interpretation:
The true is the name of whatever proves itself to be good in the way of belief. William
James [185, Lecture I]
[B]oth pragmatists and anti-pragmatists believe in existent objects, just as they believe
in our ideas of them. The difference is that when pragmatists speak of truth, they mean
exclusively something about the ideas, namely their workableness; whereas when anti-
pragmatists speak of truth they seem most often to mean something about the objects.
Since the pragmatist, if he agrees that an idea is “really” true, also agrees to whatever it
says about its object; and since most anti-pragmatists have already come round to agreeing
that, if the object exists, the idea that it does so is workable; William James [184, preface]
In his review, Sami Pihlstro¨m notes that it is erroneous to see James’ definitions as
definitions of a reductive theory of truth that competes with the correspondence the-
ory. Likewise, Ingthorsson [182, ch. 5.2] maintains that the coherence theory and the
pragmatic theory should not be seen as rivals of the correspondence theory: they should
not be seen to “deny the possibility that beliefs correspond” but to merely state that
“we should use the term ‘truth’ to denote warranted beliefs” where being coherent with
other beliefs and being supported by empirical evidence makes the beliefs warranted.
Given this interpretation, there is no pragmatic theory of truth, but the pragmatic con-
siderations about truth can be seen as demands to sufficiently incorporate verifiability or
rational assertability together with the correspondence theory. Putnam’s notions about
assertability are handled in §6.3.
nondescriptivist views. OBC presupposes a descriptivist view of propositions, as
a true proposition especially describes reality, whereas nondescriptivist propositions ex-
press people’s attitudes or motivations. Therefore, it does not seem intelligible to see
the nondescriptivist views as as theories of truth. Schmitt [353, p. 195] characterises
expressivist and motivational views as examples of nondescriptivist views: “On an ex-
pressivist view, talk of truth does not describe the world but expresses an attitude. On a
motivational view, talk of truth motivates behavior.” Consider a motivational belief Y:
I will not jump into the sea. Y describes an attitude of a human being: it is true in OBC
that the person has decided that he will not jump into the sea. Consider the expressivist
proposition X: sharks are vicious animals. X only describes the attitude of some human
beings: it is true in OBC that some people consider sharks as vicious animals; this is
completely independent of whether sharks in fact are vicious or not and what viciousness
exactly means. If it means that ‘a hungry bull shark will bite you if you go swimming
with it’ then we are not dealing with a nondescriptivist proposition.
The expressivist views clearly require OBC, for otherwise it would not be true that people
have attitudes and motivations. To illustrate, ethical judgements or moral evaluations
such as “The people in that village are bad” are expressivist propositions. In order to
objectively determine whether such propositions are true or false, universally objective
goals or ethical principles should be defined first. The primary remark about ethical
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propositions is that ethics is not a completed research program and this should not be
interpreted to threaten the empirical sufficiency of OBC. OBC is in any case required as
the overall background framework of to-be-objective moral evaluations which are based
on the to-be-discovered objective goals. For, such evaluations must in any case be based
first on a non-moral account of what some people did, and after this their actions can
be morally evaluated with the to-be-discovered objective goals.
6.2 The Solipsism/Comparison/Treadmill Argument
In economical unification the order is clear: first ontology, then applications such as the
definition of a true proposition. Once the order is mixed, the analysis is mixed. One
example of mixed analysis is the argument from solipsism against correspondence, which
is denoted as the comparison objection and as the treadmill argument by Ku¨nne [210,
pp. 126-133]. In all three versions the marching order of economical unification is turned
upside down:
I can only compare the object with my judgement by making a judgement about the object.
Thus my judgement is supposed to be confirmed by itself, which is not at all sufficient for
its truth. For since the object is external to my mind and my judgement is in my mind, I
can only judge whether my judgement about the object agrees with my judgement about
the object. Kant, Logik, Introduction, ch. VII, B, init. As translated by Ku¨nne [210, p.
127]
What ought we to do so as to decide whether something is true? We should have to enquire
whether it is true that an idea and something real, say, correspond. . . . And then we should
be confronted with a question of the same kind, and the game could begin again. Thus
the attempted explanation of truth as correspondence breaks down. Frege, part 60 of Der
Gedanke, as translated by Ku¨nne [210, p. 130]
[T]he objection is that a correspondence theory of truth must inevitably lead into skepti-
cism about the external world because the required correspondence between our thoughts
and reality is not ascertainable. David [97]
(i) Ontological realism where the mind-independent reality exists was postulated in §4.12
as a minimal and sufficient explanation of perceptions. It was concluded that an empir-
ically sufficient version of solipsism is at best equivalent with ontological realism.
(ii) OBC is defined in terms of ontological realism. Therefore there is no use to appeal
to solipsism in criticising OBC.
(iii) A justified true belief about the mind-independent reality requires to be reliably
verified. According to Chisholm [84] and Lammenranta [215], P qualifies as a justified
true belief when the following conditions are met: a person believes that P; the belief
that P is true; the belief that P is reliably verified.
(iv) David transforms the requirement of reliable verification into skepticism about the
external world, whereas Frege and Kant note that perception cannot in the end verify
beliefs with an absolute certainty.
(v) These arguments are not intelligible in the light of economical unification where the
starting point is a minimal ontology that must be accepted implicitly in any case, even
if it is explicitly denied. There is no use to deny what you must in practice accept,
whereas it is robust to define all the rest in terms of that what you in any case must
accept even if you deny it. In this case, the only alternative to accepting the existence
of the external world is some version of solipsism. However and again, as an empirically
sufficient version of solipsism is at best equivalent with ontological realism, the appeal
to solipsism cannot be used as a weapon against OBC.
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To illustrate, when you look out your window you see e.g. a tree or a building. It helps
in no way to maintain that beliefs in their existence cannot be ascertained, for there are
no other alternatives for people than to rely on their perceptions, and most of the people
do rely on their perceptions. If someone wishes to stick with the idea that perceptions
after all verify nothing with an absolute certainty and that this leads into skepticism
about the external world, this should not be considered as a threat to OBC, but as an
argument for solipsism, which, again, has no force. Ingthorsson says the same:
We cannot with absolute certainty know whether any property ascribed to any object is re-
ally possessed by the object (or if the object really exist), and hence all words used to denote
properties should be judged useless/meaningless; . . . either we demand absolute certainty
for the application of any term, or make due with a degree of uncertainty about them all.
Since we do accept some degree of uncertainty about ascriptions of knowledge—in so far
as we accept that knowledge is fallible—and about the ascription of every property known
to mankind, then why should we not accept such uncertainty about truth? Ingthorsson
[182, ch. 5.1]
Again, arguments for solipsism should be on the level of ontology, and as these do not
genuinely threaten ontological realism, solipsism should not leap on the level of appli-
cations. Another equally intelligible strategy is to maintain that we live in a computer
simulation operated by Descartes’ evil scientist. The hypothesis about an evil scientist
can be rejected by economy, for it is not needed in explaining perceptions. According
to Syropoulos [388, p. 2]) “this is an entirely different problem, which should concern
. . . science fiction authors.” People must in practice rely on observations, for even if ev-
erything is just an illusion, people must rely on observations within the supposed illusion:
The meaning of our words will be causally tied to whatever reality is ultimately causing us
to have the experiences that we do, and so we just will end up holding true beliefs about
that reality. Thus, brains in vats will hold true beliefs about electrical impulses. Anderson
[8, p. 76]
In contrast to propositions that are verifiable by perception, consider a proposition which
is not in practice verifiable: P=‘There existed a flock of thousand unicorns a billion years
ago in the distance of a billion light years from the Earth.’ This proposition is either true
or false in OBC, but it is not verifiable. So, what is the use of OBC now? Anything that
is supposed to exist but which has not been verified to exist by perception is counted as a
metaphysical commitment when theories are evaluated by economy: of two theories which
are otherwise equal, economy favours the theory which gets by without committing to
the truth of P. OBC functions as the background theory or as a pre-scientific conception
in evaluating other theories: specific theories with metaphysical postulates are induced
based on perceptions which do correspond, and the measurable predictions of a worthy
theory verifiably correspond. The notion that verifiability fits perfectly together with
OBC is the main theme of the next section.
6.3 Correspondence of Sensations vs. Theories: Putnam’s Ar-
guments
A proposition is true and corresponds when the object to which the proposition refers
exists in the way that the proposition states. The question of what correspondence is
has thus been answered. The following allegations that the correspondence relation is
mysterious, vacuous or occult either miss their target or find their correct places in the
context of OBC, or both. Consider the first allegation:
135
The correspondence relation is very mysterious: it seems to reach into the most distant
regions of space (faster than light?) and time (past and future). How could such a relation
possibly be accounted for within a naturalistic [scientific] framework? What physical
relation could it possibly be? David [97]
In economical unification ontology comes first, then applications such as truthmaking.
Presentism was selected as an axiom by economy, and truthmaking is fitted in the con-
text of presentism, where there are no viable alternatives to accepting present and past
objects as truthmakers of propositions targeted at the past, present and future (§6.6).
Therefore, OBC has no difficulties with propositions targeted at past and future. The
correspondence relation is not like any physical relation of influence such as gravitation,
and therefore it is misleading to think that it ‘reaches’ anything in any kind of a velocity
or instantaneously. However, the expression ‘the correspondence relation reaches into the
most distant regions of space faster than light’ can be interpreted as a figure of speech
which is equivalent with the proposition that the size of the present temporal stage of
the Universe is billions of light years, which is accepted in contemporary cosmology (§5).
It is wrong-headed to ask how the correspondence relation can be accounted for in a
scientific framework, for the validity of a scientific theory requires that its verifiable
predictions verifiably correspond and scientific theories have been deduced based on
perceptions which by definition correspond, i.e., the question seems to be involved with
circularity. On the other hand, if the question is not involved with circularity and only
asks just what is the role of correspondence in the context of a scientific theory, then
the answer is likewise that the validity of a theory requires that its verifiable predictions
verifiably correspond and that scientific theories have been deduced based on perceptions
which by definition correspond. In either way, the correspondence relation is firmly
present, applied and accounted for in the context of scientific theories. Consider a slightly
more exhaustive characterization:
(i) Theories are built by reasoning from sensations that result from perceptions (§8.1) and
there are no viable alternatives for supposing that these direct sensations correspond87
to something external to the perceiver’s mind, for the only alternative to accepting this
is solipsism, which is in any case at best equivalent with ontological realism (§§4.12,6.2).
This is one way of how correspondence is accounted for in a naturalistic framework.
(ii) The validity of a scientific theory requires that it gives verifiable predictions which
verifiably correspond, and again, there are no viable alternatives for supposing that these
verifications correspond. This is another way of how correspondence is accounted for in
a naturalistic framework.
(iii) The truth of a theory which incorporates unverifiable and unfalsifiable metaphysical
commitments cannot be verified. Therefore it is not asked whether such theories are
true or false, but they are evaluated by economy: it is first asked which theories give
the most accurate predictions that are measured to correspond; then all theories with
equally accurate predictions are evaluated based on their metaphysical weights and other
theoretical virtues, i.e., economy goes over and above verifiable correspondence, but only
after verifiable correspondence has first been guaranteed.
87Rasmussen [327, p. 54] aims to explain what correspondence means and characterises the problem
of matching as “the problem of seeing how truth-bearers may connect with the portions of reality they
describe.” Suppose that you perceive a tree and a mental image of the tree is realized in you mind. Now,
how does the mental image connect to the mind-independent tree? It is one thing to give an account
of the neurological processes which eventually yield the mental image in your mind; it is very different
to maintain that the mental image does not genuinely reflect the tree. The problem of explaining how
mental states exactly reflect reality is equally a challenge for all who commit to ontological realism, i.e.,
the problem of matching is not especially a problem of OBC.
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putnam’s arguments. Hilary Putnam’s criticism of the correspondence theory can be
seen as a continuation of William James’ project (§6.1) of bringing pragmatic sense into
theorising about truth. The aim is to show that Putnam’s arguments do not threaten
OBC, and that the central relevant content of his critique is incorporated in OBC when
it is applied in the context of the method of economical unification, where the principle of
economy can be characterized as a criterion of rational assertability. Consider Putnam’s
version of Michael Dummett’s language acquisition argument:
To say that truth is “correspondence to reality” is not false but empty, as long as nothing
is said about what the “correspondence” is. If the “correspondence” is supposed to be
utterly independent of the ways in which we confirm the assertions we make (so that it is
conceived to be possible that what is true is utterly different from what we are warranted
in taking to be true, not just in some case but in all cases), then the “correspondence” is
an occult one, and our supposed grasp of it is also occult. Putnam [322, p. 10]
The only conditions for rationally asserting p are epistemic, i.e., the empirical evidence
of the truth of p, and the coherence of p with other propositions which are supported by
empirical evidence. However, as in the correspondence theory truth is defined entirely
non-epistemically as correspondence to reality, “we are nowhere near a theory which could
account for how finite language-speakers could come to grasp realist truth-conditions and
thus know what pmeans” (Anderson [8, p. 52]). The argument can be answered similarly
as David’s above argument, resulting into the conclusion that the principle of economy is
a criterion of rational assertability of theories, whose application entails the acceptance
of correspondence.
OBC is defined in terms of ontological realism. There are practically no alternatives
to ontological realism, as solipsism is at best functionally equivalent with ontological
realism (§4.12).88 Putnam did not deny the existence of the mind-independent reality,
nor that direct perceptions correspond (Anderson, ibid, p. 77). Correspondence and
rational assertability coincide in the case of direct perception which is not involved with
interpretation, as characterized in §8.1. For instance, the reason why the realist makes
e.g. the assertion that it is snowing outside is that the realist perceives that it is snowing.
Thus, in the case of direct perception, that what is true is not at all different from what
we are warranted in taking to be true.
As there are no difficulties in fitting together OBC and warranted assertability regarding
direct perception, it is intelligible to look at Putnam’s notions about assertability in the
context of theories. First, theories are deduced based on perceptions, i.e., their meta-
physical commitments are deduced and their function is to explain perceptions; that a
theory explains perceptions is thus a sign of rational assertability. Second, when evalu-
ating two or more theories by economy, correspondence of their verifiable predictions is
the first criterion, and metaphysical simplicity and virtuousness in general the second.
Economy can thus be seen as a criterion of rational assertability, i.e., the most econom-
ically unified theory is the most rationally assertable. However, it is not suggested here
that the currently most rationally assertable theories should be correspondence-true,
for the mind-independent existence of their unverifiable metaphysical commitments by
definition cannot be known. But the current theories are still at least stepping stones
towards an ideally economically unified theory.
88According to Anderson [8, p. 53], some have demanded that the realists should prove that the
mind-independent world exists, but its existence cannot be proved as we are dealing with mutually
exclusive metaphysical interpretations.
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According to Khlentzos [196], Putnam [321] aims to show with one version of his model-
theoretic argument “that an ideal theory of the world could not be false, a conclusion
flatly inconsistent with realism.” Consider Medina’s formulation of the argument:
Imagine a possible formalization TI of ideal scientific theory, that is, the best theory of
the world possible for us humans, a theory at the limit of scientific investigation which
fits all possible observational evidence and satisfies all possible theoretical constraints.
Putnam’s contention is that no sense can be made of the claim that such an ideal theory
might be false, for, by definition, that theory will come out true in all possible models.
The metaphysical conception of truth as correspondence with the language and mind-
independent world makes truth inaccessible for us, and is ultimately unintelligible. Medina
[263, p. 76]
The argument seems to rest on the claim that a non-problem should be considered as
a problem. For, why should it make correspondence-truth inaccessible to us that no
sense can be made out of an ideal theory —an ideally economically unified theory of
nature— being false? Perhaps, because in this case ideally rational assertability (IRA)
would entail correspondence-truth (CT)? Suppose that IRA(x)→CT(x) holds, which is
read as: if x is an ideally economically unified theory, then x corresponds completely and
exhaustively. It is hard to see why should IRA(x)→CT(x) make correspondence-truth
inaccessible to us, for correspondence is applied in verifying the measurable predictions
of the ideal theory, and the ideal theory has been deduced based perceptions which
correspond. Also CT(x)→IRA(x) holds, or no economical sense can be made out of the
idea that a completely and exhaustively corresponding ideal theory does not e.g. give
the correct predictions. If both hold, then IRA(x)↔CT(x) holds. Perhaps the most
important notion where Putnam’s argument leads to is that there are good reasons for
supposing that if one accepts economy, one is also inclined to believe that IRA(x)→CT(x)
holds. There are three alternatives: (a) IRA(x)→CT(x); (b) IRA(x)→not-CT(x); (c)
IRA(x)→CT(x) or not-CT. If it can be shown that (b-c) are uneconomical with respect
to (a), it has been shown that economy favours (a).
(b) Suppose that IRA(x)→not-CT(x) holds, i.e., that the diachronic possibility of ar-
riving at an ideal theory through historical development entails that the ideal theory is
false, i.e., that at least one ideal theory is possible, all possible ideal theories are false,
and it is impossible to arrive at a true ideal theory. This would require that nature is so
complex that even a false ideal theory is possible. Moreover, such complexity of nature
would not explain why a true ideal theory would not be even possible. In order for a
true ideal theory to be impossible, nature should be so complex that the human kind
could not even in principle guess its structure. The hypothesis IRA(x)→not-CT(x) thus
requires a more complex nature than IRA(x)→CT(x).
(c) Suppose that IRA(x)→CT(x) or not-CT(x) holds, i.e., that at least one true ideal
theory and at least one false ideal theory are possible. Two possible ideal theories
are genuinely different on the level of ontology and not just terminologically different
versions of the same theory. Nature would thus be so complex that it would lead us in
believing in the truth of a true ideal theory as well as in the truth of a false ideal theory.
The hypothesis IRA(x)→CT(x) or not-CT(x) thus requires a more complex nature than
IRA(x)→CT(x).
Economy thus favours (a) over (b) and (c). It can be concluded that on the basis of econ-
omy, Putnam was correct in the hypothesis IRA(x)→CT(x), but this does not threaten
OBC. Ideal economy must be distinguished from economy of contemporary theories.
History shows that theories have been rejected and replaced (§3.3), i.e., contemporary
verifiability or rational assertability has not counted as an indicator of truth.
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Medina contemplates Putnam’s internal realism:
Reference and truth have to be internalized, i.e. relativized to a theory, point of view, or
≪conceptual scheme≫. The result of this internalization is that the idea of a single true
picture of the world, the God’s Eye View of metaphysical realism, is abandoned. Internal
realism urges us to give up the old ideal of the One True Theory. Medina [263, p. 75]
Putnam’s arguments give no reasons for abandoning the ideas that it is possible to
gradually arrive at an ideally economically unified theory, and that nature exists in some
absolutely determinate way even though we do not know just how. Instead, it was
pointed out above that Putnam’s model-theoretic argument only substantiates the idea
that if an ideal theory is found, then it is more economical to suppose that it is the
only one of its kind and correspondence-true. However, when Putnam’s internalization
is applied only to contemporary theories which are non-ideal, the notion that truth
is theory-dependent —dependent on a conceptual scheme— makes perfect sense. To
illustrate, in the conceptual scheme where relativistic physics is supposed to be true, it is
also supposed to be true that dark energy exists (§5.4), for this way new empirical data in
the 1990’s could be fitted in the pre-existing conceptual scheme of relativistic cosmology.
In contrast, given the principle of economy, there are no reasons to suppose that dark
energy exists, because the data of 1990’s could be fitted in the conceptual scheme of a
more economically unified theory (DU) without having to postulate dark energy. When
analysing the case in terms of the conceptual scheme of DU, what happened is that
relativistic cosmology did not agree with reality, but instead of rejecting it, the reality
was forced to agree with relativistic cosmology by adding dark energy, i.e., by supposing
that dark energy exists in reality. In sum, although interpretations of observations are
in many cases heavily theory-dependent, this does not threaten OBC which is applied
primarily on observations.
Finally, consider Niiniluoto’s [288, p. 46] comparison of Putnam’s [320] internal realism
with truth as rational assertability (IR), and ontological realism with truth as correspon-
dence (OR). Some of Niiniluoto’s formulations (in italics) are complemented.
(OR1) The world consists of some fixed totality of mind-independent objects.
(OR2) There is exactly one true and complete description of “the way the world is”. No
economical reasons have been found which would deny that an ideal theory could be
invented, which would capture the laws of nature and the overall causal structure of the
Universe. However, in the context of EUO a description that contains e.g. information
of the locations of all atoms in a single temporal stage of the Universe (TSU) could not
actually exist, for its existence would require more space than a TSU.
(OR3) Truth involves some sort of correspondence relation between words and external
things or sets of things.
(IR1) What objects does the world consist of? is a question that it only makes sense to
ask within a theory or description. The question “What objects does the world consist
of?” can be translated as “What is your theory about the Universe?” We can evaluate
theories by economy.
(IR2) There is more than one ‘true’ description of the world. If two descriptions contra-
dict one another, they cannot correspond simultaneously and in the same respect. This
is the coherence theorem of correspondence truths (§6.1). However, if Putnam means
that there are or that one could in principle invent two theories that are equally ratio-
nally assertable on the basis of contemporary empirical data, then it is hard to deny this.
Then again, the hypothesis that two genuinely different ideal theories are possible was
shown to be uneconomical.
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(IR3) Truth is some sort of idealized rational acceptability. It was concluded above that
economy favours the hypothesis IRA(x)→CT(x), but only with ideal theories. With
contemporary theories, assertability is the first evaluation criterion, but even the most
economically unified contemporary theory is not called true. Given economy, approach-
ing the ideal theory is approaching the truth, but the stepping stones are nevertheless
strictly speaking false by definition, as only the genuinely ideal theory is true.
In sum, the principle of economy not only fully incorporates Putnam’s requirement
of rational assertability, but it is a criterion of rational assertability, which can be
applied only together with correspondence, as the correspondence of verifiable predictions
is the first criterion by which theories are evaluated. Putnam’s notion that an ideal
theory cannot be false is remarkable, and compatible with OBC. His notions about
theory-ladenness are important but do not threaten OBC. Whether his internal realism
is compatible with OBC seems to be a matter of interpretation, but hopefully it has been
shown that the central import of Putnam’s critique is built-in in the team play of OBC
and the principle of economy.
6.4 Locating Truthmakers: the Slingshot Argument
The slingshot argument —also called the big fact argument— aims to undermine corre-
spondence theories by showing that all true propositions correspond to the same thing,
and that therefore correspondence is vacuous. Consider one formulation of the argument:
[C. I. Lewis89] challenged the correspondence theorist to locate the fact or part of reality,
or of the world, to which a true sentence corresponded. One can locate individual objects,
if the sentence happens to name or describe them, but even such location makes sense
relative only to a frame of reference, and so presumably the frame of reference must be
included in whatever it is to which a true sentence corresponds. Following out this line of
thought led Lewis to conclude that, if true sentences correspond to anything at all, it must
be the universe as a whole; thus, all true sentences correspond to the same thing. The
correct objection to correspondence theories is . . . that such theories fail to provide entities
to which truth vehicles (whether we take these to be statements, sentences or utterances)
can be said to correspond. If this is right, and I am convinced it is, we ought also to
question the popular assumption that sentences, or their spoken tokens, or sentence-like
entities or configurations in our brains, can properly be called “representations,” since
there is nothing for them to represent. If we give up facts as entities that make sentences
true, we ought to give up representations at the same time, for the legitimacy of each
depends on the legitimacy of the other. Davidson [98, pp. 303-4]
There are two central steps in the above argument. (1) Showing that every true propo-
sition must correspond to the Universe as a whole. (2) Concluding that therefore OBC
must be dropped, for it is essential to its validity to locate the truthmakers. The ar-
gument can be exhausted by showing that (1) cannot hold in EUO. In EUO, a true
proposition cannot even in principle correspond to the whole Universe, as this would
entail that the proposition corresponds to itself: a true proposition can correspond to
any part of the Universe but not to itself (§4.18). Therefore, given any two propositions
A and B which are not the same proposition, where A correspond to the whole Universe
discluding itself, and where B correspond to the whole Universe discluding itself, A and
B do not correspond to the same thing, and therefore (1) cannot hold.
Alternatively, suppose that Davidson means a single temporal stage of the Universe
(TSU) instead of the whole Universe, so that (1) is transformed into: (1’) Every true
89An Analysis of Knowledge and Valuation, La Salle, IL: Open Court, 1946 pp. 50-5.
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proposition about a part of a TSU must correspond to that TSU as a whole. It can be
shown that (1’) does not hold in the relevant sense, although it holds in a very narrow
sense that does not threaten OBC. Consider a single TSU t which is realized at time t,
and two propositions P and M which are realized at time t+1 and which are pointed at
different parts of TSU t:
P=Peter has a coin in the pocket of his trousers at time t.
M=Maria has a coin in the pocket of her trousers at time t.
In the narrow sense TSU t as a whole is indeed the truthmaker of both P and M. This is
the sense that all parts of t are causally connected by gravitation and other influences.
This is explicitly stated by the causality axiom. But surely, the acknowledgement that
we are living in the Universe whose parts are causally connected does not threaten OBC.
Why this is so can be understood by classifying the truthmakers of P and M in two
proper parts, the change-dependent part and the change-independent part, as follows.
CDP: the change-dependent part of t with respect to P.
CIP: the change-independent part of t with respect to P.
CDM: the change-dependent part of t with respect to M.
CIM: the change-independent part of t with respect to M.
CDP is clearly relevant with respect to the truth of P, whereas CIP is clearly irrelevant.
CDP consist of Peter, his trousers and the coin in the pocket of his trousers, whereas
CIP consists of the other parts of t, including CDM. The gist is that CDP is the relevant
truthmaker of P disregarding of CIP, i.e., it is irrelevant to the truth of P how CIP
happens to be. CIP could have existed in an extremely different way while CDP would
have made P true. For instance, millions of far away galaxies could have been realized
in different ways, but the plain CDP would still have made P true. Likewise for CDM.
CDM is clearly relevant with respect to the truth of M, whereas CIM is clearly irrelevant.
CDM consist of Maria, her trousers and the coin in the pocket of her trousers, whereas
CIM consists of the other parts of t, including CDP.
In sum, CDP is relevant to P and CDM is relevant to M. Therefore, P and M correspond
essentially to different parts, and therefore (1’) does not hold. The CD-CI dichotomy
helps to see that our beliefs are typically targeted at their change-dependent truthmakers.
Therefore, all true propositions do not correspond to TSUs as wholes in the relevant sense,
although they do in the narrow sense that all parts of a TSU are causally connected.
6.5 An Argument from Abundancy
Asay [31, p. 107] maintains that there “is no metaphysically substantive property of
truth, no matter how one understands the metaphysics of properties. Truth is at best
a mere abundant property.” It is shown in the following that truth is not an abundant
property of a proposition in OBC, but the truth of a proposition results from the fusion
of the proposition and its truthmaker object. Consider Asay’s argument:
Take again our sample true proposition, <Phil is six feet tall>. The “familiar” truthmaker
F here is either the realist’s state of affairs composed of Phil and the universal six feet tall,
or the moderate nominalist’s six feet tall trope that belongs to Phil. The “redundant”
truthmaker R is either the state of affairs composed of <Phil is six feet tall> and truth or
the truth trope belonging to <Phil is six feet tall>. F and R are fully distinct existences.
Either F and R can exist independently of each other, or there are necessary connections
that obtain between them. Both ways lead to trouble. If F and R are not necessarily
connected, then it is possible for R to exist and for F to fail to exist. Notice just what
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this possibility is. We have the proposition <Phil is six feet tall> instantiating truth,
and so we have a true proposition. But this is also a possibility where Phil does not
instantiate six feet tall. What we have, in other words, is a possible scenario in which Phil
is not six feet tall, even though the proposition <Phil is six feet tall> is true. But that is
impossible, since, necessarily, the proposition that Phil is six feet tall is true if and only
if Phil is six feet tall. In effect, taking F and R not to be necessarily connected amounts
to rejecting the necessary truth of a propositional T-sentence. Even the substantivists
accept the legitimacy of the propositional truth schema (i.e., necessarily, <p> is true if
and only if p). If F and R are not necessarily connected — which, recall, I argue is
the “default” view, given that they are fully distinct — then substantivism about truth
reduces to absurdity. Suppose instead that F and R are necessarily connected, in spite
of being fully distinct; their existence is tied up with one another, such that R cannot
exist unless F also exists. . . . this view is surprising and suspect; there are no obvious
independent grounds for taking F and R to be necessarily connected, and so to find them
so connected must involve positing a brute necessary connection between them. . . . we
should posit entities like R, and their brute necessary connections to more familiar things
like F, only when there are compelling metaphysical reasons for doing so, such as accounting
for resemblance, causality, and truthmaking. R is not needed for any of those things, so
positing its existence and its brute connection to F is unmotivated. Hence, if F and R are
not necessarily connected, then contradiction results. If F and R are necessarily connected,
then we have an unjustifiably ontologically expensive view. Metaphysical substantivism is
either contradictory or unmotivated. The substantivist road is a costly one, and offers no
benefits to justify the expense. Asay [31, pp. 122-4]
Asay’s argument about correspondence truths being abundant and the argument about
positing brute existence of necessary connections between distinct existences rely on
ambiguous time mappings, and they are accordingly resolved by disambiguating the
time mappings, under the following setting. The terms ‘Universal,’ ‘realized trope’ and
‘state of affairs’ in Asay’s quote are translated as ‘object which is realized in the past,
present or future.’ P is the proposition <Phil is six feet tall>, which is stated in some
specific time in some specific location and which refers to F, where F is Phil at a certain
time, i.e., a temporal part of Phil.
Suppose that P and F have both been realized at time 1. In the context of presentism,
everything that has been realized in the past has been necessarily realized from the aspect
of the present time (§7.1). When P was realized at 1, it referred to and corresponded
to F which was also realized at 1. This is the sense in which P and F are necessarily
connected, given presentism and that 1 is in the past. There are no extra abundant
truthmakers, for the truth of P is nothing over and above the fusion of P and F: that
P was realized at 1 and corresponded to F which was realized at 1, implies that P is
necessarily true from the aspect of the present time. There is no uneconomical brute
necessity involved. For instance, it is not uneconomical and brute either to require that
the truth of the proposition that the Moon was in the sky yesterday requires that the
Moon was in the sky yesterday.
As another example, suppose again that P was realized at time 1 and that P refers to
F, but F is Phil at time 2 which is not yet realized at 1. Suppose also that Phil’s being
six feet tall at 2 is contingent: it is possible from the aspect of 1 that Phil will be six
feet tall at 2, and it is possible from the aspect of 1 that Phil will not be six feet tall at
2. Therefore, from the aspect of 1 it is possible that P which is realized at 1, will turn
out to be false when 2 will be realized. Asay is thus correct in the sense that in this case
P at 1 is not necessarily true: the truth value of P is indeterminate from the aspect of
1 (§7.3). However, brute necessity is not involved, for necessity is not involved at all.
There are no abundant truths either, because the truth value of P is indeterminate.
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6.6 Truthmaking in Presentism
Recall that presentism is the doctrine that only present entities exist, past entities did
exist but do not exist at the present, and future entities will exist but do not exist at
the present. Many authors have pointed out that presentism is incompatible with the
principle that the truthmaker of a true proposition must exist:90
If there really are no non-present objects, then it is hard to see what we are referring
to when we use expressions such as ‘Socrates’ and ‘the year 3000’. . . . for every truth,
there is a truth-maker. The problem is that it is hard to see what the truth-makers could
be for such truths as that there were dinosaurs and that there will be Martian outposts.
Markosian [250]
The problem is that, in order to be able to accept the proposition <dinosaurs existed>,
say, one must accept that <dinosaurs existed> is true. But according to truthmaker
maximalism . . . for any true proposition P , there exists at least one entity E that makes P
true. . . . But what makes <dinosaurs existed> true? It can’t be dinosaurs, since dinosaurs
are nowhere to be found in the presentist’s ontology. Asay and Baron [32, p. 315]
Such arguments can be exhausted by recalling the marching order in economical uni-
fication: ontology first, applications second. Presentism was postulated as the most
economical axioms for temporal existence (§4.4). Therefore, presentism is not fitted in
the context of an arbitrary truthmaking principle nor rejected if it is incompatible with
such a principle,91 but truthmaking is fitted in the context of presentism by formulating
a truthmaking principle that is compatible with presentism: the truthmaker objects of
true propositions either have existed in the past, or exist at the present.92 Virtually all
arguments against truthmaking in presentism can be exhausted by taking presentism
seriously and applying this truthmaking principle.
past truthmakers. By the above truthmaking principle, truthmakers of the proposi-
tions ‘dinosaurs did exist’ and ‘Julius Caesar died’ did exist in the past, but do not exist
at the present. The proposition ‘X did exist’ does not state that X exists at the present.
If X would exist at the present, the proposition ‘X did exist but does not exist at the
present’ would be false. In presentism the past did exist and the past also caused the
present, as stated by the causality axiom of EUO. The present could not exist without
having been caused by the past. The past is essentially different from something that has
not existed in the past. Past truthmakers are thus as viable as the fusion of presentism
and the causality axiom. In contrast, one who denies their legitimacy has the problem
of giving an account of one’s own past and the history of the Universe in general. The
denier’s problem can be illustrated by investigating Leininger’s [218] argument that pre-
sentism cannot explain the passage of time. In presentism the passage of time is defined
as the transition from one temporal stage of the Universe (TSU) into another, where only
one of these is present at a time and where the TSUs are in forward directed temporal
and causal succession. Consider the core of Leininger’s argument:
90Such truthmaking principles can be found e.g. from Armstrong [29, p. 5], Bigelow, [48, p. 133],
Lewis [224, pp. 206-7], Davidson [99, p. 154], Briggs and Forbes [59, ch. 4.1], and Kierland [197, p.
175].
91Compare to Merricks [270, ch. 5] who sustains presentism and rejects a truthmaking principle that
is incompatible with presentism.
92This resembles Sanson and Caplan’s [77, p. 198] wide-based truthmaking (truth supervenes on what
was, is, or will be) except for ‘will be.’ Future objects are not needed as truthmakers in presentism
(§7.1).
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[F]or the contents of the present moment to change, there must be a difference in the
character of each successive present moment. But in order to establish that two successive
moments are different, both must exist. . . . the presentist could reply that we can com-
pare the difference between things that exist and things that do not exist. . . . This way of
comparison, however, is hypothetical comparison. That is, when we compare a horse to a
unicorn, we consider what (concrete) properties the unicorn would possess if the idea of a
unicorn were concretely instantiated. In the same way, comparing the present moment to
a formerly existing moment involves invocation of what properties the formerly existing
moment would possess if it were concretely instantiated. This may allow us to compare
differing possible moments, but it does not allow us to compare the difference in successive
moments. Nothing guarantees that the moment we are hypothetically considering is actu-
ally a formerly existing moment, which is why this reply does not allow the presentist to
avoid the need for the existence of more than one moment in order to establish temporal
change. Leininger [218, p. 730]
Leininger leans on the idea that in presentism, past objects are ontologically analogous
to hypothetical entities which have not existed in the past. This is not the case in EUO,
where the ontological status of the past is essentially different from anything that has not
existed in the past: the past did exist and it caused the present, where the past includes
physical objects and their mental properties; things that did not exist did not affect the
present in any way. Leininger’s argument fails along with the analogy of things that did
exist and things that did not exist.
Baia [37, p. 345-6] concludes that the allegation that presentism cannot be the ontological
basis for past and future truths rests on a prior choice of ontology, and maintains that
“the presentist can say that while that there were dinosaurs doesn’t depend for its truth
on how the world is, it does depend for its truth on how the world was.” Likewise,
Sanson and Caplan [348, pp. 25-30] maintain that it is sufficient for the presentist to
hold that truthmakers of propositions about the past are how things were in the past.
Fiocco aims to undermine this result:
[A]n individual that is supposed not to exist at present, nevertheless is aptly characterized
or truly described in certain ways, because it was (or will be) that way. . . . such an account
is objectionably incomplete in that it fails to provide any sort of explanation of how or
why statements about temporal reality are true, that is, it makes no attempt to ground
the structure of temporal reality. Fiocco’s [144, pp. 197-8]
Presentism is an axiom for temporal reality, i.e., it states what exists temporally. Axioms
are selected by economy; no axiom for temporal reality explains how or why statements
about temporal reality are true, for axioms are unexplained explainers. Perhaps by
saying that ‘it makes no attempt to ground the structure of temporal reality’ Fiocco
means that in presentism the past and the future do not exist? If so, then he is merely
restating presentism. In contrast, if Fiocco tries to say that presentism fails to give
truthmakers to propositions targeted at the past, then he is wrong, for in presentism
these truthmakers are past objects. Again, one who argues that a past object cannot
function as a truthmaker in presentism has the problem of giving an account of one’s own
past and of the history of the Universe in general. And again, the selection of axioms
should be on the level of ontology, not on the level of applications.
The same solution resolves the alleged problem of cross-temporal relations. According
to Fiocco [144, p. 199] the problem “arises in the light of claims that seem to attribute
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relations among entities that do not exist at the same moment(s).” Take an example
proposition from Baia [37, p. 353]: The birth of Napoleon preceded the birth of Elvis.
How can this be made true in presentism without cross-temporal relations? That both
births did take place is made true by some past objects. The temporal ordering of these
objects can be defined in terms of presentism (p. 59): when the time t of Napoleon’s
birth was the present, Elvis’ birth had not yet been present, but it was only a future
possibility, which was made a possibility by the temporal stage of the Universe t. No
physical cross-temporal relation is needed here.93 Baron argues that this is circular, for
the presentist truthmaking principle —which he calls the tensed supervenience view—
appeals to true propositions about the past, as was done with Elvis and Napoleon:
This cannot be used to flesh out the tensed supervenience view. For the truth of such claims
is precisely what is at stake when offering the tensed supervenience view as a solution to
the truthmaker objection in the first place, and so cross-temporal supervenience cannot
be analysed in this fashion, on pain of circularity. Baron [42, ch. 3]
Baron seems to mean that truthmaking in presentism cannot be defended by truthmaking
in presentism, for this is circular. In economical unification presentism is postulated as
the most economical available axiom for temporal existence, and truthmaking is fitted
accordingly. Truthmaking is defined in terms of presentism, and presentism is defended
by economy.
alternative approaches to past truthmakers. There are basically two paths of
saving the view that truthmakers of propositions targeted at the past must strictly exist.
One is to reject presentism and replace it by an axiom where the past exists. This is a
no-go, for these axioms are uneconomical with respect to presentism. Another is to sus-
tain presentism but replace past objects by their presently existing surrogates/proxies.
Also this is a no-go, for presentism with the surrogates is uneconomical with respect to
plain presentism. Various different surrogates have been proposed on the top of presen-
tism. Bigelow [49] adds tensed world-properties: the property of having once possessed
dinosaurs makes the proposition ‘dinosaurs existed’ true. Sider [357, p. 41] calls the
appeal to presently existing past-directed properties cheating, as such properties point
beyond themselves; whether this is called cheating or just uneconomical is a matter of
taste. Markosian [249] and Crisp [96] add abstract entities. Rhoda [332] appeals to God’s
memories about past event. Sanson and Caplan [348, 77] have argued that such strate-
gies do not work, for only genuine past entities qualify as truthmakers of propositions
about the past, whereas the surrogates are hypothetical. Recently, Ingram [178] has pro-
posed new kinds of present surrogates of non-present entities, that are supposed to get
over the previous counter arguments. The surrogate strategies and arguments against
them do not have to be investigated here in detail, as any surrogates are uneconomical
additions to plain presentism, even if they would work. Finally, Ingthorsson [181, p.
134] maintains that he is happy with the view that propositions about the past do not
have truth-values in the context of presentism, as some propositions about the past can
be justified in the epistemic sense based on their traces. This line of thought resembles
the pragmatic theory of truth (§§6.1,6.3), but Ingthorsson himself maintains that the
epistemic notions function in the context of the correspondence theory.
truthmakers of propositions about the future. The proposition ‘X will be
realized at the future time f ’ does not state that X exists now. If X would exist now, the
proposition ‘X will exist in the future but does not exist now’ would be false. Unlike past
93See also Bourne’s [56, pp. 97-8] solution.
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objects which did exist and which function as truthmakers as such, ‘future truthmaker’
is a figure of speech which means that the genuine truthmaker is the present or in the
past, for the present determines the future, partially or totally (§7.2). As the present
determines all future possibilities, the truth value of the modal proposition ‘It is possible
at the present that X will be realized at the future time f ’ is determined by the present
to be either true or false, i.e., the present functions as the truthmaker or falsemaker of
such propositions. If total determinism holds, there is exactly one possible future, and
thus in the context of total determinism the present also qualifies as the truthmaker (or
falsemaker) of propositions such as ‘There will be Martian outposts.’ As indicated in
§7.3, if partial determinism holds, some propositions of the form ‘X will be realized at
the future time f ’ are indeterminate at the present, i.e., the present functions as their
indeterminate-maker. Kierland’s [197, p. 174] notions are equivalent.
6.7 Funny Fact Arguments
Consider the overall form of the funny fact arguments:
Given the great variety of complex truthbearers, a correspondence theory will be com-
mitted to all sorts of complex “funny facts” that are ontologically disreputable. Negative,
disjunctive, conditional, universal, probabilistic, subjunctive, and counterfactual facts have
all given cause for complaint on this score. David [97]
In OBC facts are true propositions (p. 150), and an ‘ontologically disreputable fact’
is merely an ambiguous formulation of a true proposition. To illustrate, consider the
proposition W=‘there does not exists unicorns.’ W is ambiguous because it is unclear
where it refers to. Is it pointed at the surface of the Earth at the present time? Is it
pointed at the whole Universe —excluding itself— or at the present temporal stage of
the Universe or where? Likewise, consider the proposition Q=‘Snow is white.’ One way
to understand Q is that if Q is true, then all objects in the past, present and future
which fall under the definition of ‘snow without too much impurities’ reflect most of the
wavelengths of visible light (§8). However, W and Q leave much space for interpretation:
truthmakers of a proposition are by definition ambiguous when it is not known where
the proposition refers to. The central notion here is that it is not the fault of OBC
that people formulate propositions ambiguously. In contrast, if a proposition is formu-
lated unambiguously, it has a truth value, even when its surface structure is involved
with something negative, disjunctive, conditional, universal, probabilistic, subjunctive or
counterfactual. Conditional, probabilistic and counterfactual propositions are involved
with modalities and therefore these are handled in §7.3.
positive and negative propositions. Compare a positive proposition A to a neg-
ative proposition B. A=‘There did exist living unicorns at the first instant of the year
2015 on the surface of the planet Earth.’ B=‘There did not exist living unicorns at the
first instant of the year 2015 on the surface of the planet Earth.’ There is no ambigu-
ity about where the propositions are pointed at, and therefore no ambiguity about the
truthmaker/falsemaker: it is the surface of the Earth at the first instant of the year 2015,
which is abbreviated as E2015. If there did exist unicorns at E2015, then E2015 is the
truthmaker of A and the falsemaker of B; if there did not exist unicorns at E2015, then
E2015 is the falsemaker of A and the truthmaker of B. In contrast, propositions such as
C=‘there are no unicorns’ are ambiguous because it has to be guessed where these are
pointed at. Cheyne and Pigden [82] maintain that the truthmaker of C is the way in
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which the ‘universe’ actually is. In EUO, the truthmaker/falsemaker of C is the present
temporal stage of the Universe (TSU), if C is pointed at the present TSU. Parsons [301]
maintains that Cheyne and Pigden’s [82] strategy fails, because the actual universe is
merely one of two island universes, and even if C is true in the actual universe, it is
false in the other universe. In EUO, there is no need for island universes or transcendent
worlds; as ‘true’ is defined in terms of EUO, it is illegitimate to try to disqualify such a
definition by appealing to an uneconomical ontology where island universes are dragged
in out of the blue.
disjunctive propositions. Consider a proposition whose surface structure is disjunc-
tive. C=‘Peter came here either by walking route 1 or route 2 or . . . or route n.” While
C is disjunctive, its truthmaker/falsemaker is not. C is pointed at some locations during
some period of time in the past. If Peter actually did take one of the routes 1 − n at
that time, then C is true; otherwise C is false.
universal propositions. A universal proposition can be seen to propose that a uni-
versal fact is indeed a universal fact, i.e., that something is a uniformity of nature or
even a law of nature. If this is the correct interpretation, then a universal proposition
is a theory. The role of correspondence in inducing theories and in evaluating them was
already handled in §6.3.
subjunctive propositions. Unless a subjunctive proposition is a conditional proposi-
tion, it expresses wishes, suggestions, and other attitudes. Such subjunctive propositions
are close to non-descriptivist propositions which were discussed in p. 133, i.e., these do
not strictly speaking propose anything else than that someone said or thought something.
Consider a subjunctive proposition D=‘The doctor insisted that she walk at least a mile
a day.’94 If D is true, then the Doctor insisted that she walk at least a mile a day. That
is, D only proposes that the Doctor said to a female that she walk at least a mile a day.
In sum, ambiguously formulated propositions should not be interpreted as threats to
OBC, whereas unambiguous propositions whose surface structure involves something
negative, counterfactual, conditional, disjunctive, universal, probabilistic or subjunctive
have truth values in OBC.
6.8 Analytic Truth
The goal has been to formulate an economically unified theory of truth which is appli-
cable in natural science and human social behaviour. Although this goal and the above
analysis are very different from how the concept of truth has been mostly handled in
the context of philosophy during the last 100 years or so, various authors have meant
basically the same with ‘correspondence.’ According to Ku¨nne [210, p. 112] “It was
about 1910 in Cambridge that G. E. Moore and Bertrand Russell married ‘correspon-
dence’ with ‘fact’, and Ludwig Wittgenstein was soon to give his blessing to this union.”
OBC —where there are mental propositions that correspond to physical objects— was
shifted into analyzing different meanings of ‘fact’ and ‘state of affairs’ and the nature of
the truthmaking relation. The challenge here is that different philosophers have given
different meanings to ‘fact’ and ‘state of affairs’ while correspondence fits together only
with some meanings. OBC (1) is contrasted to the central theories of truth (2-7) which
were created in the era of analytic philosophy in figure 19. Their analysis amounts to
the following conclusions.
94The citation is from http://www.grammarmudge.cityslide.com/articles/article/1026513/13029.htm
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Figure 19: Some theories of truth .
(1) If the truthmakers are objects, then we are dealing with OBC. The truthmaking
relation is correspondence and the theory works.
(2-3) If the truthmakers are facts or states of affairs that are in any case objects or prop-
erties of objects, then we are dealing with a version of OBC with different terminology.
The truthmaking relation in a correspondence theory is correspondence, and the theory
works. However, in the context of EUO facts or states of affairs as truthmakers provide
no special advantages with respect to plain objects as truthmakers. If facts or state of
affairs differ ontologically from objects EUO, they are evaluated by economy.
(4) If the truthmaker facts are true propositions only, then the notion that a proposition
corresponds to a fact does not work, because the notion that a proposition corresponds
to a proposition does not work, except in a special case. Therefore the truthmaking
relation is ‘ambiguous’ in figure 19. Although correspondence does not work with facts
as true propositions, in the course of unification, we can translate correspondence with
facts as true propositions into deduction based on known true propositions that works in
the context of OBC.
(5-7) If deflationism, the identity theory and the primitivist theory of truth are not even
intended to function in the focal contexts, then these do not compete with OBC. If these
are intended to function in the focal contexts, then they succeed only by being definitions
in the context of a correspondence theory.
6.8.1 Correspondence/Truthmaking with Facts and States of Affairs
wittgenstein’s facts and states of affairs. Wittgenstein defines facts and states
of affairs:
1 The world is everything that is the case.
1.1 The world is the totality of facts, not of things.
2 What is the case—a fact—is the existence of states of affairs.
2.01 A state of affairs (a state of things) is a combination of objects (things).
2.011 It is essential to things that they should be possible constituents of states of affairs.
Wittgenstein [414]
According to Baker and Hacker [39, p. 85], for Wittgenstein ‘object’ is a simple object
without proper parts. As a fact is the existence of a combination of simple objects,
Wittgenstein’s fact is equivalent with an existing object in EUO that consists of two or
more proper parts (at one time, i.e., these parts are not temporal parts). If this is the
correct interpretation, then Wittgenstein’s facts function as truthmakers in what is prac-
tically OBC with different terminology: EUO’s objects cover Wittgenstein’s ‘fact’ and
‘simple object.’ That the world is the totality of facts, not of things, can be understood
as follows:
148
[T]he world is more than just a collection of objects; it is objects in particular arrangements.
If you know of all the objects in the world, have a complete inventory of everything there
is — you still have only a very inadequate idea of what the world is like. A satisfactory
account of the world would have to contain not only a list of all the objects, but descriptions
of where they are and in what relations they stand to each other. Schroeder [354]
Again, the difference is terminological: in this thesis e.g. the present temporal state of
the Universe is an object whose parts are interrelated in a certain specific way.
armstrong’s states of affairs. Armstrong sustains correspondence, switches truth-
makers from facts into states of affairs, and especially distances states of affairs from
propositions:
My hypothesis is that the world is a world of states of affairs. I think that I am saying the
same thing as those who have held that the world is a world of facts not things. . . . In my
view the word ‘fact’ is much too closely tied to the notions of statement and proposition.
. . . A state of affairs exists if and only if a particular has a property, or a relation holds
between two or more particulars. . . . The states of affairs, which includes their constituents,
constitute the ultimate truthmakers for all truths. Armstrong [25, pp. 429, 435]
It is odd to maintain that ‘the world is a world of states of affairs’ as if states of affairs
were somehow primitive, for they are defined in terms of particulars, which thus appear
to be the genuine primitives. In any case, as states of affairs are defined in terms of
particulars, there are no obstacles in interpreting that states of affairs are ontologically
nothing over and above objects in EUO. Also relations between two objects are always
included in an object: e.g. all relations between two galaxies at time t are included in
the temporal stage of the Universe which is realized at t. In Armstrong’s [16, II p. 4]
vocabulary, ‘particular’ seems to be equivalent with EUO’s object that exists during a
period of time, whereas in this thesis ‘particular’ especially exists at one time only. For
Armstrong a thin particular is “the thing taken in abstraction from all its properties”
(ibid, I p. 114), whereas a thick particular is the “particular taken along with all and
only the particular’s non-relational properties” [26, p. 124]. A thick particular is thus a
state of affairs: a particular having all its non-relational properties. As in the vocabulary
of this thesis a particular is a thick particular in an environment with all its relational
properties too, it seems plausible to interpret that Armstrong’s states of affairs are
ontologically nothing over and above EUO’s objects. Further, as an object in EUO
qualifies as Armstrong’s state of affairs, states of affairs may be used as truthmakers in
OBC.
The following example reveals an appeal of states of affairs in truthmaking. Suppose that
particular x has properties m and c, which means that the states of affairsm(x) and c(x)
exist. The proposition ‘x has the property c’ is true, although the proposition does not
indicate anything about the property m of x, and therefore the state of affairs c(x) can
be seen as the convenient truthmaker of the proposition. However, x as a particular can
be used as the truthmaker as well, and as states of affairs are involved with unnecessary
terminological and ontological complexity, it is hard to find good reasons to apply them
in the first place. Consider the terminological complexity in steps.
(1) Armstrong starts with the common-sensible conception of particular with properties,
defines states of affairs as property-particular fusions and maintains that they are the
basic building blocks of reality.
(2) In order to distinguish states of affairs from particulars, properties are abstracted
away from particulars, which leaves over the abstraction of a thin particular.
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(3) The thin particular is only an abstraction, but it creates confusion. Keller [195,
p. 114] maintains that a state of affairs is a thin particular with one to all properties;
on one hand this is understandable; on the other hand this is confusing, for a state of
affairs is not a thin-particular-with-properties, but a property-particular fusion, for once
a particular has a property, it is not thin: the conception of a basic building block of
reality as an abstraction-property fusion makes no sense. Dodd [111, pp. 9-14] aims
to undermine the correspondence theory by attacking states of affairs, maintaining that
states of affairs are the most plausible candidates to be truthmakers in a correspondence
theory, but as the unity of states of affairs —the unity of properties and particulars—
is unexplained a correspondence theory of truth can only be the ‘product of bad faith.’
Armstrong maintains that the primitiveness of states of affairs is itself the explanation,
but it is certain that states of affairs are the source of the confusion.
(4) We may classify states of affairs e.g. in particulars with some but not all their
properties, and in particulars with all non-relational properties which are also thick
particulars. It is hard to see why the terms ‘thin particular,’ ‘thick particular’ and ‘state
of affairs’ should be deployed in the first place, for truthmaking with only particulars
with properties is a lot less confusing.
The unnecessary ontological complexity of states of affairs can be illustrated by compar-
ing these with objects in EUO. In EUO, an elementary particular x can be considered
without difficulties as an indivisible particular which has properties, such as charge c,
mass m and the sum of all nonrelational properties P of x. The properties m and c are
ways in which x exists, and the expressions m(x) and c(x) are means of talking about
x. In terms of states of affairs, there exists states of affairs m(x), c(x), P (x) and states
of affairs for all combinations of properties of x. As states of affairs are the ultimate
building blocks of reality, the thick particular and a state of affairs P (x) is divisible in
states of affairs m(x), c(x) and in all other state of affairs combinations. Thus, there is a
greater number of basic building blocks with Armstrong’s states of affairs approach than
in EUO’s object approach. These building blocks are redundant, for e.g. the state of
affairsm(x) is partially redundant with the state of affairsm&c(x). There is no empirical
evidence that would favour this complexity, as there is no evidence that would demand
separating all properties of e.g. electrons and photons into separate building blocks of
reality.
In sum, if states of affairs are ontologically nothing over and above objects, then these
can be used as truthmakers in a correspondence theory. But the orientation behind
using them is unclear, as at least Armstrong’s states of affairs are terminologically and
ontologically more complex than plain objects. The analysis of Textor [394] shows that
there are conceptions of what a state of affairs is that differ from Armstrong’s, but there
is no urgent need to review these.
facts as true propositions. Fact has been defined as a true proposition e.g. by
Frege:95 “What is a fact? A fact is a thought that is true.” And by Dodd [111, p.
80]: “my view is that facts are . . . true thoughts.” If facts are true propositions, then
in fact-based correspondence a true proposition corresponds to a true proposition. The
problem is that this does not work except in a special case, whereas in the general case
the link to mind-independent reality is lost and correspondence does not work as the
truthmaking relation.
Consider the special case first. In OBC, when a true proposition corresponds to a true
proposition, this means that a true thought Q which is realized in the mind of a human
95Part 74 of Der Gedanke as translated by Ku¨nne [210, p. 7].
150
being corresponds to another true thought U realized in the mind of a human being. For
instance, person A proposes that Q=“person B is conceiving the thought U”; person B
happens to conceive U and U happens to be a true thought. In this special case Q is
true proposition that corresponds to the true proposition U.
Then consider the general case. The first problem is that a true proposition cannot
corresponds to a true proposition, except in the special case above. Let the sample
proposition P=Mount Everest is the highest mountain on Earth correspond to the fact
F=Mount Everest is the highest mountain on Earth. As facts are true propositions, P
is identical to F. This does not work: as proved in §4.18, given that non-wellfounded
structures are rejected, P cannot correspond to anything that is identical to itself. Arm-
strong’s and Frege’s remarks that a proposition cannot correspond to a fact make sense
when fact is translated as a true proposition:
The traditional correspondence theory holds that p is true if, and only if, it corresponds
to reality. Propositions correspond, or fail to correspond, to facts or to states of affairs.
But a relation of correspondence demands that the correspondents be distinct from each
other, and for true propositions this demand is not met. Suppose that the proposition in
question is ‘that the earth is round’. The fact or state of affairs to which this proposition
corresponds is the fact that the earth is round or the state of affairs of the earth’s being
round. But the proposition does not correspond with this fact or state of affairs, rather it
coalesces with it. Armstrong [15, p. 113]
It would only be possible to compare an idea with a thing if the thing were an idea too.
And then, if the first did correspond perfectly with the second, they would coincide. But
this is not at all what people intend when they define truth as the correspondence of an
idea with something real. For in this case it is essential precisely that the reality shall be
distinct from the idea. Frege [149, p. 3]
Any way you put it, correspondence does not function as the truthmaking relation when
the truthmakers are true propositions, except in the special case. Armstrong says that
the proposition ‘coalesces’ with the fact, Frege says it ‘coincides’ with the fact and Dodd
[111] maintains that the proposition is identical to the fact. The notion that P cannot
correspond to a fact but that P is identical with a fact can be seen as the guiding intuition
behind Dodd’s identity theory of truth (§6.8.3). The difficulty with the identity theory
—and the second problem of a correspondence theory where propositions correspond to
facts as true propositions— is that if facts as true propositions are the only truthmakers,
this leaves the mind-independent reality out of the picture. This would make facts
themselves primitive, which would be practically equivalent with deflationism (§6.8.2).
Dodd (ibid, p. 132) explicitly states that “the modest identity theory complements a
deflationary attitude towards truth.” In order to sustain the link to mind-independent
reality, all facts should eventually correspond to objects. This would be OBC where
propositions are identical with facts and where facts correspond to objects.
In sum, if the truthmaking facts are true propositions, the correspondence theory does
not work, for the notion that a proposition corresponds to a proposition does not work,
except in a special case. Then again, when correspondence is switched into identity, the
mind-independent reality is left out of the picture, unless we are after all dealing with
OBC, where propositions are identical with facts and where facts correspond to objects.
deduction based on known facts? Again, correspondence does not work with facts
as true propositions as truthmakers. However, in the method of economical unification
the goal is to dig out applicable ingredients of all approaches and to incorporate them in
the unified theory. The notion of ‘correspondence with facts as true propositions’ can be
translated e.g. as ‘deduction based on known true propositions’ that works in the context
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of OBC. A proposition can be deduced to be true based on the known facts, although
the proposition is always made true by objects. Based on the known facts about the
temperature of the Sun, it can be deduced that S=there is no ice in the Sun is a true
proposition. When language is used vaguely, it can be said that the facts about the Sun
make S true; when language is used accurately, it is said that the physical object Sun
makes the proposition S true, and we deduced that S is true based on the known facts.
6.8.2 Deflationist Theories of Truth
The goal of this section is to show how the linguistically oriented deflationist theories
are not competitors of OBC as the central empirically sufficient theory of truth, and to
show that when viewed in the context of OBC as not theories of truth, the deflationist
‘views’ have some applicable ingredients. They are not competitors of OBC because
they do not even aim to do the same job, as they are not concerned at all with the link
between propositions and the mind-independent reality (cf. Ingthorsson [182, ch. 6]).
This holds for all versions of deflationism, although Paul Horwich’s minimalism is the
only version that is looked at a little more detail. Horwich orientates deflationism by
sweeping fact-based correspondence theory and the epistemic theories aside:
The common-sense notion that truth is kind of ‘correspondence with the facts’ has never
worked out to anyone’s satisfaction. Even its advocates would concede that it remains
little more than a vague, guiding intuition. But the traditional alternatives—equations
of truth with ‘membership in a coherent system of beliefs’, or ‘what would be verified in
ideal conditions’, or ‘suitability as a basis for action’—have always looked unlikely to work,
precisely because they don’t accommodate the ‘correspondence’ intuition, and this air of
implausibility is substantiated in straightforward counterexamples. Hence the peculiarly
enigmatic character of truth: a conception of its underlying nature appears to be at once
necessary and impossible. Horwich [173, pp. 1-2]
Horwich’s critique is in place if ‘fact’ means ‘true proposition’ for in this case the resulting
correspondence theory does not work (§6.8.1). However, if fact is an object or a property
of an object, then the resulting correspondence theory does work. Horwich characterises
the epistemic theories as rivals of fact-based correspondence instead of seeing them as
its allies. Also this is natural, for at the time when Horwich published his book —1st
edition in 1990 and 2nd edition in 1998— Ingthorsson had not yet unified them. Also
ideal verifiability was shown to be compatible with OCB (§6.3. Horwich continues by
claiming that something that OBC provably manages to do is based on a misconception.
I believe that this impression is wholly wrong and that it grows out of two related miscon-
ceptions: first, that truth has some hidden structure awaiting our discovery; and secondly,
that hinging on this discovery is our ability to explain central philosophical principles such
as those just mentioned, and thereby to solve a host of problems in logic, semantics and
epistemology. . . . unlike most other predicates, ‘is true’ should not be expected to par-
ticipate in some deep theory of that to which it refers—a theory that articulates general
conditions for its application. Horwich [173, p. 2]
In the light of the disambiguation of the concept of truth in terms of OBC where the
‘hidden structure’ is successfully brought into light, the central applicable ingredients of
the epistemic rivals of the OBC have been unified together and various alleged problems
of OBC have been resolved, it can be concluded that Horwich’s assessment does not
touch OBC in any way. It remains to be shown that deflationism does not compete with
OBC as an empirically sufficient theory of truth. Armour-Garb and Beall [14, pp. 6-7]
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define three versions of deflationism, or three versions of the equivalence schema, also
called truthmaking schema:
minimalism: The proposition that A is true if, and only if, A.
disquotationalism: ‘A’ is true if, and only if, A.
redundancy theory: ‘It is true that A’ means no more than A.
They (ibid, p. 3) maintain that the difference of deflationism and the substantivist the-
ories (such as correspondence, coherence and the Jamesian pragmatic theory) is that
deflationism takes instances of the equivalence schema96 “to be fundamental, both con-
ceptually and explanatorily.” This means that truthmakers in deflationism are instances
of the equivalence schema. Horwich [173, p. 5] gives examples of instances of the equiv-
alence schema of minimalism: “The proposition quarks really exist is true if and only if
quarks really exist, the proposition that lying is bad is true if and only if lying is bad,
. . . and so on.” There is an instance of the equivalence schema for every true proposi-
tion, i.e., the proposition that A is true if and only if A is an instance of the equivalence
schema, or deduced by instances of the equivalence schema as explained by Horwich
(ibid, pp. 104-5).
economy of deflationism?97 Is deflationism an empirically sufficient theory of truth?
Horwich [173, p. 5] seems to think so: “The entire conceptual and theoretical role of truth
may be explained on this basis. . . . This sort of deflationary picture is attractively de-
mystifying.” How can the deflationary picture be de-mystifying when it especially leaves
the deep meaning of ‘true’ open and simply replaces it with instances of the equivalence
schema? The obvious difficulties of minimalism in natural science and typical human
social behaviour are revealed by the following reasoning:
(i) In minimalism absolutely all truthmakers are instances of the equivalence schema.
(ii) If minimalism is empirically sufficient, the instances should suffice in determining
truth values of propositions about the mind-independent reality.
(iii) Deflationism should not lead people astray, i.e., if a proposition about the mind-
independent reality is true in deflationism, then this should be meaningful, i.e., this
should tell something about the mind-independent reality.
(iv) Thus, e.g. the true proposition that the Moon is in the sky in the mind-independent
reality should be a truth about the mind-independent Moon.
(v) Although in minimalism the proposition that the Moon is in the sky in the mind-
independent reality may concern the Moon —or this is not explicitly denied— this propo-
sition is not made true by the mind-independent Moon but by an instance of the equiv-
alence schema.
(vi) Deflationism thereby puts common sense between a rock and a hard place: if de-
flationism is empirically sufficient, the instances of the equivalence schema must make
propositions about the mind-independent reality true; but if they make such proposi-
tions true, this is in any case unnecessary as the mind-independent reality itself makes
the propositions true.
In other words, if deflationism is intended to function in the focal contexts where the
mind-independent reality is admitted to exist, some empirically sufficient ontology such
as EUO is in any case required, and in the context of such ontology objects are sufficient
truthmakers. However, the deflationist commits to instances of the equivalence schema,
96Depending on the version of deflationism, instances of the equivalence schemas may also be called
truthmaking sentences and basic acceptance properties.
97E.g. Lynch [235, p. 191], Niiniluoto [288, p. 47], Unwin [403, p. 264] and Gupta [158, p. 78] criticise
deflationism, but they do not talk about OBC and therefore it is hard to build on their arguments.
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which are equivalent with metaphysical commitments (cf. Gupta [159, pp. 365-6] and
Wyatt [421]). If the instances make propositions about the mind-independent reality
true, then they are in any case unnecessary and deflationism is uneconomical with respect
to OBC; if the instances do not make propositions about the mind-independent reality
true, then deflationism is not even intended as an empirically sufficient theory, and OBC
is needed.
deflationism in the context of obc as not a theory. In the light of the above
analysis it can be concluded that deflationism does not threaten OBC as the central em-
pirically sufficient theory of truth. The remaining task is thus to incorporate applicable
ingredients of deflationism in OBC by definitions. It should of course be understood
what the applicable ingredients are before they can be defined. Two very different
interpretations of minimalism are presented, Young’s interpretation and Ingthorsson’s
summary of Wright’s [417, ch. 1] interpretation, where their difference is another sign of
the ambiguity of deflationism:
On Wright’s reading, minimalism is a pluralism about what kind of property the word
‘true’ ascribes to propositions. In some contexts it may be correct to say that something
is true because it is coherent (e.g., in mathematics), sometimes because it is scientifically
verified to correspond to reality (natural science), sometimes even because it fits to some
moral or aesthetic norm. That is, the relevant property may vary with the context, and
may not always belong to the proposition in question in virtue of corresponding to some
fact. This is why we should not expect, or look for, a single metaphysically significant
property that all true propositions have in common (like correspondence). This could
be the motivation behind the minimalist claim that all we can ever hope to achieve is a
general schema that fits all the uses of the word ‘true’, and which is consistent with the
intuitions underlying the different ontologies, so to speak, of the various properties. So
understood, the theory says absolutely nothing to undermine the thesis that sometime
our beliefs correspond to reality, or that correspondence is at the heart of our epistemic
practices. Ingthorsson [182, ch. 6]
If the minimal theory has ever been thought to be anything other than a correspondence
theory, perhaps this is because its advocates have not found it necessary to explicitly state
this consequence of their view: A consequence that nicely encapsulates all that is essential
to the correspondence theory. Young [423, p. 571]
Young quotes Horwich [173, p. 104] who states that minimalism “does not deny that
truths do correspond—in some sense—to the facts; . . . It is indeed undeniable that when-
ever a proposition or an utterance is true, it is true because something in the world is
a certain way. . . .” On the other hand, Horwich’s main orientation to deflationism was
the rejection of the correspondence theory, as indicated above. So, which interpretation
is correct, Young or Wright-Ingthorsson? Armour-Garb and Beall [14, p. 2] are compat-
ible with the Wright-Ingthorsson reading as they maintain that the deflationist theories
focus “on the concept of truth and on how that concept gets employed in our talk and
thought.”
Given the Wright-Ingthorsson reading and when the status of a theory is removed from
deflationism, instances of the equivalence schema can defined in the context of OBC as
classifications of what is assumed to be true by some people at some time in some context,
disregarding whether it is true in OBC. Consider some examples. (i) The belief that
wolves are vicious animals has been and still is a pragmatic truth for some people who
enjoy staying in the wilderness, and thus in the context of some people in the wilderness
this can be classified as a belief which is made true by an instance of the equivalence
schema. (ii) That an alms relieves the pains of one’s relatives in the purgatory can be
classified as a belief that is made true by an instance of the equivalence schema in the
context of several medieval Christians. (iii) That there are talking trees can be classified
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as a belief which is made true by an instance of the equivalence schema in the context of
a fiction. (iv) That the Moon is in space in the mind-independent reality can be classified
as a belief which is made true by an instance of the equivalence schema in the context
of most of the people living today, and it supposedly is made true also by the Moon.
6.8.3 The Identity Theory and the Primitivist Theory of Truth
Baldwin [41, p. 35] defines the identity theory as follows: “It is basically the thesis that
the truth of a judgement consists in the identity of the judgement’s content with a fact.”
In other words, a proposition is true if and only if it is identical to a fact. In the context
of EUO or just ontological realism, this makes sense only when ‘fact’ is translated as ‘true
proposition.’ Accordingly, the resulting identity theory can be defined as: proposition a
is true if and only if a is identical to a true proposition. This is also what Dodd [111, p.
80] means by his modest identity theory: “my view is that facts are not states of affairs
but . . . true thoughts.” This way, it becomes intelligible to say e.g. that the proposition
that snow is white is true if and only if it is a true proposition that snow is white. This
raises a question: What makes a fact a fact? Dodd does not worry about this for he (ibid,
p. 132) explicitly states that “the modest identity theory complements a deflationary
attitude towards truth.”
On one hand, if Dodd’s identity theory —in the spirit of deflationism— is not even
intended to function in natural science and human social behaviour where the link to
mind-independent reality is essential, then it does not compete with OBC. Also Engel
[132] concludes that the modest identity theory is truistic —in the sense that fact is a
fact but it is not explained why— and it is very hard to distinguish it from deflationism.
However, if it ought to function in these contexts, then the problem becomes to explain
what makes a fact a fact. And this cannot be done without correspondence: the pos-
tulation of some kind of an axiom schema which gives the facts only makes the identity
theory deflationism. Adding correspondence on the top of Dodd’s modest identity theory
makes a full circle:
(i) Objects were switched into facts in the early 20th century.
(ii) Fact-based correspondence does not work when facts are true propositions.
(iii) Dodd acknowledges that facts are true propositions, and therefore it makes sense
that a true proposition is identical to a fact.
(iv) This does not answer why a fact is a fact.
(v) In order to answer why a fact is a fact, a fact needs to corresponds to an object that
is external to the fact itself.
(vi) This makes a full circle.
Also other versions of the identity theory have been presented. In both of the following
versions the border between a proposition and an object that makes the proposition true
vanishes, and their difference is in the nuance of whether a proposition is pushed towards
an object or whether an object is pushed towards a proposition. In the first mapping, the
ontology is Bradley’s98 idealism where propositions are pushed towards objects. In the
second mapping, the ontology is that of early Russell and G.E. Moore99 where objects
are pushed towards propositions. Engel [132, p. 443] maintains that these mappings are
about “nudging thought towards the world” and “nudging the world towards thought.”
Engel (ibid, p. 447) also notes that the difference of these versions is unclear, for if an
98See e.g. Bradley [57] and Candlish [75, pp. 210-2].
99See e.g. Russell [344, §51], Candlish [75, p. 206] and Moore [277, p. 21].
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idea (a proposition) is equivalent with the object that makes the idea true, then also
the object is equivalent with the idea, i.e., the difference is only in where the nudging
starts. These mappings do not have to be investigated further, for in ontological realism
a proposition about object X —such as a mountain or a tree— is never the same nor
identical to X (§4.18). Commitment to solipsism may be the only way of making sense
out of the notion that a proposition is identical to the object that makes the proposition
true. If so, the debate should be on the level of ontology, not on the level of defined
concepts. Also Candlish and Damnjanovic [76] note that “the identity theory of truth
may turn out to be best thought of as comparable to solipsism.”
the primitivist theory of truth. Also primitivism about truth has its origins in the
writings of G.E. Moore [275] and Russell [342]. In primitivism truth is an unanalysable
property of a proposition. According to Moore [276, p. 284]: “ “Truth,” therefore, would,
on this view, be a simple unanalysable property which is possessed by some propositions
and not by others.” As such primitivism is uneconomical and is not needed, because
we already have OBC where the truth of a proposition results from the existence of its
truthmaker. Then again, it is in no way empirically convincing that someone argues
that his proposition is true because it has such a property, for typically and in OBC the
case is on the other way around: if a proposition corresponds it is true, and this can be
translated by saying that the proposition has the ‘property’ of being true. In contrast,
suppose that someone argues that the proposition ‘the Sun is very hot’ is true because
the proposition has the property of being true. Someone could as well argue that the
proposition ‘the temperature of the Sun is -20 Celsius’ is true because the proposition
has the property of being true. The primitivist theory reminds that metaphysical entities
such as truth-properties which are invented out of the air without no empirical support
are plainly inconvincing.
Although primitivism may look very much like deflationism —instances of the equiva-
lence schema may look like primitive truth-properties— Asay [31, p. 3] maintains that he
is not a deflationist, and that in his version of primitivism truth is a metaphysically sub-
stantive property, although a primitive one. Asay (ibid, p. 138) takes arguments against
fact-based correspondence and state-of-affairs correspondence as convincing and “rejects
the claim that truth can be understood in more fundamental terms like correspondence,
coherence, or utility.” Asay basically raises hands in the air and concludes that there are
no other alternatives than to take truth as primitive. Against this strategy, in the unified
theory truth is understood in more fundamental terms and where the central arguments
against correspondence have been resolved.
6.8.4 Semantical Problems with Presentism?
Some semantical allegations against presentism are handled here because their scope is as
far from anything that touches empirical sufficiency as the scope of the analytic theories
of truth.
Fiocco [144] lists two semantical allegations against presentism. First, the problem of
there being only one moment is a problem because we obviously talk about different
moments whereas in presentism only the present moment exists. The resolution is that we
talk about moments which did exist, about the present moment which exists, and about
future moments which will exist. Second, consider the problem of singular propositions.
The proposition Urho Kekkonen existed in the past is singular as it denotes a single object.
Fiocco maintains that such propositions only name a single object without referring to
any of its specific properties and thus such propositions are ambiguous. The resolution
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that in EUO objects always come with all their properties (§4.7). The proposition Urho
Kekkonen existed in the past is not ambiguous, for it refers to an object which existed in
the past with all its properties.
Markosian [249] characterises the problem of singular propositions in a different way:
“A singular proposition depends for its existence on the individual object(s) it is about.
Thus, Presentism entails that there are no singular propositions about non-present ob-
jects.” Markosian seems not to distinguish two things clearly enough: propositions;
objects to which propositions refer. In EUO a proposition is a mental thing conceived by
a human being; the existence of my present proposition about Kekkonen depends in no
way of the present non-existence of Kekkonen, although its truth requires that Kekkonen
did exist in the past. Then again, as propositions are mental things and as mental things
are properties of physical objects (§4.13), singular propositions as well as all propositions
in general go in and out of existence similarly as objects do. But the truth value of my
proposition will never change. When analyzed from the aspect of any future time, the
conclusion will always be the same: the true proposition Urho Kekkonen existed in the
past was realized on April 1st 2016.
A third semantical argument against presentism is the claim that presentism is either
trivial or false. Consider Meyer’s formulation of the argument.100
P1: Nothing exists now that is not present.
On this reading, presentism is true, but utterly trivial. To exist now and to be present are
the very same thing. . . . To get a non-trivial account of the thesis, we would need a more
inclusive notion of existence. Say that an object exists temporally just in case it exists at
some time or other. By regarding the ‘exists’ in P as expressing temporal existence, we
then get a second reading of the presentist’s thesis:
P2: Nothing exists temporally that is not present.
Since it does not follow from an object’s existing temporally that it exists now, this thesis
is indeed non-trivial. But consider:
JC: Caesar crossed the Rubicon.
Caesar only could have crossed the Rubicon if he did exist. Yet if he did exist then he does
exist at some past time, and therefore does exist temporally. But Caesar does not exist
now; he died on the Ides of March in 44 BC. Hence if Caesar crossed the Rubicon (and he
did) then there is an object (namely Caesar) that exists temporally, but is not present. If
JC is true (and it is) then P2 is false. Meyer [271, pp. 214]
Consider first a positive and comprehensive formulation of presentism which is comple-
mented by some clarifying further definitions, P: only the present exists, the past did
exist and the future will exist; the present is an unchanging temporal stage of the Uni-
verse whose all parts exist absolutely simultaneously; change and the passage of time
are transitions from one present into another; the present moments are in temporal and
causal succession.
P1 follows from P: to exist now and to be the present are the very same thing. P1 is
a strange negative formulation of something and fails to be a sufficient formulation of
presentism for it fails to state what exists: it only states what does not exist. As P1
is insufficient in the first place, it is not hard to turn it into a triviality. Also Deasy
[104] reviews various definitions of presentness and presentism, such as: always, every-
thing is present; always, everything exists now; always, everything always exists; always,
everything is a part of a maximal slim object that includes as a part every event that is
occurring now. Deasy maintains that these are all somehow problematic. The central
100See also Lombard [228] and Savitt [350].
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notion here is that it is more progressive to stick with an unambiguous and compre-
hensive definition of presentism, than to give a list of ambiguous and incomprehensive
definitions are review their problems. Once again, Meyer [272, p. 68] maintains that the
definition ‘nothing exists now that is not present’ is trivial, for it states “that everything
that exists now, exists now. Everybody must accept this thesis, irrespective of their
views about the metaphysics of time.” Although trivial and ambiguous definitions can
be given, these do not threaten the validity of the comprehensive definition.
Once definitional ambiguities and charges of triviality along with them have been re-
placed by the comprehensive definition, the focus may be turned on the allegation of
falsity, which relies on the conception that past objects cannot function as truthmakers
in presentism. This allegation was resolved in §6.6. In sum, the trivial-or-false argu-
ment turned out as a charge against ambiguous definitions or charge against non-present
truthmakers -argument.
6.9 Summary
OBC was built by defining various concepts in terms of EUO: proposition; true propo-
sition; correspondence; truthbearer; truthmaker. The coherence theory of truth is alone
empirically insufficient and incompatible with OBC, but its applicable ingredients were
incorporated in OBC by the coherence theorem of correspondence truths. The prag-
matic theory of truth alone is empirically insufficient and incompatible with OBC, but
its applicable ingredients were incorporated by a classification of useful beliefs in terms
of OBC. The non-descriptivist views were shown to be compatible with OBC.
Facts and states of affairs can be applied as truthmakers in a correspondence theory if
these are objects or their properties, but they do not provide special advantages with
respect to objects. If facts are true ideas, then fact-based correspondence does not work
as such, but can be translated into deduction based on known truths that works in the
context of OBC. Deflationism, the identity theory and primitivism are not even intended
as empirically sufficient theories of truth, and their correct roles are best understood by
first accepting OBC as the primary theory of truth. Thereby, the deflationist theories
could be seen as schemes of classifying what is supposed to be true in an arbitrary
context, disregarding whether it is true or false in OBC. The only intelligible version of
the identity theory —that does not make thoughts objects nor vice versa— is a version
of deflationism, so it does not have to be analyzed separately. It is hard to find anything
applicable from primitivism in the context of OBC, but it is a natural result of the culture
of uneconomical pluralism: hands are raised in the air in the face of the unresolved
allegations against the correspondence theory that should be taken as primary, and as
a way out truthmaking properties are invented out of the air. In contrast, the way in
which OBC resolves arguments targeted against the correspondence theory (or theories)
speaks of the efficiency of the method of economical unification.
(i) The argument that correspondence leads into skepticism about the external world does
not have force as OBC is defined in terms of EUO where ontological realism especially
postulates the external world, and where an empirically sufficient version of solipsism
is at best practically equivalent with ontological realism. This reminds of the clarifying
nature of the method, where the solipsism-realism debate is on level of ontology, not on
the level of applications.
(ii) The argument that the correspondence relation is mysterious resulted from confusing
it with a relation of influence such as gravitation.
(iii) The question of how correspondence is accounted for in a scientific framework and
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Putnam’s queries about assertability were answered: (a) there are no viable alternatives
to accepting that perceptions yield verified beliefs which correspond; (b) scientific theo-
ries are built to explain verified beliefs and to give verifiable predictions; (c) there are no
viable alternatives to accepting that the verified predictions of theories correspond; (d)
the correspondence of metaphysical postulates of theories cannot be verified, but they
are taken in account when evaluating competing theories by economy; (e) there are no
economical reasons to deny that the only possible ideal theory is true.
(iv) The slingshot argument only reminds that parts of the Universe and all parts of a
single temporal stage of the Universe are causally connected, and that all parts are not
relevant truthmakers when a proposition is pointed at a tiny part.
(v) The abundancy argument shows that leaving temporal mappings open leads into con-
fusions, whereas unambiguous conceptions of time and possibility and the notion that
truthbearing ideas are properties of objects which are realized at certain locations at
certain times resolve confusions.
(vi) The allegations about past and future truthmakers and cross-time relations resulted
from not taking presentism seriously and from trying to impose a truthmaking princi-
ple that does not fit with presentism. These allegations were exhausted by formulating
a truthmaking principle which is compatible with presentism. That the past and the
present function as truthmakers also for propositions targeted at the future reminds that
OBC and the given theory of modalities overlap and complement one another.
(vii) The funny fact arguments result from formulating propositions ambiguously and
then maintaining that this requires funny facts, whereas plain common sense requires
that a meaningful proposition must be formulated in a way that it can be understood,
and then its truth conditions can be investigated. Propositions that are involved with
counterfactuals and conditionals also remind that OBC is inseparable from the given
theory of modalities.
OBC can be justifiably called a unified theory of truth. It was built by defining mutu-
ally compatible concepts in terms of an economically unified ontology; it is empirically
sufficient, unambiguous and easily understandable; it incorporates applicable ingredients
of other theories of truth; it manages to resolve the central arguments targeted against
it. Compare the unified approach to the current situation in the field. According to
the PhilPapers survey, when 1803 philosophy faculty members and/or PhDs were given
three options —correspondence, deflationary, epistemic— 48.9% accept or lean toward
correspondence, 23.0% accept or lean toward deflationary, and 10.9% accept or lean to-
ward epistemic. If progress is the goal, then the most promising path is the switch from
competing theories into a unified theory that in any case does all jobs of the previously
competing theories. This saves from unnecessary controversy that results from dealing
with theories that are thought to compete when in reality they do not, and this enables
investing more time and efforts on advanced topics.
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7 Definition: Modalities
This section complements the unified theory by modalities: an unambiguous modal
proposition states that it is possible, contingent, necessary or impossible from the as-
pect of one time that an object has certain properties at a target time. The general form
of a modal proposition can be represented accordingly as (α, O, τ)=M , where α is the
aspect time, τ is the target time, O is the object with certain properties at target time τ ,
and M is a modality. Von Wright’s [418] equivalent notation MαOτ is used whenever it
is more convenient. The modal proposition “it is possible from the aspect of time α that
object O will be realized at time τ” is thus written either as (α, O, τ)=possible, or as
possibleαOτ . Modalities defined in terms of aspect and target times are called diachronic
modalities.101
The scope is on propositions which have a genuine importance in the contexts of natural
science and typical human social behaviour. In the most typical assessments the goal is
to guess correctly from the aspect of the present time what will happen at some more
or less specific time in the future and what happened during some period of time in the
past. Among typical assessments about the future are assessments about the weather,
the outcome of a war, the outcome of political elections, etc. Among typical assessments
about the past are assessments about what some person or people did in the past and
more generally about how the present came about. Consider how the unified theory
functions in the focal contexts.
First, modal proposition P is given with an arbitrary combination of α,O, τ,M . Second,
the unified theory gives the knowledge of which temporal stages of the Universe (TSUs)
qualify as the truthmakers/falsemakers of P. For instance, suppose that it is deduced
based on the unified theory that the truthmaker/falsemaker of P was realized on January
in the year 2016. This is where the application of the unified theory ends and where
epistemology takes over. It is asked which objects in January 2016 seem to be probable
candidates of being the truthmakers/falsemakers of P. After this empirical inquiry takes
over: the present is investigated in order to find traces of the events that took place in
January 2016, which would verify or falsify P.
The other primary function of the unified theory is to serve as a nexus which unifies
different aspects to the topic of modality. As always, these aspects are incorporated
in the unified theory by definitions in terms of EUO. It will be shown that the unified
theory is sufficient for dealing with contemplations about counterfactuals, fictions, logical
possibilities and epistemic possibilities, and that it can be seen as an application of
possible worlds semantics in the context of presentism and the causality axiom. The
causal structure of the Universe has been applied as a foundation of a theory of modalities
by Briggs and Forbes [59, ch. 1], McCall [255, chs. 4-5, pp. 88-92] and Belnap [46]. This
section complements their work and suggest presentism as a simpler foundation.
7.1 Deducing Truthmakers of Modal Propositions
In EUO the Universe is a single non-branching sequence of temporal stages (TSUs) which
are in a forward directed temporal and causal succession. The past TSUs have been
realized in the past, the present TSU is realized now, and future TSUs will be realized
101According to Knuuttila [205], diachronic modality is “the model of antecedent necessities and possi-
bilities with respect to a certain moment of time.” See also Knuuttila [203]. See Von Wright’s definition
of the diachronic-synchronic dichotomy in p. 166.
160
one at a time. This portion of EUO suffices in giving an account of the truthmaker TSUs
of a modal proposition with an arbitrary combination of aspect and target times. Table A
represents nine combinations which are the nine (α, τ) pairs where α, τ ∈ {past, present,
future}. The deduction of the truthmakers is started from the most common propositions
(1-3). After this the general rule of deducing the truthmaker for all combinations (1-9)
is presented.
aspect time α target time τ
1. present past
2. present present
3. present future
4. past past
5. past present
6. past future
7. future past
8. future present
9. future future
Table A: 9 combinations of aspect and target times.
1. aspect=present; target=future. In perhaps the most common modal propo-
sitions the aspect time is the present and the target time is in the future. Consider the
first example: It is possible from the aspect of the present time that it will rain tomorrow
in Helsinki. In this proposition the aspect time is the present time p, the target time
is f tomorrow, O=it rains in Helsinki and M=possible. The proposition can be repre-
sented as (p, O, f)=possible. If the proposition is true what is its truthmaker, and if it
is false what is its falsemaker? The answer is: TSU p. For, in EUO the TSUs are in
a forward directed temporal and causal succession, and therefore TSU p is the cause of
the TSUs that come after it, i.e., TSU p determines102 which TSUs are realizable in the
future. Realizability in the future is equivalent with future possibility. For instance, the
present TSU p determines which TSUs are realizable at time p + 1: those TSUs which
are realizable at p+ 1 from the aspect of p are possible at p+ 1 from the aspect of p.
In the following, when p ≤ f , {p → f} denotes the collection which contains all TSUs
that are realizable at the target time f from the aspect of p. The truth value of (p, O,
f)=possible is determined by {p→ f}. If the proposition is true, then O corresponds to
at least one element of {p → f}. If the proposition is false, then O corresponds to no
element of {p→ f}. Note that the expression ‘O corresponds to an element of {p→ f}’
is a figure of speech which means that the proposition (p, O, f)=possible corresponds to
TSU p, for p determines the contents of {p → f}, i.e., p is the genuine truthmaker of
the proposition. Consider (p, O, f)=M with each modality M.
possibility: (p, O, f)=possible is true if and only if O corresponds to at least one
element of {p → f}; (p, O, f)=possible is false if and only if O corresponds to no
element of {p→ f}.
necessity: (p, O, f)=necessary is true if and only if O corresponds to all elements
of {p → f}; (p, O, f)=necessary is false if and only if there is at least one element in
{p→ f} to which O does not correspond.
impossibility: (p, O, f)=impossible is true if and only if O corresponds to no element
of {p → f}; (p, O, f)=impossible is false if and only if there is at least one element in
{p→ f} to which O corresponds.
102The meaning of ‘determines’ is further qualified in §7.2: TSU p determines the future disregarding
if total determinism or partial determinism holds.
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contingency: (p, O, f)=contingent is true if and only if O corresponds to one or
more but not to all elements of {p → f}; (p, O, f)=contingent is false if and only if O
corresponds either to all elements of {p→ f} or to no element of {p→ f}.
The above scenario is shown to be an application of possible worlds semantics in §7.5,
and it is compatible with how Divers [110, pp. 3-4] interrelates modalities:
possibility rules out impossibility, allows contingency and necessity.
necessity requires possibility, rules out impossibility and contingency.
impossibility rules out possibility, necessity and contingency.
contingency requires possibility, rules out impossibility and necessity.
Although the truthmaker/falsemaker is known to be p, truth values of modal proposition
about the future are often strictly speaking not known, even when it seems to be ex-
tremely probable that they are true, for often we cannot predict with absolute certainty
that these are true.
2. & 3. aspect=present; target=past or present. In EUO, the past has
already been realized in exactly one way: the past is not realizable any longer and
cannot be influenced from the present. Both of the following propositions are equivalent
with the proposition that X was realized in the past at time p−1: X was possibly realized
in the past at time p− 1 from the aspect of the present p; X was necessarily realized in
the past at time p − 1 from the aspect of the present p. Also the present is necessarily
realized from the aspect of the present, i.e., the past was and the present is necessarily
realized from the aspect of the present.103 Consider the proposition S=It is possible today
that it rained in Helsinki in 1100, which can be represented as (p, It rains in Helsinki,
1100)=possible, and where 1100 denotes an instantial moment in the year 1100. As the
past has already been realized, the collection {p → 1100} contains exactly one TSU,
1100, which is the truthmaker/falsemaker of S. If S is true, then it did rain in Helsinki
in 1100, and also (p, It rains in Helsinki, 1100)=necessary is true. If it did not rain in
Helsinki in 1100, then S is false, whereas (p, It rains in Helsinki, 1100)=impossible is
true. In this sense nothing about the actual past is contingent.104 Propositions whose
aspect and target times are both present are equivalent with propositions whose aspect
time is the present and target time is the past, with the exception that the present is
real while the past was real: that object Y is possibly realized at p from the aspect of p
is equivalent with that Y is necessarily realized at p from the aspect of p.
In sum, when the aspect time is the present p and the target time τ ≤ p, it follows that
{p→ τ} contains exactly one TSU. When p = τ , the collection {p→ τ} contains exactly
103That past existence is necessary from the present aspect is characterized by Rice [333]: “Is what
is true of the past necessary? Well certainly pretty well everyone thinks that what happened in the
past cannot be undone. The past cannot now be altered.” But, given partial determinism, the present
and the past could have been differently (§7.3). Aristotle’s notion that the present is necessary (On
Interpretation, 19a23-7) is congenial with the presentist-diachronic view of possibility, and this does not
require total determinism. For, although the present exists necessarily from the present aspect p, this
does not entail that p could not have been different from the aspect of a time before p. Compare to
Knuuttila [205]: “Another interpretation is that Aristotle wanted to show that the necessity of an event
at a certain time does not imply that it would have been antecedently necessary.” The necessity of
the past reflects step (1) of the Master Argument of Diodorus Cronus, whereas step (3) reflects partial
determinism as will be revealed in §7.2: (1) every past truth must be necessary; (2) an impossibility
does not follow from a possibility; (3) something is possible which neither is nor will be true. (2) can
be interpreted in may ways; see Akama et al. [6] for different guesses of what it may mean.
104Again, in the context of partial determinism some propositions of the form something that was not
realized in the past could have been realized in the past are true as they do not concern the actual past,
whereas in the context of total determinism all such propositions are false (§7.3).
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one TSU τ which is realized. When p > τ , the collection {p → τ} contains exactly one
TSU τ which was realized. Consider the two cases with all modalities:
possibility: (p, O, τ ≤ p)=possible is true if and only if O corresponds to at least one
element of {p→ τ ≤ p}, i.e., to its only element.
necessity: (p, O, τ ≤ p)=necessary is true if and only if O corresponds to all elements
of {p→ τ ≤ p}, i.e., to its only element.
impossibility: (p, O, τ ≤ p)=impossible is true if and only if O does not corresponds
to the single element of {p→ τ ≤ p}.
contingency: (p, O, τ ≤ p)=contingent is true if and only if O corresponds to one or
more but not to all elements of {p→ τ ≤ p}, i.e., it is never true.
cases 1. - 9. The classification gets slightly more complex. As in combination 4 α
and τ are both in the past and as in 9 α and τ are both in the future, there are three
sub-combinations in both cases: α > τ ; α = τ ; α < τ . These combinations are written
out in table B, as well as the TSUs which are the truthmakers of the propositions. When
partial determinism is supposed, the truth value of some propositions is indeterminate
and therefore we are dealing with indeterminate-makers as well as with truthmakers and
falsemakers. Accordingly, the term truth-value-maker is used in the remainder of this
section. The general rule is straightforward: the truth-value-maker is always the earliest
of α, τ, p. This reminds that in presentism the present is always the ultimate viewpoint.
past present future truth-value-maker
1. τ α τ
2. α = τ α = τ = p
3. α τ α = p
4.1 α < τ α
4.2 α = τ α = τ
4.3 τ < α τ
5. α τ α
6. α τ α
7. τ α τ
8. τ α τ = p
9.1 α < τ p
9.2 α = τ p
9.3 τ < α p
Table B: 13 combinations of aspect and target times and truth-value-makers.
In cases 1, 2, 4.2, 4.3, 7 and 8 the target time τ is the earliest and it has been realized; as
these propositions state that a part of TSU τ has certain properties, τ determines their
truth values and is thus their truth-value-maker.
In cases 2, 3, 4.1, 4.2, 5 and 6 the aspect time α is the earliest and it has been realized;
as these propositions state that TSU α has certain properties —that it makes or made
this and that necessary, contingent or impossible— α determines their truth values and
is thus their truth-value-maker.
In cases 2, 3, 8, 9.1, 9.2 and 9.3 p is the earliest and it is realized; as these propositions
state that TSU p has certain properties —that it makes or made this and that necessary,
contingent or impossible— p determines their truth values and is thus their truth-value-
maker.
In sum, EUO implies which TSU is the truth-value-maker of all 13 types of propositions,
including propositions whose truth value is indeterminate. In some of the cases τ = α,
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in some cases τ = p, in some cases α = p and in one case α = τ = p, but the general
rule stands.
7.2 Partial and Total Determinism. Diachronic vs. Synchronic
Modalities
The mutually exclusive versions of determinism are qualifications of the causality axiom
which states that the TSUs are in a forward directed causal succession, i.e., qualifications
of how the present p determines what is realizable at p+1, p+2, p+3, and so on. Total
determinism is depicted on the top of figure 20 and partial determinism on the bottom.105
(The dichotomy of ‘total determinism’ and ‘partial determinism’ is applied instead of e.g.
the dichotomy of ‘determinism’ and ‘indeterminism’ because the total-partial dichotomy
characterises the intended meanings very well: in both cases the present clearly affects
the future in some degree and therefore the term ‘indeterminism’ would be misleading.)
Figure 20: Total determinism on the top and partial determinism on the bottom.
future in total determinism:106 the present TSU p totally determines the unique
TSU which will be realized at p + 1. As p + 1 totally determines p + 2, as p+ 2 totally
determines p + 3, and so forth, it follows that p totally determines all TSUs that will
be realized after p. In total determinism, if TSU x is possibly realized at p + 1 from
the aspect of p, x is necessarily realized at p + 1. Accordingly, if it is possible that
TSU x is not realized at p + 1 from the aspect of p, then it is necessary that x is not
realized at p+1, i.e., it is impossible that x is realized at p+1. This means that in total
determinism no future possibility is contingent. The future time x can be equated with
the TSU that will be realized at time x, and the period of time [p+ 1 x] can be equated
with the sequence p+1, p+2, . . ., x of TSUs which will be realized in the future. In total
determinism, the past and the future are equally determined.
future in partial determinism: the present TSU p determines totally the collection
of all TSUs which are realizable at p + 1. This collection is denoted as {p → p + 1}.
Similarly for later times: p determines totally the collection {p→ p+2} of all TSUs which
are realizable at p + 2, i.e., p determines all realizable chains or unbroken sequences of
causally connected TSUs which start from p. While the elements of {p→ p+2} are single
TSUs which are realizable at p+2 from the aspect of p, a separate notation for sequences
105Both options are contemplated because it turned out difficult to make a selection between them
by economy. Although total determinism clashes with genuine free will (Honderich [172]), e.g. Wegner
[409] notes that free will might be just an illusion, and this would be compatible with total determinism.
On one hand, partial determinism does not require that the experience of free will is an illusion, but on
the other hand partial determinism is more complex than total.
106Total determinism is analogous to causal determinism or “the idea that every event is necessitated
by antecedent events and conditions together with the laws of nature” (Hoefer [171]) and it is compatible
with the definitions of e.g. James [183], Thomason [395] and Moya [280, p. 130].
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is sometimes handy: {[p→ p+2]} contains all chains of TSUs which are realizable at p+2
from the aspect of p. As in partial determinism it is not determined at the present which
TSUs will be realized in the future, the future time x can be equated with the collection
{p → x}. The period of time [p x] can be equated with the collection of sequences
{[p → x]}. In partial determinism it is necessary that some element of {p → p + 1}
will be realized at time p+ 1 and in this sense the future is necessary, but no individual
element of {p → p + 1} is necessarily realized at time p + 1.107 Partial determinism
thus allows future contingents (§7.3). If the Universe is partially deterministic, then
future possibilities branch. Naturalism implies that the Universe does not branch: only
possibilities do, and only if partial determinism holds.108 Kripke’s illustration in figure
21 and his explanation are compatible with diachronic modalities in EUO:
The point 0 (or origin) is the present, and the points 1, 2, and 3 (of rank 2) are the
possibilities for the next moment. If the point 1 actually does come to pass, 4, 5, and
6 are its possible successors, and so on. The whole tree then represents the entire set of
possibilities for present and future; and every point determines a subtree consisting of its
own present and future. Letter from Saul Kripke to A.N. Prior, dated September 3, 1958,
kept in the Prior Collection at Bodleian Library, Oxford, Box 4. As quoted in Øoslash
and Hasle [299]
Figure 21: Kripke’s illustration of partial determinism.
asymptotical determinism. In asymptotical determinism, the realization of a partic-
ular at time t implies that a particular which is an element of a more or less homogeneous
collection of realizable particulars, will be realized at some more or less specific time after
t. Earman commits to partial determinism:
A feature can be said to be asymptotically fated if it emerges in the limit as time goes on far
enough. . . . I take it, for instance, that the laws of biology dictate that I am naturalistically
fated to die; but I also take it that the particular time and manner of my death are not
fated by any of the laws of nature. Earman [117, p. 18]
For comparison, Aristotle’s (Metaphysics 1027b10-14) statement “it is necessary that he
who lives shall one day die” is alone compatible with both partial and total determinism,
but it is seen that Aristotle presupposes partial determinism as he states: “But whether
he dies by disease or by violence, is not yet determined, but depends on the happening
of something else.”
107Another interrelated approach to future necessity is that that what is from the aspect of p necessarily
realized at p+ 1 is what is common to every element of {p→ p+ 1}.
108It is crucial to understand the difference of partial determinism in EUO which directly entails that
only future possibilities branch and e.g. Belnap’s [46] branching space-time theory where the branching
of possibilities means that all branches literally exist in some substantive sense (§7.4).
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diachronic vs. synchronic modalities. Von Wright’s [419, p. 92-3] characteri-
sations of diachronic modalities are largely compatible with the unified theory, such as:
“By a set of possible histories up to t we shall mean all the alternative ways in which
the world from its actual state at time t′ in the past might have developed up to time
t.” Von Wright uses the diachronic-synchronic dichotomy as follows:
I shall say that ≪Mtpt ≫ expresses a synchronic modality meaning that the attribution
of modal status is for the same time as the possible truth of the proposition to which the
modal status is attributed. And I shall say that ≪ Mt′pt ≫ in the formula expresses
diachronic modality because of the temporal difference between the asserted validity of
the attribution of the modal status and the possible truth of the proposition whose modal
status is involved. Von Wright [418, p. 43]
In the context of the unified theory, the synchronic-diachronic dichotomy is not onto-
logical nor logical: in a synchronic modal statement the statement and target times are
the same, whereas in a diachronic modal statement they are different, but the logic and
ontology of both types of statements is the same. In contrast, Von Wright [418] is deal-
ing with two different logical systems, and he does not give clear ontological groundings
for neither. Modalities in the below equations are complemented as follows in order to
distinguish Von Wright’s definitions (1-3) from those of the unified theory:
s: Von Wright’s synchronic expression.
su: synchronic expression in the unified theory.
d: diachronic expression.
(1) s.possibletOt = ∃t
′ < t(d.possiblet′Ot).
(1’) su.possibletOt = Ot&∃t
′ < t(d.possiblet′Ot).
In (1), it is s.possible at t that O is realized at t, if and only if (iff) some time before t
it was d.possible that O will be realized at t. (1) does not fully capture the meaning of
(1’). It must be added that O was or is or will be realized at t. When t is the present,
O is realized now. When t is in the past, O was realized in the past. When t is in the
future, O will be realized in the future, i.e., if (1’) is true and t is in the future, then
d.possibletOt = Ot&d.necessaryt′<tOt.
(2) s.strongly necessarytOt = ∀t
′ < t(d.necessaryt′Ot).
(2’) su.necessarytOt = Ot&∃t
′ < t(d.possiblet′Ot).
In (2), O is realized s.strongly-necessarily at t, iff at all times t′ < t it was d.necessary
that O will be realized at t. (2) is incompatible with (2’), where su.necessarytOt is
equivalent with su.possibletOt, i.e., as in (1’).
(3) s.weakly necessarytOt = ∃t
′ < t(d.necessaryt′Ot).
(3’) su.necessarytOt = Ot&∃t
′ < t(d.possiblet′Ot).
In (3), O is realized s.weakly-necessarily at t, iff there exists at least one time t′ < t
when it is d.necessary that O will be realized at t. (3) is incompatible with (3’), where
su.necessarytOt is equivalent with su.possibletOt, i.e., as in (1’-2’).
Von Wright (ibid. pp. 46-8) concludes that the logic of his synchronic modalities is S5
and that of diachronic modalities is S4 or S4-like. The unified theory is compatible with
the reduction formula of S4 but not with that of S5, where t1 < t2 < t3.
S4 reduction: d.possiblet1d.possiblet2Ot3 → d.possiblet1Ot3
S5 reduction: d.possiblet1d.impossiblet2Ot3 → d.impossiblet2Ot3
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The reduction formula of S4 holds in the unified theory, for if d.possiblet2Ot3 is true,
then d.possiblet1Ot3 is true for all times t1 < t2. The reduction formula of S5 does not
hold in the unified theory, for the truth of d.possiblet1d.impossiblet2Ot3 does not imply
that d.impossiblet2Ot3 is true.
7.3 Future Contingents, Counterfactuals, Conditionals, Prob-
abilities
future contingents. The fusion of EUO and partial determinism implies that var-
ious propositions of the form (present p, O, future)=contingent are true. Consider the
propositions:
Q: (p, It rains in Helsinki, tomorrow)=contingent
X1: It will rain tomorrow in Helsinki; (p, It rains in Helsinki, tomorrow)109
Suppose that Q is true. In this case, X1 is not true nor false at the present. Likewise,
its negation ‘It will not rain tomorrow in Helsinki’ is not true nor false at the present.
Briggs and Forbes arrive at the same conclusion:
Exactly one day into the future, there will be a sea battle. . . . Sometimes, the past, the
present, and the laws of nature are not enough to settle whether there will be a sea battle
one day into the future. . . . If something is not settled by the past, the present, and the
laws of nature, then it is not settled. Where nothing in the world settles whether a sentence
is true or false, that sentence must not have a truth value—there is no truth without some
sort of truthmaking. Briggs and Forbes [59, ch. 2]
The principle of bivalence (BI) and the law of the excluded middle (LEM) do not hold for
propositions such as X1 in EUO. According to BI every declarative sentence expressing a
proposition has exactly one truth value, either true or false. If partial determinism holds,
BI does not hold for propositions such as X1 and its negation. According to LEM, for any
proposition, either that proposition is true, or its negation is true. If partial determinism
holds, LEM does not hold for propositions such as X1 for X1 is not true and its negation is
not true. But this does not mean that the law of non-contradiction is violated: whatever
is ever realized is realized in exactly one way, but partial determinism entails that it is
partially open what will be realized at some future time. In sum, the violation of LEM
and BI is only another way of formulating the commitment to partial determinism in
the context of EUO. According to Øoslash and Hasle [299], Jan Lukasiewicz advocated
rejection of the principle of bivalence in discussing the topic already in 1920’s and that
such interpretation had been formulated already by the Epicureans. Knuuttila [204]
reveals that the topic has been discussed since the age of Aristotle.
There are many approaches future contingents. Akama et al. [5, pp. 1,3] classify three
approaches: (1) the paraconsistent approach where a proposition may be both true and
false; (2) the partial approach with the truth value ‘indeterminate’ and which is subdi-
vided in (2.1) partial semantics and (2.2) partial tense logic which “is based on some
partial logic like three-valued logic.” E.g. Ciuni and Proietti [87] explore a paracon-
sistent approach where “statements about the future do not lack truth-value, but may
109A modality was not written out in X1, but it can be translated into a form where the modality is
written out, the meaning preserved, such as X2: (α ≥ τ , It rains in Helsinki, tomorrow τ)=possible, or
X3: (α ≥ τ , It rains in Helsinki, tomorrow τ)=necessary. X1-3 have exactly the same meaning when
these are analyzed from the aspect of the present p < τ : they all propose that it will rain in Helsinki at
τ , and therefore they propose that this is possible at p, but they leave open whether this is contingent
or necessary at p.
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instead be glutty, that is both true and false.” Briggs and Forbes [59] evaluate three ap-
proaches: a supervaluationist approach which belongs to class (2.1); an approach inspired
by Lukasiewicz’s three-valued logic and an intuitionist approach which both belong to
class (2.2). Any unambiguous mapping of logic or semantics to EUO can be applied, but
the partial tense logic approach with three-valued logic is very straightforward.
counterfactuals. As in EUO objects are all that ever exist, a counterfactual is not
an object. Instead, a proposition of the form ‘X is not realized at time τ ’ is equivalent
with the proposition ‘X is a counterfactual at time τ .’ ‘Counterfactual’ has thereby
been defined in terms of EUO. If counterfactuals are figuratively used as truthmak-
ers of propositions of the form something that was not realized at time τ could have been
realized at τ , this means that something which actually was realized is the genuine truth-
maker. Consider six110 examples of propositions whose surface structures are involved
with counterfactuals. In all examples the times are related as α < present p ≤ τ .
(i) X does not exist at p but X was realizable at p from the aspect of α. If (i) is true,
then X is not a part of TSU p, but is a part of at least one element of {α → p}. α is
thus the truthmaker/falsemaker of (i). In examples (ii-iv) it is supposed that (i) is true.
(ii): (i) & if X would have been realized at p, then Y would have been realized necessarily
at τ . (ii) is true if and only if all elements of {α → p} whose part X is, are such that
they determine that Y will be necessarily realized at τ . α is the truthmaker/falsemaker
of (ii).
(iii): (i) & if X would have been realized at p, then Y would have been realized at τ .
(iii) is true if and only if all elements of {α → p} whose part X is, are such that they
determine that Y will be necessarily realized at τ . (iii) is false if and only if all elements
of {α → p} whose part X is, are such that they determine that it is impossible that
Y will be realized at τ . Otherwise (iii) is indeterminate; this case with the truth value
indeterminate is analogous to the above case with future contingents. In all cases, α is
the truthmaker/falsemaker/indeterminate-maker of (iii).
(iv): (i) & if X would have been realized at p, then it would have been possible that
Y will be realized at τ . (iv) is true if and only if all elements of {α → p} whose
part X is, are such that they determine that Y will be possibly realized at τ . (iv)
is false if and only if all elements of {α → p} whose part X is, are such that they
determine that Y will not be realized at τ . Otherwise (iv) is indeterminate. α is thus
the truthmaker/falsemaker/indeterminate-maker of (iv).
(v): X does not exist at p and X was not realizable at p from the aspect of α. (v) is
true if and only if X is not a part of any element of {α → p}. If so, X is an impossible
particular at p from the aspect of α. It is supposed in (vi) that (v) is true.
(vi): (v) & if X would have been realized at p, then Y would have been realized at τ .
In this case the counterfactual analysis makes sense only as a fiction. For, asking What
if something which has not even been a possibility would have been realized in any case?
is not intelligible unless one contemplates about pure fictions. Useful fictions do not
require transcendism (§7.6). If it is not known that X is an impossible particular, then
the case can be analyzed similarly as case (iii).
conditional propositions. Ku¨nne [210, p. 111-2] targets a funny-fact argument
(§6.7) against object-based correspondence, calling this the Procrustes Problem. He
takes a conditional proposition as an example: “(S) As it was rather cold, it may have
110Examples (ii-iv) are inspired by Lewis [221, p. 2]: if it were the case that X, then it would be the
case that Y; if it were the case that X, then it might be the case that Y.
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been snowing for many hours. Take any utterance of (S): which property could be said
to be ascribed in this utterance to which object(s)?” The truthmakers of (S) can be
explicated without difficulties when object-based correspondence is complemented with
modalities and temporal mappings. It is supposed that (S) has the following meaning:
‘it was’ refers to some more or less specific location within some period of time [x y]
from the past time x to the past or present time y, and this location-time is denoted
as L; ‘rather cold’ means something below zero; ‘it may have been snowing for many
hours’ means that from the aspect of time x− 1 it is possible that it will snow for many
hours in L. Given these assumptions, (S) may be translated into an unambiguous modal
proposition which is stated at time y ≤ present and which is targeted at the interval
[x − 1 y]: the temperature was below zero in L and it was possible from the aspect of
x− 1 that it will snow for many hours in L. In other words, (S) can be translated as (A
and B) where A=‘the temperature was below zero in L’ and B=‘it was possible from the
aspect of x − 1 that it will snow for many hours in L.’ If A is false then (S) is false. If
A is true the attention may be turned to B, whose truthmaker/falsemaker is a part of
the TSU which was realized at x − 1. In sum, Ku¨nne’s question about the truthmaker
object has been answered: it is the fusion of the property below zero which belongs to L,
and the property makes snowing possible for several hours in L which belongs to some
part of TSU x− 1.
probabilistic propositions. As all propositions, also probabilistic propositions can
be targeted at the past, present or future, such as E whose aspect time is the present
p and which is targeted at the future time f : E=There is at least a 50% chance that
Peter will be the president at f . TSU p determines totally the collection {p → f} of
all TSUs which are realizable at f from the aspect of p. E is true if and only if Peter
is the president in 50% or more of the elements of {p → f}; otherwise E is false. This
straightforward probability mapping is basically the same as McCall’s [255, chs. 4-5, pp.
88-92], except for the differences in EUO and McCall’s shrinking tree view (§7.5).
7.4 EUO vs. Alternative Ontological Foundations for Diachronic
Modalities
Four alternative naturalist ontological foundations of diachronic modalities are depicted
in figure 22. These are fusions of different axiom for temporal existence with naturalism,
partial determinism and forward directed temporal and causal succession.111 It was
concluded in §4.4 that presentism is the most economical axiom for temporal existence
as such. The economy of EUO is revealed very clearly when coupling its competitors
with partial determinism. The alternatives of presentism are reviewed from the newest
to the oldest, where a newer alternative happens to be more economical than an older:
the 2012 version of the growing-block theory by Briggs and Forbes [59]; the 1994 version
of the moving spotlight theory by McCall [255] which he calls the shrinking tree theory;
the 1992 version of eternalism by Belnap [46] which he calls the branching space-time.
briggs and forbes’ growing-block theory. The growing-block theory is the
closest to presentism, as their only ontological difference is that in presentism the past
does not exist while in the growing-block theory the past does exist. Briggs and Forbes
[59, ch. 1.4] seem to presuppose partial determinism and they denote future possibilities
111None of the reviewed alternatives except EUO commit directly to absolute simultaneity and therefore
they do not commit directly to causal succession of temporal stages of the Universe either, although
they do commit to some versions of forward directed causal succession, as in all versions the earlier
determines the later.
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Figure 22: Theories of temporal existence coupled with partial determinism. The round
dot represents the objective present which exists in all A-theories. The solid black lines
represent what exists (in addition to the present). The dashed lines represent future
possibilities. The dotted lines represent what have been possibilities from the aspect of
a past time but which are not possibilities at the present. The starred line in presentism
represents what was realized in the past but is not realized at the present.
as feasible timelines: “For all that the world determines, any feasible timeline might be
actualized in the future, but the world does not determine which feasible timeline will be
actualized in the future.” They do not directly state that the past and the present cause
the future, but as they do maintain that everything is settled by the past, the present
and the laws of nature, this seems to be their background idea:
But according to the Growing-Block theory, there is nothing but the past, the present, and the laws
of nature. If something is not settled by the past, the present, and the laws of nature, then it is not
settled. Where nothing in the world settles whether a sentence is true or false, that sentence must not
have a truth value—there is no truth without some sort of truthmaking. . . . There are (or could be)
propositions about the future whose truth values are not settled by the past, the present, and the laws of
nature. For Growing-Block theorists, this means that there are (or could be) propositions whose truth
values are not settled at all. Briggs and Forbes [59, ch. 2]
Apart from the difference to presentism, Briggs and Forbes’ growing-block theory looks
very much like the unified theory of possibility. Briggs and Forbes do not defend the
growing-block theory against the central arguments targeted against it, whereas pre-
sentism is defended exhaustively in this thesis. They do not give an account of the
truthmakers with an arbitrary modal statement, i.e., the unified theory is worked out
further also in the truthmaking sense, whereas they concentrate more on formalism and
logic. It will be emphasised below how Briggs and Forbes take full advantage of the
uneconomicality of McCall’s version of the moving spotlight theory with respect to their
growing-block theory, for this underlines that as much advantage can be taken out of the
uneconomicality of the growing-block theory with respect to presentism.
McCall’s shrinking-tree theory. McCall [255, 256] aims to characterize the ontol-
ogy of the fusion of the Theory of Relativity —which entails eternalism (§5.6)— and the
many-worlds interpretation of quantum mechanics where the Universe branches. McCall
suggests a version of the moving spotlight theory, where the past, present and future
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exist, where only one non-branching past exists, and an absolute and moving present
exists. McCall thus couples an A-theory with the Theory of Relativity whereas Belnap
(below) couples it with a B-theory.
Unlike in presentism and the growing-block theory, also the future possibilities exist in
the shrinking-tree theory. The branching of the future starts from the present. The
present is moving, and some branches cease to exist as the time goes forward: the top of
the tree is shrinking in the sense that its branches are being cut off.112 Briggs and Forbes
attack McCall with Michael Tooley’s arguments, who in turn defends Broad’s [60] 1923
version of the growing-block theory against McCall’s theory:
McCall defines the present as the point at which branching occurs. So, unless there is
branching, there is no absolute present. This rules out the possibility of there being only
one feasible future, on McCall’s view, which means, as Tooley points out, the shrinking-
tree theory is incompatible with determinism. More than that, the Shrinking-Tree view
cannot cope with a world which is deterministic for five minutes, since time could not pass
for those five minutes, but rather would skip until the first branching-point. McCall’s view
rests on a strong claim, then: The laws of nature are, and always will be, indeterministic.
Such assumptions should be avoided if we can do the same work without them. Briggs
and Forbes [59, ch. 4.2]
Broad’s model of a dynamic world [the growing-block theory] seems preferable to McCall’s,
for at least two reasons. First, it allows one to make sense of the idea of dynamic worlds
that are deterministic, and this seems desirable, since deterministic worlds can, no less
than indeterministic ones, be worlds where states of affairs come into existence. Secondly,
given that a world containing no future states of affairs at all is rather more austere than
one that contains states of affairs corresponding to all future possibilities, Broad’s model
is also to be preferred on grounds of simplicity. Tooley [399, p. 239]
The shrinking-tree theory is compatible with partial determinism but has problems with
total determinism, whereas the growing-block theory and presentism are compatible with
both total and partial determinism and their mixtures. Again, the economy issue is taken
very seriously by Briggs and Forbes:
It is not just that McCall is committed to more than a Growing-Block theorist, but that
McCall is committed to any number of as yet unborn children, who continually drop out of
existence when they cease to become feasible. . . . On the Growing-Block something comes
into existence which rules out the possibility, whereas on the Shrinking-Tree the possibility
literally ceases to exist. This lends the Shrinking-Tree a destructive air. It might seem as
though we are all guilty of mass-murder for wiping all the possibilities that did exist out
of the universe. . . . it seems odd that we should treat our prize-winning first novels, which
we have not yet thought of and may never write as being just as real as the first short-
stories that we wrote at school. That is the sense in which it seems the Growing-Block
is more austere than the Shrinking-Tree. . . . The Growing-Block view does not need as
much, ontologically, as the Shrinking-Tree. Briggs and Forbes [59, ch. 4.2]
If the allegations about mass-murder are viable, then so should be allegations against the
growing-block theory such as that Briggs and Forbes are guilty of bringing eternal torture
to the victims of the Holocaust. Your every head ache and sorrow is eternal, as the past
exists. Although the growing-block theory is more economical than the shrinking-tree
theory, it is still uneconomical with respect to presentism. On one hand, the growing
block and the shrinking-tree theories fail to satisfy common-sense intuition where it is
unintelligible that the past and/or future exist. On the other hand, ‘common sense’ is
subjective and therefore an objective criterion is needed, which brings take case right
back to economy.
112McCall’s version where most of the previously existing branches cease to exist, differs from Deasy’s
[103, p. 2075] version with permanentism where “it is always the case that everything exists eternally.”
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a problem for growing-block and shrinking-tree theories. Merricks main-
tains that the growing-block theory requires further metaphysical postulates and Sider
maintains that the moving spotlight theory (and thus also the shrinking-tree theory) has
the same problem:113
For consider that you think “I am reading this paper at the present time.” If ‘the present
time’ refers to the growing edge of being, you ought to conclude that your own thought
is false. After all, given growing block, once you have a thought, you continue to have
that thought forever. That thought is on the growing edge of being for just the briefest
moment and is thereafter and forever not on the growing edge. As a result, the probability
that your thought is on the growing edge is vanishingly small. . . . Happily, there is a
. . . reply that does not imply that each and every thought explicitly about the present is
virtually always—and so almost certainly—false. This reply invokes the above distinction
between the objective present and the subjective present. Growing blockers should say
that Nero’s thoughts like “I am sitting here at the present time” are always about the
subjective present. Such thoughts can be true even though Nero is not at the growing
edge of being. Similarly, growing blockers should also say that nearly all of everyone else’s
thoughts about “the present” are about the subjective present too. Merricks [269, p. 105]
We believe that we exist in the present; indeed, we take ourselves to know this. But given
the spotlight theory, there are ever so many people, with similar evidence to our own,
who also think they are in the present but are wrong–they’re wrong because the times at
which they are located do not have monadic presentness. George Washington, for example,
thinks in 1776 that 1776 is present; we think, here in 2011, that 2011 is present... . . And our
evidence is no better than Washington’s . . . so it’s hard to believe that we’re more likely
to be right than Washington. . . . The spotlight theory leads to scepticism about whether
we’re in the present. Sider [359, p. 261]
In order to function properly the growing-block and moving spotlight theories require two
conceptions of the present: subjective and objective. The ‘subjective present’ moments
do not directly increase the metaphysical weights of these theories, for ‘subjective present’
is only a name for an existing non-present moment. However, the subjective present
moments have counter-intuitive implications, despite Deasy’s counter argument for the
defence of the moving spotlight theory (which can be used also in defending the growing-
block theory):
[T]he following is true given the moving spotlight theory (remember that ‘Presento’ names
the current instant): at some instant t in 1776, George Washington thinks that t is (abso-
lutely) present, and at Presento, Dan thinks that Presento is (absolutely) present. Now,
notice that there is no disagreement here: George Washington thinks as of t that t is
present and I think as of Presento that Presento is present. Given that every instant
is present relative to itself, as of our respective instants we are both right: t is indeed
present at t and Presento is indeed present at Presento. . . as the argument relies on the
premise that there is massive disagreement between individuals located at past, present,
and future instants about which instant is present . . . But as we have seen, there is no such
disagreement, and therefore no argument against the moving spotlight theory. Deasy [103,
pp. 2087-8]
Deasy maintains that there is no problem of disagreement, as a person in the past does
not have to think that she is experiencing the objective present: she thinks that she is
experiencing the objective present only when the moment she is experiencing happens
to be the objective present. This does not change the fact that while a presentists can
always rely that she is situated at the objective present, the growing-blockers and moving
spotlighters can never know whether they reside under the objective or a subjective
present. They must accept the following line of thought: “I experience change constantly,
113See also the argument of Bourne [55].
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but this does not indicate whether I am at the objective or at a subjective present. I do
not have to think that I am experiencing the objective present, for it suffices that I think
that I experience the objective present only when the moment I am experiencing happens
to be the objective present.” In other words, the growing block and moving spotlight
theories are A-theories where the objective present explains the passage of time, but they
also have the subjective present moments, which result in the unwanted state where you
can never know whether you are situated at the present moment.
Moreover, these theories also seem to require subjective moving present moments or
something that does their jobs. For, people at all subjective present moments experi-
ence the passage of time similarly as people at the objective present, but the objective
present explains only the experiences of people at the objective present. Therefore, e.g.
subjective-moving-presents are needed in explaining the passage of time as the transition
from one subjective present into another. In sum, the growing block and moving spotlight
theories are A-theories where the objective present explains the passage of the objective
present into another objective present, but the objective present does not explain most
of the cases, i.e., all cases where people at a subjective present experience the passage
of time. So, how should George Washington explain the change he is experiencing, and
how should I? Some parameter is needed, which increases the weights of the growing
block and moving spotlight theories.
belnap’s branching space-time. Belnap’s [46] branching space-time theory (BST) is
a fusion of the Theory of Relativity and partial determinism. As the relativity principle
entails eternalism where the past, the present and the future exist (§5.6), BST is the
fusion of eternalism and partial determinism.114 Let {[p→]} contain all chains of TSUs
which are realizable in the future from the aspect of p. If BST is true, the reality which
is the branching space-time B can be defined as {[−∞ →]} which is the limit115 of the
sequence of collections of timelines {[p →]}, {[p − 1 →]}, {[p − 2 →]}, {[p − 3 →]}, . . .,
or equivalently a collection of point-events in predecessor-successor relations. According
to Belnap (ibid, pp. 386-7) B consists of “those point events that either are now future
possibilities or were future possibilities” and related by a causal order, which is equivalent
to the definition of B as {[p→]}. Although Belnap does not intend BST primarily as a
foundation of diachronic modalities, he is constantly talking about possibilities, and the
causal succession relation is their ontological ground.
As Belnap does not couple eternalism with an objectively existing present, all point-
events in B are tenselessly real. BST is interpreted to be a version of naturalism. There
are various timelines in B but they all seem to intersect at least on one point. To
illustrate, given the point event p in Our World,116 suppose that there are two possible
futures, p + 1I and p + 1II , which are thus both parts of B. These have a common
predecessor p and may also have a common future successor p+ n, and if so both p+1I
and p + 1II would belong to the history of p + n. Belnap (ibid, p. 392) makes it clear
that events have many possible histories which are all parts of B. This allows that all
timelines/worlds that branched in the past will eventually intersect. In any case, all parts
of B can be interpreted to be causally connected at least by a common predecessor point
event. This means that B is compatible with naturalism as the doctrine that all parts
114Belnap does not explicitly mention the commitment to eternalism, but as this follows from the
relativity principle, there are no other alternatives.
115Belnap leaves open whether the Universe came into existence out of nothing and whether it will end
or whether the past is infinite and the future potentially infinite, and so it is open whether −∞ denotes
finite or infinite past.
116Our World is “the set of point events that are ‘in suitable external relations’ to us” (Belnap [46, p.
387]).
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of the Universe (B) are directly or indirectly causally connected and all that ever exists
is a part of the Universe (B). However, BST contradicts EUO’s Universe as a single
and non-branching chain of causally connected TSUs. It also contradicts directly the
causality axiom which states that the present TSU is all that exists and all its parts are
causally connected at the present time. For, if there are several branches in B, then all
that exists currently is not currently causally connected; on the other hand, the meaning
of ‘exists currently in another branch’ is ambiguous.
For comparison to BST, Rietdijk [334] shows that the relativity principle implies eternal-
ism, i.e., that events at different times are co-real, but concludes that this shows that the
Universe is totally deterministic: if a seemingly future event is co-real with a seemingly
present event, then the seeming present cannot affect the seeming future event which
has already happened, and this can be made intelligible by supposing total determinism.
Rietdijk does not note that total determinism is required as the explanation only if you
reject versions of branching space-time; if you accept these, then eternalism can be cou-
pled with partial determinism, resulting into BST or something like it. The rejection of
branching space-time seems to be a hidden premise is Rietdijk’s reasoning, for otherwise
he could have come up with the following conclusion chain of reasoning.
(a) The relativity principle implies eternalism.
(b) Eternalism + partial determinism entails a branching space-time.
(c) Eternalism + total determinism does not entail a branching space-time.
(d) The relativity principle implies either total determinism or a branching space-time.
7.5 Lewis, Armstrong and Possible Worlds Semantics
In possible worlds semantics the modality of a proposition is defined in terms of the
collection of all possible worlds:
a possible proposition is true at least in one world.
a necessary proposition is true in all worlds.
an impossible proposition is false in every world.
a contingent proposition is true in one or more worlds but not in all worlds.
In Kripke’s [207, 208] version the collection of possible worlds itself is undefined and it
is not given explicitly a metaphysical status. Kripke [208, p. 68-9] states that a “normal
model structure . . . is an ordered triple (G,K,R)” where K is an arbitrary non-empty set
of possible worlds, G ∈ K is the real world, and R is a reflexive relation defined on K.
Kripke stays on the formal level, without grounding his semantics. Consider one way
of grounding Kripke’s semantics on EUO. The collection of possible worlds K is defined
as {α → τ} where α is the aspect time and τ is the target time, i.e., ‘the collection of
possible worlds’ is transformed into a collection of collections of possible temporal stages
of the Universe (TSUs) where the contents of each collection is determined by the given
values of α and τ and their relation to the present. The real world G may be defined
either as the present TSU or as the Universe, where in presentism only the present TSU
exists, the past TSUs did exist, and the future TSUs become into existence one at a
time. The relation R is defined as the arrow in {α → τ} and its meaning depends on
the temporal ordering of α, τ and the present, as classified in §7.1.
Hintikka [168, 169] developed semantics for modal logic based on model sets. According
to Sowa [369, p. 324] “Hintikka’s model sets could be considered descriptions of Kripke’s
worlds.” Accordingly, a model set can be considered as a collection of all true propositions
about a possible world. When grounded on EUO, the propositions in Hintikka’s model
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sets can be defined as true propositions about the elements of {α→ τ}. The model set
which describes e.g. the present TSU contains propositions such as ‘there are human
beings living on Earth.’
temporal mappings and accuracy. Consider assessments where the goal is to guess
correctly from the aspect of the present time p what will happen in the future time f .
In such considerations the goal is to guess correctly what is the content of the collection
{p→ f} which contains all TSUs that are realizable at the future time f from the aspect
of the present p. This testifies very clearly that temporal mappings are indispensable:
without these a theory of possibility is practically inapplicable in the focal contexts.
Further, if the ontology with which the temporal mappings are coupled is excessive, the
resulting theory of possibility may be inaccurate. To illustrate, consider the difference of
the collection {p→ f} in EUO, and the collection of all logically possible TSUs LP, which
contains all non-contradictory TSUs. Anything over and above {p→ f} is unrealizable
at f from the aspect of p, and therefore excessive when all that is needed is {p → f}.
The excessive subset of LP may be called the collection of merely logically possible TSUs
with respect to {p → f} (ML). ML contains all elements of LP which are not elements
of {p → f}: ML=LP\{p → f}. All elements of ML are unrealizable at f from the
aspect of p and therefore excessive. The left side of figure 23 depicts the true and the
false propositions which are stated at p and targeted at f . {p → f} on the right side
is the truthmaker of the true propositions and the falsemaker of the false propositions.
The correspondence arrow denotes correspondence of the true propositions. The idea
Figure 23: modal propositions where the aspect time is p and the target time is f .
that ML could function as a truthmaker of propositions which are targeted at f confuses
thinking. For, if the elements of ML were truthmakers, these should be realizable at f
from the aspect of p. As every realizable TSU is already an element of {p → f}, the
proponent of ML should replace naturalism e.g. by transcendism and maintain that in
addition to the elements of {p→ f}, there are transcendent possible TSUs.
This is the reason why Lewis’ modal realism was rejected in §4.9: because it is excessive
and inaccurate if applied the ground. Lewis [221, pp. 84, 88] makes it clear that his
intention is to give ontological foundations for modal notions such as that the actual
world could have been differently and he maintains that “Realism about possible worlds
is an attempt, the only successful I know of, to systematize these modal opinions.”
It has been widely noted that Lewis’ ground for possible worlds semantics is outright
uneconomical with respect to all naturalist alternatives: “the notion of ‘all the possible
worlds’ is not the one we need in order to give an account of the physical possibilities
of systems” (Armstrong [21, p. 68]); “Truth is supposed to be a relationship between a
statement and the real world, not an infinite family of fictitious worlds” (Sowa [371]). As
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logical possibility or modal realism is helplessly uneconomical and inaccurate in practical
predictions or epistemic considerations, and as EUO is essentially more accurate, the
principle of economy favours it in this sense, and thus LP and any version of transcendism
such as modal realism can be rejected as the ontological foundation of a theory that is
capable of handling temporally quantified modal propositions. On the other hand, the
applicable ingredients of LP are incorporated in the unified theory in the sense that
all elements of {p → f} are non-contradictory, which is guaranteed by the law of non-
contradiction.
armstrong’s combinatorial theory of possibility. Armstrong [18, p. 3] ex-
plicitly commits to eternalism and naturalism, and in his version a ‘possible world’ is a
complete eternalist spatio-temporal system. He rejects non-naturalist theories of possi-
bility, Leibnizian and Lewisian (ibid, ch. 2) and notes (ibid, ch. 3) that the roots of his
theory are in Wittgenstein’s Tractatus 3.4, and that he aims to complement Skyrms’ [365]
Tractarian Nominalism. Armstrong (ibid, p. 2) defines modalities in terms of possible
worlds:
possibility: the actual world is a possible world; the other possible worlds, the merely
possible worlds, are ways that the actual world might have been.
necessity: a necessary truth is true in all possible worlds.
impossibility: a necessary falsity is false in all possible worlds.
contingency: a contingent truth is true in the actual world but false in some possible
world; a contingent falsity is false in the actual world but true in some possible world.
In Armstrong’s combinatorial theory of possibility, those possible worlds that are not
the actual world, are conjunctions, contractions, transformations or recombinations of
the elements of the actual world (ibid, pp. 47-9). Lycan [234, p. 4] characterises the
other possible worlds as “combinatorial rearrangements of whatever are in fact the basic
elements of our actual world.” Again, Armstrong [27, p. 187] remains strictly in the
domain of naturalism: “The actual world, and it alone, is genuinely a world. The
possible is determined by the actual, and so, saving recombination, cannot outrun the
actual.” You may thus take anything that exists in the actual world —past, present,
future— and multiply it, cut it in two halves or basically transform it in any way that
is not contradictory nor does not violate the laws of nature, and you have a possible
world. Armstrong constrains the collection of all combinatorially possible particulars by
discluding particulars whose realization would directly violate the laws of nature:
I like to focus on the difference between the sphere of gold that is a mile in diameter and a
sphere of uranium of the same diameter. It is unlikely that the former will ever exist, but
there seems no nomic impossibility involved. The laws of nature, if we know them, tell us
that the second sphere is nomically impossible, or (if all fundamental laws are probabilistic
only) near enough to nomically impossible. Armstrong [24, p. 174]
The possibility aspect of the unified theory was originally formulated by incorporat-
ing presentism and temporality in Armstrong’s combinatorialism. However, once Arm-
strong’s eternalism is changed into presentism, the theory changes essentially, and once
temporality is added, the relevant sense of combinatorialism follows as a side product: all
elements of {p→ f} —where p is the present and f is in the future— are automatically
combinatorial rearrangements of p; compatibility with the laws of nature is guaranteed
as whatever that is realizable after p is automatically compatible with the laws of na-
ture that hold in the TSUs in the sequence from p to f . Armstrong’s combinatorial
theory was not designed to function with specific temporal mappings. Therefore, it is
a matter of guessing what he would have answered if he were presented the question of
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what determines the contents of {p → f}. Armstrong [18] talks about causality and
causation but does not apply causality as the ground of possibilities. All Armstrong’s
theory of possibility says about the contents of {p→ f} is that one of these is a temporal
part of the actual world. Armstrong [18, p. 109] accepts temporal parts and maintains
that their acceptance is natural for a combinatorialist. However, he does not entertain
possible temporal parts in any way. Perhaps the merely possible temporal parts would
be recombinations of the actual temporal parts? Again, this is a matter of guessing, but
even one additional recombination in {p→ f} would make the resulting theory inaccu-
rate and uneconomical, for all these are unrealizable. The more extensively the temporal
mappings are brought along, the more Armstrong’s combinatorial theory would be mov-
ing towards one of the temporally quantified theories where past, present and future
exist (§7.4).
Armstrong came half way through: he rejected Lewis’ transcendism but did not incor-
porate temporal mappings. He was stuck to the discussion of possibility that circulated
around possible worlds, as it still does, and only aimed to give a naturalist founda-
tion for possible worlds. He was also affected by the relativistic-eternalist conception of
time, that fits together with whole possible worlds with past, present and future existing
tenselessly.
7.6 Fictionalist, Epistemic and Logical Considerations
It is shown that EUO is a sufficient background for whatever epistemic, fictionalist and
logical considerations. Showing this is another way of naturalising Platonism (§4.9). The
naturalisation can be done in two steps.
1. Let the collection P contain all particulars which are ever realized or realizable. P
contains all temporal stages of the Universe (TSUs) which have been realized plus their
proper parts, and all TSUs which have ever been realizable and all their proper parts.
2. Some elements of P have mental properties (§4.12). Let the set A contain all those
particulars whose mental properties include a consciously experienced thought that is
realized in the mind of a human being, where A ⊂ P holds.
Three equivalent examples are given of how A suffices. In all examples the basic idea is
that as A contains all realizable thoughts, everything that is in principle conceivable is in
A, and as A is in P , EUO is a sufficient ontological background for whatever epistemic,
fictionalist and logical considerations. In other words, conceivability is defined first in
terms of EUO, and then used.117
quantifying over conceivable logical possibilities. When possibility is an-
alyzed in terms of EUO, we are no longer talking about the collection of all logically
possible worlds as if these were modal realist worlds, but we are instead talking about
its naturalised ‘mental’ version which is in A. A is sufficient for logical contemplations
because it is sufficient for quantifying over those logical possibilities or over those ele-
ments of the Platonic heaven which are in principle ever needed. All ideas that will ever
117The given explication of conceivability seems to be needed. Fiocco [143, p. 388] notes that there
is “no standard explication of conceivability.” That conceivability is reduced to physical possibility is
independent of the question of whether conceivability entails physical possibility in any other way: that
x is conceivable does not have to entail that x is realizable in any other way. Chalmers [81] and Yablo
[422] ask whether conceivability entails metaphysical possibility, but do not reduce conceivability to
metaphysical possibility, which is in EUO physical possibility. Tidman [398] concludes that conceivability
equals to what can be imagined, and that conceivability does not entail possibility, but does not reduce
conceivability to physical possibility.
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be thought of are in A. Once you conceive x, it is known that x is and has always been
in A: if it is even possible to ever think about something, it is in A. If you consider
adding something in A, it was already included before the addition: if you actually add
something then you must think about what you add, and whatever thinkable is in A.
A resembles the Library of Babel (Borges [54]) and in some respects also Ehrlich’s [122]
absolute arithmetic continuum.
epistemic considerations. To illustrate what it means that A is sufficient for epis-
temic considerations, suppose that all we know is that either particular a or b or c was
realized in the past at time t in location l. In EUO exactly one of these was actually real-
ized, but we do not know just which one. Therefore, we must quantify over the collection
(a, b, c). As all these epistemic possibilities are conceivable, they are in A. Armstrong’s
combinatorial theory of possibility (§7.5) finds application with epistemic possibilities in
the sense that any intelligible a, b, c are combinatorially possible particulars, whereas it
cannot always be guaranteed that all of them were possible in terms of the unified theory
e.g. from the aspect of one day before t. The order is this: economy; EUO; possibility
in terms of EUO; conceivability in terms of possibility; combinatorialism as the overall
scheme of practical border conditions of epistemic guesses about what was, is, or will be
realizable.
fictions. Armstrong [18, pp. 49-50] calls for “an Actualist, one-world, account of
fiction, and one that will accept both the merely possible and the impossible as fictions. I
do not know in detail what account to give, but it would be truly surprising if no satisfying
account were available.” The unified theory of possibility qualifies as a naturalist account
of fictions. Consider realizable fictions-as-fictions (FAFs). A realized FAF is an idea
which is realized in the mind of a human being, such as a mental representation of the
fictional world of Sherlock Holmes. As all FAFs are in A, it is sufficient for quantifying
over all realizable FAFs. A includes what Armstrong calls the merely possible as well as
the impossible fictions. By ‘impossible fiction’ Armstrong means a FAF which does not
correspond to any combinatorially possible world. By ‘merely possible fiction’ he means
a fiction which corresponds to a combinatorially possible world but does not correspond
to anything which is realized in the actual past, present or future. In sum, as all fictions
are thoughts and all realizable thoughts are in A, EUO is a sufficient ontological base
for realizable fictions.
summary. If one wishes to apply something beyond A as the ontological base for fictions,
logical possibilities, epistemic possibilities, any ideas, creative constructions, intentions
to behave and the contents of the Platonic heaven, then one actually wishes quantify over
something that is never in fact thought of and is never even in fact thinkable, because
everything that is in principle thinkable has been a possibility at some time and all those
possibilities are in A.
7.7 Summary
The unified theory was complemented by defining modalities in terms of EUO, by ground-
ing them on the causal structure of the Universe. It was shown how the truthmaker TSUs
of modal propositions can be deduced, how counterfactuals and conditionals are handled
in the unified theory, how the concept of probability can be defined in terms of EUO, pace
McCall, and how the unified theory of possibility can be seen as a grounding of possible
worlds semantics or ‘possible TSUs semantics’ on EUO. It was shown how the dichotomy
of total and partial determinism fits in EUO and how the selection between these affects
the resulting theory of possibility; e.g. future contingents follow from coupling EUO with
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partial determinism. It was shown that EUO is a sufficient background for epistemic,
fictionalist and logical considerations. Applicable ingredients of plain logical possibility
are incorporated in the sense that the law of non-contradiction implies that a possibility
is non-contradictory and in the sense that we can quantify over fictions and conceivable
logical possibilities in the context of the unified theory. The unified theory incorporates
the grounding of modalities on the causal structure of the Universe from the versions
of Briggs-Forbes, McCall and Belnap, but replaces their past and future existents by
present and past possibilities and by what has been realized. Applicable ingredients of
Armstrong-Skyrms combinatorialism are incorporated in the sense that all possible TSUs
are recombinations of some TSU that has been realized, and combinatorialism can be
applied also in epistemic considerations. These remarks underline that we are dealing
with a genuinely unified theory of modalities
The development of theories of modality in the 20th century fits in the overall devel-
opment of analytical philosophy. (i) Metaphysics was rejected by the positivists in the
1920’s and possibility was handled formally without ontological foundations e.g. by
Kripke’s possible worlds semantics and Hintikka’s model sets in the 50’s and 60’s. (ii)
Positivism was rejected by the 60’s, and metaphysics made a comeback in the 60’s and
70’s. (iii) Lewis saw in the 70’s that possibility requires a metaphysical foundation; he
gave it by grounding possible worlds on modal realism, but modal realism is extremely
uneconomical, and thus belongs to the wave of excessive metaphysics that came after
positivism. (iv) Philosophers started reacting to the excessive metaphysics. D.M. Arm-
strong rejected modal realism and naturalised possibility in the 80’s, but came only half
way through because he was still talking about full worlds without temporal mappings.
(v) Since the 90’s, suggestions have been given of how the causal structure of the Universe
functions as a foundation for possibility, and this can be seen as the process of getting
back down to diachronic possibility which is most directly needed in the focal contexts.
While the ontologies of Briggs and Forbes, McCall and Belnap are uneconomical with
respect to presentism but function equally accurately as foundations of possibility, modal
realism or logical possibility as the foundation of possibility is also helplessly inaccurate
when dealing with practical predictions. The multiplicity of alternative theories of tem-
poral existence shows how strongly philosophers have been influenced by the Theory of
Relativity which entails eternalism. This reminds of the importance of having a genuine
alternative: the unified theory naturalises possibility in terms of unambiguous and eco-
nomical conceptions of temporal existence and causality, whose empirical foundation is
the Dynamic Universe model.
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8 Definition: Colour
This section complements the unified theory by the concepts perception, colour perception
and interrelated concepts which together yield a unified colour theory. The unified colour
theory is basically the same theory as David Rosenthal’s [338, 339] double-property theory
and David Armstrong’s [20] colour realism.
8.1 Colour Perception, Colour Families, Colour Science
perception. Perception is the process where a conscious agent interacts directly or in-
directly with a mind-independent object in an environment, where the interaction yields
in the agent a sensation of the object, and where the sensation is in correspondence
with the object. Armstrong [28, p. 4] calls this immediate perception. This is the basic
setting under which it is legitimate to say that “sensation is surely not the sensation of
itself, but there is something beyond the sensation, which must be prior to the sensa-
tion” (Aristotle Metaphysics, 1010b35-37), and that “I do not think that we experience
any qualities that are qualities of the brain” (Armstrong [22, p. 188]). The cognitive
machinery of the perceiving agent, the mind-independent object which is perceived by
the agent with material senses and the environment of perception are structural objects,
whose temporal parts are structural particulars.
colour perception and colour families. When perception yields a colour sen-
sation in the perceiving agent, the following chain of events takes place. A mind-
independent structural colour object interacts with the environment. As a result of the
interaction, the object reflects or emits or transmits photons with a certain wavelength-
intensity combination. Interaction with light of the environment and the resulting reflec-
tion is by far the most common case, but also e.g. heat radiation which causes emission
of light is a form of interaction. The reflected/emitted/transmitted light with a cer-
tain wavelength-intensity combination reaches the cognitive machinery of the perceiving
agent and interacts with it, resulting in a colour sensation in the perceiving agent. The
colour sensation is in correspondence with the perceived mind-independent object.
Elements of colour families (1-3) participate in the process of colour perception: (1)
Mind-independent colour objects such as those which reside in surfaces of solid objects;
these are typically capable of interacting with and reflecting visible light. (2) Colour
sensations of human agents; also the sensations of other animals and insects could be
counted in. (3) Lights in the environment, i.e., different wavelength-intensity combina-
tions of photons; this includes lights which interact with colour objects and lights that
are reflected/emitted/transmitted by the colour objects. Although light in the environ-
ment is mind-independent, the term ‘mind-independent colour object’ denotes only the
elements of (1) in the following.
roots of the unified colour theory. The unified colour theory is oriented by
ontological realism and it is basically the same theory as David Rosenthal’s [338, 339]
double-property theory of colour and David Armstrong’s [20] colour realism, with slightly
different naming conventions. All three versions are grounded on ontological realism and
all deal with the same colour families, although all of the three families are not specifically
called colour families by Armstrong nor Rosenthal. Armstrong [20, p. 270] distinguished
two colour families: “I hold that to have a red sensation is to acquire the information
(the term is meant to cover misinformation) that there is something red at some more or
less specific place in the perceiver’s environment.” While Armstrong did not especially
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concentrate on the difference of families (1) and (2), Rosenthal118 especially unified colour
physicalism where (1) is the only colour family, and color subjectivism or eliminativism
where (2) is the only colour family:
It could be that there are two families of color properties, one a family of mental qualities
of visual sensations and the other a family of visible properties of physical objects and
processes. Color subjectivism and color physicalism, on this third alternative, are both
partly correct, since color properties of both kinds exist. The mistake subjectivism and
physicalism both make is to assume that colors are exclusively of one kind, either mental
or physical but not both. Rosenthal [339, p. 90]
the goal of colour science. The ideal goal of colour science is to fully discover
the contents of the three colour families and their relations. The actual goal of colour
science is to get as close to the ideal goal as possible. Relations of the colour families (and
colour predicates) are exemplified in terms of functions F1 and F2. Below, reflection is
understood to include emission and transmission and all definitions are supposed to be
ideally accurate and complete.
F1: (environment e, object o, reflection r).
Given any two values, the function outputs the third. Given definitions of environment
e and object o as inputs, F1 outputs the definition of the light r that o would reflect in e;
given definitions of e and r as inputs, F1 outputs definitions of all epistemically possible
objects which would reflect r in e; given definitions of r and o as inputs, F1 outputs
definitions of all epistemically possible environments where o would reflect r. Consider
a function which takes the perceiving agent along.
F2: (agent a, reflection r, colour predicate p).
It is supposed that all agents speak a common translatable language and are average in
all ways, for otherwise the colour predicates would be meaningless. The colour object
and the environment are not written out in the function, although light always comes
from some source in some environment. The colour sensation of agent a is not written
out, but it is included as a names the sensation by the colour predicate p. Given a and r
as inputs, F2 outputs the colour predicate p by which a would name the sensation that
results when r interacts with the cognitive machinery of a. Given a and p as inputs,
F2 outputs definitions of all epistemically possible lights which would cause sensations
in a which a would name with the predicate p. Given p and r as inputs, F2 outputs
the definitions of all epistemically possible human agents which are such that when
interacting with r, they would name the resulting sensation with the colour predicate p.
Various ideal functions can be entertained whose inputs are combinations of agent, re-
flection, colour predicate, environment and colour object. This shows that the colour
families of the unified theory are indispensable in defining the goal of colour science.
8.2 Experience of Similarity
One of the central tasks of a colour theory is to give a plausible explanation of the
experienced similarity of the colours of the perceived objects. It is shown how the
general case and some special cases fit in the framework of the unified theory.
the general case. When mind-independent objects x and y seem to have a similar
colour to the perceiving human agent A in environment e, the agent A gets sensation s1
118Although Rosenthal uses the term ‘double-property theory’ and does not call family (3) a colour
family, the elements of family (3) naturally play a role in his analysis.
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of x and sensation s2 of y, where A experiences s1 and s2 as similar in colour. What
explains the experience of similarity? In the unified theory, x and y are such objects
that they reflect (or emit or transmit) such wavelength-intensity combinations of light
in environment e, that when these combinations of light interact with the cognitive
machinery of A, this results in sensations s1 and s2, which are such that A experiences
them as similar. But this does not imply that x and y are identical objects nor that they
resemble closely; this does not exclude that x and y resemble closely either. Both cases
and everything in between is compatible with the unified theory.
experienced similarity of similar objects. Why does a vast majority of people
call the leaves of ground plants with the colour predicate ‘green’? The general expla-
nation is that the leaves are such objects that they reflect such wavelength-intensity
combinations of light in typical daylight environments, that when these combinations of
light interact with the cognitive machineries of the vast majority of people, this results
in certain stable colour sensations in the people. Because of the colour constancy, it has
become practical to denote leaves with some fixed colour predicate which happens to be
‘green’ in English.
The reason why people typically experience leaves as green is found from the light they
reflect and the structure of human cognitive machinery. The reason why they reflect such
light is found from their structures which happen to resemble clearly. The spectrum of
light that is visible to average humans is the range between about 390-700 manometers,
and daylight is a combination of lights of different wavelengths in that range, plus other
wavelengths. Leaves of ground plants absorb light very efficiently in the ranges [390 500]
and [600 700], but absorb very little light in the range [500 600]. The leaves reflect most
of the light in the range [500 600] (Misra et al. [274]). When light in the range [500
600] interacts with the cognitive machinery of an average human agent, the agent gets a
sensation of green.
Why is the effective white light excitation/absorption spectrum of the leaves of ground
plants the union of [390 500] and [600 700]? The reason is found from chlorophyll a and
b molecules in the leaves. A chlorophyll (a or b) molecule absorbs light very efficiently in
the ranges [390 500] and [600 700], but absorbs very little light in the range [500 600]. The
molecule uses the absorbed light for three purposes: to provide energy for photosynthesis,
to produce heat and to emit light. The emitted light is red but chlorophyll emits so
little red light that it is not typically seen, except in a special setting. The molecule
reflects most of the light in the range [500 600]. Chlorophyll thus explains the absorption
spectrum of the leaves of ground plants.
Why is the effective white light absorption spectrum of a chlorophyll molecule the union
of [390 500] and [600 700], i.e., what is it in the structure of the molecule that determines
the effective spectrum? It suffices to say that when it is known that an object absorbs
light very efficiently in a certain range and reflects most of the light in another range, then
it is know that chemical bonds in a certain range are present in the object; the account
of just which bonds reflect which wavelength-intensity combinations is the concern of
chemistry.
metamers: experienced similarity of heterogeneous objects. Any two differ-
ent wavelength-intensity combinations w and v which yield colour sensations in agent A
that A experiences as identical, are metamers with respect to A. The concept ‘metamer’
has thus been defined in terms of the unified theory: in terms of the family of colour
sensations of the perceiving agents, and the family of lights with which the agents in-
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teract.119 Ideally, metamers-to-A can be deduced from the complete knowledge of the
structure of A, for based on this knowledge it can be deduced what kinds of stimuli
cause what kinds of sensations in A. Suppose that all those metamers are known which
result in certain sensations of red in A, which A experiences as identical sensations of
red. When A gets such a sensation in environment e by perceiving the mind-independent
object o, it is known that the sensation was due to some of these metamers. Therefore,
it is known that o reflects one of these metamers in e. Therefore, the structure of o can
be deduced to be in the range of all epistemically possible objects which reflect one of
these metamers in e. The chain from behaviour to structure is discussed further in §8.3.
one-over-many properties? It has been concluded that a human agent can expe-
rience homogeneous as well as heterogeneous objects as similar in colour. Therefore, it
can be supposed that objects which seem to be similar in colour resemble closely some-
times but not always. Accordingly, the translation of ‘not always’ into ‘never’ would be
over-propagation; the translation of ‘sometimes’ into ‘always’ would be over-propagation
in the opposite direction. Hendel [167, p. 123, 125] seems to over-propagate ‘not always’
into ‘never’ by saying “What underlies the finding of such resemblance is the assimilative
tendency of the mind itself, and nothing in the perceived things.” Likewise, according to
Campbell [74, p. 256], “It seems that we shall not be able to escape the conclusion that
the unity of specific colours. . .must lie in the observer’s response to the physical facts,
rather than in those facts themselves.” When the experienced unity lies in observer’s
response to physical facts and not in the facts themselves, we are dealing with objects
whose colour properties do not resemble in a relevant sense, but the objects are still
experienced to have a similar colour. It would be over-propagation to suppose that the
colour properties never resemble closely.
Consider two arbitrary objects which are experienced to have the identical shade of red.
There are various alternatives: the objects instantiate the identical colour property; they
instantiate a very similar colour property; they instantiate a somewhat similar colour
property; they instantiate a very different colour property. Therefore, red is certainly
not a one-over-many property, but a one-over-many range of properties. The following
remarks are compatible with this notion and thus compatible with the unified theory:
“there need be no one property that all red things share. . . . Nothing, therefore, in our
learning of the use of the predicate ‘red’ requires it to correspond to any one property
of the things we apply it to” (Mellor [265, pp. 110-2]); “there need not be anything that
distinct red things “really” have in common” (Maurin [253, p. 46]). The notion that
red is not a single property but a range of properties is thus fully compatible with the
unified theory.
8.3 From Behaviour to Structure
The strength of the chain from the knowledge of the colour behaviour of an object to
the knowledge of the structure of the object is as strong as the contemporary scientific
knowledge. The colour behaviour of an object is handled in terms of its colour profile,
and the chain from a partial detection of a colour profile into the knowledge of a range
of objects is discussed.
119For comparison, Byrne and Hilbert [71, p. 10] define metamers without a direct reference to the
perceiving agent: “objects with quite different reflectances can match in color under a given illuminant.
Two such objects are a metameric pair with respect to that illuminant.”
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colour profiles.120 Talking about the colour profile Co of the colour object o is a way
of talking about the colour behaviour of o. The ideally complete definition of Co can be
thought to be syntactically a list of all (environment, reflection-emission-transmission)
pairs of o. Given an arbitrary environment e, the ideal definition of Co is thought to
contain the information of what kind of light o would reflect-emit-transmit in e. Object
o determines Co, i.e., the structure of an object together with its environment determines
its behaviour. While o is literally a certain kind of an object with a certain kind of a
structure, o does not literally have a colour profile. Therefore, the unified theory should
not be confused with a relational nor a dispositional theory (§8.5).
from behaviour to structure. Reflection-emission-transmission measurements are
committed to o in different environments. This yields partial knowledge of the colour
profile Co of o. The partial knowledge of Co in turn gives knowledge of the range of
all those epistemically possible particulars [O] which match the measured portion of
Co. Typically, the better Co is known the narrower is [O]. As the partial knowledge
of Co gives merely a range of epistemically possible objects [O], the knowledge of [O] is
partially or totally disjunctive: it is known that o is either the structure a1 or a2 or . . . or
an. If it can be deduced that all these epistemic possibilities share a common part, then
the knowledge is partially disjunctive; if even this cannot be deduced, the knowledge is
totally disjunctive.
Even human perception with bare eye manages to detect colour profiles partially; al-
though the resulting knowledge of the structure of the perceived object is highly dis-
junctive, it is still better than nothing. According to Hall [162, p. 126] “merely from
perceiving something to be red, you cannot say anything about its physical constitution.”
Hall is correct in the sense that colour detection with bare eye only manages to yield a
highly heterogeneous range of epistemically possible objects. But the range of all objects
which an average human being experiences as red in typical daylight conditions is much
narrower than the range of all objects, i.e., based on the perception of red in typical
daylight conditions you can say at least something disjunctive about the constitution of
the perceived object.
Consider a strategy of trying to break the chain from perception to structure: (i) suppose
that nature is qualitatively infinite; (ii) therefore perception only manages to identify an
infinite range of different objects; (iii) as the identification of an infinitely heterogeneous
range amounts to nothing, perceptions give no information about the perceived objects.
The argument builds on an unnecessarily heavy axiom (qualitative infinity), and there-
fore has no force: in economical unification an empirically sufficient metaphysical view
cannot be replaced by a more complex metaphysical view that is in no ways better.
Moreover, the unified theory is compatible with nature being qualitatively infinite, and
even if nature were qualitatively infinite, scientists have provably managed to successfully
connect partial colour profiles to ranges of structures in a way that these connections are
applicable. All that scientists can do in any case is to establish firmer and firmer links
between colour profiles and ranges of structures, and contemplations about qualitative
infinity have no effect on this process.
120The colour profile of an object is very close to what Rosenthal [339, p. 86] calls reflectance profile
of an object; the only difference is that a colour profile includes emission and transmission in addition
to reflection.
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8.4 Impossible Colours
Certain objects which consist of combinations of mind-independent red and green parts
cannot yield certain red-green colour sensations in human agents in typical daylight
conditions; certain objects which consist of combinations of mind-independent yellow
and blue parts cannot yield certain yellow-blue colour sensations. In human cognitive
machinery, red light cancels the effects of green light, and yellow light cancels the effects
of blue light: therefore we cannot experience certain red and green lights coming from
the same source as red-green in typical conditions, and we cannot experience certain
yellow and blue lights coming from the same source as yellow-blue in typical conditions.
The yellow-blue and red-green colours of such objects are called impossible colours.
Crane and Piantanida [94] showed that in certain laboratory settings, the test agents
after all did experience certain combinations of red and green when they were perceiving
a certain combination of red and green bars for several seconds. Altogether three different
groups of red-green sensations were reported as a result of perceiving one combination
of red and green bars. What does this show? It shows that a human agent in a certain
laboratory setting gets one or another (typically in one of three groups) colour sensation
when being stimulated in a certain way for a certain period of time. Because of this
discovery, we can now predict that when a human agent gets a colour sensation which
is very similar to the sensations that the test agents got in Crane and Piantanida’s test
setting, the agent is probably plugged into a similar laboratory setting. Arstila maintains
that the test undermines colour realism:
[I]f we are able to experience them, then they have to be consequences of those processes
that take place after retinocortical processes; in other words, they are consequences of
corticocortinal processes, as claimed by Crane and Piantanida and do not represent the
properties of extramental objects. Thus it has been argued that these new colors cannot be
reduced to the properties of physical objects; they do not have physical counterparts. Due
to this problem, color realism cannot differentiate impossible colors from other colors; and
without such an account it cannot explain our colour experiences. However, as opponent
processes prevent it, color realism cannot provide the required account. Accordingly, all
versions of color realism are false. Arstila [30, p. 102-3]
Why should the red-green sensations not represent extramental (mind-independent) ob-
jects? When a human agent is stimulated by certain kind of light in the test setting
for several seconds, the perception yields —by both retinocortical and corticocortinal
processes— some red-green sensation. The sensation corresponds to the light source,
i.e., it is true that the light source sends light that yields the red-green sensation. The
light source is a mind-independent physical object, and impossible colours can be dif-
ferentiated from other colours in terms of the unified theory. In typical environments
certain mind-independent x-y combinations cannot yield x-y sensations; an x-y sensa-
tion is called an impossible colour because of this reason. In special settings, certain
mind-independent x-y combinations can after all yield certain x-y sensations, i.e., an x-y
sensation is not an impossible colour after all within the special settings; accordingly,
the x-y sensation corresponds to some mind-independent x-y combination. Why should
this be a threat to colour realism?
8.5 The Unified Theory vs. Relationalism and Dispositionalism
Averill [35] and Cohen [89] arrive at relationalism about colour mainly because it resolves
conflicts which follow from interpersonal differences and heterogeneous lightning condi-
tions. Different agents in different environments get different sensations about identical
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or close to identical objects, and therefore the question raises about what is the colour
of such objects: “It is quite common, for example, when one person perceives something
as bluish-green, for the other to perceive it clearly as yellowish-green. How can one
decide which one of them perceives colors truthfully?” (Arstila [30, p. 74]). Cohen [90,
§2.2] comes up with a solution: “There is no independent and well-motivated reason
for thinking that just one of the variants . . . is veridical (at the expense of the others).”
Relationalism is formulated accordingly.
According to Cohen (ibid, §1.3) “The heart of color relationalism is the claim that colors
are relational; in particular, the relationalist claims that they are constituted in terms
of a relation between (inter alia) objects and subjects.” While the unified theory dis-
tinguishes the colour families (1-3) and assigns colour predicates for the elements of all
three families, Cohen’s version of relationalism bunches up all three families and assigns
colour predicates to certain combinations of elements of the families. In relationalism
the sensation s1 of agent a1 in environment e1 about object o is the colour of o for a1
in e1. Likewise, the sensation s2 of agent a2 in environment e2 about object p which is
identical to o is the colour of p for a2 in e2. There are thus no conflicts in relationalism,
but only different agent-environment-sensation pairs. For instance, when one person
perceives an object as bluish-green, the object is bluish-green for that person in that
environment; when another person perceives an identical object as yellowish-green, the
object is yellowish-green for that person in that environment.
The unified theory resolves the conflicts in essentially the same way as relationalism. In
both theories, colour sensations which result from perceiving mind-independent objects
in environments always correspond to the objects: when a human agent experiences a
leave of a tree to be green in daylight conditions, the sensation corresponds to the leave;
when the agent experiences an identical leave to be black in a low light environment,
the sensation corresponds to the leave. How can a green and a black sensation both
correspond to an identical object? The sensation of green corresponds to the leave, as
it is true that there is some object in some location which is such that it causes the
sensation of green in daylight conditions. The sensation of black corresponds to the
leave, as it is true that there is some object in some location which is such that it causes
the sensation of black in dark conditions.
The crucial difference between the unified theory and relationalism is that in the unified
theory the colour families are strictly separated: the sensation s1 of agent a1 in envi-
ronment e1 about object o is simply the sensation that agent a1 in environment e1 gets
about object o. The colour property of o is completely independent of how any agent
experiences it, whereas the colour property of o naturally affects the sensation that an
agent gets from perceiving o in sufficiently illuminated environments. In sum, both the
unified theory and relationalism resolve conflicts that result from interpersonal differ-
ences, but the unified theory sustains the three colour families whereas relationalism
mixes these. The mixing makes things difficult, because in the context of relationalism
we cannot talk about colour properties of objects without the link to one or another
agent.
relational classification of colour objects. The unified theory can be seen
to incorporate the applicable ingredients of relationalism also by means of a relational
classification of mind-independent colour objects. To illustrate, propositions such as
‘blood is red’ and ‘leaves of trees are green in the summer’ are generally considered to
be true because most people in most environments where colour vision works properly
experience the leaves as green and blood as red, and name them with predicates ‘green’
and ‘red,’ respectively. Such common mappings can be used as arbiters: if most people in
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most environments where colour vision works properly would name object o green, then
the proposition that o is green is true; if not, the proposition is false. In this sense, the
proposition that ‘o is green’ is equivalent with the proposition that ‘most of the people
in most of the environments where colour vision works properly would name o green.’
dispositionalism. “Color-Dispositionalism is the view that colors are dispositional
properties: powers to appear in distinctive ways to perceivers (of the right kind), in the
right kind of circumstances; i.e., to cause experiences of an appropriate kind in those
circumstances” (Maund [252]). This definition of dispositionalism which interconnects
the perceiver, the perceived object and the environment, is very close to relationalism.
The unified theory incorporates the fruitful ingredients of relationalism and thus also
of the version of dispositionalism which is very close to relationalism, while sustaining
intrinsic colour properties. Therefore this version of dispositionalism is not investigated
further. Dispositionalism can be formulated also independently of the perceiving agent:
colour properties are powers to reflect certain kind of light in certain environments. In
the unified theory colour objects (with their properties) cause the dispositions (the colour
profiles), but colour properties are not mixed with the dispositions. The explanation of
why an object has a certain colour profile starts from the object, not from the disposition:
“We can explain dispositions by means of their categorical bases [objects and their in-
trinsic properties] but we cannot explain a categorical basis by means of the dispositions
it constitutes” (Vanderbeeken [406, p. 137]).
8.6 Summary
The unified colour theory was built by defining various concepts in terms of EUO, starting
from perception and proceeding into colour perception and the three colour families.
Colours were handled because these are typically discussed in the philosophical literature;
the process of perception could have been complemented as well with the families of
odors, tastes and sounds, i.e., plain perception in the context of EUO unites all these.
The unified theory unifies the central applicable ingredients of colour subjectivism, colour
physicalism, colour relationalism and colour dispositionalism into a coherent whole. The
unified theory captures the primary meanings of colour that are at work in natural science
and human social behaviour. The unified theory has no difficulties in defining the goal
of colour science and the concepts metamers and impossible colours, in classifying colour
objects, in explaining different cases of the experience of similarity and the chain from
behaviour to structure, and in answering the question of whether colour properties are
one-over-many properties. The unified colour theory has all virtues that an economically
unified colour theory should have: it is defined in terms of an economically unified
ontology; it is comprehensive and understandable; it is in line with science about colours
and with increasing knowledge about colours; it handles special cases as well as general
cases; it incorporates fruitful ingredients of competing theories and manages to resolve
arguments targeted against colour realism.
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9 Concluding Remarks
The central argument by which this doctoral dissertation is defended is that economical
unification is a more progressive method of philosophical analysis than plain conceptual
analysis of individual pieces in isolation from one another, in the absence of a unified
ontology, and without having economy or virtuousness as the criterion. Virtuousness as
the criterion yields a virtuous ontology which enables everything built on it to be vir-
tuous. Applying the method is the process of building an economically unified ontology
by having the principle of economy as the criterion, and defining concepts in terms of
the ontology. In this process, the meanings of concepts are disambiguated and genuinely
understood, and interrelations between ontological commitments, between defined con-
cepts, and naturally between ontological commitments and concepts defined in terms
of them, are explicated and understood. Problems are efficiently resolved, stability is
gained, and ontological, terminological and all conceptual redundancy is reduced. The
progressiveness of the method has been testified by showing that it does what is expected
from it, and this was done by actually doing the unification, i.e., by actually applying
the method in practice. Consider the central partially overlapping contributions of this
thesis to the existing body of knowledge.
1. Advancing unification substantially. Methodology, ontology and applications have
been interrelated. Several methodological concepts have been interrelated, several onto-
logical commitments have been interrelated, and several applications have been interre-
lated externally and unified internally in terms of the ontology. Explication of external
interrelations of applications means showing how the theories of truth, possibility and
colour as well as all other concepts defined in terms of EUO work together seamlessly.
2. Systematisation of the method of economical unification and showing how it can be
successfully applied, thus providing a clearly more progressive alternative to plain con-
ceptual analysis. Economical unification merely combines the Aristotelio-Machian goal
of seeking out the simplest first principles and the axiomatic method from mathematics,
thus applying results of philosophy of science in philosophical analysis itself. The method
provides interesting prospects for follow-up research as various concepts are in the need
of disambiguation by unification, and the method is applicable in every field whose goals
and premisses can be explicated.
3. Pointing out the indispensability of the principle of economy in science and in phi-
losophy of science. It was shown how economy can be applied as an evaluation criterion
of theories, and that there are no good alternatives for applying it if the goal is to bring
the progress rate of science into the state of optimal acceleration. It was shown that
economy genuinely unifies the philosophy of science, as it functions as an efficient point
of departure to the challenges of underdetermination, defining of approximate truth,
incorporating the falsifiability criterion in theory evaluation, preventing unconditional
stagnation to paradigms, determining what is the reasonable degree of theory prolifer-
ation, in making paradigm shifts rational, and in determining the meaning of a good
scientific explanation.
4. Applying economy in deriving the axioms of EUO, which was a prerequisite for
showing that the method does what it is supposed to. Showing how everything else can
be built on presentism. Partially popularising the Dynamic Universe model and showing
that the axioms of EUO are compatible with it, thus coming up with a proof that a
somewhat economically unified theory is not just a possibility, but actuality. It is quite
different to say that philosophy and physics are one, than to show what this means by
a comprehensive example. This example also provides an easily accessible introduction
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to some of the top-level interrelations of physics and philosophy, especially temporal
existence and causality. It is not claimed that the fusion of EUO and the Dynamic
Universe model is the only alternative, but the method requires some alternative, and a
fusion with relativistic physics could not be applied because it especially keeps science
disunified, as its conception of time is not understandable and as it does not build on
the conservation law.
6. Complementing previous efforts of internally unifying applications, by formulating
mutually compatible definitions which together do the jobs of e.g. previously compet-
ing theories of truth and previously competing theories of possibility. Complementing
Ingthorsson’s work on the unified theory of truth and defending the resulting theory
extensively. Defending the unified colour theory which was formulated by Rosenthal.
Complementing the work of Belnap, McCall and Briggs and Forbes on the unified the-
ory of possibility, simplifying their foundations by presentism and defending presentism
substantially, also by relying on the Dynamic Universe model. Complementing Mar-
golis and Laurence’ defence of concepts as mental representations by showing that the
naturalist definition of ‘abstract’ reconciles nominalism and Platonism.
The method does what is expected from it, and it should be considered as a valuable
contribution for the sake the progress that comes along with it. Its progressiveness can
be denied only by closing one’s eyes. Hume’s guillotine works: it is certainly not wisdom
to look at the currently disunified science and philosophy and to conclude that this is
how things should be, because this is how things currently are. One should not try to
bury the goal towards ideal science because science is currently not ideal, and one should
not deny that steps towards the ideal state are progressive.
I am willing to complement future versions of this thesis by important aspects of the
investigated topics that were not taken in account, and all suggestions are welcome.
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Appendix A: Mereology
Mereology is a simple formal foundation for transitive part-whole relations. Lesniewski
[220] gave his first axiomatization of mereology in 1916, and coined in the term ‘mere-
ology’ in 1927, which derives from the Greek word for part: me´ros. There are several
versions of mereology and several ways to axiomatize these. See e.g. Sowa [370, pp.
105-8] and Simons [361, pp. 42-3] for comparison. These axioms were formulated by
Aapo Halko. The axioms of mereology define the model {D,}, where the elements
of D will be called aggregates. An aggregate is composed of other aggregates, or if an
aggregate is indivisible, it is an ur-element, where ur is basic in German.
axiom of extensionality: x = y ↔ ∀w(w  x ↔ w  y). x = y iff (if and only if)
every part of x is a part of y, and every part of y is a part of x. Examples: a1 = a1;
a1a2 = a1a2.
axiom of reflexivity: ∀x(x  x). Every aggregate is a part of itself.
axiom of transitivity: ∀x, y, z((x  y ∧ y  z) → x  z). If x is part of y and y is
part of z, then x is a part of z.
axiom of symmetricity: ∀x, y((x  y ∧ y  x) ↔ x = y). x is identical with y iff x
is a part of y and y is a part of x.
definition of ur-element: 6 ∃x(x ≺ y), denoted as ur(y). Ur-element is indivisible
and has no proper parts.
(optional) axiom for discrete mereology: ∀x∃y(ur(y)∧y  x). Every aggregate
is composed of ur-elements only, and can be subdivided down to the point where nothing
is left but a single ur-element. Discrete mereology is a sufficient logical foundation for
part-whole relations in EUO.
definition of proper part: x  y ∧ ¬(y  x), denoted as x ≺ y. Aggregate x is
a proper part of aggregate y iff x is a part of y but y is not a part of x. Examples:
a1 ≺ a1a2; a2 ≺ a1a2; a1a2 ≺ a1a2a3; a2a3 ≺ a1a2a3; a1a3 ≺ a1a2a3. No aggregate is a
proper part of itself. The negation “A is not a proper part of B” is denoted as A 6≺ B,
or as ¬(A ≺ B). Examples: a1 6≺ a1; a1 6≺ a2; a1a2 6≺ a1a2.
definition of overlap: ∃z(z  x ∧ z  y), denoted as ◦(x, y). Aggregate x over-
laps with aggregate y iff x and y have a common part z. For example, ◦(a1a2, a2a3)
and ◦(a1, a1) are true; ◦(a1, a2) and ◦(a1a2, a3a4) are false. Overlap is the contrary of
disjointness: ¬ ◦ (A,B) ↔ A ≀ B; ◦(A,B) ↔ ¬(A ≀ B). That A and B overlap can be
written also as A ◦B.
definition of disjointness: 6 ∃z(z  x∧ z  y), denoted as x ≀ y. Two aggregates are
disjoint iff they have no common parts. Examples: a1 ≀ a2; a1a2 ≀ a3a4.
definition of intersection/meet: ∀w((w  x ∧ w  y) ↔ w  z), denoted as
z = x ⊗ y. Intersection of x and y contains all those, and only those parts of x that
are also parts of y. Examples: a1 ⊗ a1 = a1; a1a2 ⊗ a1 = a1; a1a2 ⊗ a2a3 = a2;
a1a2a3 ⊗ a2a3a4 = a2a3.
definition of union/join: y  z ∧ x  z ∧ ∀w((y  w ∧ x  w)→ z  w), denoted
as z = x⊕ y. The union z of aggregates x and y is an aggregate that contains all parts
of x and all parts of y. Examples: a1 ⊕ a2 = a1a2; a1 ⊕ a1 = a1; a1a2 ⊕ a2a3 = a1a2a3.
definition of difference: ∀x(x  z ↔ (x  y∧x 6 w)), denoted as z = y⊖w. The
difference y⊖w contains every part of y that is not a part of w. Examples: a1a2⊖a2 = a1;
a1 ⊖ a2 = a1; a1a2a3 ⊖ a1a2 = a3.
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Appendix C: Glossary and Abbreviations
absolute simultaneity: an axiom of EUO which states all parts of a TSU exist at
the same time; presupposed by presentism. §§4.1, 5.6
abstract: everything that is abstract is a thought realized in the mind of a human be-
ing. E.g. consciously experienced ideas such as mathematical objects can be classified
as abstract. §4.14
axiom of euo: an unfalsifiable and unverifiable metaphysical commitment which is
derived by the principle economy. §4
causality: an axiom of EUO which states that all parts of the present TSU are causally
connected and realize energy in an absolutely determinate location in an absolutely
determinate way, and that the present TSU is the consequence of the preceding TSU
and the cause of the succeeding TSU. §4.7
cle: see the entry conservation law of energy.
conservation law of energy: an axiom of the Dynamic Universe model which states
that the total energy of every TSU is identical. §5.1
definition: states something about something. A definition which is not an axiom nor
a theorem defines the meaning of a concept in terms of an ontology, but does not state
what exists.
du: see the entry Dynamic Universe. §5
dynamic universe: Suntola’s unified theory whose central postulate is the conservation
law of energy. §5
economy: see the entry principle of economy.
economically unified ontology: a system of interrelated ontological commitments
that is favoured by the principle of economy and which has (in the ideal case) all
theoretical virtues.
economically unified concept/theory: a concept/theory that is defined unam-
biguously in terms of an economically unified ontology and which is applicable in the
contexts of natural science and typical human social behaviour.
euo: the given version of economically unified ontology. EUO incorporates axioms that
are sufficient for concepts that are defined in terms of it in this thesis, such as truth,
possibility and colour, so that the concepts function in the contexts of natural science
and human social behaviour.
exists: it follows from presentism that ‘to exist’ means primarily to be a part of the
present TSU, whereas the past TSUs did exist and the future TSUs become into
existence one at a time. However, the context eventually determines whether ‘exists’
refers to the present, past or future.
fact: a true proposition. As an exception, see §6.8.1.
finiteness: an axiom of EUO which states that all TSUs are spatially finite and consist
of finitely many indivisible and positive interrelated parts. §4.17
flrw: see the entry Friedmann-Lemaˆıtre-Robertson-Walker model. §5
friedmann-lemaˆıtre-robertson-walker model. The contemporary standard model
of cosmology which is based on the General Theory of Relativity. §5
gr: see the entry General Theory of Relativity. §5
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general theory of relativity: the General Theory of Relativity inherits all pos-
tulates of SR and adds the Equivalence principle.
grounding: that a concept is grounded on an ontology means that the concept is
defined in terms of the ontology. ‘Grounding on’ is equivalent with ‘mapped to’.
hypothetical entity: an entity whose existence is predicted by a theory or which is
supposed to exist for some other reason, but which has not been empirically verified
to exist nor falsified to not exist. Hypothetical entities and regularities are commonly
called parameters. §3.3
infinitesimal: a number greater than zero and smaller than any real number.
infinite: see the entry transfinite.
law of non-contradiction: an axiom of EUO which states that one property cannot
belong and not belong to the same particular at the same time in the same respect.
§4.15
mapping: that a concept is mapped to an ontology means that the concept is defined
in terms of the ontology. ‘Grounding on’ is equivalent with ‘mapped to’.
mental realism: an axiom of EUO according to which mental states of human beings
exist. Implicit in ontological realism. §4.12
metaphysics and metaphysical commitment: a metaphysical commitment is an
ontological commitment which is unfalsified and unverified by perception. The term
‘metaphysics’ is also used to denote the branch of philosophy that deals with ontological
commitments: in this sense ‘metaphysics’ and ‘ontology’ both denote the same branch
of philosophy. §1
model: used in this thesis interchangeably with ‘theory.’ E.g. ‘the Dynamic Universe
model’ could be translated as ‘the Dynamic Universe theory,’ and ‘models of cosmol-
ogy’ could be translated as ‘theories of cosmology.’
naturalism: a theorem of EUO according to which all parts of the Universe are directly
or indirectly causally connected, and all that ever exists is a part of the Universe. §4.8.
naturalisation: naturalisation of a concept means that everything transcendent is
shaved away from the concept while sustaining its functionality.
non-positive number: an infinitesimal or a transfinite number or zero.
obc: object-based correspondence theory of truth. §6
object: a part of the Universe; either a particular, a sequence of consecutive particulars
or two or more particulars that are temporally scattered. §4.6
ontological commitment: a belief of a human being about what exists, has existed
or will exist or any combination of these. Ontological commitments of a theory are
the entities which are required to exist in order for the theory to be true. §1
ontological realism: an axiom of EUO which states that a proper part of the
Universe is independent of human minds. §4.12
ontology: a system which consists of interrelated ontological commitments. The term
is also used to denote the branch of philosophy that deals with ontological commit-
ments: in this sense ‘metaphysics’ and ‘ontology’ both denote the same branch of
philosophy. §1
paradigm: a theory which is commonly accepted by a vast majority of the scientific
community during some interval of time. §3.3
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parameter: any extra metaphysics which is coupled with the basic postulates of a
theory in order to make the theory function as intended, such as to match percep-
tions; in models of cosmology parameters are typically called extra regularities and
hypothetical entities. §§3.3,5.7
partial unification: postulate C is found which is common to theories A and B, but
A and B have non-overlapping postulates even after the partial unification. §3.3
particular: an energy-endowed part of the Universe that exists exactly at one time in
one location. §4.6
physicalism: a theorem of EUO according to which all that ever exists is physical, i.e.,
that all that ever exists realizes energy at some absolutely determinate time in some
absolutely determinate location in some absolutely determinate way. §4.13
positive number: a real number greater than zero.
postulate: a basic unverifiable assumption of a theory. E.g. the conservation law of
energy is a postulate of the Dynamic Universe model. All postulates are thus meta-
physical commitments but all metaphysical commitments are not called postulates.
Postulates may be coupled with parameters.
potential infinity: a potentially infinite process never ceases and is never completed,
i.e., one can always take one more, but never infinitely many (Styrman [381]).
presentism: an axiom of EUO which states that only the present TSU exists. §4.1
principle of economy: the evaluation criterion of theories and ontologies according to
which the metaphysically simplest theory that explains perceptions is to be preferred.
§1
proposition: a proposition is a truth-valued thought which is realized in the mind of
a human being in a certain location at a certain time, which refers to something else
than the thought itself, which especially states that the thing to which the proposition
refers exists or more specifically has certain properties in a certain location at a certain
time. §6.1
reduction: theory A is derived from theory B, where A and B are compatible. §3.3
regularity: a supposed uniformity of nature, deduced based on perceptions, i.e., a
metaphysical commitment of a theory. E.g. the elliptical orbits of the planets around
the Sun are regularities of the Sun-centered paradigm. §3.3
rp: see the entry relativistic physics.
relativistic physics: SR, GR and FLRW and all physics based on them.
sr: see the entry the Special Theory of Relativity.
special theory of relativity: Einstein’s 1905 theory whose central postulates are
the Relativity principle, the static velocity of light and Lorentz transformations. §5
standard model of cosmology: the Friedmann-Lemaˆıtre-Robertson-Walker model
(FLRW), which is founded on the Theory of Relativity. §5
temporal stage of the universe (tsu): everything that exists at time t is a part
of TSU t. A TSU is everything that exists at one instant. A TSU can also be called
a temporal part of the Universe.
temporal part: temporally consecutive particulars which constitute an object are
called temporal parts of the object. E.g. a person within a period of one second is an
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object; the person at the first instant of the period is called a temporal part of the
object.
theorem of euo: an implication of one or more axioms of EUO, and therefore an
unverifiable and unfalsifiable metaphysical commitment.
theory: a fusion of some ontology and all concepts defined in terms of the ontology. §1
theory of relativity: denotes the General Theory of Relativity in this thesis. §5
theory shift: theory A is replaced by theory B, where A and B are incompatible. §3.3
thing: an object, a mental property of an object, a concrete property of an object or
any combination of these.
transcendism: any postulate which violates naturalism. §4.9
transfinite: a number greater than any real number. The terms ‘transfinite’ and ‘infi-
nite’ are interrelated as follows. An endless sequence such as 1, 2, 3, . . . or −,−,−, . . .
is an infinite sequence. Any totality that consists of infinitely many parts is transfinite.
For instance, when all elements of an infinite sequence are considered as members of
a set, the set is transfinite. The sequence 1, 2, 3, . . . is infinite; the set {1, 2, 3, . . .} is
transfinite. The transfinite numbers are called cardinal numbers, where the cardinal-
ity of a set is the answer to the question of how many members does the set have.
The length of the sequence 1,2,3 is 3 and the cardinality of the set {1, 2, 3} is 3. The
sequence 1, 2, 3, . . . is infinite, the set {1, 2, 3, . . .} is transfinite, and the cardinality of
{1, 2, 3, . . .} is denoted by the ‘transfinite’ number ∞ or ℵ.
tsu: see the entry temporal stage of the Universe.
universe: the Universe is a single non-branching sequence of consecutive TSUs which
are in a forward directed temporal and causal succession. Only the present TSU exists,
the past TSUs did exist, and the future TSUs become into existence one at a time.
The Universe is thus strictly speaking an idealization —an idea realized in the mind
of a human being— which however is supposed to correspond to what existed, what
exists and what will exist. As in presentism only the present exists, only the idea
about the present corresponds to an existing particular. If a proposition corresponds
to a past object, the object existed in the past. If a proposition corresponds to a future
object, the object will be realized in the future. §6.6
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